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Art is different from science. 
While science requires systematically all characteristic cases, art is satisfied with a lesser number of 
interesting ones: as many as fantasy demands in order to produce for itself an image of the whole, 
in order to dream about it. 
For this reason even development should never be understood here to mean that all cases must 
come into being, but rather just a few, the interesting ones – 
“More of this another time,” the artist can say – “for today enough of it.” 
 
Arnold Schoenberg1 
 
 
 
Mathematics is in a way like the production of feelings in the listener: It occurs in all the arts, but 
only in the case of music is a big fuss made about it. 
 
Eduard Hanslick2 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
1 Arnold Schoenberg, The Musical Idea and the Logic, Technique, and Art of Its Presentation, ed. and trans. 
by Patricia Carpenter and Severine Neff (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 93. 
2 Eduard Hanslick, ‘From Vom Musikalisch-Schönen’, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey Payzant, in Source 
Readings in Music History, ed. by Oliver Strunk, edn rev. by Leo Treitler, 7 vols (New York: Norton, 
1998), VI: The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Ruth A. Solie, pp. 160–69 (first publ. in On the Musically 
Beautiful: A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey Payzant 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), pp. 32–35, 38–44) (pp. 166–67). 
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Abstract 
This thesis proposes a new model for motivic analysis which, being based on the metaphor of a 
web or network and expanded using the mathematical field of graph theory, balances the polar 
concerns prevalent in analytical writing to date: those of static, out-of-time category membership 
and dynamic, in-time process.  The concepts that constitute the model are presented in the third 
chapter, both as responses to a series of analytical observations (using the worked example of 
Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in F minor, Op. 2, No. 1), and as rigorously defined mathematical 
formalisms.  The other chapters explore in further detail the disciplines and methodologies on 
which this model impinges, and serve both to motivate, and to reflect upon, its development.  
Chapter 1 asks what it means to make mathematical statements about music, and seeks to 
disentangle mathematics (as a tool or language) from science (as a method), arguing that music 
theory’s aims can be met by the former without presupposing its commonly assumed inextricability 
from the latter.  Chapter 2 provides a thematic overview of the field of motivic theory and analysis, 
proposing four archetypal models that combine to underwrite much thought on the subject before 
outlining the problems inherent in a static account and the creative strategies that can be used to 
construct a dynamic account.  Finally, Chapter 4 applies these strategies, together with Chapter 3’s 
model and the piece’s extensive existing scholarly literature, to the analysis of the first and last 
movements of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony.  The central theme throughout – as it relates to 
mathematical modelling, music theory, and music analysis – is that of potential, invitation, 
openness, and dialogic engagement. 
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∎ End of proof 
⇏, ∄, etc. ‘does not imply’, ‘there does not exist’, etc. 
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usually denote sets, lower-case letters elements, and script letters (e.g. ℳ) sets of sets. 
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∈ (is)‘a member of the set’/‘in’/ ‘drawn from’, e.g. 𝑎 ∈ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, 𝑥 ∉ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} 
|𝑋| The number of elements in the set 𝑋 e.g. |{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}| = 3 
… Used in listing integers; so 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 means ‘for integer values of 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑛’ 
∅ The empty set; |∅| = 0 
ℤ+ The set of positive integers: {1,2,3, … } 
ℚ+ The set of positive rational numbers i.e. all 𝑎 𝑏⁄  where 𝑎 ∈ ℤ
+ and 𝑏 ∈ ℤ+ 
ℝ+ The set of positive real numbers (i.e. ℚ+ and irrational numbers like √2 and 𝜋) 
{ | } ‘the set of all … such that…’; so ℚ+ = {𝑎 𝑏⁄ |𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ
+} 
∩ The intersection operator; 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 is the set of all objects in both 𝐴 and 𝐵 
∪ The union operator; 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 is the set of all objects in 𝐴, 𝐵, or both.  This can be 
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𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑋1 ∪ 𝑋2 ∪ … ∪ 𝑋𝑛 and ⋃ 𝑋𝑖𝑖=1,3 = 𝑋1 ∪ 𝑋3 
⊎ The disjoint union operator; {𝑎, 𝑏} ∪ {𝑏, 𝑐} = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} but {𝑎, 𝑏} ⊎ {𝑏, 𝑐} = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑏, 𝑐} 
\ or − The complement operator; 𝐴\𝐵 is the set of all objects in 𝐴 but not 𝐵 
⊂ and ⊆ (is) ‘a subset of’ and (is) ‘a subset of, or equal to’; so {𝑎, 𝑏} ⊂ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} 
𝑀𝐴𝑋{ } The maximum value of the given set; 𝑀𝐼𝑁{ } is similarly the minimum value 
Other 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) Function of 𝑥 and 𝑦 which outputs a single value; 𝑓(𝑥) is a function of 𝑥 only 
𝑓: 𝑋 → 𝑌 ‘the function 𝑓 maps members of set 𝑋 to members of set 𝑌’ 
∑ 𝑥𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1   The sum of all 𝑥𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛: 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑥𝑛 
⌊𝑥⌋ and ⌈𝑥⌉ The integer floor and integer ceiling functions: ⌊1.8⌋ = 1 and ⌈1.8⌉ = 2, for example 
[𝑎 , 𝑏) The closed–open interval from 𝑎 to 𝑏: [𝑎, 𝑏) = {𝑥 ∈ ℝ|𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑏} 
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Introduction 
E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 1810 review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony – ‘[a]rguably the most 
celebrated document in the history of music criticism’, according to Ian Bent – begins its 
analysis of the first movement with a casual reference to ‘the main idea [Hauptgedanke] consisting 
of only two bars, which subsequently appears again and again in a variety of forms’.1  The 
observation seems innocuous, even obvious; but it establishes the conceit that what is seen and 
heard in Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is the constant reappearance and reinterpretation of a 
single ‘idea’ in different ‘forms’: ‘the endless reshaping of a basic shape’, in Arnold Schoenberg’s 
phrase.2  This understanding is not limited to Hoffmann and Schoenberg – Jonathan Dunsby 
notes that Hoffmann’s review ‘is often cited as the first torch in [a] phalanx of critical 
illumination deriving from Goethean organicism and marching on to this day’ – and the implied 
locus of the ‘main idea’, ‘basic shape’, or ‘motive’ (a term not actually used by Hoffmann) varies 
between the members of this phalanx.3  Some consider it to be a concrete musical segment (for 
example, the first two bars) while others (explicitly or implicitly) construct a more abstract 
archetype; all, however, agree that it is underwritten by the central concept of recurrence.  This 
presents a paradox: that to apply a label such as ‘motive’ to a singular object is actually to tacitly 
assert a set of relationships between a plurality of objects. 
 A certain fluidity between individual musical segments on one hand, and the abstract 
types or groupings that they realise or define on the other, is therefore apparent in most 
analytical writings on the subject (as discussed in further detail in Sections 2.1 and 2.2).  As Bent 
argues, ‘[w]e have been conditioned (by twentieth-century analysts writing largely about 
eighteenth-century music) to look for unifying forces’, even when each segment in a unified 
category ‘is a cleanly incised utterance with its own distinct properties’.4  The assumption that 
motives are sets of segments can therefore be a misleading one, as sets depend on a property 
known as transitivity: if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in the same set, and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are in the same set, then 𝑎 and 
                                                     
1 Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, ‘Review: Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 in C Minor’, 
trans. by Martyn Clarke with David Charlton and Ian Bent, in MA19II, pp. 145–60 
(introduction pp. 141–44) (pp. 141ed, 147).  The German term in square brackets is included in 
Bent’s edition; see the list of abbreviations on p. x for an explanation of how this volume and its 
companion MA19I are cited in this thesis. 
2 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Linear Counterpoint’, in S&I, pp. 289–95 (p. 290). 
3 Jonathan Dunsby, ‘Thematic and Motivic Analysis’, in The Cambridge History of Western Music 
Theory, ed. by Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 907–26 
(p. 909).  Bent lists the terms that Hoffmann uses, and notes that Motiv is not among them, in 
his introduction to Hoffmann’s review (p. 141ed).  I use ‘motive’ throughout this thesis (spelled 
to accord with the Germanic Motiv rather than the French motif) as an umbrella concept (see 
Section 2.1). 
4 Ian Bent, ‘Introduction [to Part I: Elucidatory Analysis]’, in MA19II, pp. 31–38 (p. 37). 
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𝑐 are in the same set.  If one motive is said to develop into another, or combine with another, 
or liquidate, or share parallels with another category that the analyst ultimately wishes to keep 
separate (as is the case when correspondences between first and second subjects are noted), the 
transitivity condition is violated and the set model breaks down. 
This thesis argues that a better model for defining the relationship between musical 
segments and motivic categories is provided by the image of a network: a series of links or 
bridges between individual points (known as nodes), aggregating into a structural picture of the 
target phenomenon.  The idea of a motivic network or web is not uncommon in music theory 
(although it is not as prevalent as the hybrid set/segment model): Rudolph Reti, for example, 
speaks of a work’s ‘thematic and contrapuntal web’ (which can turn in to a ‘vague, amorphous 
mass’ to be replaced with ‘characteristic melodies’ in listeners’ memories), Stephen Davies of ‘an 
unbroken web of unobvious relationships […] although there is no element or set of elements 
common to all parts of the work’, and Kofi Agawu of ‘the dispersal of motifs in a kind of 
network claim[ing] a significant part of [a] movement’s teleology’.5  The metaphor seems to be 
particularly popular in discussions of Wagner’s music: the composer himself considers a ‘web of 
basic themes [which] intertwine with one another’ to be definitive of ‘symphonic unity’, while 
Thomas Grey writes of his ‘associative motivic networks’, Bent of his ‘complex circuitry’, and 
Richard Taruskin of his ‘formally free (or ad hoc) web[s] of motifs’.6  Similar phrases tend to 
surface whenever Mahler’s thematic process is discussed, as examined in further detail below. 
Suggestive as these comments may be, however, they have not been comprehensively 
pursued to their music-analytical ends; this is particularly surprising given the preponderance of 
                                                     
5 Rudolph Reti, The Thematic Process in Music ([New York: Macmillan, 1951; repr.] London: Faber 
and Faber, 1961), p. 283; Stephen Davies, ‘Attributing Significance to Unobvious Musical 
Relationships’, Journal of Music Theory, 27 (1983), 203–13 (p. 205); Kofi Agawu, Music as Discourse: 
Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 273. 
6 Thomas Grey, ‘...wie ein rother Faden: On the Origins of “Leitmotif” as Critical Construct and 
Musical Practice’, in Music Theory in the Age of Romanticism, ed. by Ian Bent (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 187–210 (p. 188); Hans von Wolzogen, ‘“Prelude”, “Act 
I Scene I”, Parsifal: A Thematic Guide through the Poetry and the Music’, in MA19II, pp. 93–105 
(introduction pp. 88–92) (p. 90ed); Richard Taruskin, The Oxford History of Western Music, 6 vols 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), IV: The Early Twentieth Century, p. 354.  Wagner’s 
‘Gewebe’ is rendered ‘web’ in Alfred Clayton’s translation (quoted here); alternatives include 
‘network’ (by Anthony Newcomb), ‘fabric’ (by Grey), and ‘tissue’ (by William Ashton Ellis): see 
Richard Wagner, Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen, 4th edn, 10 vols (Leipzig: Siegel; 
Linnemann, 1907), X, 185; Carl Dahlhaus, ‘The Music’, trans. by Alfred Clayton, in Wagner 
Handbook, ed. by Ulrich Müller and Peter Wapnewski, translation ed. by John Deathridge 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 297–314 (p. 304); Anthony Newcomb, 
‘Those Images That Yet Fresh Images Beget’, Journal of Musicology, 2 (1983), 227–45 (p. 233, n. 
16); Thomas S. Grey, Wagner’s Musical Prose: Texts and Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 90; and Richard Wagner’s Prose Works, trans. by William Ashton Ellis, 8 
vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1892–99), VI: Religion and Art (1897), p. 183. 
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networks in recent music theory.7  Introduced by David Lewin in his influential monograph 
Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations, the concept of a transformation network aims to 
put the analyst ‘inside the music’ by reconceptualising an ‘interval’ between two points as a 
‘characteristic gesture’, or motion, from one to the other.8  The focus therefore shifts from 
individual pitches, pitch-class sets, or consonant triads (for example) to the relational structures 
between them, which come to behave in quasi-motivic ways: to take one of Lewin’s analyses as 
an example, he argues that the openings of the first and third movements of Beethoven’s First 
Symphony realise the same underlying transformation network.9  A related idea, reinvigorated in 
Lewin’s work, is that of a spatial harmonic map or ‘game board’ (Lewin’s phrase), the most well-
known of which is the Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz: similar maps have proliferated since Lewin, a 
major recent development being Dmitri Tymoczko’s argument that if we wish to use such maps 
to measure musical distance, then they need to be understood in terms of their geometry.10  
Networks are abstract sets of relationships, and while they are often represented “spatially” or 
visually, it can be misleading to read too much into the printed layout of a particular network (as 
anyone who has chosen to take three Tube trains, rather than the five-minute walk, to get from 
Warren Street to Great Portland Street will attest).11 
While Lewin does construct several networks in which the nodes themselves are 
motives, these are often treated like pitch-class sets (i.e. with rhythm and note order playing 
secondary roles) and their scope can be seen to support Lewinian theorist Steven Rings’s 
observation that ‘[t]ransformational theory is at its most powerful in the pluralistic exploration 
of phenomenologically rich local passages’.12  The vignettes offered by Lewin and Rings, 
                                                     
7 Figures that look like motivic networks appear in David L. Montgomery, ‘The Myth of 
Organicism: From Bad Science to Great Art’, Musical Quarterly, 76 (1992), 17–66, but on closer 
inspection these are essentially paradigmatic charts (the problematic assumptions of which are 
discussed in Chapter 2) with superfluous arrows added. 
8 David Lewin, Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987; rev. repr. with a foreword by Ed Gollin New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; 
repr. 2011), p. 159. 
9 Ibid., pp. 169–74. 
10 Ibid., p. 21.  The literature is sizeable, but good overviews may be found in Richard Cohn, 
‘Introduction to Neo-Riemannian Theory: A Survey and a Historical Perspective’, Journal of 
Music Theory, 42 (1998), 167–80 and The Oxford Handbook of Neo-Riemannian Music Theories, ed. by 
Edward Gollin and Alexander Rehding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  Tymoczko 
sets out his geometric argument concisely in Dmitri Tymoczko, ‘Geometrical Methods in 
Recent Music Theory’, Music Theory Online, 16.1 (2010) <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/ 
mto.10.16.1/mto.10.16.1.tymoczko.html> [accessed 17 December 2014]; see also Chapter 2, 
notes 78 and 82 below. 
11 See Bill Bryson, Notes from a Small Island (London: Doubleday, 1993; repr. 1999), p. 52 for 
more on the Tube map’s geographical oddities. 
12 Steven Rings, Tonality and Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 38.  
An example of a motivic analysis by Lewin may be found in Generalized Musical Intervals: here he 
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sensitive and nuanced though they are, do not tend to concern themselves with the complex 
and comprehensive webs of motivic relationship that stretch across entire movements.  My own 
master’s dissertation began to address this lacuna, analysing Liszt’s B minor Piano Sonata by 
grouping its melodic segments into a hierarchy of motives, types, and variants, and using these 
groupings as nodes in transformational networks.13  The arrows between the nodes were 
labelled with well-defined functions, making my networks Lewinian in method but, in their 
static categorisations of each node’s contents, not fully transformational in spirit.  This thesis 
tilts that balance in the other direction, doing away with neat functions between abstracted 
categories in favour of contextually influenced derivation relationships that obtain directly 
between musical segments.  This not only respects my argument that morphological identity of 
pitch and rhythm is neither a guarantee of, nor a pre-requisite for, motivic relationship (see 
Section 2.3, point six), but imbues the resultant networks with an increased dynamism and sense 
of temporal unfolding.14 
The centre of gravity of this thesis is Chapter 3, which sets out a proposed 
mathematical network model for motivic analysis alongside a worked example (the first 
movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in F minor, Op. 2, No. 1).15  The other chapters serve 
to underwrite this model, expanding on its methodological and theoretical underpinnings, 
clarifying what it does and does not purport to say, and suggesting how it might be analytically 
applied.  These other chapters should not, however, be understood as simply prefatory or 
supplementary: the arguments and insights that they propose have wider ramifications for 
mathematical music theory, motivic analysis, and Mahler’s Sixth Symphony respectively, to an 
extent thereby standing for themselves. 
                                                                                                                                                      
uncovers retrograde-inverted forms of motives from Parsifal chained together in the opera’s 
Schenkerian middleground (Figure 7.4, p. 162) and represents them in a transformation network 
(Figure 8.3, p. 181).  For an empirical study which suggests that arrhythmic pitch-class set 
descriptions may be inadequate for defining piece-specific motives that are salient, distinctive, 
and significant, see David Huron, ‘What is a Musical Feature?  Forte’s Analysis of Brahms’s 
Opus 51, No. 1, Revisited’, Music Theory Online, 7.4 (July 2001) <http://www.mtosmt.org/ 
issues/mto.01.7.4/mto.01.7.4.huron.html> [accessed 17 December 2014]; the same Brahms 
quartet is also the subject of the papers in Computational Music Analysis, ed. by Christina 
Anagnostopoulou and Chantal Buteau (=Journal of Mathematics and Music, 4.2 (July 2010)). 
13 Daniel Holden, ‘A Mathematical Model of Motivic Transformation’ (unpublished master’s 
dissertation, University of Leeds, 2011). 
14 Lewin was constantly aware of the tension between music’s unfolding in time and its 
analytical representations in space: this tension becomes thematic in his analysis of 
Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III, found in David Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation: Four 
Analytic Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 16–67. 
15 A full segmented score of this movement is provided as Figure 3.22, and also as a PDF on 
the supplementary CD to allow side-by-side comparison with the discussion. 
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Chapter 1 addresses the question of what it means to make mathematical statements 
about music, seeking to disentangle mathematical music theory from the scientific pretensions 
read into it by some of its critics (as well as, it must be said, some of its proponents).  The 
relationship between mathematics and science is not fixed and well-defined, but nor is that 
between science and music theory, a field which exhibits what Nicholas Cook has called 
‘[e]pistemological slippage’ in its desire to suggest new hearings of music as much as to describe 
existing ones.16  Theory’s ability to influence perception and observation, seen as scientifically 
problematic in the concepts of theory-ladenness, coherentism, and pseudo-science, becomes a 
positive asset in the humanities, where the goal of theory is typically to provide a flexible 
orienting framework – a ‘good comparison’, in Schoenberg and Cook’s preferred phrase – 
rather than a predictive explanatory system.17  In this context, mathematics can be understood 
as a language for the formulation of rich and detailed metaphors about music, these metaphors 
constituting a natural amplification of the creative and metaphorical nature of all mathematical 
modelling. 
One of Chapter 1’s important arguments, advanced in Section 1.5 especially, is that it 
can be a mistake to replace or ignore traditional music theory: not only, within a humanities 
paradigm, are its insights valid as alternative lenses through which to view a complex musical 
phenomenon, but existing music theory can take on a mediating role in influencing how 
composers, performers, and listeners experience music.  Many mathematical models of music 
are therefore better characterised as models of music theories, and Chapter 2 examines the 
concept of a motive in detail to make the considerations underwriting Chapter 3’s model more 
explicit.  Departing from a more detailed exploration of the paradox of repetition outlined 
above (Section 2.1), four archetypal conceptual models of motivic structure are presented in 
Section 2.2 and shown to underpin, in various combinations, four important motivic theories.  
If the archetypal models represent alternative resolutions of the tension between 
static/category-based and dynamic/process-based understandings, then Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
explore these understandings’ inherent “internal” problems (and opportunities) in detail; Section 
2.3 in particular identifies six major barriers to formal motivic modelling, contributing to an 
explanation of mathematical music theory’s tendency to avoid contextually defined motives in 
favour of abstracted universes of chords and scales.  The final section of the chapter 
reintroduces the concept of a network – or graph, in a mathematical sense distinct from that of 
                                                     
16 Nicholas Cook, ‘Epistemologies of Music Theory’, in The Cambridge History of Western Music 
Theory, ed. by Christensen, pp. 78–105 (p. 102). 
17 See Arnold Schoenberg, Theory of Harmony, trans. by Roy E. Carter (London: Faber and Faber, 
1978), p. 11 and Nicholas Cook, ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”: A Viennese 
Perspective’, Journal of Music Theory, 33 (1989), 117–41. 
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an 𝑥 − 𝑦 plot – to provide a pivot between the thematic overview of music-theoretical literature 
presented in Chapter 2 and the formalised model presented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 can be understood as two parallel chapters arranged in three alternating 
blocks.  The first chapter explains the model’s main concepts informally and illustrates them 
with references to the Beethoven piece where possible, while the second defines the same 
concepts in a more formal mathematical language.  Cross-references allow the second to be read 
as a summary of the ideas arising in the first and an effort to make them more precise, 
generalisable, and rigorous; alternatively, they allow the first to be read as exegesis and 
exemplification of the informationally dense mathematical language found in the second.  The 
decision to separate out the mathematical content was taken in order to stop the main thrust of 
the argument getting clogged with potentially off-putting technical detail, though even those 
readers with little mathematical background are invited to follow the cross-references and, in 
doing so, to glean a more rounded picture of the model being presented.  (A similar invitation 
applies to analytical comments: references to bar numbers and labelled figures are provided, and 
while the general contours of the argument can be traced without following these up, a more 
concrete picture emerges when they are).18  Graph theory is a relatively self-contained 
mathematical field, so most of Chapter 3’s mathematical content should be understandable 
through reference to the glossary of standard mathematical symbols on p. xi, the fundamental 
concepts presented at the end of Section 2.5, and the terms defined as the chapter proceeds.  As 
well as the definitions, theorems, and proofs, the mathematical sections contain further figures 
and prose explanations relating to the mathematical content. 
The final chapter uses the ideas developed in the rest of the thesis to construct analyses 
of the first and last movements of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony.  Mahler’s motivic process has 
been frequently discussed – John Williamson considers it ‘widely accepted’ that his motivic 
technique ‘is different in kind from that of his most distinguished predecessors’ – and a central 
theme in this reception history has been the idea that his motives are defined as pluralities.19  
Theodor Adorno, for example, argues that they ‘are too independent, too evidently living beings 
in process, to […] sink their identity in a seamless web’ (my italics); Erwin Stein that they are not 
‘the kind of unalterable ideas which make suitable music examples for programme notes’; Paul 
                                                     
18 I would recommend, in particular, reading Chapter 4 alongside a score of Mahler’s Sixth 
Symphony (the reductions presented in Seth Monahan’s thesis are excellent for this purpose: see 
Seth Monahan, ‘Mahler’s Sonata Narratives’, 2 vols (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale 
University, 2008), II: Supplements (pp. 303–532), pp. 386–413, 490–532).  The Mahler analyses 
repeat the process of the Beethoven analysis on a much larger scale: a firm grasp of the 
manageable detail of Chapter 3 therefore helps when reading Chapter 4. 
19 John Williamson, ‘New Research Paths in Criticism, Analysis and Interpretation’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Mahler, ed. by Jeremy Barham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 262–74 (p. 269). 
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Bekker that Mahler’s ‘new kind of thematic form […] no longer knew of incessant striving from 
a creative spiritual centre but, on the contrary, had first to gather strength in the multiplicity of 
its appearances’; and Agawu that ‘in a complex work like the first movement of Mahler’s Ninth, 
giving a single label – as opposed to a multitude of labels in a network formation – may seem to 
do violence to thematic interconnectedness and the numerous allusions that constitute its 
thematic fabric’.20  Mahler himself, according to Josef Foerster, thought in terms of themes 
‘already embellished, developed, and in many ways linked to secondary thematic 
permutations’.21 
Yet, as always with Mahler, the true picture is more complex.  He saw himself (at times) 
as a Beethovenian organicist: he told Natalie Bauer-Lechner that ‘music is governed by the law 
of eternal evolution, eternal development’, conceived in ‘in one grand sweep’; he also told 
Anton von Webern, in comments reminiscent of Schoenberg’s viewpoint discussed in Chapter 
2, that ‘[j]ust as in nature the entire universe has developed from the primeval cell, […] so also 
in music should a larger structure develop from a single motive in which is contained the germ 
of everything that is yet to be’.22  The Schoenbergian Grundgestalt (see Section 2.2) appears to 
lurk, too, behind his injunctions to Max Marschalk: ‘Themes – these must be clear and plastic, so 
that they can be clearly recognized at any stage of modification or development – and then 
varied presentation, holding the attention above all through the logical development of the inner 
                                                     
20 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Mahler: Centenary Address, Vienna 1960 and Afterthoughts, 1961’, in 
Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992; 
repr. 1994), pp. 81–110 (pp. 94–95); Erwin Stein, ‘Mahler the Factual’, trans. by Hans Keller, in 
Orpheus in New Guises (London: Rockliff, 1953), pp. 15–18, p. 17; Paul Bekker, Gustav Mahlers 
Sinfonien (Berlin: [Schuster & Loeffler], 1921), pp. 17–18, quoted in Theodor W. Adorno, Mahler: 
A Musical Physiognomy, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; 
repr. 1996), p. 65; Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 271.  On a personal note, the kernel of 
inspiration for this research was an undergraduate analysis of the first movement of the Second 
Symphony: traditional letter-name designations seemed inadequate when faced not only with 
the sheer number of motivic ideas, but also with the comprehensive web of inter-relationship 
binding them all together. 
21 Josef Bohuslav Foerster, Der Pilger: Erinnerungen eines Musikers, trans. by Pavel Eisner (Prague: 
[Artia], 1955), p. 356, quoted (and trans.) in Stephen E. Hefling, ‘“Ihm in die Lieder zu blicken”: 
Mahler’s Seventh Symphony Sketchbook’, in Mahler Studies, ed. by Stephen E. Hefling 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 169–216 (p. 214). 
22 Natalie Bauer-Lechner, Recollections of Gustav Mahler, trans. by Dika Newlin, ed. by Peter 
Franklin (London: Faber Music, 1980), pp. 130, 29; Webern’s diary, 3 February 1905, quoted in 
Hans Moldenhauer, with Rosaleen Moldenhauer, Anton von Webern: A Chronicle of His Life and 
Work (London: Gollancz, 1978), p. 75.  Williamson, arguing that Mahler’s themes do not behave 
like ‘cells in a unified organism’, concedes that this ‘may, however, have been how Mahler saw 
them himself’ (John Williamson, ‘Mahler, Hermeneutics and Analysis’, Music Analysis, 10 (1991), 
357–73 (p. 360)). 
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idea, but also by the genuine opposition of contrasting motives.’23  Plurality creeps in as he 
discusses the ‘inexhaustible wealth of variations’ that this process produces: while he rails 
against the practice of ‘playing around with some poor little scrap of a theme’, at other times he 
is reported to have ‘filled a pile of sketch-sheets and his pocket music notebooks with a 
hundred variants of a motif or a modulation’, considering it ‘a superhuman labour and waste of 
energy […] to have to create everything you need on the spot, without provision in advance, or 
any “collection”’.24  The result – whether understood organically, pluralistically, 
compositionally, or in terms of an extensive field (‘network’, again, for Agawu) of quotation, 
self-quotation, and allusion – is a complex motivic language ripe for analytical discussion.25  The 
interconnections and allusions that blur motives into each other and into other movements, 
possibly by other composers, must be treated with care lest, as Laura Hedden warns, ‘[m]otives 
that resemble one another in shape, but not in function [are] mistakenly […] grouped under the 
same semantic interpretation’: Mahler considered the ‘profound logic’ of motivic connection to 
be secondary to an overriding need to ‘embrace [the world]’ in his famous conversation with 
Sibelius.26 
The tension between motivic homogeneity and affective delineation is nowhere more 
apparent than in the Sixth Symphony, making this work an ideal testing ground for a model that 
privileges heterogeneously constructed parallels between specific musical passages over crisp 
morphological categorisations.  The Sixth Symphony has also been chosen for another reason, 
one that would at first seem to place it at the back of the queue: it is one of Mahler’s most 
frequently discussed symphonies, and its first and last movements in particular have received 
recent detailed analytical attention from Seth Monahan in three articles, two thesis chapters, and 
                                                     
23 Letter to Max Marschalk, 12 April 1896, in Selected Letters of Gustav Mahler, ed. by Alma Mahler 
and Knud Martner, trans. by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser with Bill Hopkins (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1979), p. 182 (no. 160).  Analyses of the first movements of Mahler’s Ninth 
and Tenth symphonies from explicitly Schoenbergian perspectives may be found in Jonathan 
Mann, ‘“Nothing but the Theme Itself”: Developing Variation in the Andante Comodo of 
Symphony No. 9, by Gustav Mahler’ (unpublished master’s thesis, Wayne State University, 
2008) and Jack Boss, ‘Mahler’s Musical Idea: A Schenkerian-Schoenbergian Analysis of the 
Adagio from Symphony No. 10’, in Analyzing the Music of Living Composers (and Others), ed. by Jack 
Boss and others (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 115–31. 
24 Bauer-Lechner, p. 29 ‘inexhaustible’, ‘scrap’; p. 61 ‘filled’; p. 170 ‘superhuman’. 
25 Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 47.  For a comprehensive study of quotation in Mahler, see 
Henry-Louis de La Grange, ‘Music About Music in Mahler: Reminiscences, Allusions, or 
Quotations?’, in Mahler Studies, ed. by Hefling, pp. 122–68. 
26 Laura Hedden, ‘The Motivic Code: Defining an Element of Mahler’s Style’ (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), p. 28; Karl Ekman, Jean Sibelius: His Life and 
Personality, trans. by Edward Birse with a foreword by Ernest Newman (New York: Knopf, 
1938; repr. New York: Tudor, 1946), p. 191. 
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two chapters of his forthcoming monograph.27  Any analysis is necessarily a re-imagining, a 
performative act of individual engagement (as argued in Section 1.3), and as such a given work 
will always bear the weight of more interpretation.  But further to this, Chapter 4 hopes to show 
that dialogue with existing analyses can be a strength rather than an obligation, inflecting certain 
insights, challenging others, and taking yet others as routes into a motivic labyrinth that can lead 
to a number of different endpoints (Adorno argues that Mahlerian themes are always 
provisional: ‘the listener should not cling to themes, but instead should propose them to 
himself, and await events’).28  Monahan actively invites others to use his work in this way: ‘I 
would be pleased if this study served as the starting point for any extended dialogue that brings 
us into a closer engagement with [Mahler’s] music.  With Mahler, there is always so much more 
to say.’29 
The tools developed in this thesis can be understood similarly: they prompt, suggest, 
facilitate, offset, and nuance insights, but do not determine or circumscribe them, and are not 
always insightful in and of themselves.  Chapter 4 is the result of an interaction between the 
score of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony, the scholarship surrounding it, the tools developed in this 
thesis, and the mind of an analyst, with the aim of demonstrating the kind of insights that such 
an interaction can produce.  In the spirit of Monahan’s dialogue, I have included all the data 
used in my analyses as Microsoft Excel spreadsheets on a supplementary CD, and I discuss in 
Section 4.3 how these data relate to the eventual analyses as presented (portions of the 
Beethoven data appear in Chapter 3, but the Mahler data are so numerous that to reproduce 
them in the thesis itself would be impractical, overwhelming, and even tangential).  Each 
spreadsheet includes the macro that implements the formal ideas of Chapter 3, and so the 
interested reader can track the structural consequences of competing interpretations by making 
small changes to my judgements and running the macro again; a blank spreadsheet is also 
included to be used as a template for new analyses. 
The thesis thereby ends, in the Afterword and on the supplementary CD, near to where 
it begins: with Section 1.3’s portrait of analysis as an open invitation rather than a closed answer.  
The material in between – just as with a pair of motivic segments – affects not only the 
understanding of the second, but, retrospectively, the memory of the first.
                                                     
27 See Seth Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence and the Failure of the Novel-Symphony in the 
Finale of Mahler’s Sixth’, Nineteenth-Century Music, 31 (2007–08), 53–95; Seth Monahan, ‘“I Have 
Tried to Capture You …”: Rethinking the “Alma” Theme from Mahler’s Sixth Symphony’, 
Journal of the American Musicological Society, 64 (2011), 119–78; Seth Monahan, ‘Success and Failure 
in Mahler’s Sonata Recapitulations’, Music Theory Spectrum, 33 (2011), 37–58 (pp. 51–54); 
Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I: Text (pp. i–302), pp. 104–49, 240–88 and II, 310–28, 367–83; and Seth 
Monahan, Mahler’s Symphonic Sonatas ([New York]: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
28 ‘Centenary Address’, p. 100. 
29 ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 94. 
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1 Mathematics and Music Theory: An Unscientific 
Defence 
1.1 Introduction: Oppositions and Conflations 
In a recent article decrying ‘creationist’ music theory (that which reifies musical documents as 
‘God’s creations’ rather than ‘creations of God’s creatures’), Richard Taruskin ends by singling out 
two exemplary theorists who are ‘becoming aware of the pitfalls of creationism and acting on that 
awareness’.1  The theorists are Robert Gjerdingen and Lawrence Zbikowski, and Taruskin sees it as 
‘no accident, of course, that both Gjerdingen and Zbikowski have taken inspiration […] from the 
work of Leonard B. Meyer (1918–2007), the great pragmatic exception among the founders of 
American music theory’.  Meyer, according to Taruskin, ‘never lost sight of real worlds’ in his work, 
chiefly because he ‘based his music-theoretical ideas on messy psychological premises rather than 
tidy mathematical systems’. 
 The general criticisms of mainstream American music theory evoked by Taruskin are 
nothing new, either in his own work or in musicology more generally.2  Having their locus classicus in 
Joseph Kerman’s programmatic injunctions to ‘get out’ of formalism in the 1980s, such criticisms 
are now orthodox and have done much (although, Taruskin would argue, not enough) to bring 
about a greater degree of methodological self-awareness amongst music theorists.3  What is 
                                                     
1 Richard Taruskin, ‘Catching Up with Rimsky-Korsakov’, Music Theory Spectrum, 33 (2011), 169–85 
(p. 181 ‘becoming aware’; p. 180 other quotes in this sentence; p. 182 other quotes in this 
paragraph).  The passage about ‘God’s creations’ also appears, in a slightly altered form, in Richard 
Taruskin, ‘Reply to Brown and Dempster’, Journal of Music Theory, 33 (1989), 155–64 (p. 162); see 
next note. 
2 Kofi Agawu, ‘Taruskin’s Problem(s)’, Music Theory Spectrum, 33 (2011), 186–90 (pp. 186–87) tracks 
how Taruskin has ‘repeat[ed] himself […] loudly and unapologetically’ (p. 187) in articles spanning 
thirty-two years. 
3 See Joseph Kerman, ‘How We Got Into Analysis, and How to Get Out’, Critical Inquiry, 7 (1980–
81), 311–31 and Joseph Kerman, Musicology (London: Fontana Press, 1985), especially chapter 3 (pp. 
60–112).  We must be careful, however, of narrativising a generational shift away from “scientific” 
music theory and towards “poetic” music theory, a view which David Lewin claims ‘is not exactly 
wrong, but [which] is very far from adequate to engage the critical issues at hand, issues which it 
hopelessly trivializes’ (see David Lewin, ‘Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of 
Perception’, in Studies in Music with Text (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; repr. 2009), pp. 
53–108 (first publ. in Music Perception, 3 (1985–86), 327–92) (p. 102); further references cite the 
version in Studies in Music with Text).  In a 1997 article, Agawu cites a number of music-theoretical 
writings from 1983–94 that already explicitly engage issues characteristic of the so-called “New 
Musicology”, including phenomenology, hermeneutics, symbolism and semiotics; questions of 
unity, narrative, and meaning; the contingency and constructedness of analyses; and the work of 
Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Harold Bloom.  See Kofi Agawu, ‘Analyzing Music under the 
New Musicological Regime’, Journal of Musicology, 15 (1997), 297–307. 
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particularly interesting about Taruskin’s latest critique is how he associates ‘tidy mathematical 
systems’ with what he terms musical creationism, and Meyer’s ‘messy psychological premises’ with 
what he terms musical evolutionism: he seems to be suggesting that, in the domain of music theory 
at least, mathematical and scientific modes of thinking are antithetical. 
 Similarly arresting juxtapositions are presented in Cook’s 2002 article ‘Epistemologies of 
Music Theory’.  In tracing the history of music theory ‘[b]etween art and nature’ (p. 85), he 
associates Milton Babbitt’s calls for a more “scientific” music theory in the 1960s with a turn away 
from the idea that music is firmly rooted in nature and therefore natural science: partly for Babbitt 
to legitimise his own music by recasting consonance as a culturally conditioned (rather than innate) 
phenomenon, and partly as a reaction against the Nazi ‘rhetoric of natural origins and the drawing 
from them of universal and unchangeable criteria of value’ (p. 90).  In this climate, Cook labels as 
‘striking’ not only that the idea of performativity (see Section 1.3 below) entered the theoretical 
mainstream thanks to Lewin, ‘the leading contemporary exponent of a formalized approach to 
music that would appear, more than any other, to embody the strictly scientific epistemology that 
Babbitt adumbrated in 1961’ (p. 97), but also that the associated pragmatic emphasis on the 
importance of ‘useful, useable, relevant, or significant characterizations’ was called for by Babbitt 
himself in 1965.4 
These examples highlight a series of oppositions (science and mathematics, psychology and 
music theory, pragmatism and “mainstream” music theory, natural science and scientific music 
theory, performativity and formalism, formalism and musical relevance) and conflations (science 
and formalism, mathematics and mainstream theory) that appear by turns familiar, naïve, or self-
contradictory, and imply a rift between music theory and “real” science (psychology for Taruskin 
and natural science for Cook).  Part of the problem is that several of these terms have taken on 
special shadings in relation to music theory, and these can be traced back to Babbitt’s attempt to 
                                                     
4 This chapter cites three important methodological papers by Babbitt, all available in (and cited 
from) The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt, ed. by Stephen Peles and others (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003).  They are (with page numbers from The Collected Essays and original 
publication details): 
 ‘Past and Present Concepts of the Nature and Limits of Music’, pp. 78–85 (first publ. in 
International Musicological Society: Report of the Eighth Congress, New York, 1961, [ed. by Jan 
LaRue, 2 vols (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1961–62), I: Papers,] pp. 398–403); 
 ‘The Structure and Function of Musical Theory’, pp. 191–201 (first publ. in College Music 
Symposium, 5 (1965), 49–60); 
 ‘Contemporary Music Composition and Music Theory as Contemporary Intellectual 
History’, pp. 270–307 (first publ. in Perspectives in Musicology: The Inaugural Lectures of the Ph.D. 
Program in Music at the City University of New York, ed. Barry S. Brook, Edward O. Downes, and 
Sherman van Solkema (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 151–84). 
The first two have been reprinted in Perspectives on Contemporary Music Theory, ed. by Benjamin Boretz 
and Edward T. Cone (New York: Norton, 1972), as pp. 3–9 and 10–21 respectively.  For ‘useful, 
useable’, see Babbitt, ‘Structure and Function’, p. 194, quoted in Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, p. 97. 
-12- 
 
 
  
-1
2
- 
bind the discipline into the unusually tight weave of science and mathematics proposed by the 
philosophy of logical positivism (explored in more detail in Section 1.2).  It is, however, 
problematic to assume too much about the relationship between mathematics and science: even 
outside the domain of music theory, this area is one of intense enquiry in the contemporary 
philosophy of mathematics.5  For while mathematics is popularly referred to as “the language of 
science” or even (by Gauss) ‘the queen of the sciences’, in Mark Colyvan’s phrase ‘she would seem 
to be an eccentric and obstinate queen’.6  Mathematics deals with abstract rather than physical 
entities, proceeds a priori by rational deduction rather than a posteriori by empirical induction, and 
deals in provable theorems rather than revisable theories.  Even so, the so-called ‘indispensability 
argument’ – that our best scientific theories cannot be stated without mathematics, thus entailing an 
ontological commitment to mathematical objects – retains a persuasive force and gives pause to 
anyone seeking to link physical phenomenon, scientific theory, and mathematical model in a neatly 
demarcated chain of cause and effect.7 
This chapter unfolds an argument, fully realised in Section 1.10, that mathematical models 
are essentially rich and detailed metaphors which can therefore fulfil the suggestive, performative 
ends of music theory (as set out in Section 1.3) without presupposing a scientific epistemology.  
Such an argument requires careful consideration of mathematics’ role in science and, especially, 
science’s role in music theory: while Section 1.4 identifies a decisive incompatibility of aims in 
respective attitudes toward overturning sedimented knowledge, Section 1.5 problematises this in 
terms of both music theory’s mediating role in psychological experiments, and science’s capacity to 
enrich the descriptive capabilities of music theory.  These issues are reframed in relation to the ‘two 
cultures’ of the sciences and the humanities in Section 1.6, and the expectations that each culture 
places on a ‘theory’ – in particular, of the balance between conceptual elegance and goodness-of-fit 
– are examined in more detail in Sections 1.8 and 1.9.  Under this sharpened understanding of what 
it means to make scientific claims about music, mathematics is free, after a methodological 
                                                     
5 A recent introduction to the field devotes four of its seven central chapters to this area, and the 
issues raised permeate much of the rest of the book: see Mark Colyvan, An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 36–117. 
6 Colyvan, p. 1.  Gauss’s phrase was (reportedly) ‘die Königin die Wissenschaften’ (see Wolfgang 
Sartorius von Waltershausen, Gauss zum Gedächtniss (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1856; repr. Wiesbaden: Sändig, 
1965), p. 79): but as Geraint Wiggins points out, while Wissenschaft is normally translated as ‘science’, 
it actually means something closer to ‘scholarship’ (see Geraint A. Wiggins, ‘Response to Marsden 
and Mazzola: On the Correctness of Imprecision and the Existential Fallacy of Absolute Music’, in 
3MR, pp. 93–101 (pp. 93–94)).  The next sentence in the Gauss source explicitly makes reference to 
Naturwissenschaften (natural sciences), while the previous holder of the title ‘queen of the sciences’ 
was theology, further advising caution against a literal interpretation of the standard Gauss 
translation. 
7 See Colyvan, especially pp. 41–51, for an outline of the indispensability argument and its main 
criticisms. 
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discursion into how we should understand mathematical definitions in Section 1.7, to emerge from 
the chimerical mode of music theory often referred to as ‘formalism’.  This role for mathematics – 
in particular as set into relief against science – is what drives and underpins this thesis as a whole. 
1.2 A “Scientific” Music Theory 
The delicacy of the relationship between mathematics and science is nowhere more apparent than 
in the philosophy of logical positivism.  David Huron has argued that positivism, despite being ‘the 
preeminent target of postmodernist critiques’, actually only exercised an influence ‘almost 
exclusively restricted to American psychology’ between 1930 and 1965.8  It was, however, a central 
component in Babbitt’s methodological call for a more “scientific” music theory: 
[Q]uestions of musical theory construction attend and include all matters of the 
form, the manner of formulation, and the signification of statements about 
individual musical compositions, and the subsumption of such statements into a 
higher-level theory, constructed purely logically from the empirical acts of 
examination of the individual compositions.9 
Although he never labels his philosophy explicitly, there are clear echoes of positivism in Babbitt’s 
writing: he frequently cites, and borrows conceptual terminology from, philosophers associated 
with positivism such as Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, Hans Reichenbach, Gustav Bergmann, W. V. 
O. Quine, and Paul Oppenheim.  In particular, Babbitt endorses the characteristic positivistic 
principle of verificationism: that observational concepts carry empiric content and thus are distinct from 
theoretical or logical concepts, which must nevertheless be empirically verifiable through the 
observational statements that they imply.10  Babbitt gives ‘a simple and yet immensely practical and 
powerful music-theoretical example’ of this distinction by contrasting an interval number (the 
difference between two pitches) with what he calls an index number (the sum of two pitches).11  
The former is ‘a direct musical perceptible’ (p. 298), audible and identifiable even when transposed.  
The latter, conversely, is ‘theoretical’ (p. 299): the musical meaning of D+E=F+C, the exact value 
of which is dependent on the choice of pitch-class 0, is unclear.  It turns out that just as intervals 
relate to transposition, index numbers relate to inversion (p. 299): if there are 𝑛 occurrences of 
                                                     
8 David Huron, ‘The New Empiricism: Systematic Musicology in a Postmodern Age’ (lecture 3 of 
the Ernest Bloch Lectures, University of California, Berkeley, 1999), available at 
<http://www.musiccog.ohio-state.edu/Music220/Bloch.lectures/3.Methodology.html> [accessed 
17 December 2014] (paras. 24 and 25). 
9 Babbitt, ‘Structure and Function’, p. 191. 
10 Verificationism is a problematic concept and as such has seen a number of definitions; mine 
draws on A. J. Ayer’s and Carnap’s (adding the term ‘theoretical’ from Babbitt – see following 
example) as summarised in Richard Creath, ‘Logical Empiricism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2014 edn <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/ 
entries/logical-empiricism/> [accessed 17 December 2014] (section 4.1). 
11 ‘Contemporary Music Composition’, p. 298 (further citations follow in parentheses in the text); 
see also ‘Structure and Function’, pp. 196–97. 
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interval 𝑎 in pitch-class set 𝑋, then 𝑋 shares 𝑛 of its pitch-classes with the transposition of 𝑋 by 𝑎; 
similarly, 𝑛 occurrences of sum 𝑎 in set 𝑋 entails 2𝑛 shared pitch-classes between 𝑋 and its 
inversion about 𝑎/2.12  Index numbers therefore have a variety of compositional and analytical 
consequences: this, for Babbitt, constitutes their empirical verification. 
 Two observations about this philosophy may be noted: first, that a call for positivism is not 
the same thing as a call for scientific method; and second, that empirical “verification” (broadly 
construed) is a necessary foundation for formal theorising.  Babbitt himself underlines the first 
observation when he answers the hypothetical charge that music is not a science by asserting that 
‘[t]his, naturally, is not the point, not even a point’.13  The point, as he argues in a famous passage, 
is terminological rigour: 
[T]here is but one kind of language, one kind of method for the verbal 
formulation of “concepts” and the verbal analysis of such formulations: 
“scientific” language and “scientific” method. […] Our concern is not whether 
music has been, is, can be, will be, or should be a “science,” whatever that may be 
assumed to mean, but simply that statements about music must conform to those 
verbal and methodological requirements which attend the possibility of 
meaningful discourse in any domain.14 
The scare quotes around “scientific” resound throughout his work, as do calls for ‘an adequately 
reconstructed terminology’ satisfying ‘the shared standards of rational discourse’.15  Unless a 
concept can be defined in terms of musical observables, Babbitt argues, intersubjective 
understanding breaks down to be replaced by a set of personal opinions that can be neither 
corroborated nor refuted, thereby curtailing discussion and paralysing musical scholarship.  At a 
time when music theory was trying to establish itself as an intellectual discipline in the American 
academy, such paralysis was potentially fatal, as Babbitt was acutely aware.  He worries that ‘musical 
theory is not a theory in any sense in which the term ever has been employed’, that there is a 
possibility of ‘student[s] of contemporary philosophy and science [dismissing] the theory and – 
therefore, probably – the music, as immature and irresponsible’, that those ‘of predominantly 
literary orientation [may] transplant mistakenly the prevalent verbiage of that domain to our, at 
least, more modest area of activity’, and that non-specialist writers on music are frequently 
                                                     
12 There are two slight modifications to these rules that have been omitted from the above 
formulation for the sake of brevity.  The number of common pitch-classes under tritone 
transposition is actually double the number of tritones in the set (since two pitch-classes a tritone 
apart map onto each other when transposed by a tritone); similarly, since each pitch-class in a pair 
that sums to 𝑎 maps onto the other under inversion about 𝑎/2, the count of common pitch-classes 
increases by one if the set contains 𝑎/2 itself. 
13 ‘Structure and Function’, p. 192. 
14 Babbitt, ‘Past and Present Concepts’, p. 78.  Huron sees positivism’s main methodological legacy 
today as the fact that it ‘drew attention to the issue of language and meaning in scientific discourse’ 
(‘The New Empiricism’, para. 24). 
15 ‘Structure and Function’, p. 191; ‘Contemporary Music Composition’, p. 294. 
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misinformed partly due to specialists’ failure to use terminology clearly.16  His concerns are echoed 
by Gjerdingen (one of Taruskin’s evolutionists) nearly thirty years later when he argues that music 
theory’s ‘premisses of discourse’ should be open to ‘translation into domains where inexactitude is 
never mistaken for subtlety’.17 
 Clarity of definition is therefore a central component of Babbitt’s ‘“scientific” language’, 
but it is not its only component.  If a good definition fixes an observational concept, it can then be 
used as the basis of a logical system of theoretical concepts which reduces to ‘a connected set of 
axioms, definitions, and theorems, the proofs of which are derived by means of an appropriate 
logic […] when uninterpreted predicates and operations are substituted for the terms and 
operations designating musical observables’.18  Babbitt is suggesting that any work we require a 
scientific theory to do (such as generalisation, explanation, and prediction) can be accomplished by 
pouring appropriate definitions into a mathematical theory (that is, a logically connected set of ideas 
– see Section 1.10), ensuring via the deductive certainty of mathematics that all statements retain 
their moorings in empirical observation.  Although this separation of theory and definition has 
been critiqued (since definitions are theory-laden – see Section 1.4 – and tied up in the deductive 
process – see Section 1.7), Babbitt’s unusually tight relationship between scientific and 
mathematical methods has coloured the terms’ implications in the context of music theory ever 
since. 
As Marion Guck has convincingly argued, emphasis on Babbitt’s ‘“scientific” language’ 
(and on formal mathematics in particular) has overshadowed his complementary call for 
‘“scientific” method’.19  This is not a scientific method of rigorous data analysis and falsification, 
but a broader interpretation of empiricism (as reliance on sense experience) that can be seen in the 
verificationist insistence that all concepts are either directly observable or capable of implying 
observational statements.  Versions of this requirement can be seen at work in a variety of contexts 
as a means of justifying abstraction: Matthew Brown and Douglas Dempster suggest that 
everything in a music theory should ‘contribute to an explanation of musical events that are 
hearable’ but need not itself be hearable; Cook proposes that ‘no analytical model should be more 
abstract than it has to be in order to communicate the analyst’s interpretation of a work’; and 
                                                     
16 ‘Structure and Function’, p. 193 ‘employed’; p. 200 ‘student[s]’, ‘literary’; see also ‘Contemporary 
Music Composition’, pp. 270–74.  For more on music theory’s entry into the academy see Patrick 
McCreless, ‘Contemporary Music Theory and the New Musicology: An Introduction’, Journal of 
Musicology, 15 (1997), 291–96 (pp. 292–93), and for more on the requirements of the label ‘theory’ 
see Section 1.8 below.  
17 Robert Gjerdingen, ‘An Experimental Music Theory?’, in Rethinking Music, ed. by Nicholas Cook 
and Mark Everist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; repr. 2001), pp. 161–70 (p. 169). 
18 Babbitt, ‘Past and Present Concepts’, p. 79. 
19 Marion A. Guck, ‘Rehabilitating the Incorrigible’, in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. by 
Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 57–73. 
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Colyvan argues that the indispensability argument still applies to highly abstract mathematics ‘[s]o 
long as the chain of applications eventually bottoms out in physical science’.20  What is interesting 
about Babbitt’s brand of verification is that it foregrounds music theory’s status as a performative, 
an utterance that is itself an action rather than a representation: for Babbitt, this makes theory-led 
composition the apotheosis of music theory.  It is no coincidence that ‘useful’ and ‘useable’ come 
first in the list of desirable features that so intrigued Cook (cited in Section 1.1).  In his discussion 
of index numbers, Babbitt sees the assignment of observational content to a theoretical concept as 
a creative act – ‘What could be meant or designated by a sum of pitch numbers?’ (italics added) – and 
then justifies the utility of a property of certain twelve-tone sets in what would appear to be 
strikingly circular terms: 
This property is explanatory in that it explains the compositional use of such 
related sets, and – by extension – suggests more general applications […].  This 
property also functions as predictive in determining possible attributes of future 
works concerned with exposing this property.21 
1.3 Suggestive Description and Performative Perception 
The “scientific” and performative aspects of Babbitt’s theory appear to point in different directions, 
the former resting on the problematic notion of replicable and direct musical observables, the latter 
almost glorying in the arbitrariness and, therefore, creative potential of musical theory-building.  
Underlying this superficial tension are deeper questions concerning purpose and epistemology: that 
is, the kind of knowledge that music theory and analysis concern themselves with.  These are 
difficult questions to address in general, not only because a wide variety of individualised practices 
fall under the rubric of ‘music theory’, but also because those practices in themselves exhibit Cook’s 
‘[e]pistemological slippage’: each work of music theory ‘says how things are, it suggests how you 
might hear things, it recaptures historical conceptions, and each register merges imperceptibly into 
the next’.22  Cook’s prime example is Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Tonal 
Music, which draws on Heinrich Schenker’s quasi-metaphysical music theory, the same theory’s 
American post-war formalisation, Meyer and Cooper’s work on rhythm (influenced by Gestalt 
psychology), and structural linguistics (a partially empirical discipline).  Lerdahl’s further work adds 
in a spatial mathematical model which overlaps both with Schoenberg’s harmonic theory (itself 
drawing on work by Arthur von Oettingen and Hugo Riemann) and Carol Krumhansl’s empirical 
                                                     
20 Matthew Brown and Douglas J. Dempster, ‘The Scientific Image of Music Theory’, Journal of 
Music Theory, 33 (1989), 65–106 (p. 96); Cook, ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 140; 
Colyvan, p. 44. 
21 ‘Structure and Function’, pp. 196, 199. 
22 ‘Epistemologies’, p. 102; the rest of the present paragraph summarises pp. 99–102, where full 
references to the numerous works mentioned in passing here may be found.  For the theory at the 
centre of Cook’s discussion, see Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983; repr. 1985); see also Chapter 2, n. 92. 
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experiments on the perception of pitch relations.  The resultant writing veers between the scientific 
and the literary, and also finds a performative outlet in Lerdahl’s work as a composer. 
Broadly speaking, we might follow David Temperley in recognising two basic modes of 
music theory: the descriptive mode, which ‘attempts to describe listeners’ unconscious mental 
representations of music’, and the suggestive mode, which aims ‘to find and present new ways of 
hearing pieces’.23  Each, he argues, is valid on its own terms, and a given theory may differ in 
purpose across different structural levels, for different people, and at different times: a Schenkerian 
analysis might describe listeners’ experiences of local directed motion whilst also suggesting a 
binding Ursatz structure, for instance (p. 75), and a theory intended to be descriptive might turn out 
to be suggestive if its ‘assumption of perceptual uniformity is false’ (p. 78).  Temperley argues that 
‘remaining noncommittal between them, in the hope that something like this might happen’ is a 
methodological problem since we need to be ‘clear in our own minds about what we are claiming’ 
(p. 78); this is convincing insofar as a given theory cannot pretend to be describing experiences at 
the same time as it seeks to impart new ones.  However, there are dangers in both unchecked 
description (stating the obvious, making problematic truth claims about how the music “is”, or too 
readily attributing a particular technical “cause” to a supposed experiential “effect”) and unchecked 
suggestion (prioritising theories over pieces of music via anything-goes “formalism”). 
Most music theorists seek to retain both modes in their writing and, in doing so, endorse a 
kind of modified verificationism: analysis must latch onto description but ultimately go further in 
what it proposes, all without straying from the realms of plausibility.  This is a delicate balance, with 
Cook noting that ‘the perceptual reality of what the music theorist is saying seems to become 
parlous just at the point that it becomes of the greatest aesthetic interest’.24  Consider the following 
analytical maxims: 
Agawu: An analysis works best if it proceeds in a two-way stream, making explicit 
some of the listener’s intuitions (a confirmatory function) while at the same time 
firing the imagination that contemplates the music (an exploratory function). 
Guck: If a description is evocative, this constitutes strong empirical evidence in its 
favour. 
Schoenberg: Efforts to discover laws of art can then, at best, produce results 
something like those of a good comparison […].  In making a comparison we 
                                                     
23 David Temperley, ‘The Question of Purpose in Music Theory: Description, Suggestion, and 
Explanation’, Current Musicology, 66 (1999), 66–85 (pp. 68, 70); further page references to this article 
follow in parentheses in the text.  ‘Description’ is a broad category: as well as encompassing 
personalised analysis (‘I hear…’), which may or may not assume shared perceptions with the reader 
(‘…is heard as…’), it can also include perceptual or cognitive studies of music, or speculation 
regarding compositional processes.  It can even describe music in a way that avoids the composer 
and listener altogether, and hence buy into a form of musical creationism. 
24 ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 120. 
-18- 
 
 
  
-1
8
- 
bring closer what is too distant, thereby enlarging details, and remove to some 
distance what is too close, thereby gaining perspective. 
Cook: [I]nterpretation means transforming potential meaning [‘tensional or 
energetic qualities’ present in the music] into actualized meaning [‘that depends on 
words for its formulation and communication’] […] It is for this reason that there 
is a kind of sleight of hand in the impression [writers] give of simply describing 
how the music is, when in reality they are in the business of proposing 
interpretations and so constructing actualized meaning. 
Babbitt: [I]n addition to the crucial point of susceptibility to a perceptually 
feasible interpretation, the potential fruitfulness of [a music theory] is obviously 
contingent upon its degree of avoidance of “triviality” both formally and 
interpretively, in the sense of containing musical interpretations of the logical 
entailments of the formal system.25 
All of these writers show a clear concern that theory and analysis should remain anchored in, but 
not circumscribed by, musical “common sense”; to borrow another phrase from Cook, such 
analyses aim towards ‘the fusion of aural perception and imagination that we refer to as 
“hearing”’.26  Otherwise, we have no way of choosing between the infinite number of theoretical 
lenses that could be used to view a given piece: the only thing that elevates the meaningless to the 
suggestive, in other words, is the presence of the descriptive. 
Under this paradigm of music theory, it is easy to see how an analysis becomes a creative 
aesthetic response to a musical composition, just as any ‘evocative’ poetic description both 
describes and enhances its target experience.  Lewin links this idea to literary theorist Harold 
Bloom’s proposal that poems can be understood as responses to other poems, but broadens ‘poem’ 
to include any act of poiesis (making), including criticism, analysis, and the very act of perception 
itself.27  For Lewin, this feature of music theory is more important than any superficial differences 
between “scientific” and “poetic” writing styles such that ‘the writings of Babbitt are as much 
poems, in the broad interpretation of the post-Bloomian view, as are the writings of [critical 
musicologist James] Randall’.28  Agawu has compared analysis to both performance and 
                                                     
25 V. Kofi Agawu, Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), p. 79; Guck, p. 63; Schoenberg, Theory of Harmony, p. 11; Nicholas Cook, 
‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, Music Theory Spectrum, 23 (2001), 170–95 (p. 186; p. 185 ‘tensional’); 
Babbitt, ‘Past and Present Concepts’, p. 82. 
26 ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 129. 
27 Lewin, ‘Phenomenology’, p. 100; see Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry 
(New York; London: Oxford University Press, 1973; repr. 1975).  Bloom’s ideas have also been 
applied to music in Joseph N. Straus, Remaking the Past: Musical Modernism and the Influence of the Tonal 
Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); see pp. 12–20 especially. 
28 ‘Phenomenology’, p. 102.  Tymoczko has suggested that Guerino Mazzola’s highly technical 
1335-page book The Topos of Music (Guerino Mazzola and others, The Topos of Music: Geometric Logic of 
Concepts, Theory, and Performance (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2002)) could be understood ‘as a radical and 
challenging artwork that adopts the guise of scholarship, but whose ultimate goal is beauty rather 
than truth’: see Dmitri Tymoczko, ‘Mazzola’s Model of Fuxian Counterpoint’, in Mathematics and 
Computation in Music: Third International Conference, MCM 2011: Paris, France, June 15–17, 2011: 
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composition, and recently August Sheehy has likened it to improvisation.29  Taking this idea one 
step further, Alan Marsden has proposed a circular model of music’s ontology in which music as a 
psychological entity in a composer’s mind becomes, via the behaviour it influences, the sounds the 
behaviour creates, and the patterns and properties of the sounds, a set of concepts which almost – 
but not quite – lines up again with music as a psychological entity.30  Marsden then goes on to 
argue that this disconnect creates ‘potential music’, either in the form of compositions which have 
not yet been performed and therefore only exist in the composer’s mind, or in patterns and 
properties which are not accepted as hearable concepts.  The model therefore relates a piece’s 
conception to its reception extremely closely, and implies that every analysis is, in effect, a new 
piece of potential music in the conceptualisation it proposes. 
Analysis, then, is doing something to a piece rather than finding something out about it: as 
Schoenberg comments in a letter to Reti, ‘even had your analysis not told me anything new about 
my piece, still it was, above all, a deed.  And a deed is to be valued above all as it springs from a 
productive urge’.31  It therefore does not terminate in an article, book, presentation, or lesson 
(artefacts that Lewin describes as ‘ski tracks on the hill behind’), but must continue with the reader 
and listener; a good analysis, argues Agawu, ‘must always make discovery possible; if it seems 
closed, if it provides answers rather than further questions, it betrays its most potent attribute’.32  
The reader of an analysis is attempting to relive the analytical process, shuttling between score, 
prose, diagram, and (performed, imagined, and/or recorded) sound, so that its insights may be, in 
Cook’s words, ‘“seen” in the same sense as a joke: that is to say, not conceptualised in analytical 
terms, but grasped through what could be called a kind of inner performance’.33  An analysis lecture 
enacts and externalises this performance, but can leave the audience with little more than ‘a positive 
“aura”’ bereft of the ability to ‘review, criticise and go beyond’: while this stymies the ‘cumulative 
advancement of knowledge’ for Jean-Jacques Nattiez, it also robs listeners of the opportunity to 
perform analyses in their own unique ways.34 
                                                                                                                                                           
Proceedings, ed. by Carlos Agon and others, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 6726 (Berlin: 
Springer, 2011), pp. 297–310 (p. 306). 
29 See Kofi Agawu, ‘How We Got Out of Analysis, and How to Get Back In Again’, Music Analysis, 
23 (2004), 267–86 and August Sheehy, ‘Improvisation, Analysis, and Listening Otherwise’, Music 
Theory Online, 19.2 (June 2013) <http://mtosmt.org/issues/mto.13.19.2/mto.13.19.2.sheehy.php> 
[accessed 17 December 2014]. 
30 Alan Marsden, ‘Final Response: Ontology, Epistemology, and Some Research Proposals’, in 
3MR, pp. 161–67 (p. 162). 
31 Rudolph Reti, Tonality – Atonality – Pantonality: A Study of Some Trends in Twentieth-Century Music, 
rev. edn (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), p. 48 and plate II. 
32 Lewin, ‘Phenomenology’, p. 95; Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 319. 
33 ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 128. 
34 See Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ‘Varese’s Density 21.5: A Study in Semiological Analysis’, trans. by Anna 
Barry, Music Analysis, 1 (1982), 243–340 (p. 244).  As Nattiez’s argument suggests, this creates 
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1.4 A Scientific “Music Theory” 
Most analysis – whether describing, suggesting, or performing the behaviour of composers, 
listeners, or analysts – retains as its primary concern the human experience of sound.35  The best 
route to a scientific music theory therefore seems to be through the study of perception and 
cognition: but, like any interdisciplinary enterprise, the meeting of methodologies can become a 
zone of negotiation or even conflict, each side remaining sceptical about the guiding assumptions 
of the other.  Gjerdingen, wishing to take ‘[c]areful measurements of what is truly measurable’ and 
to situate these within general theories of human perception, denounces music theorists’ retention 
of inadequate, ill-defined, and aesthetically loaded terminology as a yardstick to judge psychological 
research: ‘Why don’t psychologists study real musical issues?’, a hypothetical interlocutor asks; ‘Why, 
for example, can’t they measure how long a tonic can be prolonged?’.36 
The scientific freedom to escape assumptions ‘grounded in, and hobbled by, the narrow 
aesthetic philosophy of an earlier century’, as Geraint Wiggins puts it, engages the issues of 
coherentism and foundationalism, two of Michel Foucault’s ‘epistemes’ on which Cook bases his 
epistemological and historical survey of music theory.37  Although broadly historical in origin, 
epistemes apply across all of human thought and their deployment as ‘epistemological options’ (p. 
80) continues today; particularly, Cook argues, in music theory.  Coherentism is an episteme 
characteristic of pre-seventeenth century thought and justifies knowledge by assessing its 
compatibility with existing knowledge: it therefore accumulates observations based on judgements 
of similitude, emulating the ‘great chain of being’ stretching from God to the soil via angels, 
humans, animals, and plants.38  This is an approach that, in Gjerdingen’s phrase, ‘precludes 
fundamental revisions, major discoveries, or even accidental breakthroughs’, shortcomings that 
                                                                                                                                                           
certain institutional problems since analysis-as-performance fits uncomfortably within traditional 
models of research; cf. Babbitt’s anxieties concerning music theory’s respectability cited in Section 
1.2, and see also Agawu, ‘How We Got Out of Analysis’, pp. 274–77. 
35 See Cook, ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 117 for some qualifications: he cites Carl 
Dahlhaus’s comment that this is largely a product of the last two centuries, Lewin’s argument (in 
‘Phenomenology’) that music theory can focus too much on listening at the expense of other 
modes of response, and articles suggesting that some non-Western musics are structured around 
gesture rather than sound.  However, the basic observation as it applies to music theory in the 
contemporary West, he argues, still stands. 
36 Gjerdingen, ‘Experimental Music Theory’, pp. 166, 163. 
37 Wiggins, ‘Response to Marsden and Mazzola’, p. 97; Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, in particular pp. 80–
84.  Cook draws on Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
(London: Tavistock, 1970), particularly pp. 22–61. 
38 There is also a sense in which modern scientific theories are coherentist, in that they “add” but 
never “take away”: Einsteinian gravitation subsumes Newtonian gravitation as a special case, and 
the observation that the Earth is a sphere does not contradict the understanding that the planet’s 
surface is locally flat (see Isaac Asimov, ‘The Relativity of Wrong’, Skeptical Inquirer, 14.1 (Fall 1989), 
35–44). 
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foundationalism aims to overcome by ‘sweep[ing] away sedimented knowledge’ in the spirit of the 
Enlightenment.39  It therefore takes as little as possible for granted and builds theories in a 
systematic, rational way on a few fundamental “certainties” (which may or may not be empirical, 
and which in turn may or may not be established through a scientific method). 
The wholesale rejection of traditional music theory can, as argued in the remainder of this 
chapter, be a highly problematic move.  Some writers, like Temperley, try to limit foundationalism’s 
ambit by separating music theory’s entangled modes of discourse in a manner reminiscent of 
Stephen Jay Gould’s argument for the ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ of science and religion: in this 
understanding, the two magisteria (teaching authorities) answer fundamentally different types of 
question (broadly speaking, science answers ‘how?’ while religion answers ‘why?’), and so neither 
should pronounce on the activities of the other.40  We therefore find Temperley drawing the 
descriptive–suggestive divide and implying that descriptive questions are best answered by music 
psychologists, Eugene Narmour distinguishing cognitive scientists’ interest in ‘natural’ modes of 
listening from music theorists’ active construction of ‘denaturalized’ ones, Ian Cross arguing that 
science can ‘underpin’ but not ‘replace elements of analytical or hermeneutic accounts’, and 
Gjerdingen similarly arguing that music theory should not ‘become’, but rather ‘embrace 
experimental science’ so as not to lose its ‘important historical and art-critical components’.41  
While the prevailing picture is one of two broadly independent projects continuing alongside each 
other, Cross and Gjerdingen in particular appear to imply that the results of scientific enquiry can 
safely be passed to music theory for ‘hermeneutic’ or ‘art-critical’ interpretation as shown in Figure 
1.1, just as one might explore the theological implications of Darwinian evolution. 
The major problem with this strategy is that descriptions and observations are always theory-
laden: they are inseparable from their guiding theories, which always underpin the choice, execution, 
and interpretation of measurements.  Even a basic musical statement such as ‘the violin plays a C’ 
embeds a whole host of ideas about sound, tuning systems, notational systems, scales, and the 
primacy of the individual pitch as the unit of theorising; the phrase ‘the violin plays pitch-class 0’ is 
an alternative description of the same event, but one which rests on a different set of assumptions 
and suggests a different musical and theoretical context (it is argued in Section 1.10 that this can be 
enough to make it a description or model of a different event).  This not only makes strict 
foundationalism as an escape from theory impossible (it is better understood as the sweeping away 
                                                     
39 Gjerdingen, ‘Experimental Music Theory’, p. 162; Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, p. 84. 
40 See Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Nonoverlapping Magisteria’, Natural History, 106.2 (March 1997), 16–22 
and 60–62. 
41 Temperley, ‘Question of Purpose’; Eugene Narmour, ‘Our Varying Histories and Future 
Potential: Models and Maps in Science, the Humanities, and in Music Theory’, Music Perception, 29 
(2011–12), 1–21 (p. 11); Ian Cross, ‘Music Analysis and Music Perception’, Music Analysis, 17 (1998), 
3–20 (pp. 6, 16); Gjerdingen, ‘Experimental Music Theory’, p. 169. 
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of accumulated knowledge by another theoretical outlook; a paradigm shift in the sense of Thomas 
Kuhn), but also confounds any simple attempt to ‘embrace’ experimental science within music 
theory, to proceed from scientific description to hermeneutic gloss, since the latter comes with its 
own set of descriptive concepts and the former its own set of theoretical implications.42  It is in 
these traditional descriptive concepts that a suggestive music theory trades, making use of a shared 
language to construct and communicate its insights: by retaining its stake in description and its 
attachment to the historical or aesthetic value of certain concepts, the walls of its magisterium 
become porous.43 
Music theory therefore embeds a certain coherentist bias: Agawu’s two-way stream, Guck’s 
evocative description, Schoenberg’s good comparison, Cook’s actualised meaning, and Babbitt’s 
non-trivial interpretation all make appeals to existing conceptualisations and draw their strength 
from not contradicting them.44  These existing conceptualisations are the ground truths that new 
                                                     
42 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th edn with an introductory essay by 
Ian Hacking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. vii–xxxvii for Hacking’s introduction 
to Kuhn’s thought (pp. xvii–xxv discuss ‘paradigm’ in particular).  Guck (pp. 71–72) has argued that 
a narrative reading similarly does not simply gloss analytical “facts”, but ‘begins life as an analysis’ (p. 
71), with observation and interpretation inseparably intertwined. 
43 Cross argues that authors should be explicit about whether their theory ‘employ[s] either a folk-
psychological theory of musical perception or a cognitive-scientific one’ (p. 18), a distinction that at 
first seems to mirror Temperley’s separation of suggestion (traditional theory) and description 
(cognitive science) but in fact suggests that both types of theory engage the descriptive.  The concept 
of a folk psychology is defined at n. 52 below. 
44 Coherentism can be said to underlie certain twentieth-century analyses in a more direct way too: 
Cook cites Reti’s method of ‘piling up of resemblance upon resemblance’ (‘Epistemologies’, p. 82), 
a tactic also apparent in certain pitch-class set analyses.  Such analysis at its worst is simply 
‘commentary, endlessly reiterated’ (p. 82) on the prevailing truth that “this work of music is 
Music theory overwritten by scientific theory 
=theory of music 
 
Retention of music-theoretical descriptive terms 
=rhetorical foundationalism 
Music-theoretical 
interpretation 
Scientific 
description 
 
Figure 1.1: A simple trajectory from description to theory is problematised by the 
theory-ladenness of observational terminology. 
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music theories, even purportedly foundationalist ones, seek to model (an argument which is 
expanded in Sections 1.5, 1.7, and 1.9 below).  Cook recounts Rameau’s attempts to derive the 
“laws” of harmony from the overtone series of a corps sonore, focusing in particular on the logical 
contortions that he must perform in order to reconstruct the minor triad.45  Clearly, any theory that 
ignores music in the minor key is at best incomplete and at worst inadequate – judgements that are 
based on existing theory and also existing practice (which is in turn shaped and mediated by theory) 
– and so, by ‘adopting the rhetoric of foundationalism but in reality synthesizing received 
knowledge within a more or less unified framework’, Rameau’s theory shades into coherentism.46 
The trope of rhetorical foundationalism is a common one in music theory, usually 
proceeding (as in Rameau’s writings) from the overtone series as the prime “certainty” rooting 
music in the natural world.  The trope began, apocryphally, with Pythagoras’s stroll past a 
blacksmith who was striking metal with hammers of different weights: consonant intervals were 
produced by hammers with weights in small consecutive whole-number ratios (the unison (1:1), 
octave (2:1), fifth (3:2) and fourth (4:3)), an idea which tied in (coherently) with the Pythagorean 
worldview that numbers were the ‘constituent elements of reality’, icons of the harmonious design 
of the Universe.47  This Pythagorean cosmology persisted into the Renaissance: major and minor 
thirds and sixths were defined and legitimated (by, for example, Bartolomeo Ramis de Pareia in his 
Musica practica of 1482) not through strict acoustical consistency with the perfect intervals, but by 
using the next ratios in the sequence, 5:4 (=80:64≈81:64) and 6:5 (=162:135≈160:135).48  A shift 
in this thinking was marked at the end of the sixteenth century by a subtle reconceptualisation of 
mathematics from building block of the universe to tool of physics: consonance not as the product 
of whole-number ratios per se, but of the overtone series produced by a vibrating object (although 
Catherine Nolan notes that Rameau persisted with a mathematical explanation in terms of string 
length ratios as late as 1722).49  From there, Cook traces a general historical trend – via Helmholtz, 
Schenker, Schoenberg, and Babbitt, whose rejection of the “given-ness” of consonance was 
referred to in Section 1.1 – away from the idea that the overtone series can motivate and justify all 
the contents of a given theory.50  The urge to begin afresh from the first principles of acoustics and 
                                                                                                                                                           
unified”, identifying more and more occurrences of a particular pattern without concern for how 
these patterns change through time, or how they function structurally, rhetorically, or affectively. 
45 Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, pp. 84–87. 
46 Ibid., p. 85. 
47 See Catherine Nolan, ‘Music Theory and Mathematics’, in The Cambridge History of Western Music 
Theory, ed. by Christensen, pp. 272–304 (pp. 272–73; p. 273 ‘reality’). 
48 Ibid., p. 276.  If a tone=a fifth–a fourth=3:2/4:3=9:8, then a major third=two 
tones=(9:8)2=81:64 and a minor third=a fifth–a major third=3:2/81:64=32:27(=160:135). 
49 Ibid., p. 278. 
50 Schenker, for example, saw the major triad as an abbreviation of the overtone series, and the 
minor triad as an artificial imitation of the major triad; he claimed that Nature provides the ‘hint’ 
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psycho-acoustics has continued in modern theory, however, with Tymoczko citing papers on the 
perception of consonance in animals to support the idea of its innateness, and Wiggins piecing 
together psycho-acoustical studies to sketch a theory rooted in near-universal human perception.51 
It was argued above (see Figure 1.1) that an attempt to proceed from scientific description 
to music-theoretical interpretation is bound to be problematic since each has a stake in the other’s 
language: in Rameau’s case, his foundationalist project failed because he allowed the traditional 
concepts of the latter to influence the method of the former.  The complementary solution – giving 
scientific concepts the theoretical breathing-space to overwrite traditional music theory if necessary 
– is advocated by some cognitive scientists like Wiggins or historians like Taruskin, who disavow a 
“separate-but-equal” coexistence or indeed ignore the possibility of an alternative magisterium 
altogether.  Wiggins argues that music theory, being ‘a descriptive model of music perception as 
collectively learned in a particular culture’ (known as a folk psychology), becomes a pointless 
exercise unless it diverts all of its efforts to the study of the cognitive activities of those who 
produce and receive it; anything else is ‘to study (or model) an effect without considering (or 
modelling) its cause’, reaching empirical conclusions (about listeners’ or composers’ mental 
activities) through rational introspection.52  The ‘folk psychology’ of music theory should therefore, 
he argues, be entirely superseded by a scientifically rigorous cognitive music theory.53 
Such an approach is likely to produce an account that is more scientific than Rameau’s; it is 
also likely to produce something that stands outside what would normally be termed ‘music theory’, 
given the understanding proposed in Section 1.3.  As Colyvan has argued, those seeking to 
understand (or even change) the methodology, epistemology, and philosophy of a particular field 
should not attempt to redefine it to such a radical extent that it no longer bears any relation to 
practice: ‘[t]he job of philosophers of science and mathematics is to help make sense of, and 
contribute to, science and mathematics as practised [and] not to overrule the pronouncements of 
mathematics and science on philosophical grounds’ (p. 78).  Wiggins himself considers ‘a quick look 
over the music theory section of any good library’ sufficient reason to reject an overly restrictive 
                                                                                                                                                           
and art does the rest (see Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, p. 89, and pp. 85–91 more generally).  The term 
‘hint’ is from Heinrich Schenker, Harmony, ed. by Oswald Jonas, trans. by Elisabeth Mann Borgese 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954; repr. 1972), p. 20. 
51 See Dmitri Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music: Harmony and Counterpoint in the Extended Common 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 5, n. 5 and Geraint A. Wiggins, ‘Position 
Paper: Music, Mind and Mathematics: Theory, Reality and Formality’, in 3MR, pp. 111–23 (p. 118). 
52 Wiggins, ‘Position Paper’, p. 120; Geraint A. Wiggins, ‘Final Response: The Future of 
(Mathematical) Music Theory’, in 3MR, pp. 135–44 (p. 137).  For Taruskin, talk about music is 
meaningless ‘unless its agents can be specified; and agents can only be people’ (Oxford History, I: The 
Earliest Notations to the Sixteenth Century, p. xxvi). 
53 Cross similarly distinguishes between folk psychology and cognitive science in the realm of music 
theory (see n. 43 above), but does not argue that the latter should always supersede the former (see 
n. 41 above). 
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definition of music theory, and so it is problematic for him to dismiss the heterogeneous reality of 
music-theoretical practice as (among many other things) ‘the intellectual self-satisfaction of the lone 
scholar’, and argue that it ‘is both a proxy and approximate’, when such an account also entails 
dismissing the books on his shelves, the professional practice of the writers of those books, and the 
historical-theoretical environments surrounding the subjects of those books.54 
The writing of music theory is a suggestive, performative act that nevertheless must ‘slip’ 
into the descriptive mode to anchor its insights in empirical observation.  If an account of music is 
framed in terms of scientifically supported theories of perception, then it is better characterised as a 
theory of music rather than a music theory (a theory about music); the latter might still use the 
paraphernalia of scientific method (including statistical tests and mathematical models), but must 
retain as its primary purpose the performance and communication of suggestive insights in a shared 
conceptual language.55  On the face of it, this reframing is mere wordplay, retaining ideas and 
definitions whilst simply swapping terms around on the surface: but one of the terms – ‘music 
theory’ – is central to the present discussion and has a rich sedimented meaning that cannot be 
ignored. 
1.5 Mediation 
As is the case with any binary categorisation, the dividing line between theories of and theories 
about music is not always clear, and this is an even more pressing concern when the second term is 
defined by its slippage into areas of the first.  An argument against dispensing with traditional music 
theory in terms of respecting the reality of practice is presented above, but there is also a more 
concrete methodological reason why a theory of music cannot afford to ignore theories about 
music: the phenomenon of mediation.  Countering Wiggins’s assertion that music theory is mostly 
descriptive, an optional extra for composers, Marsden argues that the practices of composing and 
listening are unavoidably affected by music theory: either directly through training, or indirectly 
through acculturation in the results of that training.56  An alternative interpretation might place 
theory, performatively, as post facto composition, such that the response to Wiggins’s insistence that 
‘[s]omeone, somewhere, was the first person to use [a perfect cadence], and it was only after the 
event that it was theorized’ is that they hadn’t actually used a perfect cadence until someone else, 
                                                     
54 ‘Position Paper’, p. 112; ‘Final Response’, p. 140; ‘Response to Marsden and Mazzola’, p. 99. 
55 The theories-of/theories-about terminology comes from Wiggins, ‘Position Paper’, p. 119 and p. 
122, n. 8, but I do not agree with his cursory dismissal of the latter as irrelevant in an exploration of 
the meaning of ‘music theory’. 
56 Wiggins, ‘Response to Marsden and Mazzola’, p. 98; Alan Marsden, ‘Response to Geraint 
Wiggins’, in 3MR, pp. 125–28 (pp. 125–26). 
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somewhere else, theorised what a perfect cadence was, thus turning a collection of pitches into a 
theoretical entity.57 
An example of theoretical mediation is provided by Marsden in his discussion of the gap-
fill principle: that is, the music-theoretical idea that a melodic leap is usually followed by motion in 
the opposite direction (Figure 1.2a).58  A statistical investigation by Huron and Paul von Hippel has 
suggested that this is only partially accurate, and that the phenomenon can be better modelled by 
regression to the mean (Figure 1.2b): the two principles agree if the leap spans the melody’s centre 
point, but where they disagree, regression to the mean provides the better fit with the observed 
data.59  Independently of these findings, Wiggins and Marcus Pearce have created a learning-based 
computational model of melodic expectation in which ‘no hard-wired, music-theoretic rules are necessary’: 
the model makes accurate predictions of listeners’ expectations in a given context based on 
statistical analysis of a large number of melodies it “knows”.60  If regression to the mean 
characterises a large number of melodies, then, and if listeners’ expectations are conditioned by the 
melodies they know, then it might seem reasonable to suggest that listeners expect regression to the 
mean rather than gap-fill.  However, this is not the case: an experiment by von Hippel has shown 
no preference for either principle among non-musically trained subjects, and a preference for gap-
fill among the musically trained, leading Huron to posit the possibility that listeners (especially 
those who have received some training in music theory) use the gap-fill principle as a heuristic, an 
efficient (if occasionally inaccurate) rule of thumb.61  ‘Clearly,’ argues Temperley in a recent study 
comparing rule-based and statistical models of interval probability, ‘humans have the capacity to 
learn general rules; they also have the capacity to absorb large amounts of statistical information’, 
                                                     
57 Wiggins, ‘Final Response’, p. 138.  Cf. Jerrold Levinson’s argument that, since ‘[a] sound event 
conforming to the sound structure of Beethoven’s Quintet, Opus 16 logically could have occurred 
in the Paleozoic era’, an ontology of musical works must take into account the composer’s role in 
indicating a particular sound structure: see Jerrold Levinson, ‘What a Musical Work Is’, Journal of 
Philosophy, 77 (1980), 5–28 (repr. in Music, Art, and Metaphysics: Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990; repr. 1996), pp. 63–88) (p. 7). 
58 Alan Marsden, ‘Position Paper: Counselling a Better Relationship Between Mathematics and 
Musicology’, in 3MR, pp. 145–53 (pp. 146–49); the present paragraph summarises Marsden’s 
narrative. 
59 Paul von Hippel and David Huron, ‘Why Do Skips Precede Reversals? The Effect of Tessitura 
on Melodic Structure’, Music Perception, 18 (2000–01), 59–85. 
60 Wiggins, ‘Response to Marsden and Mazzola’, p. 95; see also Marcus T. Pearce and Geraint A. 
Wiggins, ‘Expectation in Melody: The Influence of Context and Learning’, Music Perception, 23 
(2005–06), 377–405.  Their model (known as IDyOM) is therefore a theory of music, predicated on 
theoretical ideas about human learning in general rather than on traditional music theory. 
61 Paul von Hippel, ‘Melodic-Expectation Rules as Learned Heuristics’, in Seventh International 
Conference on Music Perception & Cognition: Conference Proceedings, ed. by Catherine Stevens and others 
(Adelaide: Causal Productions, 2002), pp. 315–17 [on CD]; David Huron, Sweet Anticipation: Music 
and the Psychology of Expectation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006; repr. 2007), pp. 94–97 (these 
pages of Huron’s book outline Marsden’s gap-fill narrative in similar terms). 
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necessarily inviting a trade-off (discussed in more detail in Sections 1.8 and 1.9) between the 
conceptual simplicity and goodness-of-fit of a proposed model.62 
The argument for statistical learning underpins a research methodology – christened 
‘musical corpus research’ in the introduction (by Temperley and Leigh VanHandel) to a recent pair 
of issues of Music Perception devoted to the topic – in which the lines between theories of and about 
music are at their most blurred.63  As its name suggests, this methodology examines corpora of 
musical data (usually suitably encoded scores) using computational and statistical methods and so, 
according to Temperley and VanHandel, ‘becomes an important part of the field of music 
perception: gathering statistical information from music simulates the listener’s learning process, 
and provides parameters needed for the modeling of expectation and other aspects of perception’ 
(p. 1).  The leap is thereby easily made from a ‘creationist’ account of the regularities found in 
musical objects (note that at no point is it necessary to conduct any psychological tests on human 
subjects, despite tests of this type unexpectedly saving the notion of gap-fill) to an ‘evolutionist’ 
account of the underlying perceptual mechanisms of composers and listeners.  There is a subtle but 
significant difference, however, between (for example) Yuri Broze and Huron’s suggestion that 
higher music tends to be faster due to the physical properties of instruments and performers (as 
well as the perceptual limitations of listeners), and Jon Prince and Mark Schmuckler’s supposition 
‘that composers correlate the tonal and metric hierarchies in their compositions’ consciously as a 
way of manipulating listeners’ expectations and therefore ‘communicating musical emotion’.64  
Both are cognitive hypotheses about compositional behaviours: but while the former constitutes a 
                                                     
62 David Temperley, ‘Probabilistic Models of Melodic Interval’, Music Perception, 32 (2014–15), 85–
99 (p. 98; see also p. 96). 
63 The special issues are numbers 1 (September 2013), 1–95 and 3 (February 2014), 191–301 of 
Music Perception, 31 (2013–14); all items cited in notes 64 to 66 below are drawn from these.  For the 
introduction, see David Temperley and Leigh VanHandel, ‘Introduction to the Special Issues on 
Corpus Methods’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–14), 1–3 (p. 1 ‘musical corpus research’). 
64 Yuri Broze and David Huron, ‘Is Higher Music Faster? Pitch–Speed Relationships in Western 
Compositions’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–14), 19–31 (pp. 29–30); Jon B. Prince and Mark A. 
Schmuckler, ‘The Tonal-Metric Hierarchy: A Corpus Analysis’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–14), 254–
70 (p. 265). 
a) The gap-fill principle b) Regression to the mean 
Figure 1.2: The gap-fill principle agrees in part with the principle of regression to the 
mean. 
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theory of music, offering acoustical and physiological explanations for its observed phenomena, the 
latter only makes sense under the assumption that the composers being discussed (and the listeners 
that those composers presupposed) had some concept of tonal theory (statistically learned or 
otherwise).  Conclusions of the second type are strengthened by what Gjerdingen terms 
‘“historically informed” corpus studies’ in his contribution to the special issues of Musical Perception: 
he argues that, for example, rather than tallying Roman-numeral progressions in Bach, it might be 
more enlightening to look for the cadenza doppia, a scale-degree archetype ‘taught to every apprentice 
musician at the conservatoires in Naples’ in Bach’s time.65 
The normative or regulative music theories that shape musical practice (and therefore 
mediate the musical “object”) can incorporate a variety of preoccupations (for example, the quasi-
theological justification of the ‘just’ thirds 5:4 and 6:5), but are often themselves responses to 
perceived musical patterns: in other words, they can be folk psychologies, or pseudo-theories, of 
music.  Some music theories are therefore amenable to rigorous empirical testing (John Paul Ito 
measures how well Koch’s theories describe Mozart’s music), or else can be treated as records of 
cognitive or perceptual responses to music: when Joshua Albrecht and Daniel Shanahan report a 
new key-finding algorithm which matches piece titles and the judgements of independent analysts 
with 95.1% accuracy, what they have really constructed is a model of how composers and analysts 
form a theory of a piece of music’s key.66  But even if a music theory is found to be wanting as an 
empirical description of a musical corpus (Ito (p. 220) concludes that ‘the patterns Koch describes 
[…] are not prevalent enough to justify taking them as givens’), this is not grounds for its rejection 
as a mediating heuristic for listeners or composers (as in the case of gap-fill) or a good comparison 
(as in Ito’s insistence (ibid.) that ‘Koch’s tools can provide an extremely rich perspective on the 
music of Mozart and Haydn’) – even if the comparison is not as good as first thought.  Certain 
pieces of musical corpus research therefore produce what Gjerdingen characterises as ‘complexified 
dogma’: they establish the domain of applicability of, or the regularities that may have given rise to, 
a particular music theory, but do not seek to question its basic premises.67 
                                                     
65 Robert O. Gjerdingen, ‘“Historically Informed” Corpus Studies’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–14), 
192–204 (p. 197).  The same argument is advanced from the perspective of the corpus itself, rather 
than the theories used to mine it, in Justin London’s contribution (Justin London, ‘Building a 
Representative Corpus of Classical Music’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–14), 68–90), which aims to 
assemble a corpus of classical works reasonably familiar to a typical modern listener. 
66 John Paul Ito, ‘Koch’s Metrical Theory and Mozart’s Music: A Corpus Study’, Music Perception, 31 
(2013–14), 205–22; Joshua Albrecht and Daniel Shanahan, ‘The Use of Large Corpora to Train a 
New Type of Key-Finding Algorithm: An Improved Treatment of the Minor Mode’, Music 
Perception, 31 (2013–14), 59–67 (pp. 62, 66). 
67 Gjerdingen, ‘Experimental Music Theory’, p. 162. 
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1.6 Two Cultures 
If we take the goals of music theory to align with the goals of the humanities more broadly (as 
Section 1.8’s discussion of theory in the humanities argues we can), some of the tensions between 
science and music theory can be understood as a clash of C. P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ (the sciences 
and the humanities).68  As suggested above, each culture has different requirements of a theory, 
different expectations of a definition, and different concepts of empirical adequacy, and these three 
crucial aspects of theory-building are examined in more detail in the next three sections.  But nearer 
the surface than these epistemological and methodological concerns are matters of institutional 
culture and professional training that, as argued in a recent issue of the Journal of Mathematics and 
Music devoted to methodological debate, frequently lead to misunderstandings between domains.69  
To give a sketch of the relevant straw men: musicologists are vague, quick to make unsupported 
empirical claims, and anxious about the scientific need for abstraction and generalisation, with 
those that do dabble in science and mathematics frequently lacking the relevant training ‘to meet 
the specific standards required of researchers in established experimental sciences’ or in high-level 
mathematics ‘far from [that] conceived by music theorists’.70  Scientists, meanwhile, are locked in a 
meaningless and arrogant quest for “precise” definitions of nuanced and sedimented terminology 
(Guerino Mazzola, encountering ‘a set of completely incoherent, fuzzy, and fragmentary 
“theories”’, in his own words ‘decided to rethink musicology in a rigorous way’), and ‘are often 
unwilling to discuss their work in terms intelligible to the uninitiated’.71  They are also guilty of 
deficiencies in training, with Marsden warning against the ‘mathematician who believes that he or 
she understands music simply because he or she is good at playing it and has heard lots’ (echoing 
Babbitt’s characterisation of ‘the light-hearted impudence of the scientist vis-à-vis music’), and 
arguing that it is possibly easier for a musician to learn a circumscribed set of scientific methods 
and concepts than it is for a scientist ‘to learn the subtleties of music analysis’.72  Huron frames 
                                                     
68 See C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution: The Rede Lecture 1959 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1959; repr. 1960). 
69 See 3MR, and in particular (for a summary), Anja Volk and Aline Honingh, ‘Introduction: 
Mathematical and Computational Approaches to Music: Challenges in an Interdisciplinary 
Enterprise’, in 3MR, pp. 73–81. 
70 Gjerdingen, ‘Experimental Music Theory’, p. 169; Guerino Mazzola, ‘Position Paper: Thinking 
Music with Precision, Depth, and Passion’, in 3MR, pp. 83–91 (p. 88). 
71 Guerino Mazzola, ‘Mazzola’s Response to Marsden’s Text’, in 3MR, pp. 155–59 (p. 156); 
Raymond Erickson, ‘Music Analysis and the Computer’, Journal of Music Theory, 12 (1968), 240–63 
(p. 241), quoted in Alan Marsden, ‘“What Was the Question?”: Music Analysis and the Computer’, 
in Modern Methods for Musicology: Prospects, Proposals, and Realities, ed. by Tim Crawford and Lorna 
Gibson, Digital Research in the Arts and Humanities (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 137–47 (p. 
137) with the observation that ‘little has changed’ in the intervening forty years. 
72 Marsden, ‘Position Paper’, p. 152; Babbitt, ‘Contemporary Music Composition’, p. 272; Marsden, 
‘What Was the Question?’, p. 147.  Mazzola’s proposed musicological pre-requisites for 
interdisciplinary work seem basic and incomplete alongside his seven advanced mathematical topics 
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these differences in more equitable terms by arguing that they reflect the different training priorities 
attached to research methodology and epistemology, respectively, in the sciences and the 
humanities.73 
 When mathematics, which often unwillingly serves as an icon of scientific epistemology, 
appears within the context of music theory, it can, then, be subject to criticism from both cultures: 
on the one hand as an inadequate or even manipulative attempt to impart an illusive sense of 
scientific rigour, and on the other as an essentialising “explanation” of the heterogeneous, culturally 
situated practice of music.  But if mathematics is the ‘language’ of science, and not itself science, 
then there is no reason why it cannot be – alongside written analyses, verbal analyses, diagrams, and 
performances – a language of music theory.  One way it might fill this role, as suggested in Section 
1.5, is as a tool for what Cook describes as ‘doing traditional musicology better’: statistical and 
computational studies allow rich observations to be made about large quantities of data without 
sacrificing the underlying nature of the questions asked, and indeed Marsden has argued that all 
testable claims made about music should be underpinned by such studies.74  But mathematics can 
also serve the suggestive ends of good comparison through the process of modelling, as discussed 
in Section 1.10: once ideas have been conceptually clarified (which ‘is not the same’, warns 
Marsden, ‘as making them easier to understand’), finding where these ‘tidy mathematical systems’ 
(see n. 1) break down when faced with musical reality can be instructive in revealing what 
individuates a particular piece or practice.75  The next three sections explore what it means for a 
mathematical model to ‘clarify’ sedimented terminology, to serve as a ‘comparison’ within the 
context of humanities theory, and to be described, under certain criteria, as ‘good’. 
                                                                                                                                                           
and five sizeable computational ones: ‘Sonata theory, serialism, large forms, instrumentation and 
orchestration, music semiotics, acoustics.’ (‘Position Paper’, p. 90) 
73 ‘The New Empiricism’, para. 10. 
74 Nicholas Cook, ‘Towards the Compleat Musicologist?’ (paper presented at the International 
Society for Music Information Retrieval Conference, London, 2005), available at 
<http://ismir2005.ismir.net/keynote.html#cook> [accessed 17 December 2014], p. 6; Alan 
Marsden, ‘Music, Mathematics, Morality and Motion’ (paper presented at the RMA Study Day on 
Music and Mathematics, Leeds, 2014).  Huron advances a similar argument in rhetoric reminiscent 
of Babbitt’s call for terminological rigour (‘The New Empiricism’, para. 155): ‘For the new 
empiricist, an interest in quantitative methods has nothing to do with science.  It has everything to 
do with becoming a more observant music scholar.’ 
75 Alan Marsden, ‘Response to Guerino Mazzola’, in 3MR, pp. 103–06 (p. 104). 
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1.7 Theory-Building I: Definition 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a number of terms that can be used to characterise 
different types of definition, of which three will be particularly useful for the following discussion:76 
1) A stipulative definition ‘imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment 
that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term’. 
2) A descriptive definition ‘aim[s] to be adequate to existing usage’. 
3) An explicative definition ‘aims to respect some central uses of a term but is stipulative on 
others’. 
Marsden associates stipulative definitions with rationalism and descriptive definitions with 
empiricism; broadly speaking, we might therefore equate the former with mathematics (as the 
logician Gottlob Frege has argued we should) and the latter with science.77  The third type of 
definition was proposed by Carnap, one of Babbitt’s chief influences, and we can see embedded 
within it the twin positivist concerns for empirical validity and formal manipulability.  It also 
reflects the idea of ‘evocative’ description in music theory since an analysis must simultaneously 
describe and stipulate. 
 In practice, stipulative and descriptive definitions exist on a spectrum, and most definitions 
are explicative to some degree.  No descriptive (or dictionary) definition can ever completely 
capture a term’s full range of uses and resonances and so must impose a stipulative closure, and 
most stipulative concepts are attached to words with analogous informal meanings (such as the 
mathematical sense of ‘set’).  This spectrum must be negotiated in any work of mathematical music 
theory (or, more generally, any work of applied mathematics): when Chantal Buteau and Mazzola 
define a motive as ‘a non-empty finite set of notes [with no two notes sharing the same onset 
time]’, they are clearly trying to be faithful to the concept of melody whilst stipulating which of its 
aspects are to shape its role as a formal object.78 
Stipulative definitions in mathematics are therefore determined not (or not only) by a drive 
towards “better” or more precise concepts, but by an invisible hand of theory similar to that which 
guides the process of rhetorical foundationalism.  Imre Lakatos has argued that the traditional, 
strictly deductive, definition–theorem–proof format of mathematical writing ‘hides the adventure’: 
                                                     
76 Anil Gupta, ‘Definitions’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 
2014 edn <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/definitions/> [accessed 17 
December 2014]; the three quotes are from sections 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 respectively. 
77 Marsden, ‘Final Response’, p. 163; Gottlob Frege, ‘Logic in Mathematics’, in Posthumous Writings, 
ed. by Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, and Friedrich Kaulbach, trans. by Peter Long and Roger 
White with Raymond Hargreaves (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), pp. 203–50 (e.g. pp. 203, 211). 
78 Chantal Buteau and Guerino Mazzola, ‘Motivic Analysis According to Rudolph Réti: 
Formalization by a Topological Model’, Journal of Mathematics and Music, 2 (2008), 117–34 (p. 119). 
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definitions ‘frequently look artificial and mystifyingly complicated’ and theorems ‘are loaded with 
heavy-going conditions’, but ‘[o]ne is never told how these complications arose’.79  The process of 
mathematical reasoning is therefore closer to the picture painted by Colyvan (p. 148): 
We start out with some intuitive mathematical concepts, derive some results using 
these concepts, refine our definitions in light of the results, and revisit the 
derivations.  Neither definition nor derivation is logically or temporally prior to 
the other.  This is in stark contrast to the received view of mathematics being a 
deductive science, cranking out theorems by agreed-upon rules and using well-
defined concepts given in advance. 
To illustrate this, Lakatos presents a dialogue on Euler’s polyhedron formula: that is, for any 
polyhedron, the number of vertices plus the number of faces minus the number of edges equals 
two.80  It is easy to find counter-examples to this conjecture (for example, a cube with another cube 
hollowed out from its centre, or two pyramids that touch at a vertex), and so we are faced with a 
choice: consider the conjecture disproved, revise our definition of a polyhedron to exclude the 
(admittedly odd) counter-examples (known as ‘monster-barring’), or make a strategic retreat and 
admit that the conjecture only applies to certain polyhedra which agree with the assumptions made 
in the proof.  The initial descriptive notion of a polyhedron (a solid bounded by polygonal faces) is 
thereby refined by additional stipulation (either in the definition or in the theorem) and becomes 
explicative. 
 Stipulative definitions hence do some of the work of monster-barring, but may not be 
judged on their descriptive adequacy in isolation: the “missing” parts of a definition can be 
scattered throughout the rest of the theory and contribute to an emerging model of the 
phenomenon under consideration.  Buteau and Mazzola’s definition of a motive bars infinite, 
empty, or simultaneous sets of notes, but otherwise seems hopelessly general: it encompasses any 
set of any number of notes which need not be contiguous and may never appear again within a 
piece.  However, they go on to define, for instance, a motive’s gestalt as the set of other motives 
derivable from it via an agreed group of transformations (including some acting on its intervals or 
contour), and a motive’s 𝜖-neighbourhood as the set of motives whose gestalten are within distance 𝜖 
of its own (pp. 121–22; note my italics, commonly used to signify that a stipulative definition is 
being imposed).  Ideas of variation and similarity thus appear in the theory and reflect back on the 
meaning of the original term ‘motive’. 
The process of monster-barring is what gives a mathematical model its conceptual clarity: it 
ensures that if an explicit set of conditions holds, then the model’s conclusions are deductively 
valid.  But, as elaborated in Section 1.10, since every assumption, condition, stipulation, and logical 
                                                     
79 Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, ed. by John Worrall and Elie 
Zahar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 142. 
80 See Lakatos, pp. 6–105; his argument is also summarised in Colyvan, pp. 145–47. 
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deduction closes off portions of the messy and potentially inconsistent phenomenon that is being 
modelled, no model is a perfect translation of its object.  It is therefore problematic for Mazzola to 
claim that he and Buteau have ‘succeeded in turning motif theory into a valid topological theory’, as 
this would suggest that the ill-defined field of ‘motif theory’ can impart no insights outside those 
portions of Reti’s theory which Buteau and Mazzola have managed to model adequately.81  There 
also seems to be some confusion over what, exactly, the object of Mazzola’s modelling is: despite 
his foundationalist complaint that ‘[i]n musicology and more generally in the humanities […] [a] 
definition must always fulfil a grown content [which we cannot be sure] is adequate for 
understanding the facts’, his practice here and elsewhere (including a formalisation of the rules of 
Fuxian counterpoint) is heavily mediated by the traditional concerns of music theory.82  Yet 
Mazzola sees his project as scientific, endorsing a Roger Penrose-derived ontology in which 
mathematics is ‘the innermost ontological kernel of physical reality’ that is not applied ‘for fun, but 
because the objective situation requires it’: he therefore dismisses criticisms that his mathematical 
methods are obsfuscatingly complex as ‘psychologically motivated, but not scientifically 
acceptable’.83 
1.8 Theory-Building II: Theory 
The scientific and musical relevance of formalisation for its own sake has been questioned by many 
writers: ‘no amount of formalism can ever transform a description into an explanation’ for Brown 
and Dempster, ‘formalizations alone do not make theories better’ for Anja Volk and Aline 
Honingh, Cook warns against analyses that simply create ‘a new kind of score’, Marsden against 
music theories adopting mathematical ‘veneers’, and, perhaps most damningly, Wiggins argues: 
‘Music theory as it stands may well describe musical works usefully, and mathematical music theory 
may do so more formally, and more precisely.  Frankly, though, if that were really all music theory 
can be, I would rather just listen.’84  These warnings are salutary, especially within the context of 
claims to scientific acceptability, but they risk overlooking the extent to which “mere” descriptions 
of music, formal or otherwise, can serve as good comparisons: all discourse about music is 
necessarily metaphorical, and all metaphors necessarily suggest as much as they describe (see 
Section 1.10). 
                                                     
81 Mazzola, ‘Position Paper’, p. 84. 
82 Mazzola, ‘Response to Marsden’s Text’, p. 157 (see also Tymoczko, ‘Mazzola’s Model of Fuxian 
Counterpoint’).  Mazzola (ibid.) goes on to contrast the idea of ‘grown content’ with the standard 
mathematical procedure of revising definitions in the light of counter-intuitive examples, but does 
not explicitly refer to Lakatos. 
83 Guerino Mazzola, ‘Mazzola’s Response to Wiggins’ Position Paper’, in 3MR, pp. 129–33 (p. 130) 
‘kernel’; Mazzola, ‘Position Paper’, p. 89 ‘fun’, ‘motivated’. 
84 Brown and Dempster, p. 81; Volk and Honingh, p. 79; Cook, ‘Towards the Compleat 
Musicologist?’, p. 3; Marsden, ‘Position Paper’, p. 151; Wiggins, ‘Final Response’, p. 140. 
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Schoenberg’s notion of good comparison is connected more broadly to the meaning of the 
term ‘theory’ within the humanities.  When Cook notes that, for the coherentist, ‘commentary, 
endlessly reiterated, is accorded the same epistemological status as empirical observation’, he hints 
at his later distinction between the humanities and the sciences in that the former seek ‘not certainty 
but understanding, and the means by which it is to be achieved is not explanation but elucidation’.85  
He cites Bent’s characterisation of idealised scientific explanation as a linear path from general to 
particular, while human-scientific elucidation is a circular process between part and whole; crucially, 
in the humanities neither domain has ‘ontological priority’.86  This accords with Narmour’s 
definition of what ‘theory’ (in the sense of postmodern theory, gender theory, or Marxist theory) 
means in a humanities context (p. 4): 
Theory in the humanities means any kind of more or less fixed and hypothetically 
identifiable top-down approach to a text or a score, where the target of the literary 
or musical analysis is mapped onto the phenomenon in accordance with the 
chosen approach. 
The very purpose of theory in the humanities, then, is to load observations; to put the general at the 
service of the particular rather than subsume the particular as a case of the general.  ‘The scientist 
wishes to make it unnecessary to know each in order to know all’, summarises Benjamin Boretz, 
while ‘the musician wishes to make it impossible to know all without knowing each. […] To learn 
to hear a unique thing as a categorical thing is a net loss for musical experience’.87 
In using humanities theory, Narmour speaks of ‘the intellectual promise of an atypical 
mapping’ (p. 4), and it is this mapping – including (perhaps especially) its weak points, monsters, 
omissions, and ad hoc patches – that sheds light on the phenomenon, setting a piece’s unique 
features into relief.  Again, this is at the heart of Cook’s interpretation of ‘good comparison’: the 
frequent criticism of Schenkerian analysis that it treats a piece’s most interesting and individualising 
moments as superficial foreground features is turned on its head, with their striking effect being 
explained through their inability to be part of the flat, generic background structure.88  In such a 
                                                     
85 Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, pp. 82, 93. 
86 Ian Bent, ‘General Introduction’, in MA19II, pp. 1–27 (p. 9), quoted in Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, 
p. 93. 
87 Benjamin Boretz, ‘Musical Cosmology’, Perspectives of New Music, 15.2 (Spring–Summer 1977), 
122–32 (p. 130).  According to Cook, music theory’s shift towards theories that are chiefly valued 
for the insights they can provide into individual works is dated by Dahlhaus to the close of the 
eighteenth century (see ‘Epistemologies’, p. 80, which draws on Thomas Christensen, ‘Review[: Carl 
Dahlhaus, Die Musiktheorie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert: Grundzüge einer Systematik]’, Music Theory 
Spectrum, 10 (1988), 127–37, as acknowledged in Cook, ‘Epistemologies, p. 78, n. 2).  Cook also 
notes that the post-World War II decline of comparative methods in musicology (such as style 
analysis) ironically parallels the rise of the computer, the very device that would allow accurate and 
rapid processing of large amounts of data (Cook, ‘Towards the Compleat Musicologist?’, pp. 4–5). 
88 Cook, ‘Music Theory and “Good Comparison”’, p. 132.  As Huron points out, ‘ex planum’ carries 
a literal sense of ‘making flat’ (‘The New Empiricism’, para. 130). 
-35- 
 
 
  
-3
5
- 
context, refining the theory to better fit the phenomenon can risk doing a disservice to both.  
Lewin takes as an example the famous duck/rabbit optical illusion: although one could create a new 
term to describe the figure, the perceptual tension between the duck and rabbit is what 
characterises the image – ‘[w]ho cares if you see a dubbit?’.89 
 It would be a misrepresentation to say that humanities theories are therefore free of the 
need for empirical justification, as discussed in further detail in the next section.  However, owing 
to their intentional and unbreaking flexibility, many humanities theories do not conform to the 
scientific standard of falsifiability, which requires theories to be testable through being open, in 
principle, to refutation through empirical observation (in the classical example, no number of white 
swans can prove the idea that all swans are white, but a single black swan can disprove it).90  
Empirical observations that seem to refute a music theory can be explained as individuating 
features set into relief by good comparison, or defined circularly to stand outside the theory’s 
domain of applicability: fitting a Schenkerian archetype to a piece of music, for example, depends 
on the ingenuity of the analyst; if it were to prove impossible, Schenker would take this as proof 
that the piece does not, therefore, constitute a true Meisterwerk.  We might, following Karl Popper’s 
definition of the term, uncharitably therefore consider music theory to be a pseudo-science; but 
such a characterisation is unhelpful as it connotes pretensions to a scientific method that music 
theory as a whole, and as practised, does not necessarily entail.91 
Huron has proposed the more neutral term ‘theory-conserving’ to describe those fields in 
which false negatives (missing something) are seen as more serious than false positives (making 
incorrect assertions), and so which guard against discarding theories prematurely (with the 
                                                     
89 Lewin, ‘Phenomenology’, p. 91. 
90 The falsificationist position is most strongly associated with Karl Popper (see next note); for a 
summary of its main criticisms see Huron, ‘The New Empiricism’, para. 22.  Certain music theories 
can be phrased in falsifiable terms, especially if they make cognitive claims – Cross singles out 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s generative theory and Narmour’s melodic theory as ‘the two most highly 
developed’ (p. 6) – and, unsurprisingly, these are the ones that are most frequently subjected to 
psychological testing (see Cross, pp. 6–13; this frequent testing is what facilitates Marsden’s 
discussion – summarised in Section 1.5 above – of gap-fill, a concept which appears prominently in 
Narmour’s work).  Ito transforms Koch’s theory into a series of empirical predictions, which he 
tests using corpus methods: but the results as they relate to falsification are moot, as he 
acknowledges (see Section 1.5), since such theories can always be rescued through appeals to the 
suggestive mode. 
91 See Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 4th edn (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972; repr. 1981), pp. 33–37.  For an argument that a necessary 
component of a pseudo-scientific practice is its presentation of itself as scientific, see Sven Ove 
Hansson, ‘Science and Pseudo-Science’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta, Spring 2014 edn <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/pseudo-science/> 
[accessed 17 December 2014] (section 3). 
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attendant risk of provisionally accepting them prematurely).92  This desire to retain theories which 
have not yet been falsified, but which are largely unfalsifiable, is a contributing factor to a 
coherentist outlook.  The split between theory-conserving and theory-discarding methodology is 
often drawn between the sciences and the humanities, but there are more fundamental factors at 
play including the availability of data, the possibility of generating more data (and therefore testing 
predictions; see Section 1.9), the political implications of closing off debate in data-poor fields, the 
choice between holism via pluralism or via generalisation, and the relative ethical costs of false 
positives versus false negatives (for example in the legal preference for false acquittals over false 
convictions: ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’).93  To take one of Popper’s examples of a pseudo-
science (see n. 91): a theory-conserving scholar might value Marxist theory as one perspective 
among many contributing to an understanding of a complex, interrelated, and finite set of historical 
events (or a work of literature, or a piece of music), and not as the “best” current predictive, 
explanatory, or unificatory model of a relatively circumscribed and ongoing phenomenon.94 
Retaining an “inadequate” yet familiar theory can therefore be more informative, in the 
context of the humanities, than rejecting it and constructing a “better” one: coherentism yet again 
emerges as an important strategy in music theory.  This carries an ideological component: if we 
agree with Julian Johnson that ‘[a]nalysis, properly understood, is a critical activity in that it destroys 
the illusion of seamless unity which is the ideology of every work of art’, then this critical power is 
forfeited by ‘an analytical approach which appeals only to its readers’ sense of satisfaction’.95  Cook 
argues for an understanding of musical works as ‘fugitive amalgams of […] potentially meaningful 
attributes’ rather than ‘authorized wholes stabilized by dominant interpretations’, and there is a 
certain resonance here with an idea that Marsden highlights as one of the foremost strengths of 
computational analysis: that its end result is often not a preferred interpretation, but ‘a mapping of 
the terrain of possible interpretations’.96  Unable to supply the interaction between human and 
sound so essential to the act of analysis, a computer must simply enumerate possibilities under 
                                                     
92 See Huron, ‘The New Empiricism’, paras. 70–79. 
93 These factors and others are discussed in depth in Huron, ‘The New Empiricism’, paras. 66–134. 
94 Cf. Cohn: ‘If we still invoke formal archetypes, it is not because we agree with their designers that 
they embody a unifying spiritual principle, or even because they are functional imperatives, but 
rather because we find them heuristically useful in individual cases.’ (Richard Cohn, ‘The Autonomy 
of Motives in Schenkerian Accounts of Tonal Music’, Music Theory Spectrum, 14 (1992), 150–70 (p. 
170)). 
95 Julian Johnson, ‘Analysis in Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music’, Music Analysis, 14 (1995), 295–313 (p. 
311); Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, p. 98. 
96 Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, p. 189; Marsden, ‘What Was the Question?’, p. 145.  
Marsden’s argument accords with Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann’s point that computer 
simulations facilitate ‘systematic exploration of a model’s parameter space’: see Roman Frigg and 
Stephan Hartmann, ‘Models in Science’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta, Fall 2012 edn <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/> 
[accessed 17 December 2014] (section 3.1). 
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certain conditions and in doing so effectively explode the idea of a privileged, innate reading of a 
work; it shatters the artistic illusion in the most comprehensive and systematic way possible. 
1.9 Theory-Building III: Verification 
While its roles as suggestive heuristic (Section 1.5) and humanities theory (Section 1.8) relax the 
need for music theory to make empirically testable, statistically significant claims, Sections 1.2 and 
1.3 follow Babbitt and Guck in arguing that a form of empirical verification is at work whenever a 
description is considered to be evocative (or a comparison to be good, or a theory to be 
compositionally fruitful, or an observation to be “musical”); Section 1.4 argues, moreover, that this 
verification is underpinned by a sense of coherentism.  Given the impossibility of isolating a 
musical “object” from its music-theoretical mediations, mathematical models of music usually end 
up as models of music theories and so have a degree of coherentism guaranteed: but to return to 
Mazzola’s problematic claims of ‘success’ in Section 1.7, not only is the translation between music-
theoretical target and mathematical model never perfect, but the target phenomenon itself is 
seldom well-defined. 
To illustrate this, Marsden refers to a computer program designed by Kemal Ebcioğlu to 
harmonise melodies in the style of a Bach chorale.97  How is its success to be evaluated?  Scientific 
theories are usually tested on their predictive ability, but the Bach program cannot predict what 
Bach will write next as the data set is retrospective and finite; in order for predictions to be tested, 
argues Huron, the possibility for the generation of new data must be open since the same data 
cannot be used both to formulate and test a theory.98  Of course, some chorales could be set aside 
as “unseen” by the program; but once the program’s harmonisation of these melodies has been 
tested against the real thing, the theory is unfalsifiable since in order to determine whether a new 
harmonisation “sounds like Bach”, we need ‘something which is itself effectively a theory of Bach-
style chorale harmonisation, which is circular’.99  The same problems plague computer programs 
that seek to produce analyses, since there is no standard ground truth but instead a coherentist urge 
to produce something that looks convincingly “musical”; one reason why such programs often shy 
away from proposing preferred interpretations and instead enumerate possible analytical 
conclusions under given parameter settings. 
                                                     
97 ‘Response to Mazzola’, p. 104.  The system under discussion is outlined in Kemal Ebcioğlu, ‘An 
Expert System for Harmonizing Four-part Chorales’, Computer Music Journal, 12.3 (Fall 1988), 43–51. 
98 See Huron, ‘The New Empiricism’, paras. 99–109; he also argues here that causation (as opposed 
to simple correlation) may only be established for phenomena that can be manipulated in 
controlled experiments. 
99 Marsden, ‘Response to Mazzola’, p. 104. 
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Care must be taken not to advance too naïve or restrictive a view of prediction.  Brown 
and Dempster have argued that even our best scientific theories are incapable of predicting the 
behaviour of individual cases, and instead generalise over ‘classes of individuals and not individual 
events per se’ (p. 92).  Formulating classes of potential phenomena with the same characteristics as 
the one under consideration permits prediction of what is possible in principle, with research into 
the Big Bang providing an extreme example as it must necessarily generalise over a class containing 
a single member.  Babbitt frames this idea in terms of the linguistic analogy that music theory 
“predicts” new pieces of music (cf. his circular statement quoted at the close of Section 1.2) in the 
way that grammar predicts sentences in a language.100  Marsden proposes an alternative view: that a 
music theory is essentially a prediction about ‘the musical effect of a particular configuration of 
notes’ on a listener, an observation that Wiggins takes as support for the idea that music theory can 
only predict as part of a wider theory of cognitive behaviour (i.e. a theory of music).101 
 A program that can generate the finite set of Bach chorale harmonisations given their 
melodies can therefore tell us something about Bach’s harmonic syntax, or predict which new 
harmonisations listeners might judge to be particularly Bach-like; but some critical examination is 
required in order to determine what is useful (and, indeed, possible), in this context.  Marsden states 
that it is desirable for a theory to be ‘smaller’ than its target phenomenon – it shouldn’t, for 
instance, simply consist of a database of all the harmonisations and a search function on the melody 
input – but that the 300+ rules in Ebcioğlu’s Bach program amount to a figure ‘strikingly close’ to 
the number of chorales (371) in the Riemenschneider edition.102   
 What is to be gained from a music theory that fits the data well but fails to communicate its 
underlying principles clearly?  Although John Rahn has argued that the ‘apotheosis’ of theory is a 
system ‘that is not only capable of generating the piece it explains in all its particularity and richness 
[…], but is capable of generating only that piece’, Edward Pearsall recognises that a good theory 
‘accounts for some of [a piece’s] complexity […] without building unnecessary complexity into the 
theoretical model itself’.103  Even within the broader context of scientific computer simulation, 
where it is reasonable to pursue predictive accuracy over theoretical elegance, Roman Frigg and 
Stephan Hartmann have warned against: 
                                                     
100 Babbitt, ‘Contemporary Music Composition’, p. 301. 
101 Marsden, ‘Response to Wiggins’, p. 126; Wiggins, ‘Final Response’, p. 138. 
102 Marsden, ‘Response to Mazzola’, p. 104.  In another sense, a theory should also be “bigger” by 
not being limited to its initial data set; Marsden elsewhere argues that theories should ‘encompas[s]’ 
rather than ‘simply correspon[d] to’ their targets (‘Position Paper’, p. 150; cf. the mapping account 
of applied mathematics discussed in Section 1.10). 
103 John Rahn, ‘Aspects of Musical Explanation’, Perspectives of New Music, 17.2 (Spring–Summer 
1979), 204–24 (p. 207); Edward Pearsall, ‘Transformational Streams: Unraveling Melodic Processes 
in Twentieth-Century Motivic Music’, Journal of Music Theory, 48 (2004), 69–98 (p. 92). 
-39- 
 
 
  
-3
9
- 
[I]ncreasingly complex but conceptually premature models, involving poorly 
understood assumptions or mechanisms and too many additional adjustable 
parameters [which] may lead to an increase in empirical adequacy […] but not 
necessarily to a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms.104 
Such a model brings to mind Lewin’s ‘dubbit’, and its attendant warning is surely even more 
pertinent to fields in which ‘empirical adequacy’ (e.g. in some sense “predicting” new Bach 
chorales) is less important. 
Within a scientific methodology, there is a professional reticence to summarise or 
essentialise, to put words in the data’s mouth lest it is forced to say more than it is trying to (hence, 
as Huron notes, wordings such as ‘the data are consistent with’ X and not ‘the data “support”’ X in 
scientific journals).105  The individual rules of a computational model are left to speak for 
themselves, and not associated with problematic coherentist terms.  Conversely, in sensitive 
computational music analysis, Marsden argues that: 
[A]n extra step is needed after the computer has done its work to make the 
connections back to the world of personal listening experience, to illustrate how 
conclusions drawn from a study of […] many pieces influence our understanding 
of individual pieces, and to explain how [imperceptible details] do nevertheless 
have an impact on what we hear.106 
Similar injunctions could be made about theories, such as Mazzola’s, which make use of advanced 
mathematical methods since as the complexity of a music theory increases, its utility as a good 
comparison decreases.  Tymoczko (no mathematical dilettante himself) has observed that Mazzola’s 
work is incapable of comprehension and critique by music theorists outside his own circle of 
collaborators.107  His theoretical insights, too superficial to be of music yet too opaque to be about 
it, therefore end up empirically unsupported or self-supporting; they fall in the woods and, since 
there is no-one around to hear them, cease to be music theories. 
One way to return a complex theory about music to the realm of good comparison is to 
use it to generate a theory about, or a model of, a particular piece, and then to use this model as an 
analytical tool for setting the piece into relief.  For example, a harmonisation of a real Bach melody 
by Ebcioğlu’s program, or of pared-down versions of it possibly including some rules drawn from 
harmony textbooks, could be compared with the actual chorale data with the intention of 
highlighting the points where Bach “breaks the rules” as worthy of special analytical attention.  The 
program could also be used as a measuring tool for a corpus study, testing how well the models 
generated by the program fit with a variety of corpora (including the Bach chorales, music by Bach 
in other genres, chorales by other composers including student exercises, other sacred music, and 
                                                     
104 Frigg and Hartmann, section 3.1. 
105 Huron, ‘The New Empiricism’, para. 23. 
106 Marsden, ‘What Was the Question?’, p. 143. 
107 Tymoczko, ‘Mazzola’s Model of Fuxian Counterpoint’, p. 298. 
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broader “control sets” of tonal music) in order to suggest which of its rules seem to characterise the 
Bach chorales in particular.  Both of these suggestions clear the opacity of the theory and enhance 
the potential for a good comparison that influences the way individual works or groups of works 
are heard; they use empirical, computational, and mathematical methods, yet remain within the 
epistemological orbit of music theory. 
1.10  Models as Metaphors 
The arguments presented above project a certain interchangeability between the term ‘model’ and 
the term ‘theory’: the relationship between the two is not well-defined, but a common 
understanding casts models in a mediating role between theories and phenomena, as specific 
manifestations of the former and simplifications of the latter.108  The motion of a pendulum, for 
example, can be modelled by an equation derived from Newton’s second law under certain 
simplifying assumptions about the physical setup (e.g. that the string is massless and inextensible); 
analogously, we might see a Schenkerian analysis as a model of a piece of music derived from 
Schenker’s theory under certain assumptions about the piece (e.g. that it is more-or-less tonal, and 
that pitch is a stronger organising factor than rhythm).  Fields in which overarching, unifying 
theories are rare sometimes, however, use models to stand in for theories: Frigg and Hartmann cite 
biology and economics, while Narmour notes the preponderance of ‘mappings or models without 
explicit goals of theoretical unity’ in the humanities.109  Target phenomena in either case can be 
individual objects (a Meccano bridge models a bridge, a computer harmonisation of a Bach chorale 
melody models Bach’s harmonisation), or more general theories and processes that produce such 
objects (Meccano-building models the engineering process, Ebcioğlu’s program models (a theory 
of) Bach’s harmonic syntax).  When the encompassing theory is mathematical but not scientific, 
this relationship changes slightly as ‘theory’ in mathematics denotes something more like 
‘subdiscipline’, a consistent and broadly self-contained collection of logically related ideas (such as 
graph theory, group theory, or number theory).  A mathematical theory ‘of’ or ‘about’ something 
therefore really behaves more like a model, a matching between one of these subdisciplines and a 
target phenomenon. 
To construct a mathematical model of a phenomenon is to take an existing structural 
archetype ‘from the shelf’ and modify or extend it to fit the situation at hand, an understanding 
known as the mapping account of applied mathematics.110  The choice of structure and choice of 
correspondence (or ‘mapping’) ‘is an art and not a mechanical procedure’, with the fitting of 
phenomenon to theory via model constituting, according to Nancy Cartwright, an explanation of 
                                                     
108 See Frigg and Hartmann, section 4 and n. 125 below for more on this relationship. 
109 Frigg and Hartmann, section 4.2; Narmour, p. 4. 
110 See Colyvan, pp. 106–09; p. 108 ‘shelf’. 
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the phenomenon in question.111  Some features of the target system are preserved and some are 
omitted.  Importantly, some are added – or suggested – by the mathematical theory or by other 
applications of the same structure (as, for example, in the concept of ‘ecological inertia’ arising 
from an application of the mathematics used in celestial mechanics to the problems of population 
dynamics), thus emphasising the role of structural over material correspondence in mathematical 
thinking.  For the British pure mathematician G. H. Hardy, ‘a mathematical idea is “significant” [to 
both mathematics and other sciences] if it can be connected, in a natural and illuminating way, with 
a large complex of other mathematical ideas’; in slogan form, ‘mathematical objects are places in 
structures’, or ‘mathematics is the art of giving the same name to different things’.112 
This crucial addition of structure – which only happens because the fit between model and 
object is imperfect – can be broken down, as argued by R. I. G. Hughes, into a three-stage process: 
first a correspondence is denoted between the target system and a mathematical structure, then the 
mathematical conclusions within this structure are demonstrated, and finally the results are interpreted 
back in terms of the target system.113  All three stages must be active, even creative, processes since, 
argue Frigg and Hartmann, ‘we do not learn about [a model’s] properties by looking at it’.114  With 
echoes of positivism (although with more emphasis on the comparison of two broadly self-
contained entities than the internal reconstruction of a mathematical theory from empirical 
primitives), this determination of what is necessary, possible, and impossible within a given setup 
and under certain constraints can form an explanation of an observed phenomenon. 
 A music-theoretical example of this kind of thinking may be found in Tymoczko’s A 
Geometry of Music.115  Expanding on previous collaborative work with Ian Quinn and Clifton 
Callender, Tymoczko builds a basic model of voice-leading by representing a motion between two 
𝑛-note chords as an arrow between two points on an 𝑛-dimensional grid.116  Considering the two-
                                                     
111 Frigg and Hartmann, section 4.2; Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 152. 
112 G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940; repr. 
1941), p. 29.  The first slogan is given without attribution in Colyvan, p. 40, and the second may be 
found in Henri Poincaré, Science and Method, trans. by Francis Maitland with a preface by Bertrand 
Russell (London: Nelson, [1914]), p. 34.  For more on ecological inertia, see Colyvan, p. 114. 
113 R. I. G. Hughes, ‘Models and Representation’, in Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the 
Philosophy of Science Association: Part II: Symposia Papers, ed. by Lindley Darden (=Philosophy of Science, 
64.4 suppl. (December 1997)), S325–36. 
114 Frigg and Hartmann, section 3.1. 
115 The following condenses some of the main ideas found on pp. 65–99. 
116 See Clifton Callender, Ian Quinn and Dmitri Tymoczko, ‘Generalized Voice-Leading Spaces’, 
Science, n.s., 320 (2008), 346–48.  For a simple example of voice-leading motion (a short two-voice 
passage on a two-dimensional grid), see Figure 3.1.3 in A Geometry of Music, p. 67; this figure is also 
available, with audio, on the book’s companion website <http://www.oup.com/us/ 
companion.websites/9780195336672/examples/chapter3/figure_313> [accessed 17 December 
2014]. 
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dimensional example (i.e. when the chords are in fact dyads), Tymoczko then observes that the grid 
repeats itself in two ways: firstly, each 12×12 block is repeated an octave higher, and secondly, each 
12×12 block contains two copies of each pair of notes (one for each possible ordering).  The 
general idea is then that the space is “folded” twice (into a Möbius strip) so that, for example, the 
point (C4,E4) matches up with both (C5,E5) and (E4,C4) (among others).  The choice to make 
these folds (and therefore omit certain information) was motivated by the original purpose in 
building the model: to study how individual voices move in progressions between chords.  Under 
such a framework, (C4,E4)→(B3,F4) is equivalent to (E5,C6)→(F5,B5) since the voices behave in 
exactly the same way.117 
 Having imported a geometric structure, Tymoczko can then reframe musical questions in 
terms of geometry, or ask about the musical ramifications of certain geometric properties.  In 
particular, he observes that unisons lie at the edges of the space, while chords that divide the octave 
evenly (tritones in two-dimensional space, augmented triads in three-dimensional space, and 
diminished sevenths in four-dimensional space) lie at the centre.  This means that nearly-even 
chords (such as fifths, major triads, dominant sevenths, and nearly all other common chords) are all 
gathered around the centre and are therefore close to each other in terms of voice-leading: more 
specifically, it transpires that nearly-even 𝑛-note chords are particularly close to their transpositions 
by 12/𝑛 semitones.118  This gives rise to an empirical hypothesis: that if composers wish to avoid 
parallel motion whilst moving between chords of the same type, then we would expect root 
motions of a major third (12/3=4 semitones) between triads and of a minor third (12/4=3 
semitones) between seventh chords.  A statistical analysis of a large number of pieces by Schubert 
and Chopin supports this claim: 39% of Schubert’s major triad progressions move by a major third 
(as opposed to 26% by minor third) and 42% of his dominant seventh progressions move by a 
minor third (as opposed to 3% by a major third).119  Denoting multiple musical voices as points on 
a co-ordinate system, demonstrating the mathematical conclusions of this, and interpreting these 
conclusions as musical possibilities therefore shows how mathematical modelling can determine 
                                                     
117 I adopt Callender, Quinn, and Tymoczko’s notation here (see supporting online material 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/320/5874/346/suppl/DC1> [accessed 17 December 2014] 
(p. 1)): voice-leadings are represented as arrows pointing between two ordered sets (signified by 
round brackets), mapping the first element to the first element (i.e. C4 to B3), the second to the 
second (E4 to F4), and so on. 
118 Of course, every chord is close to its transpositions via voice-leadings that move in strict parallel 
motion: the voice-leadings of interest here are those which feature contrary motion too.  Consider, 
for example, moving the voices of (C4,G4) inwards: the result is the fourth (C4,F4), an interval 
equivalent (in this space) to the fifth (F,C), which is the 12/2=6-semitone transposition of (C,G). 
119 See A Geometry of Music, p. 99; for Chopin, the analogous figures are 25% as opposed to 15%, 
and 20% as opposed to 9%.  Tymoczko admits that his methodology is ‘crude but, hopefully, 
unbiased’ (p. 97, n. 29); it lacks, for example, a formal hypothesis, significance testing, and a 
proposed function from voice-leading distance to frequency of occurrence. 
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what constraints apply within a certain setup – and that these theoretical constraints are consistent 
with empirical data. 
It is important to stress that the constraints demonstrated in a particular mathematical 
system are not regulative compositional demands but rather “paths of least resistance” in a certain 
formal sense; modulation is similarly “constrained” by the fact that a major scale shares six of its 
seven pitch-classes with the major scale formed on its fifth degree.  The leap from here to an 
empirical hypothesis – that composers will tend to prefer such paths of least resistance – introduces 
a cognitive element and echoes the epistemological short-circuiting of musical corpus research, 
slipping from a formal theory about music to a statistical analysis bearing on a theory of music 
(whilst still being mediated by, accepting the basic premises of, and remaining relevant to, music 
theory). 
Constructing a mathematical model is therefore akin to constructing a metaphor: in 
Tymoczko’s case, the metaphor allows us to see harmonic patterns tracing paths through an 
abstract space, and to inflect our hearing based on associated concepts such as distance, 
smoothness, progress and scenic detour (which is why his work remains a music theory, albeit an 
epistemologically slippery one).  Such elisions between mathematics and metaphor are embodied 
perhaps most clearly and repeatedly in Lewin’s work.  Even at a theoretical rather than analytical 
level, Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations foregrounds the metaphorical nature of 
mathematical modelling by developing two distinct mathematical systems (each occupying half of 
the book) from two interpretations of a single schematic picture (an arrow between two points): 
one emphasises interval and distance, and the other motion and transformation (see p. xxix).  The 
conflation of formalism and performativity that ‘surprised’ Cook (see Section 1.1) also arises in his 
review of Lewin’s book of analytical essays Musical Form and Transformation: despite Generalized 
Musical Intervals containing mathematics that ‘frightened [him] off’, Cook praises ‘Lewin’s 
enthusiastic and infectious espousal of the metaphorical and indeed fictive nature of all analytical 
writing’.120 
Marsden, however, marks an important distinction between mathematical theories and 
metaphors: 
A mathematical theory should not ‘break down’ at any point […] Another 
mathematical theory of the same phenomenon would either have 
correspondences with different aspects of the music, and so be strictly a theory of 
a different phenomenon, or be equivalent to the first theory, and so in a sense be 
the same theory. […] There are not alternative equally valid but essentially 
                                                     
120 Nicholas Cook, ‘Review[: David Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation: Four Analytic Essays]’, 
Music & Letters, 77 (1996), 143–46 (pp. 143, 146). 
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different mathematical theories of the same phenomenon, whereas there are 
different equally ‘valid’ (in the sense of facilitating understanding) metaphors.121 
It is important to note that Marsden is not implying the existence of a single unified mathematical 
theory of music: his contention is that any attempt to construct one necessarily selects only a few of 
music’s many and varied ‘aspects’, defining a simplified (object) model (or a particular 
‘phenomenon’) which behaves in a way that has essentially only one mathematical description.  
This, taking ‘mathematical theory’ to mean ‘scientific theory expressed mathematically’, and 
assessing validity in terms of prediction, is accurate: either two theories predict the same thing and 
so are equivalent, or they differ, in which case at least one is wrong (although, as argued in Section 
1.9, prediction can be a problematic enterprise in music theory).  There is also significant work 
done by the qualifier ‘essentially different’, covering a range of scenarios from a simple terminology 
change to the case of one theory subsuming or overlapping the other: Einsteinian and Newtonian 
theories of gravitation predict the same motion for a falling apple and so are ‘the same’ in that case 
even if not more generally.122 
However, on the understanding of mathematical theories-of/about (i.e. mathematical 
models) advanced above, the idea of ‘equivalent’ models becomes as problematic as the idea of 
‘equally “valid” […] metaphors’ of ‘the same phenomenon’.  A metaphor is an invitation to 
compare one domain (e.g. the world) with another (e.g. a stage), carrying no guarantee that two 
readers (or the author and a reader) will draw the same correspondences between the same aspects 
of these domains (some might take away the message that the world is deterministic, others that 
societies require their members to fulfil different roles, others that an element of pretence is 
involved, and others that the scenery is pretty).  Just like Marsden’s characterisation of modelling, 
every reading of every metaphor therefore technically deals with a different phenomenon: but in 
practice we see these readings ‘facilitating’ different ‘understanding[s]’ of underlying phenomena 
which actually come to be defined by the overlapping and incomplete patchwork of metaphors used 
to describe them (my concept of ‘the world’ will be different to yours, partly dependent on whether 
and how we each consider it to be stage-like).   
Mathematical models necessarily work in the same way, framing the object through the 
lens of the theory and therefore changing not only the way that the object is conceptualised, but 
also the questions that can be asked of it and the directions that future developments can take.  
This phenomenon is embedded in mathematics as deeply as in notation itself: consider the symbols 
‘80’, ‘eighty’, ‘quatre-vingts’, and ‘LXXX’.  As ‘places in structures’, or models of the number-line, 
they are as equivalent as one is likely to get since they are merely different names for the same 
quantity: but whether one understands this quantity as ‘eight tens’, ‘four twenties’, or ‘fifty and ten 
                                                     
121 ‘Position Paper’, p. 150. 
122 See also n. 38 above. 
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and ten and ten’ is significant.  Without wishing to indulge in counter-factualism, it seems unlikely 
that the Romans would have invented the computer since binary numbers require an understanding 
of place value, which is a structure added by other numeral systems (binary numbers are in base 2; 
‘eighty’=80 in base 10, while ‘quatre-vingts’=40 in base 20).123  So, returning to Marsden’s 
categorisation: are the different symbols models of different phenomena, or are they essentially 
equivalent?  Are the differences in added structure and “feel”, and the attendant differing potentials 
for future exploration, enough to assure the former?  If so, can two models ever be equivalent or is 
one of Marsden’s categories empty?  What about if we transpose the question back to an 
explicative, evocative, perception-modifying music theory: do the differences in feel become even 
more important than the formal correspondences that two models might share?124 
The differences between metaphors and mathematical models therefore subsist in degree 
and not in kind: mathematical models, insofar as they invoke near-“pure” structural archetypes, 
leave less room for interpretative variety (‘all the world’s an oblate spheroid’), and are generally 
more explicit about the aspects they address and exclude (‘if one neglects friction and assumes 
spherical bodies with even mass distribution, then when studying collisions, all the world’s a 
snooker table’).  In a scientific context, this facilitates a programme of reductionism (i.e. breaking a 
larger problem into several smaller ones), but humanities theories and musical analyses tend to aim 
directly at messy wholes rather than beginning with a series of simplifying assumptions.  We 
therefore understand individual pieces of music through the heterogeneous patchwork of 
(mathematical or non-mathematical) models, metaphors, and humanities-style theories used to 
analyse them – Schenkerian, Neo-Riemannian, harmonic-functional, formal, topical, semiotic, 
textual, narratological (sometimes, indeed often, in the same analysis) – with this patchwork 
constituting a “theory” of the piece in question.125 
                                                     
123 For more on the importance of notation in mathematics, including more advanced examples of 
notation influencing development, see Colyvan, pp. 132–48; for a music-theoretical example, see 
Babbitt’s discussion of index numbers as extensions of interval numbers (outlined in Section 1.2 
above).  These ideas also bear on the indispensability argument (see Section 1.1) in their 
problematisation of the idea that mathematics is merely a convenient notation for some truth that 
lies “behind”, and independent of, the language used to express it. 
124 A possible difference between metaphors and mathematical models is the locus of this “feel”: 
while metaphors are inextricably tied to the words that form them, models, as argued by Frigg and 
Hartmann (section 2.4), do enjoy some degree of independence from their individual descriptions.  
Analyses are situated somewhere between these two, as they are shaped strongly by words but 
ultimately only ‘grasped’ (as models are) by “performing” them (see Section 1.4 above). 
125 This is a semantic view of the relationship between models and theories: that is, that a theory is 
no more or less than a collection of models rather than an abstract formal framework that is 
realised by its models (the syntactic view; see Frigg and Hartmann, section 4).  In the semantic view, 
non-formal models (such as analogies from other domains, or other modifications of the same 
structural archetype) are treated seriously in their own right, and not as mere differing 
interpretations of a fundamentally equivalent formal structure.  “Tonal theory” can be seen as a 
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 The similarity between metaphors and mathematical models is apparent in Marsden’s 
example of a musical metaphor, which is strikingly scientific: he corresponds musical notes to 
bodies in motion, explaining that certain properties of the latter (such as inertia) have musical 
interpretations while others (such as collision) do not, thereby causing the metaphor to break 
down.126  Cook notes that this intertwining of scientific and metaphorical discourse is common in 
music theory, for example in the trope of likening tonal motion to gravity: some writers see tonal 
gravity as a kind of natural law, others intend the comparison as a metaphor, and yet others blend 
these two in a manner befitting music theory’s characteristic epistemological slippage.  ‘But’, argues 
Cook, ‘their performative effect, their impact on perception or belief, remains the same’.127 
1.11 Conclusions: Of and About Music 
The roles that science and mathematics play in music theory, like the very music analyses they 
facilitate, resist neat aphoristic summary.  Some of the oppositions and conflations with which this 
chapter opened are in fact complex relations of co-dependence at arms’ length (namely the 
oppositions of science with mathematics and psychology with music theory), while others (such as 
formalism’s conflation with science and opposition to performativity and musical relevance, or 
mainstream theory’s conflation with mathematics and science and opposition to pragmatism) are 
stereotypes resulting from a misreading of the nature of analytical knowledge.  A central chimera – 
the “scientific music theory” – is usually either not conventionally scientific or not conventionally a 
music theory.  Any analytical utterance, mathematical or not, is necessarily metaphorical: 
mathematical models and statistical conclusions of and about music should therefore not pretend 
(or be perceived to be pretending) to be explanatory “improvements” or natural laws. 
Mathematical methods do not, in themselves, give scientific answers: but the epistemology 
of music theory as a humanities subject permits, in its slippage between the descriptive and the 
suggestive, the incorporation of scientific methods to serve the music-theoretical end of achieving a 
                                                                                                                                                           
semantic music theory; likewise, “scale theory”, for all its mathematical rigour, is actually a fairly 
heterogeneous collection of approaches that each choose to formalise and generalise a different 
property of the diatonic scale, from the fact that it is formed by taking a tritone shortcut across the 
circle of fifths, to the fact that each interval appears within it a unique number of times, to the fact 
that each 𝑛-note set produces 𝑛 different chromatic forms when transposed along the scale.  A 
slightly different take on this idea is provided by Cohn and Dempster: rather than arguing that an 
analysis is a “theory” of a piece formed from a patchwork of systems, they suggest that a piece 
might be seen as a (potentially unique) “solution” arising from a number of simultaneously-
deployed generative procedures (a Schenkerian tonal hierarchy overlaid with a topical narrative and 
a motivic process of expansion, for example).  See Richard Cohn and Douglas Dempster, 
‘Hierarchical Unity, Plural Unities: Toward a Reconciliation’, in Disciplining Music: Musicology and Its 
Canons, ed. by Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), pp. 156–81 (pp. 174, 176). 
126 ‘Position Paper’, p. 150. 
127 See Cook, ‘Epistemologies’, p. 98. 
-47- 
 
 
  
-4
7
- 
good comparison.  Mathematics, if it avoids pseudo-scientific opacity, can provide extremely 
powerful conceptual frameworks, facilitating rich and detailed metaphors for the musical object 
(however defined) under consideration: the goal of the rest of this thesis is to do this with respect 
to the music-theoretically mediated “object” of motivic structure.  And while ‘messy psychological 
premises’ (see n. 1) might take us closer to a scientific understanding of music, the practice of 
devising, exploring, modifying, applying, stretching, breaking, and untidying  ‘tidy mathematical 
systems’ retains its powerful intellectual, aesthetic, creative, and performative value.
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2 Motive(s): Towards a Mathematical Model 
2.1 The Problem of Repetition 
Despite subtle distinctions in usage (even amongst occurrences of the same term), the concepts 
‘motive’, ‘theme’, ‘figure’, ‘idea’, ‘germ’, ‘cell’, and ‘paradigm’ (among many others including, 
perhaps, ‘pitch-class set class’) all share a single defining characteristic: they are all predicated on the 
idea of recurrence or repetition.  Schoenberg and Reti, the two writers whose influence on today’s 
motivic thinking is arguably the most significant, respectively stress that ‘[t]he most important 
characteristic of a motive is its repetition’ and define a motive as ‘any musical element […] which, by being 
constantly repeated and varied throughout a work or a section, assumes a role in the compositional 
design somewhat similar to that of a motif in the fine arts’.1  Nicolas Ruwet’s paradigmatic method 
begins by searching for ‘sequences – the longest possible – which are repeated in their entirety’, and 
Schenker defines a motive as ‘a recurring series of tones’ forming ‘the basis of music as an art’ in his 
earlier writing (a viewpoint echoed more recently by John Rothgeb’s observation that ‘Schenkerian 
thought recognizes only one imperative for thematic content: the necessity of repetition’).2  The 
idea of repetition persists despite Schenker’s radical redefinition of both a motive’s material (as a 
linear progression rather than a rhythmic series of pitches) and its significance within a piece’s 
organisation (a negative assessment not borne out, argues Richard Cohn, by Schenkerian practice), 
meaning that Pieter van den Toorn is right to assert that ‘[m]otives are inseparable from patterns of 
repetition’.3 
 As aphorised by George Kubler, however: ‘It is in the nature of being that no event ever 
repeats, but it is in the nature of thought that we understand events only by the identities we 
imagine among them.’4  If, then, musical repetition can never strictly occur, these imagined 
identities must be constructed by prioritising certain musical parameters and ignoring others: this is 
‘the neutralisation of differences considered to be negligible’ in Nattiez’s phrase.5  This 
                                                     
1 Arnold Schoenberg, Coherence, Counterpoint, Instrumentation, Instruction in Form, ed. by Severine Neff, 
trans. by Charlotte M. Cross and Severine Neff (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 
31; Reti, Thematic Process, pp. 11–12, n. 1. 
2 Nicolas Ruwet, ‘Methods of Analysis in Musicology’, trans. by Mark Everist, Music Analysis, 6 
(1987), 3–36 (p. 18); Schenker, Harmony, pp. 4, 5; John Rothgeb, ‘Thematic Content: A Schenkerian 
View’, in Aspects of Schenkerian Theory, ed. by David Beach (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1983), pp. 39–60 (p. 39). 
3 See Cohn, ‘Autonomy’ and Pieter C. van den Toorn, ‘What’s in a Motive? Schoenberg and 
Schenker Reconsidered’, Journal of Musicology, 14 (1996), 370–99 (p. 370). 
4 George Kubler, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1962), p. 67. 
5 ‘Density 21.5’, p. 253. 
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prioritisation is often left implicit, usually resting on characteristics of relative or absolute pitch and 
rhythm whilst allowing other parameters such as timbre and dynamics to vary; however, the 
arbitrariness (at least in theory) of these choices is a recurrent theme in writings espousing a 
paradigmatic method.6  This idea can be taken to two opposing extremes.  Firstly, we can adopt the 
Heraclitean dictum that it is impossible to step in the same river twice: even under the strictest 
identity conditions, there is an unavoidable experiential and therefore structural distinction between 
the first and second hearings of “the same” pattern.  This lies at the heart of Kierkegaard’s 
characterisation of ‘[t]he dialectic of repetition’: ‘what is repeated has been, otherwise it could not 
be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been gives to repetition the character of novelty’.7  A 
motive is therefore an inherently plural entity as it can only exist as a relationship between two or 
more musical events: a relatively uncontentious conclusion that nevertheless seems to challenge 
what Zbikowski has recognised as ‘our intuition that there is just one main form of the opening 
motive, despite evidence to the contrary’.8 
 The second possible strategy is to acknowledge that, since quasi-arbitrary criteria must be 
applied to define repetition, the term can be broadened to include instances of variation, 
elaboration, transformation, or development (or, again, a variety of other similar terms).  The first 
conclusion casts repetition as a special kind of development, the second casts development as a 
special kind of repetition: in practice, the conclusions are therefore largely equivalent in that they 
speak to the impossibility of separating the two categories out.  However, the term ‘development’ 
carries more than a simple implication of ‘change’: it also suggests teleology, growth, or evolution 
and, in its musical sense, a certain kind of process, argument, or plot.  In a cautionary article, Peter 
Hoyt notes that “developing” originally carried a sense of “uncovering”, “bringing out”, or “de-
enveloping” what is already present (as in “to develop a photograph”), and as such was actually 
contrasted with ideas of wilful change and restlessness (since introspective character development 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, pp. 248–49 and Ruwet, p. 17, which includes the 
somewhat unusual claim that ‘segments, variable as to pitch and duration, can be considered as 
repetitions as long as they are identical in other respects’. 
7 S[øren] Kierkegaard, Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology, trans. by Walter Lowrie 
(London: Oxford University Press; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), p. 34.  The 
understanding that ‘musical time, unlike architecture, permits no simple relationships of symmetry’ 
is characteristic of Adorno’s thought (Mahler, p. 52), and also inflects Agawu’s paradigmatic method 
(see Music as Discourse, pp. 200, 268, for example). 
8 Lawrence M. Zbikowski, ‘Musical Coherence, Motive, and Categorization’, Music Perception, 17 
(1999–2000), 5–42 (p. 24).  This tension is also acknowledged by Cohn, who notes that ‘[a]lthough 
a motive is a singular abstract entity, the term normally implies the existence of a plural set of 
realizations, and some relationship between them’ (‘Autonomy’, p. 165), and Emilios 
Cambouropoulos, who suggests that musical similarity is not about connecting entities, but rather 
‘the emergence of the core musical entities themselves’ which exist ‘primarily by virtue of self-
reference via repetition and variation’ (Emilios Cambouropoulos, ‘How Similar Is Similar?’, in 
Discussion Forum 4B: Musical Similarity, ed. by Petri Toiviainen (=Musicae Scientiae, 13.1 suppl. (March 
2009)), pp. 7–24 (p. 8)). 
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requires a slowing of the action).9  This original sense of development remains embedded in the 
word and defines its most problematic aspect: its association with the organicist idea that, as 
expressed metaphorically by Schoenberg, ‘[i]n an apple tree’s blossoms, even in the bud, the whole 
future apple is present in all its details’.10 
 In understanding the term ‘development’ and its organicist implications, we must be 
careful, however, not to confuse temporal with logical growth, or necessity with possibility.  
Immediately following his apple metaphor, Schoenberg goes on to clarify its subject (ibid.): 
‘Similarly, a real composer’s musical conception, like the physical, is one single act, comprising the 
totality of the product.’  He is therefore not suggesting that the “seed” of a piece of music is its first 
few bars, but rather the abstract ‘idea’ (Gedanke) which the piece realises; the confusion between 
background-to-foreground compositional growth and left-to-right “narrative” growth has been 
likened by Ruth Solie to the discredited biological theory that ontogeny (the growth process of an 
individual) recapitulates phylogeny (the evolution of a species).11  And while many writers argue 
that a short melodic phrase can imply certain variations or methods of development, this is often 
followed by a reference to the critical role of the composer in selecting and ordering which of these 
possible continuations to use.  Johann Christian Lobe, writing in 1850, argues that ‘invention, 
strictly speaking, thus resides purely in the model, for the extension is a continuation of what 
already exists’, but then that ‘the possibilities for transformation […] cannot be wholly exhausted’ 
by an individual piece.12  Similarly, A. B. Marx, writing in 1856, remarks that no phrase ‘actually 
exhausts its content’ in terms of variation, and Riemann, writing in 1890, sketches some possible 
variations of a Bach theme and then notes: ‘We find none of these possibilities taken up in the 
finished piece.  It is for us to concentrate on what Bach has selected from the wealth of 
possibilities’.13  Distinguishing compositional from temporal growth helps to resolve the apparent 
contradiction between Schoenberg’s apple metaphor and his argument, in a draft for his unfinished 
book The Musical Idea and the Logic, Technique, and Art of its Presentation, that ‘the usual understanding 
of the motive as germ of the piece out of which it grows’ is inadequate since ‘if this conception 
                                                     
9 See Peter A. Hoyt, ‘The Concept of Développement in the Early Nineteenth Century’, in Music Theory 
in the Age of Romanticism, ed. by Bent, pp. 141–62 (pp. 151–53, 159). 
10 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Folkloristic Symphonies’, in S&I , pp. 161–66 (p. 165). 
11 See Ruth A. Solie, ‘The Living Work: Organicism and Musical Analysis’, Nineteenth-Century Music, 
4 (1980–81), 147–56 (pp. 153–54) for more on this distinction, and for examples of its confusion in 
writings by Schenker and Reti. 
12 Johann Christian Lobe, ‘First-movement Form in the String Quartet: Beethoven: Op. 18 no. 2 in 
G: Allegro’, in MA19I, pp. 201–20 (introduction pp. 197–200) (pp. 211, 215). 
13 Adolf Bernhard Marx, ‘Form in Music’, in Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven: Selected Writings on 
Theory and Method, ed. and trans. by Scott Burnham, Cambridge Studies in Music Theory and 
Analysis, 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 55–90 (p. 73); Hugo Riemann, 
‘Prelude and Fugue in B minor, Bk II No. 22 from J. S. Bach’s Well-tempered Clavier’, in MA19I, pp. 
114–24 (introduction pp. 108–13) (p. 114). 
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were correct, only one single piece could arise from one motive.  As is well known, such is not the 
case’.14 
 A melodic segment’s course is not predestined, therefore, by any inherent properties of its 
musical material; the same could be said of a piece of music’s first chord.  But there is a crucial 
difference between the motivic and harmonic domains, and that is in the existence of a syntax 
which identifies a universe of possible objects, describes which objects are more or less likely to 
follow each other, and provides a means for understanding those transitions hierarchically.  It 
therefore makes sense to speak of a piece’s harmonic or tonal course, but the idea of a motivic 
course is more ambiguous: as Carl Dahlhaus argues, degree of change and temporal separation 
within the piece are two independent dimensions, but ‘the concept of development misleadingly 
suggests that the one coincides as a matter of principle with the other’.15  Agawu similarly contrasts 
‘logical’, or ‘simple-to-complex’, ordering with ‘chronological’ ordering, arguing that the ‘dissonance 
between [these] domains is far more widespread and fundamental than has so far been 
recognized’.16 
 There is therefore no theory of motivic development – no ‘specific and independent 
structural/processive principle’ that ‘transcend[s] the taxonomic [and] explains, rather than 
describes, the diachronic ordering of variants’, to use Meyer’s list of desiderata.17  This is attributed 
by van den Toorn to ‘the closeness with which motives are bound to individual contexts and their 
makings’ (p. 383), whilst Meyer proposes a socio-historical argument: that structures ‘based upon 
classlike identity rather than on learned constraints’ helped to fulfil ‘the needs of the novices in the 
bourgeois audience’ during the nineteenth century.18  Both Schoenberg and Reti acknowledge this 
theoretical vacuum but demur from claiming to fill it: Reti’s opening pages, for example, argue that 
                                                     
14 Musical Idea, p. 151n (see n. 1 above for information on citations of this volume).  I have 
preserved Schoenberg’s (and the editors’) idiosyncratic formatting as much as possible. 
15 Carl Dahlhaus, ‘What Is “Developing Variation”?’, in Schoenberg and the New Music: Essays by Carl 
Dahlhaus, trans. by Derrick Puffett and Alfred Clayton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), pp. 128–33 (p. 133). 
16 Music as Discourse, p. 167. 
17 Leonard B. Meyer, ‘A Pride of Prejudices; Or, Delight in Diversity’, Music Theory Spectrum, 13 
(1991), 241–51 (pp. 245, 246). 
18 Meyer, ‘A Pride of Prejudices’, p. 243; see Leonard B. Meyer, Style and Music: Theory, History, and 
Ideology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 163–217 for a more detailed 
examination of romanticism’s ‘elite egalitarian[ism]’ (p. 163).  Meyer’s argument is problematised in 
a perceptual study by Alexandra Lamont and Nicola Dibben, which finds that listeners are more 
likely to base similarity judgements on ‘“surface” features such as dynamics, articulation, texture, 
and contour rather than on “deeper” features such as motivic or harmonic relationships’ (Alexandra 
Lamont and Nicola Dibben, ‘Motivic Structure and the Perception of Similarity’, Music Perception, 18 
(2000–01), 245–74 (p. 245)) – although, of course, these sets of features may coincide in any given 
example, and motivic resemblances pointed out by analysts exist at a variety of depths from the 
obvious to the unconvincing. 
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‘“thematic structure” has become an almost fundamental term in music, yet its full meaning and 
content have never been realized concretely’ in a manner ‘analogous to, and complementing, the 
old disciplines of harmony, counterpoint, and the general schemes of form’; his later analyses then 
make the point that ‘thematic phenomena are so manifold and complex that in a sense they evade 
academic tabulation.  Though they can perhaps be described, they can hardly be comprised in an 
actual “system.”  They are too intimately connected with the creative process itself’.19  Schoenberg, 
who ‘did not claim to be a theorist’ according to the editors of his draft of The Musical Idea, was 
cautious of the distinction between theory and explanation on one hand and description and 
presentation (both of a piece through an analysis and a musical idea through a piece) on the other.20  
Such accounts, however, undersell the importance of “mere” description to the theoretical 
enterprise and expect too much from theory in terms of prediction and explanation (see Sections 
1.8 and 1.9); these issues come into even sharper focus within the context of a music theory of 
good comparison. 
 The motive-concept in music is torn between static, synchronic, category-dependent 
repetition and dynamic, diachronic, syntax-dependent development, and each of these poles 
embeds its own inherent problems which are explored in detail in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  The tension 
between the poles is the subject of Section 2.2, which proposes four archetypal models of how it 
might be negotiated and shows how the interactions of these models can be seen to underpin four 
important motivic theories.  Before this, however, it is necessary to establish the musical 
phenomena that I am taking the term ‘motive’ to include.  The definition produced will lie at the 
descriptive end of the explicative spectrum (see Section 1.7); but as some stipulative closure is 
unavoidable, it will mark out the relevant literature to be discussed in this chapter (in particular the 
four important motivic theories of Section 2.2), and will also define the object for which a 
mathematical model is sketched in Section 2.5 and expanded in Chapter 3.  While Definition 1 
seeks to capture existing usage, a definition cannot be assessed in isolation from its theory (as 
argued in Section 1.7): it assumes and implies properties and relationships that, strictly speaking, lie 
beyond its object.  In particular, Definition 1 fixes the term motivic segment, which does not 
make sense without understanding that these segments relate to each other in certain ways to form 
motives.  Unpacking these relationships is the goal of this chapter, while modelling them 
mathematically is the goal of the next. 
The term ‘motive’ is used in this thesis as an umbrella for a variety of concepts (some of 
which are listed in the first sentence of this chapter) that are neither wholly interchangeable nor 
wholly distinct (the crucial commonality being, of course, repetition).  Writing over 150 years ago, 
                                                     
19 Reti, Thematic Process, pp. 3, 5, 233. 
20 Editors’ preface to Musical Idea, pp. xv–xxi (p. xvi). 
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A. B. Marx complains that the term ‘motive’ is ‘lost […] in slippery vagueness (it designates a 
melody, a fragment of a melody, a phrase built out of melody and harmony – anything one wants)’, 
and this situation largely persists today, although with certain common strands emerging.21 
Firstly, a motive is usually a melodic entity, a segment of what Leopold Mozart referred to 
as a composition’s filo (‘thread’), but it can also permeate other areas of texture: Schoenberg elevates 
an ‘accompanying voice’ to a ‘subordinate voice’ if it follows its own independent process of 
developing variation.22  Its content is usually defined in terms of pitch, but rhythm has a role to 
play too: William Drabkin’s Grove entry acknowledges the possibility of independent rhythmic 
motives ‘capable of recognizable performance on unpitched percussion’, Adam Ockelford and 
others argue the importance of rhythmic similarity in creating coherence among dissimilar pitch 
patterns, and, according to his editors, ‘[t]he importance of rhythm to Schoenberg’s concept of 
motive cannot be overemphasized.’23  Harmony and tonality normally assume secondary roles 
(although they may, argues Drabkin, ‘contribute potently to a composite motif’, and Schoenberg 
suggests that harmonic change is an important category of variation) unless a pitch sequence is 
abstracted away from a concrete appearance and used to explain a particular simultaneity or 
succession of key areas.24  This strategy bears the influence of pitch-class set theory (which treats a 
motive as an unordered set of intervals) and Schenkerian theory (which treats a motive as a linear 
progression that may appear at any hierarchical level).25   
                                                     
21 ‘Form in Music’, p. 66. 
22 Schoenberg, Musical Idea, pp. 267–69.  For uses of the thread metaphor in musical writing, see 
Grey, ‘...wie ein rother Faden’; Leopold Mozart is discussed on pp. 197–98, n. 23. 
23 William Drabkin, ‘Motif’, in Grove Music Online <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com> [accessed 
17 December 2014] (para. 2); Adam Ockelford, ‘Similarity Relations Between Groups of Notes: 
Music-Theoretical and Music-Psychological Perspectives’, in Discussion Forum 4B, ed. by Toiviainen, 
pp. 47–98 (p. 74); editors’ commentary to Schoenberg, Musical Idea, pp. 1–86 (p. 28).  The idea 
associated with Ockelford above is also found in Arnold Schoenberg, Fundamentals of Musical 
Composition, ed. by Gerald Strang with Leonard Stein (London: Faber and Faber, 1967; repr. 1983), 
p. 8; see Chapter 3, n. 34 below.  Similarly Hoffmann, in his review of the Fifth Symphony, admires 
Beethoven’s ability ‘to relate all the secondary ideas [Nebengedanken] and episodes by their rhythmic 
content [rhythmischer Verhalt] to [a] simple theme’ (p. 153; German terms in square brackets are 
included in Bent’s edition). 
24 Drabkin, para. 2; Schoenberg, Fundamentals, p. 10. 
25 See, for example, van den Toorn, pp. 374–79, which takes the opening motto of Brahms’s Third 
Symphony as the source of the first movement’s modal mixture, common-tone pivots and 
modulations to the lowered submediant; van den Toorn also points out that the sequential 
repetitions of the motto in the movement’s transition generate the ‘celebrated hexachord’ set 6-20 
(p. 379), an observation which comes complete with a Freudian-slip reference to Allen Forte’s The 
Structure of Tonal [sic] Music (n. 29).  Reti, by treating motives as abstract collections of pitches and 
intervals, approaches this viewpoint in a number of his analyses, but remains open to charges of 
arbitrariness since he cannot justify the selection of non-contiguous notes through recourse to a 
Schenker-style hierarchical theory (see, for example, Rothgeb, pp. 41–42). 
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Secondly, motives are usually understood as units, what Steven Jan refers to as ‘discrete, 
“digital” patterns within the fluid, “analog” continuity of the sound stream’, distinguished from 
each other and possibly from “non-motivic” material (termed ‘connective tissue’ by Jan).26  Even 
without imposing a higher-level motivic theory, the concept of breaking a melody up into units 
constitutes an important and unavoidable perceptual mechanism that relies heavily on patterns of 
repetition.  Temperley has argued that metrically parallel units (note the importance of rhythm) are 
perceived in a so-called ‘modular’ way that is fast, automatic, and nearly impossible to override 
conceptually (just as the “trick” of an optical illusion – e.g. that two lines are the same length – can 
never be seen, even if it is known): this automatic segmentation also influences, as much as it is 
influenced by, the perception of meter, and its effect is therefore lessened if metric and pitch 
patterns do not align.27  The issue of segmentation comes to the fore in paradigmatic or 
computational approaches, as discussed in more detail in Sections 2.2 and 3.1; but it is not a 
universal music-theoretical preoccupation, and it is particularly secondary in the continuous and 
overlapping generative process of Schoenberg’s developing variation (examined in Section 2.2 and 
exemplified in Figure 2.2).  However, the term ‘gestalt’ – as a ‘characteristically articulated’ and 
more-or-less “closed” unit – retains its place in Schoenberg’s terminological armoury, most 
famously in his concept of the Grundgestalt (see Section 2.2).28 
Finally, the notion of a motive being ‘the shortest complete idea in music’ (for Parry), ‘the 
shortest subdivision of a theme or phrase that still maintains its identity as an idea’ (for Drabkin), or 
‘the smallest recognizable part of a musical work’ (for Zbikowski) is pervasive but exists in tension 
with the concept of variation, since if 𝑎′ is understood as a variation of 𝑎 then the two must share 
some smaller subset of features.29  Schoenberg attempts to resolve this problem by defining a 
motive as ‘at any one time the smallest part’ of a gestalt (a concept analogous to what is referred to 
here as a ‘motive’): his definition then continues by referring to a motive as ‘a complex of 
interconnected features’, thereby invoking a still smaller entity (the ‘feature’).30  Nevertheless, given 
that it is unlikely that an entire formal section would be referred to as a motive, we might include 
                                                     
26 Steven Jan, ‘Meme Hunting with the Humdrum Toolkit: Principles, Problems, and Prospects’, 
Computer Music Journal, 28.4 (Winter 2004), 68–84 (p. 68). 
27 David Temperley, ‘Motivic Perception and Modularity’, Music Perception, 13 (1995–96), 141–69.  
For a recent experimental study testing the effects of misalignment between metric grouping and 
motivic pattern, see Stefanie Acevedo, David Temperley, and Peter Q. Pfordresher, ‘Effects of 
Metrical Encoding on Melody Recognition’, Music Perception, 31 (2013–2014), 372–86. 
28 Schoenberg, Musical Idea, p. 171. 
29 See Parry’s 1906 article on ‘Figure’ for Grove’s Dictionary, quoted in Dunsby, p. 907; Drabkin, para. 
1; and Zbikowski, p. 13.  Although recognition of variation is not straightforwardly predicated on 
similarity, as I argue in Section 2.3, point six below, connected segments do usually share at least 
some of the same outward features. 
30 Musical Idea, pp. 169–71. 
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some notion of brevity (although more along the lines of a musical molecule than a musical atom) 
to arrive at a descriptive definition of a motivic segment: 
Definition 1 
A motivic segment is a short, recognisably recurrent melodic gestalt. 
2.2 Four Archetypal Models and Four Motivic Theories 
Since motivic segments are concrete sequences of notes but recurrence is also an important part of 
Definition 1, a given motivic segment implies the existence of a set, ℳ, of related motivic segments 
drawn from the same piece of music.  The relationships between the segments in this set must 
negotiate the tension between repetition and development discussed above, and this negotiation is 
realised in a slightly different way by each of the four archetypal models proposed below and 
illustrated schematically in Figure 2.1.  Real motivic theories and analyses frequently blend aspects 
of all four; but it is useful, following Schoenberg’s aim of good comparison, to separate out these 
distinct conceptual and formal underpinnings in order to sharpen an assessment of how that 
blending functions in specific cases.  No assumptions are made at this stage concerning: 
a) whether or not every note in the piece is contained in a segment contained in ℳ; 
b) whether any material outside ℳis non-motivic connective tissue, or whether it falls into 
other sets that may partly overlap with ℳ. 
The four models, then, might be characterised as follows: 
1) The first (“stable”) segment of ℳto appear in the music serves as a prototype against 
which all the others are compared.31  This is seldom an explicit part of any theory; but 
since, as Zbikowski notes, ‘it is often the case that significance accrues to the first events in 
any psychological process’ (p. 23), it is usually a feature of analyses.  It is implied by 
analytical writing which labels a musical excerpt as, say, motive x, and uses phrases such as 
‘x is declaimed by the trombones in bar 17’ and ‘a tune based on an inversion of x is heard 
in bar 27’. 
                                                     
31 The qualifier “stable” is intended to account for the fact that the first appearance of a given 
motivic category is not always considered to be its most analytically pertinent: the classic case is that 
of a movement’s introduction “foreshadowing” its main themes, a device which Meyer considers to 
be a rare genuine example of motivic syntax (see Section 2.4 at n. 106) and which Edward Cone 
designates an instance of reverse derivation (see Section 2.3, point six).  Trying to identify which 
appearances “state” and which merely “foreshadow” is a problem which recalls the sorites paradox 
(see Section 2.3, point one), so while the term is admitted as a heuristic in this descriptive archetype, 
no such explicit formal distinction is made in the model developed in this thesis (see, nevertheless, 
Chapter 3, n. 16, which explores how passages which “foreshadow” others can give rise to 
particular formal structures). 
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2) Each member of ℳis a realisation of the same abstract type, so all share the same ‘inner 
essence’ (Reti’s phrase) and display what Solie terms ‘organic unity’.32  For some writers, this 
makes the members of ℳequivalent and interchangeable; but for others, this inner essence 
is a deeply buried compositional principle that unifies otherwise contrasting passages (such 
as first and second subjects).  A. B. Marx, for example, writes ‘that every [phrase] is one-
sided, that one can glean other, even opposed, sides from its content, giving the [phrase] a 
consequent or an opposing phrase.  These two (or more) phrases belong to each other, in 
accordance with their related content, and can form an internally unified whole’.33 
3) Each member of ℳvaries the previous member in a continuous process of development 
(Solie’s ‘organic growth’, to be contrasted with the ‘organic unity’ of archetype 2) so that, in 
Dahlhaus’s words, ‘while one may sense a derivational unity, it is not always possible to 
speak of a uniform substance’.34  This process may trace or thematise a directed 
progression, such as the “resolution” of a particular motivic interval (see Section 2.4); there 
                                                     
32 See Reti, Thematic Process, p. 13 and Solie, pp. 148–52. 
33 ‘Form in Music’, p. 73.  Here his term Satz, which Burnham retains in the original German, has 
been replaced with [phrase]; Burnham’s parenthetical original German terms have also been excised 
here.  ‘Satz’ and ‘phrase’ are not equivalent concepts, but the substitution clarifies the quotation 
without the need for a lengthy terminological digression: Burnham notes elsewhere that Satz may 
refer to ‘any closed structure’ ranging from phrase to theme to movement (Adolf Bernhard Marx, 
‘From The Theory of Musical Composition’, ed. and trans. by Scott Burnham, in Source Readings in Music 
History, ed. by Strunk and Treitler, VI, 181–89 (p. 181n)). 
34 See Solie, pp. 152–54 and Dahlhaus, ‘Developing Variation’, pp. 132–33. 
 
 
1) The first (stable) appearance is a prototype 2) All segments share the same ‘inner essence’ 
  
 
 
3) ‘Derivational unity’ vs. ‘uniform substance’ 4) A category emerges through time 
Figure 2.1: Four archetypal models of the negotiation between repetition and 
development. 
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may also be an implication that this trajectory is predetermined (as discussed in Section 
2.1). 
4) The set ℳunfolds with the music, as an evolving category, with each new member of 
ℳbeing weighed against, and ultimately contributing to, a combination of all the previous 
members.  This ‘cognitive re-alignment of material as perceived over time’ is considered to 
be a hallmark of Kierkegaardian ‘dynamic repetition’ (as opposed to developing variation) 
by Tim Howell.35  It differs from archetype 2 in that it has an implied directionality and 
respects Adorno’s argument that ‘[u]nity […] is undermined as soon as it ceases to unify a 
plurality’: its path from heterogeneity to unity has been, for Dahlhaus, ‘neglected in 
analytical practice’ as it traces ‘the opposite process’ to that of development.36  If combined 
with 3, it adds Dahlhaus’s uniform substance to his derivational unity and so underpins 
interpretations in which we are invited to see “the same” object, such as a character in a 
narrative, changing through time.  This archetype, being closely related to the idea of 
category formation, often arises in approaches influenced by cognitive science.37 
These archetypes are just that: archetypes.  To illustrate their utility as conceptual tools for 
understanding the assumptions which underlie specific motivic theories, analyses, and models, the 
remainder of this section is given over to detailed explorations of four styles of analysis that have 
proved to be influential on today’s motivic thought: Schoenbergian, Retian, paradigmatic, and 
leitmotivic. 
Schoenberg’s concept of developing variation – as a series of changes to motivic segments 
that ‘proceed more or less directly toward the goal of allowing new ideas to arise’ – is largely 
underpinned by archetype 3, and his understanding of development as a structural, generative 
process leads him to consider a sonata’s development section to be misnamed since it ‘seldom 
lead[s] to the “development” of anything new’.38  At the same time, however, terms such as 
‘variant’ (a segment changed in a way that has ‘little or no influence on the continuation’) and 
‘motive-form’ suggest the static, category-based conception of archetype 2: the inner essence in this 
                                                     
35 Tim Howell, ‘Brahms, Kierkegaard and Repetition: Three Intermezzi’, Nineteenth-Century Music 
Review, 10 (2013), 101–17 (p. 111). 
36 Adorno, ‘Centenary Address’, p. 94; Dahlhaus, ‘Developing Variation’, p. 133.  The idea of 
earned unity also underpins Cone’s notion of epiphany; see Section 2.3, point six. 
37 See, for example, Cambouropoulos (quoted in n. 8 above) and Zbikowski. 
38 Coherence, p. 39; Fundamentals, p. 200n.  The following discussion is largely informed by Musical 
Idea, including the editors’ preface, pp. xv–xxi, commentary, pp. 1–86, and useful ‘Concordance of 
Terms’, pp. 351–401, which brings together occurrences of selected key terms in Schoenberg’s 
writings.  Also useful as a summary of Schoenberg’s thought, complete with a speculative analytical 
example of his ideas in practice, is Severine Neff, ‘Schoenberg and Goethe: Organicism and 
Analysis’, in Music Theory and the Exploration of the Past, ed. by Christopher Hatch and David W. 
Bernstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 409–33. 
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case would be the motive.39  Motive-forms are chained together into gestalten (more complete units 
such as phrases and themes), and a work’s gestalten can be traced back to their Grundgestalt, a 
prototype suggestive of archetype 1 (although this understanding is complicated by Schoenberg’s 
stipulation that a twelve-tone work’s Grundgestalt is its tone row, relating the term to a more abstract 
entity).40  The chaining together of motive-forms saturates the texture to the point that the 
Schoenbergian answer to a) above would be affirmative: the ‘musical prose’ generated by 
developing variation, exemplified for Schoenberg above all by the music of Brahms, depends on 
the overlapping of motive-forms (which in some cases are simply intervals) with phrase boundaries 
and each other to create a texture in which every note is motivic.41  This technique is illustrated 
most clearly in Schoenberg’s analysis of the main theme of the Andante of Brahms’s String Quartet, 
Op. 51, No. 2 in his essay ‘Brahms the Progressive’ (reproduced here as Figure 2.2).  Such an 
account can conflict with the automatic modular perception of metrically parallel motives (see 
Temperley’s explanation cited at n. 27 above) through ‘the unexcelled freedom of its rhythm and 
[its] perfect independence from formal symmetry’.42 
 The mediation between the different archetypes at work in Schoenberg’s thought is 
provided by the central concept of the idea (Gedanke), ‘the essence of the work, […] its total 
dynamic, the balance of forces within the whole’.43  According to Schoenberg, every Grundgestalt 
embeds a ‘tonal problem’: 
Every tone which is added to a beginning tone makes the meaning of that tone 
doubtful.  If, for instance, G follows after C, the ear may not be sure whether this 
expresses C major or G major, or even F major or E minor; and the addition of 
other tones may or may not clarify this problem.  In this manner there is produced 
a state of unrest, of imbalance which grows throughout most of the piece, and is 
enforced further by similar functions of the rhythm.  The method by which 
balance is restored seems to me the real idea of the composition.44 
The purpose of developing variation is therefore to ‘elaborat[e] the idea of the piece’ by presenting 
and solving the problem; Schoenberg likens the process to that of an architect who cannot begin 
without a plan, but must ultimately commence the building work by joining two bricks together.45  
In this way Schoenberg evokes archetype 4 through the implication that the stages of 3, the various 
motive-forms and gestalten, are in fact the same Grundgestalt (type 1) reinterpreted in new contexts 
and incrementally progressing towards a goal – a goal that is not embedded in the first segment as 
such, but in the overall movement design (of which the first segment is nevertheless a crucial 
                                                     
39 Fundamentals, p. 9. 
40 Musical Idea, pp. 169, 259. 
41 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Brahms the Progressive’, in S&I, pp. 398–441 (p. 415). 
42 Schoenberg, ‘Brahms the Progressive’, p. 416. 
43 Editors’ preface to Musical Idea, p. xix. 
44 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea’, in S&I, pp. 113–24 (p. 123). 
45 Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Bach’, in S&I, pp. 393–97 (p. 397); Musical Idea, p. 151. 
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initiating part: Schoenberg’s translators bring out the resonances between ‘motive’, ‘motion’, and 
‘motor’).47 
 Reti, despite the title of his theoretical monograph (The Thematic Process in Music), is more 
concerned with ‘uniform substance’ than ‘derivational unity’, and therefore tends to adhere more 
closely to archetype 2; recall that the phrase ‘inner essence’ is his.  However, the full context of this 
phrase reveals that it is not meant to imply stasis or repetitiveness: ‘[The composer] strives toward 
homogeneity in the inner essence but at the same time toward variety in the outer appearance.’48  Similarly to 
Schoenberg, then, he sees his ‘process’ as a means to generate new material from old whilst 
retaining a deep structural unity; but ‘[w]hether or not the inner identity is demonstrable is a matter of 
entire indifference to the composer’ (p. 243).  It also appears to be a matter of indifference to the 
performer and the listener, as Reti explains when elucidating the meaning of a particular analytical 
observation (p. 47): 
It does not imply by any means that this B, G, E, should be artificially accented by 
the performer, nor that it must be heard and understood as a motivic utterance by 
the listener.  The unnoticeable influence that it may exert on the listener as a 
                                                     
46 Processed from Ex.46 in ‘Brahms the Progressive’, p. 430. 
47 Coherence, p. 27; cf. p. 26 ‘Motiv’, ‘Bewegung’, and ‘Motor’. 
48 Thematic Process, p. 13; further references are given in parentheses in the text. 
 
Figure 2.2: An example of developing variation. 
Schoenberg’s analysis of the opening theme of the Andante from Brahms’s String 
Quartet, Op. 51, No. 2.46 
 
-60- 
 
 
  
-6
0
- 
passing subconscious recollection – in fact, its theoretical existence in the piece – 
suffices.  It constitutes a symbol of the ever recurring idea, nothing more.49 
Reti’s perspective is therefore (re-)compositional, asking ‘not whether shapes are “similar” but 
whether the composer in forming them endowed them with qualities that assure some bond 
between them’ (p. 353): this is why he disavows the term ‘theory’, since this ‘compositional 
inspiration’ does not rely on ‘any specific device, old or new, that can be formulated’ (p. 67), and 
indeed need not even be a conscious process of manipulation.50  His analytical narratives are 
frequently compositional narratives, aiming ‘to retrace the compositional process’ (p. 117; perhaps 
this is the Process of his title?) using (re-)constructive language with pretensions to explanation: to 
take one example, ‘the resulting theme would have seemed too short had the composer immediately 
annexed segment III.  Therefore he prolonged the theme by inserting bars 4 and 5’ (p. 167). 
 The other archetypes are, however, by no means absent from Reti’s work.  Archetype 1 is 
frequently implicit in the musical excerpts Reti chooses to illustrate a particular motive.  Tracing 
thematic connections among the pieces of Schumann’s Kinderszenen, Reti describes the first as ‘the 
thematic source and sample for all the following ones’ (p. 32), thus invoking archetype 1 at the level 
of movements rather than motives.  He then organises the cycle into groupings of three to five 
movements and traces a ‘progression formed by the keys or, perhaps more adequately expressed, by 
the pitches and key qualities of [the movements’] thematic material’ (p. 53), culminating when ‘the poet 
himself steps before the curtain’ (p. 50) and states the main motive with its last note as part of the 
globally stable tonic for the first and only time in the work.51  The resonances with archetypes 3 
and 4, and with Schoenberg’s tonal problem and musical idea, are clear, and their implications are 
realised more fully in chapters 5 (pp. 109–38) and 6 (pp. 139–92) of Reti’s book.  These are devoted 
to the phenomenon of ‘thematic resolution’, ‘the problem of how a theme moves by transformation 
                                                     
49 Reti explicitly contrasts ‘theoretical, analytical similarity’ (p. 143) with ‘musical affinity’ (p. 242) at 
least twice more; discovery of the former does not change the fact that ‘[a]s an actual musical 
utterance [a second theme] does truly form a new thought’ (p. 143).  This sits uneasily with his 
insistence, near the opening of the book, that ‘[i]n order to comprehend the full meaning of the 
following analytic deductions, with all their structural and esthetic implications, the examples 
quoted must be understood, indeed, heard, as musical utterances’ (p. 6).  It is possible to address this 
apparent double standard through Temperley’s distinction between metrically parallel, 
‘phenomenologically direct’ relationships – which are perceived modularly – and those of a more 
abstract nature – which can be perceived eventually, but only in a ‘slow, deliberate, 
phenomenologically indirect way’ (see ‘Modularity’, p. 167; cf. ‘descriptive’ and ‘suggestive’ theories, 
Section 1.3).  To ‘artificially accent’ a relationship of the second type, or expect its ‘musical affinity’ 
to be heard and understood straight away, would be to misrepresent it as an instance of the first – 
which is not to say that it cannot ever be heard in principle. 
50 On balance however, ‘confronted with an abundant variety of different and irrefutable proofs’ (p. 
233), and after devoting an entire chapter to the question (pp. 233–47), he convinces himself that 
the process must be essentially conscious. 
51 The last piece is therefore a ‘moment of narration’; see Section 2.4. 
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toward a goal and how in this process the dramatic development of the work and its thematic course 
are intertwined’ (p. 139); this renewed emphasis on process leads Walter Frisch to single out the 
analysis of Mozart’s Symphony No. 40 in this section as Reti’s ‘most persuasive’.52  Reti even 
directly associates the various occurrences of a theme to ‘the same hero’ (p. 136): ‘The new 
environments influence the “hero,” who in turn influences them, and the final outcome is the result 
of this interplay, both in a symbolic and in a technical, that is, thematic sense.’ 
 A letter from Schoenberg to Reti, reprinted in facsimile in Reti’s second monograph, 
shows that the former considered the latter to be ‘a person who stands very close to my sphere of 
thought’; the two do indeed share certain similarities of outlook.53  However, to return to Solie’s 
two types of musical organic growth (that is, background-to-foreground construction and left-to-
right progress), Reti largely leaves the relationship between them unexplained.  This stands in sharp 
contrast to Schoenberg’s understanding, which relates concept to unfolding exceptionally tightly: 
developing variation is the means through which the story of the musical idea is told. 
 By its very nature, paradigmatic analysis rests on archetype 2: its goal is to abstract 
segments away from a piece of music’s syntagmatic chain (left-to-right progress) and into 
categories.54  This is, however, an inherently provisional separation since syntagmatic analysis ‘uses 
information and segmentation established from a paradigmatic point of view’, and paradigmatic 
segmentation frequently relies on syntagmatic criteria such as rests or sudden changes of register.55  
To use Nattiez’s word (ibid.), the point of this style of semiotic analysis is to ‘thematis[e]’, rather 
than reinforce, the distinction between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. 
 Another thematised opposition within the paradigmatic method is that of analytic versus 
synthetic procedures: in other words, the methodological balancing act between the bottom-up 
empirical project ‘to derive the units, classes of units, and rules of their combination which together 
constitute the code’, and the top-down theoretical desire to describe this code ‘uniformly with 
                                                     
52 Walter Frisch, Brahms and the Principle of Developing Variation, California Studies in Nineteenth-
Century Music, 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 22. 
53 Reti, Tonality – Atonality – Pantonality, p. 48 and plate II.  Frisch considers Schoenberg’s legacy to 
lie not in a rigorous theoretical system but a ‘critical or analytical tradition’ (p. 18) whose major 
contributors include Reti, Adorno, Erwin Ratz, Josef Rufer, Hans Keller, Alan Walker, Karl 
Wörner, Arno Mitschka, and Dahlhaus (see pp. 18–29).  I would also add David Epstein: see David 
Epstein, Beyond Orpheus: Studies in Musical Structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979). 
54 I am using the term ‘paradigmatic’ in preference to ‘semiotic’ as the latter can refer to a variety of 
approaches to meaning and signification in a variety of musics running the gamut from “absolute” 
to audiovisual.  My focus here is on the Ruwet–Nattiez approach (adopted, in part, by Agawu) to 
what Agawu terms ‘introversive semiosis’: signs that signify in reference to each other and ‘not 
necessarily by referential or extramusical association’ (Playing with Signs, p. 51). 
55 Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 252 ‘uses’; Ruwet, p. 14.  See also Chapter 3, n. 14. 
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maximum internal coherence and simplicity’.56  The aim, therefore, is to cover and “explain” as 
much of the analysed piece as possible in terms of a code (a grammar or means of interpretation), 
and to keep the connective tissue to a minimum.57  In order to do this whilst keeping the criteria 
for segmentation and repetition as explicit as possible, thereby avoiding the contortions on display 
in Figure 2.2, a piece of music will generally have more than one paradigmatic block (each of which is 
roughly equivalent to what is referred to as an ℳ-set above). 
 In theory, units grouped along the same paradigmatic axis (column) are ‘equivalent from a 
given point of view’: note that ‘this does not mean that they are homogeneous’ since the units can 
be arranged in many different ways corresponding to different criteria of identity, and units on the 
same axis in one arrangement might lie on different axes in others.58  The notion of a block, ‘a more 
or less homogeneous group constructed by the analyst on the basis of one or several criteria, 
dominant and convergent’ is intended to mediate between these conflicting arrangements through 
analytical assessment of which criteria are most important at a given point; the existence of this 
feature is what makes paradigmatic analysis impossible to implement computationally, according to 
Nattiez, since ‘explicit is not synonymous with algorithmic or mechanical’.59  Blocks are therefore 
intended to represent classes of “grammatically” interchangeable units, with the code of 
syntagmatic succession understood to act directly on these.  Paradigmatic analyses can, however, 
slip into language which suggests syntactically significant change occurring within a block, thereby 
invoking archetypes 1 (‘the head of the paradigm’), 3 (‘paradigmatic link with [1] through the 
intermediary [38]’) and 4 (‘references to the entire substance of what has transpired’).60  Nattiez 
                                                     
56 Ruwet, p. 11 ‘to derive’; p. 12 ‘uniformly’.  These issues are discussed in relation to music theory 
more generally in Sections 1.8 and 1.9. 
57 Ruwet is, in general, much more explicit about connective tissue than Nattiez.  He advocates 
finding strictly repeated sequences of the greatest possible length, then provisionally labelling 
everything that is left as a ‘remainder’.  These remainders are then examined and possibly 
assimilated on a higher level so that, for instance, (A+x)+(A+y) becomes A+A' (see pp. 18–19).  
Nattiez, on the other hand, typically skips the intermediary step and assigns varied units, or units 
only related through distribution (e.g. B and X in A+B+A'+X), to the same block (see, for 
example, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 268). 
58 Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 248. 
59 Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 257 ‘dominant’; p. 255 ‘explicit’.  Nattiez’s comments have not prevented 
researchers from trying to implement paradigmatic analysis computationally: see, for example, 
Kamil Adiloglu, Thomas Noll and Klaus Obermayer, ‘A Paradigmatic Approach to Extract the 
Melodic Structure of a Musical Piece’, Journal of New Music Research, 35 (2006), 221–36, and note 
Christina Anagnostopoulou and Chantal Buteau’s characterisation of Nattiez’s supposed belief in 
‘the neutrality, objectivity and scientific nature of music analysis’ (Christina Anagnostopoulou and 
Chantal Buteau, ‘Can Computational Music Analysis Be Both Musical and Computational?’, in 
Computational Music Analysis, ed. by Anagnostopoulou and Buteau, pp. 75–83 (p. 76)). 
60 Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 284 ‘head’; p. 303 ‘through’; Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 268 
‘substance’.  The italics have been added, but the square brackets are present in the original and 
refer to units used in Nattiez’s analysis. 
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even criticises Harry Halbreich’s archetype 1 remark that ‘[e]verything is born of the first bars’ by 
noting that ‘not all the relationships between units are transitive’ (i.e. that not everything explained 
using archetype 3 of Figure 2.1 can be rephrased in terms of archetype 1); in doing so, he therefore 
inadvertently implies a major criticism of his own approach, as discussed in point four of Section 
2.3 below.61 
 Finally, although the concept was not intended to be applicable beyond the repertoire of 
Wagner’s music-dramas, the leitmotivic approach has proved to be more widely influential; one 
need only call to mind the symphonies with so-called ‘Fate’ motives (such as Beethoven’s Fifth, 
Tchaikovsky’s Fourth and Fifth, and Mahler’s Sixth) to see that motives with symbolic or narrative 
implications are not confined to operatic works.  The leitmotive-concept is strongly characterised 
by its allowance, and even expectation, of both connective tissue and multiple ℳ-sets, an approach 
which contrasts with the generative, unifying, and texture-saturating models of Schoenberg and 
Reti.  Grey has written on ‘the agency of the Leitfaden or guiding thread image that underwrites this 
term’, following Theodor Uhlig in comparing leitmotivic structure to the red thread used in 
weaving and braiding to provide ‘a visual means of orientation within a complex fabric’.62  The 
thread can disappear from view, beneath ‘large swathes of often fairly neutral musical recitation or 
else semantically “unmarked” (non-recurring) arioso melody’ (p. 199), but it is‘imaginarily construed 
as a continuous but subconscious presence, somewhere beneath the threshold of our perceptions 
or beneath the surface of the work’ (p. 204).  This stands in contrast to the ever-visible thread of 
Schoenberg’s developing variation as exemplified in Figure 2.2, but the two models can co-exist: 
Grey refers to ‘ordinary, “unmarked” musical motives in other musical contexts’ (p. 188), and Reti 
maintains that although ‘thematic structure’ and ‘thematic symbolism’ are ‘separate in principle’, 
Wagner lets leitmotives ‘emerge as parts of the organic thematic design’ and ‘endow[s] ordinary 
thematic phrases with leitmotivic effects’, thereby developing a single ‘convincing entity’ from the 
two disparate phenomena.63 
 To create a ‘leitmotivic effect’ and signal when the red thread re-emerges from the 
‘unmarked’ texture, leitmotives need to be clearly recognisable: the first sentence of Arnold 
Whittall’s Grove entry on the subject therefore duly insists that a leitmotive must be ‘clearly defined 
                                                     
61 Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 331; for Halbreich’s remark see Harry Halbreich, ‘Etude de l’oeuvre 
d’Edgard Varèse’, in Georges Charbonnier, Entretiens avec Edgard Varèse (Paris: Belfond, 1970), pp. 
121–67 (p. 151), quoted in Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 330. 
62 Grey, ‘...wie ein rother Faden’, pp. 196, 199 (further references given in parentheses in the text); see 
also Theodor Uhlig, ‘Drei Tage in Weimar’, in Musikalische Schriften, ed. by Ludwig Frankenstein 
(Regensburg: Bosse, 1913), p. 333, quoted in ‘...wie ein rother Faden’, p. 198. 
63 Thematic Process, p. 337. 
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so as to retain its identity if modified on subsequent appearances’, suggesting archetype 2.64  
Archetype 1 is again never far from analytical practice, however, with the dramatic context of a 
leitmotive’s first appearance frequently determining its name – even though this original association 
is ‘almost always multivalent’ and can lead to alternative labellings (e.g. the ‘Flight’/‘Redemption 
through Love’/‘Glorification of Brünnhilde’ leitmotive of the Ring).65  But Grey warns against 
‘reading motives as fixed musical-semantic tags, static signifiers that betray the true, fluid, 
semantically indistinct or labile nature of musical signification’, advocating instead a sensitivity ‘to 
the fluid, evolving realities of their musical-dramatic implementation’.66  Bent similarly asserts that 
‘each [leit]motif must develop progressively, usually doing so in several directions at once’, which 
invokes the directionality of archetype 3, and elsewhere characterises Hans von Wolzogen’s 1882 
understanding of a leitmotive as ‘[a] cluster of definable separate motifs […] linked by organic 
mutation’, tinging the idea of unity from plurality (archetype 4) with some archetype 3-like 
organicism in the form of non-teleological chance ‘mutation’.67 
 Archetypes 1 to 4 represent one way to break complex analytical and theoretical statements 
into their constituent conceptual underpinnings, and these in turn rest on the balance between 
static, repetition-based and dynamic, development-based models.  A slightly different 
decomposition is proposed by Vera Micznik, who splits a motive’s ‘multi-levelled semiotic 
meanings’ into morphological, syntactic, and semantic dimensions by exploring the material 
similarity between musical units, the distribution of those units in time, and their connotative 
topical content (finding, for instance, echoes of ‘Viennese salon music’ in Mahler’s Ninth 
Symphony).68  Schoenberg arrives at a similar categorisation when listing the ways that musical 
ideas can cohere, grouping his initial list of sixteen under three headings: ‘musical content’, ‘other 
types of spiritual content’ and ‘something formal’ (although the extent to which form and syntax 
are related will be discussed below).69  The following two sections examine the natures of motivic 
morphology and motivic syntax independently and in detail; the issue of semantics is dealt with at 
various points throughout, although it is a particular feature of the discussion of musical narrative 
in Section 2.4. 
                                                     
64 Arnold Whittall, ‘Leitmotif’, in Grove Music Online <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com> 
[accessed 17 December 2014] (para. 1). 
65 See Whittall, para. 5. 
66 ‘...wie ein rother Faden’, p. 188. 
67 Ian Bent, ‘General Introduction’, in MA19I, pp. 1–17 (p. 16); von Wolzogen, p. 91ed. 
68 Vera Micznik, ‘Music and Narrative Revisited: Degrees of Narrativity in Beethoven and Mahler’, 
Journal of the Royal Musical Association, 126 (2001), 193–249 (pp. 203, 213).  For an introduction to 
topic theory, see The Oxford Handbook of Topic Theory, ed. by Danuta Mirka (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
69 Schoenberg, Coherence, p. 63. 
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2.3 Similarity and Categorisation 
One of the fundamental goals of any motivic analysis is to extract one or more ℳ-sets from a piece 
of music.  Although this can be done explicitly (as in a paradigmatic or computational study), these 
ℳ-sets usually arise implicitly through a series of analytical observations often presented as a 
hypothetical enquiry: a shape or small set of shapes is noticed near the beginning of the piece, then 
actively searched for in what follows.  (Of course, the hypothesis is seldom rejected since once a 
shape is proposed it is difficult to avoid seeing it everywhere – and ‘seeing’ rather than ‘hearing’ is 
apposite.)  Even analyses foregrounding archetype 3, and therefore shying away from questions of 
categorisation, are not simple segmentations of the syntagmatic chain with arrows interspersed but 
meaningful links between segments considered to be associated: they therefore require the same 
kind of critical similarity judgements to be made. 
 Once a small number of putative ℳ-sets has been established, the question facing the 
analyst is how the rest of the piece can be understood in relation to them.  This inevitably guides 
segmentation (especially if derivatives of a single ℳ-set are assumed to cover the entire piece – 
again, see Figure 2.2) and requires a judgement to be made regarding which set(s), if any, a 
particular passage belongs to.  Although Schoenberg uses six letters and up to three dashes to 
distinguish the (ultimately related) segments of Figure 2.2, category judgement may be more a 
matter of degree than kind: as Dunsby and Whittall note with respect to a particular example, labels 
are often ‘based more on the closeness of the “a” statements to each other than on the principle 
that “b” and “c” are totally independent of “a”’; a corollary of this is that certain passages might be 
judged sufficiently dissimilar to all three to be labelled connective tissue.70   
This idea of similarity and distance along a continuous spectrum of segments stretching 
from identical to unrelated is a tempting one, and is certainly an improvement to the naïve view 
that it is possible to separate a piece of music into neatly reified, non-overlapping, and independent 
ℳ-sets.  Nevertheless, the notion of categorisation based on a similarity or distance measure is a 
problematic one for a number of reasons.  Some of these are intrinsic to the exercise of similarity-
matching, and are therefore challenges that must be negotiated by the field of music information 
retrieval (MIR); others stem from the fact that motivic analysis, as a theory about music rather than 
a theory of music (see Section 1.4), has a different set of goals to those that typify MIR.  Finding a 
way to match segments in building a musical search engine can be a very different task to tracing 
the “story” of a particular motive throughout a single piece of music, even though each can feed in 
to the other – for example, if a search engine is used as an analytical tool, or a motivic analysis as a 
record of perceptual judgements to be modelled (see Section 1.5).  The following six problems, 
                                                     
70 Jonathan Dunsby and Arnold Whittall, Music Analysis in Theory and Practice (London: Faber Music, 
1988), p. 160. 
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while constructed with music theory in mind, can therefore be understood to apply, in part, to the 
enterprise of MIR. 
 First, extracting a collection of sets from a collection of distance measures is not 
straightforward.  A solution is suggested by fuzzy set theory, which proposes that traditional set 
theory’s ‘in’ and ‘out’ states are actually the two endpoints (1 and 0 respectively) of a continuous 
spectrum: similarity or distance measures can therefore be re-appropriated as so-called membership 
functions, such that a similarity value of 0.82 means that one segment is 82% “in” the other’s set.  
Thresholds can then be defined to convert fuzzy sets into ‘crisp’ sets, mapping, say, anything above 
70% to ‘in’ and everything else to ‘out’.  Applying this to the case of motivic categorisation, one can 
take a putative ℳ-set, find some suitably defined (possibly in terms of the similarity measure) 
“average” of its members, and then test every other segment in the piece against it, admitting into 
the set those above the threshold.  A more sophisticated version of this process would recalculate 
the average every time a new member is admitted, turning an archetype 1-based model into an 
archetype 4-based model: both strategies are used in Quinn’s study of the different contour types in 
Steve Reich’s The Desert Music, a piece that is admittedly atypical due to its high degree of near-exact 
repetition.71  An alternative method would be to use statistical cluster analysis to determine which 
segments, given a specified threshold or clustering parameter, appear to group together into sets; 
such an approach would find “the best” solution without the need for the user to propose possible 
ℳ-sets. 
 The problem, however, lies in setting the similarity threshold or clustering parameter: in an 
article surveying the subject, Olivier Lartillot and Petri Toiviainen highlight the fact that ‘no 
heuristic for precisely fixing this value has been proposed’ and so it ‘relies entirely on the user’s 
intuitive choices’ (Quinn suggests adopting the mean similarity of each set member to the 
“average”, but then immediately lowers this – intuitively – to avoid filtering out 99.994% of 
candidate segments).72  It is a mistake to assume that between all ‘definitely in’ cases and ‘definitely 
                                                     
71 Ian Quinn, ‘Fuzzy Extensions to the Theory of Contour’, Music Theory Spectrum, 19 (1997), 232–
63.  Most of Quinn’s article centres around the problem of how to judge whether or not a new 
segment should be included in a pre-defined 11-member set, but pp. 260–63 model an ‘in-time’ 
process that measures each segment’s similarity to the “average” member of a single growing ℳ-
set containing all of the piece’s previous segments.  Quinn’s work builds on the contour theory of 
Robert Morris, Elizabeth West Marvin, Paul A. Laprade, Michael Friedmann, Larry Polansky, and 
Richard Bassein; while this field is reminiscent of pitch-class set theory and serial theory in its use 
of sets and matrices, Quinn later reinterprets contours as regions of 𝑛-note space in Callender, 
Quinn, and Tymoczko, supporting online material, pp. 15–16, 37–38. 
72 See Olivier Lartillot and Petri Toiviainen, ‘Motivic Matching Strategies for Automated Pattern 
Extraction’, in Discussion Forum 4A: Similarity Perception in Listening to Music, ed. by Petri Toiviainen 
(=Musicae Scientiae, 11.1 suppl. (March 2007)), pp. 281–314 (p. 286) and Quinn, pp. 256–57. See also 
Cambouropoulos, pp. 16–18 (and the rest of this section) for a critique of the argument that a 50% 
threshold at least ensures that segments are more similar than dissimilar. 
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out’ cases lies a crisp borderline, as illustrated by the classical sorites paradox: in various 
formulations, it asks when a heap of wheat stops being a heap as single grains are taken away, when 
a man becomes bald if he loses one hair at a time, and when a tadpole becomes a frog given a series 
of photographs taken at one-second intervals during its life.  The concepts involved are all vague (in 
the philosophical sense) and the paradox can only be resolved (inadequately) by redefining them 
and retreating to extreme cases: so a heap is redefined as two or more grains, a man is only bald if 
he lacks a single hair on his head, a tadpole only becomes a frog in the last second of its life, and a 
motive is a single segment. 
 Linking these ideas back to more traditional motivic theories, we are often confronted with 
the idea that development involves “more” change than variation, and that the two exist on a 
spectrum: Reti, for example, proposes a ‘gamut’ from ‘imitation’ to ‘varying’ to ‘transformation’ to 
‘indirect affinity’, terminating, at least in theory, in ‘nonrelationship’ which is ‘virtually unknown in 
great compositional literature’.73  Reti is aware that ‘there is no clear border line between these 
different principles, and it is by no means always distinguishable when a change ceases to be mere 
“varying” and begins to be “transformation”’: he considers this terminological problem to be 
‘rather unimportant’, however, especially when placed next to the importance of recognising the 
‘different principles’ at work.74  The idea that variation and development can be compared in terms 
of degree, but differ fundamentally in kind, is a common one: Lisztian thematic transformation for 
van den Toorn and Frisch, ‘leitmotiv and programmatic content’ for Adorno, and popular song 
composition and repetitive sequence for Schoenberg are all devices which are separate from, but 
comparable (sometimes unfavourably) to, “true” developing variation, a label which itself would be 
redundant were its component terms not conceptually distinct yet capable of adjectivally modifying 
each other.75  A motivic similarity threshold predicated solely on degree of change therefore runs 
the risk of over-simplification. 
 Second, any measure of motivic similarity would have to deal regularly with segments of 
different sizes, a formal problem with no consistently successful practical solution.  In Schoenberg’s 
list of twelve elementary ways to vary the intervals and rhythms of an initial motive, seven 
                                                     
73 Thematic Process, p. 239 ‘gamut’; p. 240, n. 1 ‘unknown’; p. 240 the rest. 
74 Ibid., p. 61. 
75 See van den Toorn, p. 384; Frisch, pp. 42–52; Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 
trans. by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloomster (New York: Seabury Press; London: Sheed & 
Ward, 1973), pp. 57–58; Severine Neff, ‘Schoenberg as Theorist: Three Forms of Presentation’, in 
Schoenberg and His World, ed. by Walter Frisch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 55–
84 (pp. 67–72); and Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Criteria for the Evaluation of Music’, in S&I, pp. 124–36 
(p. 131).  Frisch cites Mitschka, ‘apparently unfamiliar with the writings of Schoenberg and his 
followers’, as the originator of the phrase variierende Entwicklung, or ‘varying development’ (p. 24; see 
Arno Mitschka, ‘Der Sonatensatz in den Werken von Johannes Brahms’ (unpublished inaugural 
dissertation, University of Mainz, 1961)). 
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(including ‘addition of upbeats’, ‘repetition of features’, and ‘filling up intervals with ancillary notes’) 
involve changing the number of notes in the segment; the uniform segment sizes in Quinn’s Reich 
study are therefore, again, atypical of usual motivic practice.76  Together with Callender and 
Tymoczko, Quinn has written on the problems of measuring distances between chords of different 
sizes (as the resultant geometric spaces are infinite-dimensional); but since the article’s focus is 
ultimately on voice-leading progressions, and numbers of voices do not tend to change mid-
passage, the writers claim that the problems can usually be worked around by simplifying to a finite-
dimensional case.77  For example, the abstract progression V7→I links a four-note chord to a three-
note chord, but any four-part realisation will involve doubling or omitting notes to turn it into a 
progression between two four-note chords (e.g. (G,G,F,B) → (C,G,E,C)), hence describing a 
measurable distance in four-dimensional space. 
This voice-leading is a non-bijective mapping between the two sets: some pitch-classes in the 
first chord are sent to unique pitch-classes in the second (F to E), but some are sent to two 
different pitch-classes (G to both C and G), some to the same pitch-class (G and B to C), and some 
are not mapped to anything (D; analogously unused members of the second set would also be 
permitted under the definition of a non-bijective mapping).78  Finding such mappings in the 
motivic domain – that is, pattern-matching between strings of different sizes – is a non-trivial 
problem, and is indeed a central concern of MIR: solutions to finding an appropriate alignment or 
embedding include fitting curves and measuring distances or correlations, testing all possible 
alignments to find the one that gives the highest similarity, measuring the edit distance (i.e. the 
number of insertions and deletions) between two strings, and applying reductive (quasi-
Schenkerian) algorithms until the segments are comparable at the same size – and each of these 
methods must decide whether to work with pitch, pitch-class, interval, scale-degree, contour, 
duration, metric level, and/or harmonic encoding.79  But even if an alignment is found, there seems 
to be no natural way to relate this back to a similarity measure: taking the similarity between the 
                                                     
76 Schoenberg, Fundamentals, p. 10. 
77 See Callender, Quinn and Tymoczko, supporting online material, pp. 6–7, 14. 
78 Strictly speaking, Callender, Quinn, and Tymoczko’s voice-leadings are not mappings but line 
segments in a continuous geometric space: Tymoczko explores this distinction, and critiques 
Lewin’s implication that mappings may adequately model ‘directed measurements, distances, or 
motions’ (Generalized Musical Intervals, p. 16), in Dmitri Tymoczko, ‘Lewin, Intervals, and 
Transformations: A Comment on Hook’, Music Theory Spectrum, 30 (2008), 164–68 and Dmitri 
Tymoczko, ‘Generalizing Musical Intervals’, Journal of Music Theory, 53 (2009), 227–54.  The first of 
these articles is a response to Julian Hook’s generalisation of Lewin’s bijective theoretical constructs 
to incorporate non-bijective mappings in Julian Hook, ‘Cross-Type Transformations and the Path 
Consistency Condition’, Music Theory Spectrum, 29 (2007), 1–40. 
79 A useful summary and bibliography of recent approaches may be found in Alan Marsden, 
‘Interrogating Melodic Similarity: A Definitive Phenomenon or the Product of Interpretation?’, in 
Creativity Rethinks Science, ed. by Federico Avanzini, Giovanni De Poli, and Davide Rocchesso 
(=Journal of New Music Research, 41.4 (December 2012)), pp. 323–35 (pp. 326–27). 
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aligned subsets implies that adding notes does not decrease similarity, but taking the average across 
all possible alignments would unfairly penalise simple cases such as added passing notes.  How do 
we quantitatively relate the operations ‘changing a note’ and ‘adding a note’ on the same numeric 
scale?  The subtle conceptual migration from similarity and distance to embedding and mapping 
that underlies this question leads to the next problem with motivic similarity measures. 
Third, to use terms borrowed from Kamil Adiloglu, Thomas Noll and Klaus Obermayer, 
there is an important distinction to be made between ‘similarity by proximity’ and ‘similarity by 
symmetry’.80  Broadly speaking, the first concerns itself with “analogue” similarity or distance 
measures, and the latter with “digital” (and inherently non-fuzzy) functions or mappings, 
considering two objects (say, pitch-class sets) to be similar if one can be reached from the other by 
some permitted combination of functions (say, transposition and inversion).  Both types of 
similarity are important: although retrograde forms, such as those frequently identified by Reti, can 
be derided as imperceptible, Ockelford argues that in a different light Reti’s ‘position makes good 
sense, since retrogression demands, in logical terms, a minimal degree of change’.81  A lot also rests 
on encoding: if we consider a segment to be a set of pitches then it is symmetrically close but 
proximally distant to its transpositions (given a unit of measurement defined as a change of one 
note by one semitone), whereas if we consider it to be a set of intervals then it is similar (in fact, 
identical) to its transpositions in both cases. 
 While each type of similarity corrects oversights in the other, combining both types in a 
single model can be problematic.  Pearsall’s theory of ‘transformational streams’, for example, 
introduces ‘transformational communities’ (sets defined by combinations of retrograde, inversion, 
and cyclic permutation; p. 72), which are linked by ‘motivic transmutations’ (changes to a motive’s 
interval sizes and/or directions; pp. 73–74).  Changing too many intervals at once can lead to a 
                                                     
80 Adiloglu, Noll and Obermayer, p. 224.  These broadly align with the geometric and mapping-
based approaches referred to in n. 78 above, and also with Marsden’s distinction (following Amos 
Tversky’s) between geometric similarity measures and those based on sets of features 
(‘Interrogating Melodic Similarity’, pp. 325–27).  Note that mathematically speaking, a symmetry is 
simply a function that preserves some feature of an object, and does not necessarily imply the 
musical baggage that has built up around the term (such as periodic phrasing, balance, or mirror-
relationship). 
81 Ockelford, p. 84.  The perceptibility of serial transformations (retrograde and inversion) seems to 
be a disputed matter, with Lerdahl citing four studies implying ‘that permutational structures are 
hard to learn and remember’ (Fred Lerdahl, ‘Cognitive Constraints on Compositional Systems’, in 
New Tonality, ed. by Paul Moravec and Robert Beaser (=Contemporary Music Review, 6.2 (1992)), pp. 
97–121 (p. 116)).  However, the Dowling study that he cites reaches the conclusion that these 
transformations can be ‘recognized with better than chance accuracy’ (W. Jay Dowling, 
‘Recognition of Melodic Transformations: Inversion, Retrograde, and Retrograde Inversion’, 
Perception & Psychophysics, 12 (1972), 417–21 (p. 417)), and a more recent study similarly reports 
subjects’ ‘classification accuracy of mirror forms’ to be ‘above chance’ (Carol L. Krumhansl, 
Gregory J. Sandell, and Desmond C. Sergeant, ‘The Perception of Tone Hierarchies and Mirror 
Forms in Twelve-Tone Serial Music’, Music Perception, 5 (1987–88), 31–77 (p. 31)). 
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disintegration of the similarity relationship, so Pearsall only considers transmutations that reverse 
up to half of a motive’s directions and change its interval sizes by up to two semitones (p. 75).  This 
threshold is misleading, however, since any sequence of directions can be obtained by changing up 
to half of the directions of an original shape or its inversion: once the halfway point has been 
reached, transmutations actually head back towards their original community. 
Any concept of distance in music theory cannot, therefore, rest on a symmetry- or 
mapping-based account and must be understood geometrically: this is an argument which has been 
advanced by Tymoczko on several occasions.82  His injunction applies even when the mappings 
involved seem closely related to a concept of distance: for instance, the Neo-Riemannian operations 
P (for parallel), L (for leading-tone exchange) and R (for relative) represent the three possible ways 
of moving from one consonant triad to another by moving a single voice by one or two semitones 
– illustrated by example, 𝑃(C,E,G) = (C,E,G), 𝐿(C,E,G) = (B,E,G), and 𝑅(C,E,G) = (C,E,A).  
The progression below shows one way to get from C major to F minor: 
(
G
E
C
)
𝑅
→ (
A
E
C
)
𝐿
→ (
A
F
C
)
𝑃
→ (
A
F
C
) 
At each stage, the moves are locally minimal in the sense described above, and so it is tempting to 
use them to form a distance measure: under this measure, C major is closer to F major than F 
minor.  However, (C,E,G) → (C,F,A) involves 1 + 2 = 3 semitones of total voice-leading motion, 
whereas (C,E,G) → (C,F,A) involves 1 + 1 = 2: the locally efficient moves do not aggregate into 
a globally analogous measure of distance, and it can indeed be seen that the top voice in the 
example – i.e. G → A → A – changes direction to move back towards its starting-point.  
Functions, mappings, and symmetries, even music-theoretically pertinent ones, can therefore 
produce anomalies in relation to proximity-based distance measures unless these functions are 
understood in relation to the geometric spaces they work within. 
  Fourth, the relationships that hold between motivic segments are normally of a different 
type to those required to form coherent sets and distance measurements.  Related to the ideas of 
similarity by symmetry and similarity by proximity, consider the two mathematical concepts defined 
below, the first of which seeks to generalise the notion of equality, and the second that of distance: 
 
                                                     
82 See Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music, pp. 412–17, which expands Tymoczko, ‘Geometrical 
Methods’.  The sources cited in n. 78 above critique Lewin’s use of group-theoretical mappings to 
measure intervals, whereas the sources cited here deal with mapping-based graphs constructed by a 
wider range of authors (see also the present Introduction at notes 10 and 11). 
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A relation ~ between two objects is called an 
equivalence relation if: 
e1) 𝑥~𝑥 
e2) If 𝑥~𝑦 then 𝑦~𝑥 
e3) If 𝑥~𝑦 and 𝑦~𝑧 then 𝑥~𝑧 
A function 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) is called a metric if: 
m1) It is never negative 
m2) 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0 only when 𝑥 = 𝑦 
m3) 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑑(𝑦, 𝑥) 
m4) “Direct” routes are never longer: 
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑧) ≤ 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) + 𝑑(𝑦, 𝑧) 
  
Following these definitions, equality (=) is an equivalence relation whereas inequality (≠) is not 
(condition e3 fails), and straight-line distance is a metric whereas journey time is not (since 
condition m3 fails if, for example, points 𝑥 and 𝑦 lie at the top and bottom of a hill).  An important 
consequence of an equivalence relation is that it can be used to generate what are known as 
equivalence classes: starting with a pair 𝑥~𝑦, one can add objects such as 𝑤~𝑥 and 𝑦~𝑧 whilst 
ensuring that, thanks to e3, if a new object is related to one of the members, then it is related to all 
of them (a property known as transitivity).  Condition e2 ensures that it is irrelevant which order this 
is done in, and e1 ensures that an element unrelated to anything else can still form an equivalence 
class on its own: for a given equivalence relation, every object in a set can therefore be placed in 
exactly one (non-overlapping) equivalence class, an arrangement known as a partition of the set.83 
Equivalence classes are a particularly strong kind of grouping, formalising, as they do, the 
idea of sorting objects into discrete pigeonholes, boxes, or folders; the meaning behind the label 
‘motive 𝑥’ in an archetype 1-inspired analysis seems to be ‘member of the equivalence class also 
containing 𝑥, given a suitable equivalence relation ~’ (written ‘member of  [𝑥]~’ for short).  If ~ is 
intransitive (i.e. if condition e3 fails) then the result is either overlapping sets (such as {𝑥, 𝑦} and 
{𝑦, 𝑧}) or a larger set in which not everything is related ({𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} in which 𝑥 ≁ 𝑧).  Similarly, as 
outlined above, if a proposed distance measure is not a true metric then it cannot be interpreted 
geometrically and therefore can give rise to anomalies.84  It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a 
suitable equivalence relation and/or metric could be defined on motivic segments. 
                                                     
83 A numeric example: suppose we take the set of all non-simplified fractions 𝑎 𝑏⁄  and the 
equivalence relation ‘=’.  Each fraction falls into a single class, such as {1 2⁄ ,
2
4⁄ ,
3
6⁄ , … }, and is 
equal to everything in its class and nothing outside it.  Interpreting 𝑥 and 𝑦 as pitch-class sets and ~ 
as ‘can be transformed by transposition or inversion into’ also shows that pitch-class set classes are 
equivalence classes. 
84 Counting the shortest Neo-Riemannian path between two triads does actually define a metric; 
but since this metric does not respect voice-leading distance or number of common tones (F minor 
and E minor are both three moves away from C major but share one and zero tones with it 
respectively), ‘it is an open question whether there is any intuitive notion of musical distance that is 
being modelled here’ (Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music, p. 412).  It seems the best we can do is 
observe, tautologically, that the length of the shortest Neo-Riemannian path between two triads 
-72- 
 
 
  
-7
2
- 
 Conditions e1 and m1 are straightforward to satisfy in the way that the relation and 
distance function are defined.  Condition m2 would require careful negotiation since segments 
which are strictly distinct are often held to be identical (if, for example, one is an exact transposition 
of the other): the distance function must therefore either be defined to act on classes of segments 
rather than segments themselves, or must take account of temporal separation such that no two 
segments can ever be truly identical.  The symmetry conditions e2 and m3 might again be satisfied 
through careful definition, but Marsden has noted that familiarity and relative length can make 
melodic similarity judgements asymmetrical: an unfamiliar melody is more likely to be judged 
similar to a familiar one than vice versa, and a short melody might call to mind a longer one without 
the converse being true (Marsden illustrates this with the extreme example of a symphony being 
represented by a ringtone).85 
Conditions e3 and m4 prove to be more problematic in their underlying assumption that 
pairwise relationships are directly comparable to each other and therefore imply conclusions about 
sets with more than two members.  The example of Neo-Riemannian voice-leading distance above 
illustrates why this cannot be assumed in general: each stage moves one of three voices by one or 
two semitones up or down, so the “unit” of distance is actually three distinct units which cannot be 
treated as equivalent.86  This is why steps away from the initial point can actually end up moving 
back towards it (as the top voice in the example shows), and the reason for this is intransitivity: 
7 ≠ 6 ≠ 7 is an expression that makes sense reading from left to right, but which is clearly invalid 
if we attempt to skip the intervening step and conclude that 7 ≠ 7.  Motives are amalgamations of 
several musical dimensions (absolute and relative chromatic and diatonic pitches, durations, onsets 
within a metric framework, contours, and so on), with any given motivic change moving, fixing, or 
going backwards in any or all of these directions at once.  Irrespective of the number of these 
                                                                                                                                                           
measures the minimum number of moves it takes to get from one to the other where each step 
only moves one voice by one or two semitones, and where the intervening steps must also be 
consonant triads. 
85 ‘Interrogating Melodic Similarity’, p. 324; Alan Marsden, ‘The Plurality of Melodic Similarity’, in 
Proceedings of the Eighth Sound and Music Computing Conference (Padova: [n. pub.], 2011), pp. 5–10 
<http://www.smcnetwork.org/smc_papers-2011179> [accessed 17 December 2014] (p. 5): the 
former paper expands the latter, which is therefore only cited if it contains ideas not present in the 
former. 
86 Lora Gingerich’s theory of motivic functions runs into similar problems: while she defines fifteen 
different transformations (such as sharpening or flattening individual notes, inverting or expanding 
individual intervals, and permuting the note order), there are often multiple ways to get from one 
segment to another (for example, UP12=SHARP12, FLAT=SHARP-1).  This lends the theory a 
degree of interpretative flexibility (although the cumbersome notation can cloud the good 
comparison in places), but leads to formal redundancy in its failure to identify a set of independent 
dimensions that could form the basis of a geometric motivic space (or even a coherent system for 
labelling motivic transformations).  See Lora L. Gingerich, ‘A Technique for Melodic Motivic 
Analysis in the Music of Charles Ives’, Music Theory Spectrum, 8 (1986), 75–93; the fifteen 
transformations are defined on pp. 77–82. 
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dimensions that a given metric can account for, however, it must still output a single number and 
therefore presuppose the problematic one-dimensional spectrum from identity to non-relationship 
that is under critique in this section. 
Attempting to distil differences in a variety of dimensions down to a single number can run 
the risk of assuming that the relative importance of these dimensions is fixed and independent of 
context.  Interpretations are frequently modified to maximise similarity, with different dimensions 
taking precedence at different times (Nattiez’s ‘dominant criteria’); in such contexts, Marsden 
argues, ‘we should expect [condition m4] to be violated: that melody b can be interpreted in different 
ways to be similar to both a and c does not imply that there is any way to interpret a to be similar to 
c’.87  Reti, for example, speaks of a theme that ‘shows no kinship’ to a predecessor until the 
appearance of ‘another thematic shape between these two themes which is readily recognized as 
related to both’; elsewhere he hears ‘the first theme unmistakeably resounding from the Interlude 
theme, which itself is a clear copy of the second theme’.88  His strategy in both cases is to find a b-
shape that links otherwise unrelated a- and c-shapes; couching the same observation in re-
compositional language, he claims that ‘one of the favourite means in the technique of classical 
composers’ is ‘the building of a thematic shape from a blending of two previous ones’, creating an 
overlap between [𝑎]~ and [𝑐]~ (in the form of b) without implying any relationship between a and c 
themselves.89  This phenomenon can be a source of awkwardness in paradigmatic analysis which, 
despite permitting ‘oblique’ relationships that fit between or across paradigms, still largely functions 
on the pigeonhole model: Agawu, for instance, is uncomfortable with the seemingly forced decision 
to place a b-like segment in a new paradigm that ‘is, technically, not a paradigm since it occurs only 
once and clearly grows out of Paradigms E and F’.90 
Fifth, and implicit in the discussion so far, is a problem that is inherent in most music-
theoretical formalisations (as discussed in Section 1.9 above), but perhaps most of all in motivic 
analysis: the lack of an unambiguous and coherent ground truth.  It is comparatively easy to fault a 
proposed formalism by finding musical examples (or examples of analyses) that expose some 
oversight in the model; consider the above criticisms that a distance-based model cannot take 
account of the (under-defined or possibly non-existent) border between variation and development, 
or of the conceptual ‘closeness’ afforded by symmetry operations such as inversion.  That these 
counter-examples (Lakatos’s ‘monsters’; see Section 1.7) exist is only fatal for an approach based on 
strict falsificationism (a position untenable within music theory anyway; see Section 1.8): they do 
                                                     
87 ‘The Plurality of Melodic Similarity’, p. 8; for Nattiez’s dominant criteria, see Section 2.2 above. 
88 Thematic Process, p. 240 ‘kinship’, ‘between’; pp. 144–45 ‘unmistakably’.  See also the discussion of 
Cone’s ‘epiphany’ in point six below. 
89 Thematic Process, p. 25. 
90 See Playing with Signs, p. 68; oblique relationships are discussed in Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 251. 
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not necessarily stop a model from being a useful heuristic or good comparison, and so need not 
always be barred (although it is my contention that the problems with motivic distance are so 
numerous that the idea ceases to function as a good comparison – or at least that a better 
comparison can be found). 
However, when one begins to ask exactly what phenomenon is being modelled by the 
notion of motivic distance, one finds, like Marsden, that it appears to have no ‘stable underlying 
cognitive functions’; as the discussion in Section 2.2 shows, its analytical definitions are similarly 
heterogeneous.91  Marsden contrasts this with the idea of tonal pitch hierarchy: if one conducts a 
perceptual experiment asking listeners to rate how well each of the twelve chromatic pitch-classes 
fits into a passage in, say, C major, and then takes a passage in C major and counts the frequency 
distribution of notes, then the two resulting profiles will be similar.  Moreover, these profiles 
correlate well with a reasonably coherent and consistent set of traditional music-theoretical ideas 
(i.e. that the tonic is the most important note, followed by the dominant, and so on).92  Listeners’ 
motivic similarity ratings, on the other hand, seem to vary depending on the experimental paradigm 
used, some of which invoke “real” musical situations and some of which do not: in his survey of 
the topic, Marsden notes that subjects have been variously asked to numerically rate the similarity 
between two melodies, rank all or some of them in relation to a comparison melody, choose the 
most and least alike pairs in a set of three, sort melodies into categories, hum a melody from 
memory, or deliberately vary a given melody; some of these tasks have also been modified by 
instructions to, for example, explicitly consider a particular feature (such as contour) or rate 
melodies (asymmetrically) as if one was ‘a student’s attempt to reproduce a teacher’s melody’.93  
Different contexts require the listener to creatively construct different kinds and degrees of similarity 
(variation form, for instance, invites the listener to maximise similarity judgements) and so, argues 
Marsden, ‘it is probably safer to consider melodic similarity to be a family of possibly related 
phenomena’.94 
                                                     
91 ‘Interrogating Melodic Similarity’, p. 325. 
92 See Carol L. Krumhansl, Cognitive Foundations of Musical Pitch, Oxford Psychology Series, 17 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990); for a music theory built on these empirically derived tonal 
hierarchies, see Fred Lerdahl, Tonal Pitch Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; repr. 2005).  
Of course, as discussed in Section 1.5, it is simplistic to say that traditional theoretical ideas about 
tonality were “right all along”, since they undoubtedly influenced the composers who created the 
frequency distributions and (directly through training or indirectly through a musical corpus) the 
experimental subjects who rated the musical examples. 
93 ‘Interrogating Melodic Similarity’, pp. 324–25; p. 325 ‘attempt’. 
94 Ibid., p. 325.  For a comparative study which reaches a different conclusion, namely ‘that a 
subgroup of music experts has a reliable and consistent notion of melodic similarity, and that this 
notion can be measured with satisfactory precision’, see Daniel Müllensiefen and Klaus Frieler, 
‘Modelling Experts’ Notions of Melodic Similarity’, in Discussion Forum 4A, ed. by Toiviainen, pp. 
183–210 (p. 183). 
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Sixth and finally, any notion of morphological similarity between independent, free-
floating segments is often challenged, constructed and overwritten by the rhetorical disposition of 
those segments within a piece of music.  The strong effect of phrase beginnings on similarity 
judgements (between antecedent and consequent pairs, for example) has been implied above (see n. 
57) and has proved to be influential on at least one formal similarity model which considers a 
motive’s first intervals to be crucial in identifying temporally distant repetitions.96  More 
heterogeneous local processes play a part too: Figure 2.3 reproduces a musical excerpt not drawn 
from a real piece, but constructed artificially by Charles Seeger.  It creates a convincing connection 
between two disparate segments in a way that also illustrates how this sixth problem plays on the 
concerns of the previous five: the point at which the first segment becomes the last is either near-
impossible to identify or completely arbitrary; each segment is difficult to align with its predecessor 
as the added notes can be matched in terms of either pitch or rhythm (is the C in bar 5 aligned with 
the B or C in bar 7?); closeness can be understood both as semitone distance (A in bar 4 becomes 
G in bar 6) and conceptual parsimony (bar 9 is almost an octave transposition of bar 7 – ‘almost’ 
of course referring to the semitone distance between C and D); the relationships between 
segments are intransitive (as the first and the last are unrelated directly); and the musical context 
invites the listener to maximise the similarity between adjacent pairs of segments. 
 To draw an example from a real piece of music – indeed, the piece of music most often 
held up as a paradigmatic example of motivic organisation (see Introduction at n. 3) – consider 
Figure 2.4, a passage from the development section of the first movement of Beethoven’s Fifth 
                                                     
95 Processed from Charles Seeger, ‘On the Moods of a Music-Logic’, in A Musicological Offering to 
Otto Kinkeldey upon the Occasion of His 80th Anniversary, ed. by Charles Seeger (=Journal of the American 
Musicological Society, 13 (1960)), pp. 224–61 (p. 233, Ex. 5).  I am grateful to Ed Venn for bringing 
this example to my attention. 
96 See Lartillot and Toiviainen, p. 289. 
 
Figure 2.3: Similarity is strongly dependent on rhetorical context. 
Charles Seeger’s ‘logical’ linking of the opening of Schubert’s ‘Great’ C major 
Symphony and a passage from Strauss’s Till Eulenspiegels lustige Streiche.95 
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Symphony.  This has been identified by Edward Cone as an example of ‘intransitive derivation’ and 
in my own earlier work as an example of ‘continuous development’.98  The movement’s opening 
motive (𝑥) is shortened to a three-note version (𝑥′) and also used to initiate the second subject (𝑦).  
This second subject is then progressively truncated to five (𝑦′), two (𝑦′′), then one (𝑦′′′) note(s), 
such that when the complete phrase (𝑦) is heard again in bar 228, the individual notes (𝑦′′′) that 
follow are heard in relation to it: a link has been forged, through the second subject, between the 
distinctive opening motive and an undistinctive single note.  This particular process – that is, 
‘gradually depriving the motive forms of their characteristic features and dissolving them into 
uncharacteristic forms, such as scales and broken chords’ – is termed ‘liquidation’ by Schoenberg, 
its purpose being to ‘neutralize the obligations’ of motivic material and keep runaway development 
in check.99 
 Liquidation is not the only process covered by Cone’s term ‘derivation’, and in a relatively 
short article he examines a wide range of rhetorical devices that complicate the idea that ‘if y, which 
resembles x, follows x, then we normally accept y as derived from x’.100  Initially (pp. 240–44), his 
                                                     
97 Processed from Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphonie Nr. 5 in c-moll, op. 67 [Score], ed. by Jonathan 
Del Mar (Bärenreiter: Kassel, 1999). 
98 Edward T. Cone, ‘On Derivation: Syntax and Rhetoric’, Music Analysis, 6 (1987), 237–55 (pp. 
242–43); Holden, pp. 13–14. 
99 Editors’ commentary to Schoenberg, Musical Idea, p. 53.  The obligations of the material are 
related to the musical idea and the tonal problem: according to Schoenberg, the problem being 
resolved in this movement is the G–E interval in the opening motive, which could imply E major 
or C minor (see ‘Folkloristic Symphonies’, p. 164). 
100 Cone, ‘On Derivation’, p. 240; further references are given in parentheses in the text. 
 
Figure 2.4: Context can intransitively link distinctive and undistinctive segments. 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, first movement, bars 175–234 (excerpts).97 
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discussion activates many of the same issues encountered in Section 2.2 above: the Beethoven 
example relates to archetype 3; variation form is seen as motivated by archetype 1 but frequently 
incorporating sub-1s or -3s in the way that variations group into sections; and something like 
archetype 4 is proposed to model variations derived ‘through’ their predecessors (an understanding 
implicit, Cone argues, in archetype 3 itself).  Cone then considers units formed from multiple 
sources stated successively, simultaneously, or in more subtle ‘portmanteau’ (p. 245) forms (taking, 
for example, the rhythm of one and intervals of another): these syntactic devices share the common 
‘rhetorical aim’ of ‘epiphany […,] designed to compel the listener to realise a previously 
unsuspected – or at most unconfirmed – relationship’ (p. 246) in the manner of Reti’s examples 
cited in relation to point four above.101  This is followed by a discussion of ‘rederivation’ (p. 248), a 
device by which a passage of development culminates in an existing theme and can therefore 
symbolise such notions such as ‘home-coming’ or ‘self-discovery’ (p. 249); it tends, therefore, to 
occur at the boundary between development and recapitulation sections.102  The rest of the article 
(pp. 250–54) is then devoted to the question of whether or not derivation can work in reverse.  
Cone first examines derivatives that might be seen as simultaneous with their sources (such as 
complete canons by retrograde or diminution), then sources that (from a composer’s, and possibly 
listener’s, point of view) stand outside the temporal succession of the composition (songs recycled 
as sonata movements, chorales, cantus firmi, folk-songs, or tone rows); he then moves onto 
introductory ‘foreshadowing’, narrative quotation marks (the opening of Strauss’s Till Eulenspiegel 
announcing, for example, ‘I’m going to tell you about a rogue named Till’ (p. 251)), and 
Schenkerian derivation from the background, before finally arriving at his ‘true case of reversed 
                                                     
101 One of Cone’s examples is a discussion of the ‘tangled lines of inheritance’ (p. 246) leading to 
Brünnhilde’s Immolation scene, illustrating that leitmotives need not be simple static symbols but 
can participate in complex, rhetorically-deployed networks of allusions. 
102 Adorno sees this process as tautologous, since the outcome of the development’s extensive 
motivic working turns out to be ‘the affirmation and justification of what has been, what was there 
in any case’ (Mahler, p. 94).  Mahler’s structures, Adorno claims, usually manage to escape this 
tautology; it is therefore somewhat surprising to see Cone’s most extensive example of rederivation 
being drawn from Mahler’s Fifth Symphony.  The passage under question is the final peroration 
which, being a successful culmination of the Finale’s material, succeeds where the previous 
‘insufficiently motivated’ appearance of the same music near the end of the second movement 
failed (Cone, ‘On Derivation’, p. 249).  Cone’s reading implies that the peroration is a delayed case 
of Adornian Erfüllung (fulfilment); for an argument that it is an Adornian Durchbruch (breakthrough; 
Section 2.4 explains these terms in further detail) see William Kinderman, The Creative Process in 
Music from Mozart to Kurtág (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), pp. 102–37 (p. 134 in 
particular).  Kinderman argues that Adorno considers the chorale’s first appearance, as ‘failed 
teleology’ (Kinderman, p. 118), to be more authentic than the second, as ‘mere conviction’ 
(Adorno, Mahler, p. 137): but the very fact that the same musical material can point in radically 
different affective directions should give pause to the notion that rederivation is always a 
tautologous reinforcement of the status quo. 
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temporality […] the potpourri overture’ (p. 254), in which the themes are heard as derived from the 
following opera and not vice-versa.103 
The syntactical and rhetorical devices of epiphany, rederivation and reverse derivation do 
more than simply obscure or clarify existing motivic relationships: they are integral to the 
experience of the piece as it unfolds.  Cone discusses this briefly, but elaborates in more detail in his 
earlier article ‘Three Ways of Reading a Detective Story – Or a Brahms Intermezzo’, which uses the 
example of Conan Doyle’s ‘The Adventure of the Speckled Band’ to examine the role of analysis in 
hearing (or reading).104  A first reading, argues Cone, simply follows the succession of events as 
written with the primary aim of finding out what happens next.  A second reading is an analysis, an 
out-of-time study of ‘an object abstracted or inferred from the work of art’ (p. 80): in a Sherlock 
Holmes story, this object is a chronological ordering of the plot events, which are narratively 
revealed out of sequence (a story typically begins with a client visiting Holmes and Watson to 
recount what they know about a past crime, and ends, after following Holmes’s investigative 
process in the “present”, with Holmes revealing his reconstruction of the events leading up to that 
crime to Watson and the reader ).  A third reading is then an idealised first or an enacted second: it 
is informed by analysis, but in a sense aims to suppress synoptic insights by focusing on ‘the 
strategies of concealment and disclosure by which the author controls the process’ (p. 81).  A good 
performance, being a temporally projected analysis, is therefore a third reading, since the performer 
is in a position to anticipate surprises (like Holmes) rather than experience them with the audience 
(like Watson; see pp. 90–93).  This carries suggestions of archetype 4, being a combination of an 
“in-time” first reading (archetype 3) and an “out-of-time” second reading (archetypes 1 and 2).  
Cone also argues that a good analysis is a third reading as it should connect spatial, abstract, 
synoptic perspectives to the music as it unfolds in time (p. 86), thereby encouraging explorations of 
phenomena (such as ambiguity) that tend to get flattened by a second reading.105  If 𝑎 is linked to 𝑐 
through 𝑏, then, their intransitivity as abstracted segments tells only part of the story: equally, if not 
more, important is their rhetorical disposition in time since 𝑎 → 𝑏 → 𝑐 and 𝑎– 𝑐– … – 𝑏 describe 
two significantly different musical processes. 
                                                     
103 The Strauss example is a ‘moment of narration’ – see Section 2.4. 
104 Edward T. Cone, ‘Three Ways of Reading a Detective Story – Or a Brahms Intermezzo’, in 
Music: A View from Delft: Selected Essays, ed. by Robert P. Morgan (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), pp. 77–93 (first publ. in Georgia Review, 31 (1977), 554–74); further references to the 
version in the Selected Essays are given in parentheses in the text. 
105 Agawu argues that ‘[o]nce a specified context and a specific metalanguage intervene, […] the 
interpretation of a musical event as ambiguous in the strict sense becomes untenable’, implying that 
ambiguity must disappear in a third reading; see Kofi Agawu, ‘Ambiguity in Tonal Music: A 
Preliminary Study’, in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. by Pople, pp. 86–107 (p. 90). 
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2.4 Syntax, Form, and Narrative 
Section 2.1 agrees with Meyer that a ‘structural/processive principle’ (see n. 17) of motivic 
development comparable to that which describes the norms of harmonic progression must remain 
largely illusive: not only is the universe of possible objects much larger and more heavily piece-
specific, but even when the concerns of determinism, organicism, and unity are stripped away, the 
assumption that Agawu’s ‘simple-to-complex’ ordering even exists (in the light of Section 2.3), let 
alone in some necessary relationship with ‘chronological’ ordering, is a problematic one.  When 
such a relationship does hold, it is often easily identified: complex-to-simple ordering is 
Schoenberg’s liquidation, and the simple-to-complex ordering often found generating a 
movement’s main theme in its introduction is identified by Meyer as one of the very few ‘clear and 
unproblematic’ instances of motivic syntax.106  Yet, as shown above, categorisation cannot exist 
completely independently of syntagmatic influence, whether this is interpreted as development, 
syntax, rhetoric, grammar, process, narrative, developing variation, or distributional assimilation; to 
hold the extreme stance that the temporal organisation of motivic segments cannot be 
comprehensively theorised and therefore does not warrant serious discussion rests on a 
misunderstanding of music “theory” (see Section 1.8) and hence closes down a number of 
analytically fruitful heuristic approaches. 
 One of these approaches is a consideration of how motives relate to form.  ‘The idea of a 
form-generating motive – almost as if it actually had a will of its own,’ notes David Montgomery, 
‘has survived into the present day as a commonplace doctrine of theoretical musicology’.107  His 
case is perhaps overstated in the light of the crucial distinctions between temporal and logical 
growth and necessity and possibility made in Section 2.1 (‘[a] work of art is created as a whole, all at 
once,’ insists Schoenberg, ‘not the motive toward it’), but he is perceptive to note ‘our own 
willingness to experience a work through all its contrasting formal sections as a predetermined 
journey of its motivic and thematic elements’.108  This not only shifts the focus from dubious 
speculation concerning a piece’s organic generation to what Nattiez has termed the listener’s 
‘narrative impulse’, but also sets up a suggestive dynamic between formal sections and motivic 
journeys, and invites the question of whether the latter are indeed ‘predetermined’ by the former.109 
 Schoenberg argues that they should not be: that any passage serving a formal function 
(such as a transition or codetta) ‘must be an idea which had to take this place even if it were not to 
                                                     
106 ‘A Pride of Prejudices’, p. 245.  It also appears in Cone’s list of reverse derivations (Section 2.3, 
point six). 
107 Montgomery, p. 25. 
108 Schoenberg, Musical Idea, p. 149; Montgomery, p. 25. 
109 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?’, trans. by Katharine Ellis, Journal 
of the Royal Musical Association, 115 (1990), 240–57 (p. 243). 
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serve for this purpose or meaning or function; and this idea must look in construction and in 
thematic content as if it were not there to fulfil a structural task’.110  The demands of the musical 
idea come first, with Reti similarly arguing that formal archetypes ‘can only describe the more 
outward, ephemeral attributes of the complex and mysterious process through which “form” 
manifests itself in music’.111  It might, therefore, be seen as strange that the results of this ‘complex 
and mysterious process’ frequently look like traditional formal archetypes (Erwin Ratz speaks of 
Mahler’s ‘almost somnambulistic sureness of formal conception’), and it is precisely this 
reconstruction and re-affirmation that Adorno sees as conformist and tautologous (see n. 102).112  
Others hold that the revivification of a supposedly static formal mould is a mark of compositional 
quality: Bent’s commentary on Theodor Helm’s 1885 analysis of a Beethoven string quartet notes 
that motivic and sonata-form analyses ‘cohabit’ without conflicting, showing that Beethoven has 
‘raised [sonata form] to the new and higher dynamic principle of motivic association; thus in the 
analysis the terminology of sonata form is sublimated into that of motivic analysis’.113 
Just as prevalent as the idea that generic, modular forms require specific, continuous 
processes to breathe life into them is the equal but opposite conceit that forms (as static 
frameworks) prevent motivic processes from becoming aimless or overgrown.  Bent notes that in 
the nineteenth century, the prevailing compositional theory became ‘one of a potentially infinitely 
expanding structure triggered by an initial motivic inspiration and perpetuated by the laws of 
organic musical procreation, ultimately to be controlled and governed by one of a small number of 
underlying formal archetypes’, even though the archetypes could be left changed as a result.114  
Indeed, when discussing how nineteenth-century writers were more prepared to engage in criticism 
than their modern counterparts, he points to Hermann Kretzschmar’s 1898 guide to Bruckner’s 
Fourth Symphony as a prime example, which argues that a ‘large number of themes and motifs […] 
is not a sign of fecundity and abundance; rather it is the weakness of the composition, the 
consequence of insufficient control and mastery of its material’; Bent adds that form and motive 
                                                     
110 ‘Brahms the Progressive’, p. 407. 
111 Thematic Process, p. 105. 
112 Erwin Ratz, ‘Musical Form in Gustav Mahler: An Analysis of the Finale of the Sixth Symphony’, 
trans. by Paul Hamburger, Music Review, 29 (1968), 34–48 (p. 41).  Pace Adorno’s interpretation of 
his works, Mahler seems to acknowledge his own sleepwalking when discussing his Third 
Symphony: ‘I see that without my having planned it, this movement – just like the whole work – 
has the same scaffolding, the same basic groundplan that you’ll find in the works of Mozart and, on 
a grander scale, of Beethoven.’ (Bauer-Lechner, p. 66) 
113 Theodor Helm, ‘Beethoven: String Quartet in A Minor, Op. 132’, in MA19II, pp. 242–66 
(introduction pp. 238–41) (p. 241ed).  Bent also notes Helm’s use of ‘vaguely Wolzogenish affective 
or descriptive tags: “scurrying semiquaver figure a”, “heroic figure d”, and so forth’ (p. 241ed), 
demonstrating the reach of the leitmotive idea (which has its locus classicus in Hans von Wolzogen’s 
thematic guides) beyond Wagner’s music-dramas. 
114 Bent, ‘General Introduction’, MA19I, p. 16. 
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‘become decoupled’, with motivic growth becoming ‘disproportionately prolific’ and leading to 
‘formal incoherence’.115  The recurrent metaphor of control in this perspective is nowhere sharper 
than Adorno’s gloss of the ‘Tragic’ subtitle of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony as ‘[t]he totality that 
sanctions for its own glory the destruction of the individual’, and Monahan’s detailed analytical 
exploration of this idea will be discussed in Chapter 4.116  It suffices to note here that Monahan’s 
Sonata Theory-inspired analysis frequently construes motivic goals as manifestations of the sonata 
principle (such that, for example, the second-theme elements “desire” recapitulation in the home 
key), yet maintains an important tension between the generic, order-imposing demands of the 
sonata and the freer, more individualised processes of ‘novelistic’ development (see Section 4.2) 
that Adorno saw as characteristic of Mahler’s music.117 
Momentarily setting aside metaphors of self-determined growth or generic functionality, a 
third approach to motivic form attempts, in the spirit of paradigmatic analysis, to pare form back to 
its fundamentals as ‘the traces left by the work of repetition’.118  Repetition is the crucial process 
that converts ‘linear’ into ‘circular’ time, to use Howell’s Jonathan Kramer-inspired terminology, 
and so one way to view form is simply as the sum of its repetitions.119  It is useful here to 
distinguish, as Rothgeb does, between ‘temporally distant repetitions of form-defining significance 
and the more immediate and local repetitions from bar to bar and phrase to phrase’; expanding his 
‘local repetitions’ to include chains of derivation yields the distinction between ‘recall’ and 
‘continuous development’ made in my master’s dissertation.120  A refinement is made by Meyer’s 
three-part model (interpreting work by Roger Schank and Robert Abelson in a musical context), 
which reintroduces traditional notions of form by distinguishing between scripts (familiar or 
archetypal schemas) and plans (work-specific patterns of organisation); these are again contrasted 
with moment-to-moment ‘standard causal chain expansion[s]’.121 
                                                     
115 Bent, ‘Introduction [to Part I]’, MA19II, pp. 37–38; Hermann Kretzschmar, ‘Anton Bruckner: 
Symphony No. 4 in E (“Romantic”)’, in MA19II, pp. 109–17 (introduction pp. 106–08) (pp. 117, 
107ed). 
116 Adorno, Mahler, p. 97; Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’. 
117 The classic text for Sonata Theory is James A. Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, Elements of Sonata 
Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006; repr. 2011). 
118 Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 166. 
119 See Howell, p. 104 and Jonathan D. Kramer, The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, 
New Listening Strategies (New York: Schirmer, 1988). 
120 Rothgeb, p. 39; Holden, p. 13.  Howell somewhat surprisingly considers ‘local, more immediate 
instances of repetition’ to be ‘less dynamic’ than ‘larger-scale gestural recurrence’ (p. 113); here he 
appears to be using ‘dynamic’ in the Kierkegaardian sense of ‘dynamic repetition’ (see n. 7 above) 
rather than to signify a foregrounded sense of motion or process. 
121 Roger C. Schank and and Robert P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into 
Human Knowledge Structures (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1977), p. 70, quoted in Meyer, Style and Music, p. 
245. 
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Formal functions – whether construed as external, internal, or merely the result of 
repetition – are therefore important for any consideration of motivic structure.  But can segments 
fulfil functions that do not necessarily serve such generic formal ends as closing or transitioning, 
and hence signify independently of their temporal and formal locations within a piece of music?  
Agawu has written extensively on the conventional gestures that characterise beginnings, middles, 
and endings in classic music and argues that these gestures have become independent of their 
structural locations and thereby allow composers to ‘play’ with their meanings, for example by 
beginning a piece with a closing gesture.122  The syntactic functions of liquidation and its generative 
inverse (‘solidification’, perhaps?) are discussed above, and Cone’s epiphany and rederivation could 
also be considered non-formal functions (that is, answers to the question ‘what is this segment 
doing?’ that do not refer to its role within a more-or-less normative formal script).  To this list we 
might add piece-specific categories such as those constructed by Nattiez in his analysis of Varèse’s 
Density 21.5: ‘flights lead to a climax’, ‘permutation is stagnant, delaying the appearance of a new note 
which is generally a semitone higher’, progression to new pitch levels is facilitated by oblique 
paradigms, and descents serve to keep the progressive expansion of the melodic range in check.123  
These ideas approach Adorno’s repeated calls for a ‘material theory of form’ which would 
characterise sections of music through their affective meanings ‘beside or below’ their formal 
functions: Adorno’s three ‘essential genres’ are Durchbruch (‘breakthrough’, in which an element 
from “outside” the work intrudes and changes its course), Suspension (in which time is arrested and 
an “outside” is implied but ‘without positively asserting the presence of the Other’), and Erfüllung 
(‘fulfilment’, which ‘achieve by form […] what the breakthrough promised itself from outside’).124 
Motives may also be seen to fulfil tonal functions, whether in the generation and resolution 
of a tonal problem (as in Schoenberg’s concept of the musical idea), or under a quasi-Schenkerian 
paradigm of ‘composing-out’ between structural levels (as illustrated in n. 25 above with an example 
from the work of van den Toorn).  Reti even devotes chapter 8 of The Thematic Process in Music to 
‘Thematic Key Relations’ (pp. 219–30): although this is the section of the book where he is least 
sure of himself, repeatedly qualifying this part of his theory as ‘somewhat fragmentary’ (p. 229), ‘less 
manageable’ (ibid.), or ‘lack[ing a] binding, lawlike quality’ (p. 219), he cannot resist pointing out 
                                                     
122 See Playing with Signs, especially pp. 51–79. 
123 See Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, p. 283 for the first three of these (italics added) and p. 289 for the last; 
the entire piece is mapped out in relation to the four categories on pp. 290–94. 
124 Adorno sketches some characteristics of his proposed material theory in Mahler, pp. 44–46 and 
Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On the Problem of Musical Analysis’, trans. by Max Paddison, Music Analysis, 
1 (1982), 169–87 (p. 185); the definitions quoted here are from Mahler, p. 43 (p. 41 ‘essential genres’, 
p. 45 ‘beside or below’).  His proposed theory never received a full theoretical exposition (perhaps 
due to its inherent resistance to abstraction), but Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; repr. 1997) devotes an entire chapter (pp. 149–83) 
to its discussion.  Note 102 above gives a brief example of Durchbruch and/or Erfüllung at work in 
Mahler’s Fifth Symphony. 
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that C–D–C motives permeate the texture of Beethoven’s ‘Appassionata’ sonata up to and 
including the level of the three movements’ focal pitches (pp. 222–26), and even argues that the 
movements of the ‘Moonlight’ sonata, being in the same key and arranged in a long-short-long 
pattern, echo the work’s opening melody (p. 226). 
Non-formal functions, particularly those serving no apparent tonal purpose, necessarily 
open up the somewhat vexed question of musical narrative; this is especially pertinent here since, 
according to Agawu, ‘thematic or motivic process’ is ‘[a] favourite dimension’ for the construction 
of narrative readings (often through an analogy between recurrent themes and characters).125  
Although in a recent review Matt BaileyShea considers ‘the most common objections to narrative 
analysis’ to have been ‘rigorously counter[ed]’, it remains important to identify the locus (as 
BaileyShea admits) and nature of any proposed musical narrative.126  In Carolyn Abbate’s oft-
quoted phrase, ‘musical works have no ability to narrate in the most basic literary sense; that is, to 
posit a narrating survivor of the tale who speaks of it in the past tense’.127  This lack of ability to 
establish a narrator and a past tense, together with the absence of other narrative features such as 
causal relationships, agents, semantic referents, and an essential tension between chronological 
story and the discourse that unfolds it (as in a Sherlock Holmes tale), seems to place sustained 
narration out of music’s reach.  This is not, however, to deny that these criticisms can be 
problematised, nor that individual ‘moments of narration’ can be found within musical works.128  
Writers sympathetic to the idea of musical narrative have cited literary theorists to show that many 
of these supposedly essential features frequently do not appear in literary narratives: causality is 
constructed by the reader, the past tense is often transformed into an imagined present or replaced 
with ungrammatical constructions (as in Hemingway’s ‘[i]t was now lunch time’), and the notion 
that a story can exist independently of its discursive constructions has come under attack.129 
                                                     
125 Agawu, Music as Discourse, p. 103; see, for example, Adorno, Mahler, p. 72: ‘the thematic figure is 
no more indifferent to the symphonic flow than are the characters in a novel to the dimension of 
time within which they act’.  The notion of a straightforward correspondence between themes and 
characters is problematised below. 
126 Matt BaileyShea, ‘Review of Michael L. Klein and Nicholas Reyland, eds., Music and Narrative 
since 1900 (Indiana University Press, 2013) and Peter Kivy, Antithetical Arts: On the Ancient Quarrel 
between Literature and Music (Clarendon Press, 2009)’, Music Theory Online, 19.3 (August 2013) 
<http://mtosmt.org/issues/mto.13.19.3/mto.13.19.3.baileyshea.php> [accessed 17 December 
2014] (para. 1; see also para. 12). 
127 Carolyn Abbate, ‘What the Sorcerer Said’, Nineteenth-Century Music, 12 (1988–89), 221–30 (p. 
230).  A modified form of this article also appears as chapter two in Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices: 
Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 
30–60. 
128 The phrase is Abbate’s; see Unsung Voices, p. xi. 
129 See Byron Almén, ‘Narrative Archetypes: A Critique, Theory, and Method of Narrative 
Analysis’, Journal of Music Theory, 47 (2003), 1–39 (pp. 5–8) for causality; Gerald Prince, Narratology: 
The Form and Functioning of Narrative, Janua Linguarum, 108 (Berlin: Mouton, 1982), pp. 28–29, 
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Under the premise that narratives must be constructed rather than simply discovered in the 
musical text, the question of whether music can narrate then becomes one of how it is, or can be, 
made to narrate or project a musical plot by listeners and analysts (an instance of music theory’s 
status as a performative; see Section 1.3).  Some writers (such as Abbate, Micznik, and Lawrence 
Kramer) seek musical moments of narration, devices which suggest features of literary narrative 
such as those listed above: Micznik, for example, considers changes of style, external intrusions, 
quotations or allusions, and topical references to increase the strength of an implied narrator’s voice 
and hence lend the piece a high ‘degree of narrativity’.130  Those works which move further away 
from “pure” story and therefore seem non-narrative at first (such as Finnegan’s Wake) actually have 
an enhanced sense of narrative mediation, and therefore a higher degree of narrativity.  Other 
writers such as Byron Almén, Gregory Karl, and Fred Maus explore how narrative readings can 
produce interesting analyses of music that does not seem, as in Adorno’s memorable description of 
Mahler’s Fourth Symphony, to be ‘composed within quotation marks’, but activates in some other 
way the human narrative impulse.131  Abbate argues that under this latter strategy, a ‘critical 
methodology […] becomes a mere machine for naming any and all music’; it is therefore important 
to distinguish between those analyses that propose narratives (or narrative features), and those that 
propose plots, a distinction not intended as a strict taxonomy but as a characterisation of the 
different strands of thought that may even be active within a single piece of writing.132 
According to Maus, the transformation of sound to plot is dependent on the crucial 
imaginative leap of construing musical events as musical actions: action implies intention and 
therefore agency, and any interpretation seeking to understand such intention ‘will normally situate 
it within a relatively extended sequence of events’.133  Actions can be determined through 
establishing (arguably arbitrary) symbolic, “leitmotivic” associations, topical or intertextual 
                                                                                                                                                           
quoted in Micznik, p. 196, n. 18 for the imagined present; Wallace Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; repr. 1994), pp. 136–42, summarised in Almén, ‘Narrative 
Archetypes’, p. 9 for ungrammatical constructions; and Barbara Herrnstein Smith, ‘Narrative 
Versions, Narrative Theories’, in On Narrative, ed. by W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 209–32 (first publ. in Critical Inquiry, 7 (1980–81), pp. 213–36), 
paraphrased in Fred Everett Maus, ‘Music as Narrative’, Indiana Theory Review, 12 (1991), 1–34 (pp. 
23–24) for stories independent of discourse. 
130 Micznik, p. 247.  See also Abbate, Unsung Voices and Lawrence Kramer, ‘Musical Narratology: A 
Theoretical Outline’, Indiana Theory Review, 12 (1991), 141–62.  Maus argues that musical narrators 
are perhaps more ‘akin to the silent, invisible intelligence that guides the montage of a film rather 
than a vividly dramatized speaker like Huck Finn or a moralizing commentator like George Eliot’ 
(‘Music as Narrative’, p. 34). 
131 Adorno, Mahler, p. 96.  See Byron Almén, A Theory of Musical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008) and ‘Narrative Archetypes’; Gregory Karl, ‘Structuralism and Musical Plot’, 
Music Theory Spectrum, 19 (1997), 13–34; and Fred Everett Maus, ‘Music as Drama’, Music Theory 
Spectrum, 10 (1988), 56–73 and ‘Music as Narrative’. 
132 Abbate, Unsung Voices, p. xi. 
133 ‘Music as Narrative’, p. 7. 
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references, or what Micznik refers to as ‘gestural connotations’: parallels between musical shapes 
and ‘structures or processes from other domains of reality’ (p. 226).  Although this sounds fanciful 
at first, the metaphorical nature of analytical language places every utterance, for Maus, on a 
spectrum ‘from technical to emotive or anthropomorphic’ such that, for example, Nattiez’s flights, 
Cone’s epiphany, and Adorno’s breakthrough all carry affective connotations alongside their more 
specific technical (i.e. stipulative – see Section 1.7) meanings.134 
Agency and temporality can be fluid, however, even within a plot-focused (as opposed to a 
narrativity-focused) enquiry.  Micznik refuses to anthropomorphise musical events, ‘as if music as 
“action” or “predicate” needed an external agency as the subject who performs its actions’ (p. 243), 
considering them to be ‘stative’ (that is, ‘constitut[ing] a state’) rather than ‘active’; the states are 
determined by their semantic topical connotations, and the narrative is supplied by the listener in 
response to the changes of state (as when, in the first movement of Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, ‘an 
old-fashioned Biedermeier world’ gives way to ‘a modernistic, stormy, disturbed world’ (p. 218)).135  
Karl, following Cone, interprets events not as actions, but as ‘forces and impressions of mental life’ 
(p. 17) experienced by a posited compositional persona ‘in the present tense, though not in 
objective time, each musical moment embodying indeterminate but almost invariably longer spans 
of experience’ (pp. 16–17); this persona is not to be confused with the composer, nor with any 
narrator that the work might imply.136  Even if coherent groupings of motivic segments can be 
found, a single one of these groupings can embed ‘simultaneous multiple agency’, with Maus 
arguing that in any plot-driven analysis ‘it seems best to give an account […] that leaves the 
determination of character vague’.137 
Emplotted analyses tend to favour a structuralist position – maintaining, that is, that the 
(usually binary) relationships between events are more important than the events themselves – and 
Almén uses this defence against Nattiez’s argument that music cannot specify its objects of 
reference and therefore cannot narrate.138  The idea of the dramatic archetype is a structuralist one: 
                                                     
134 Maus, ‘Music as Narrative’, p. 20. 
135 The distinction between stative and active events is Gerald Prince’s (pp. 62–63, quoted in 
Micznik, p. 218, n. 64).  A similar emphasis on transition, although between action sequences rather 
than states, is apparent in Rick Altman’s theory of narrative (see Rick Altman, A Theory of Narrative 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), especially pp. 21–27).  This describes the ‘following-
patterns’ created when different ‘following-units’ (‘portion[s] of the text where a character […] is 
followed continuously’ (p. 22)) are linked by different types of ‘modulation’ (for example, 
‘metonymic’, in which ‘direct spatial contact’ between one unit and the next is established (p. 24), or 
‘hyperbolic’, which presents a discontinuity and leaves the audience to infer the link). 
136 See also Micznik, p. 247 and Edward T. Cone, The Composer’s Voice, The Ernest Bloch Lectures 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). 
137 Karl, p. 25 ‘simultaneous’; Maus, ‘Music as Narrative’, p. 14 ‘vague’. 
138 See Almén, ‘Narrative Archetypes’, pp. 10–11, which responds to Nattiez, ‘Narrativity’, pp. 257 
and 249.  This sense of ‘structuralism’, which follows Karl’s usage, has recently been identified by 
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Maus quotes Aristotle’s understanding of character as ‘subsidiary to the action’ and mainly 
constructed ‘with a view to the action’, while certain novels can be understood as relationships 
between ideas rather than stories or character portraits for their own sake.139  Of course, from the 
standpoint of narrativity, moments of narration rely on the disruption of normative structural 
procedures and forms, such that for Lawrence Kramer ‘narrative elements in music represent, not 
forces of structure, but forces of meaning’ (p. 161).  Kramer notes a reluctance amongst 
structuralist writers to ‘leav[e] the safe haven of form’ (p. 142), a criticism echoed by Abbate when 
she observes that if a motive with symbolic connotations appears in a situation that conflicts with 
the analytical plot being proposed, it is explained away as a product of a strictly musical process and 
therefore conveniently ‘stripped of its symbolic meaning’.140  But from the perspective of 
emplotment, the search for moments of narration can easily lapse into an exercise in plugging the 
gaps of formal ambiguity and can therefore underplay the more holistic role of plot in music: ‘one 
is not driven to a dramatic or narrative approach by the failure of more conventional approaches’, 
argues Maus.141 
As noted above, a structuralist plot-based analysis usually relies on some form of binary 
opposition (a subtrope of which is the search for a particular “desired” end-state): this paradigm 
generates weak narrativity according to Micznik (p. 248), especially when compared to the 
heterogeneous richness of topical reference.  Karl argues that topical references and gestural 
parallels are indeed semantically rich but, by their very nature, function generically, and that for any 
specific semantic meaning to be generated they must interact in ‘relations of identity and 
opposition’ (p. 19) – a point that is actually tacitly supported by Micznik’s analysis of the first 
movement of Mahler’s Ninth cited above.  Karl’s analytical method hinges on the concept of the 
literary foil, a character whose similarity to another sets into relief (like a good comparison) the 
more significant differences between the two in order to yield insights into the characters, plot, or 
author.142  The main agents (or, more precisely, mental states of the piece’s persona) in a typical 
musical plot are therefore the protagonist (‘the persona’s will to action and the seat of its identity’), 
the antagonist (‘the persona’s mental representation of an extrapersonal force or […] some aspect 
                                                                                                                                                           
Michael Klein as an American ‘synonym for formalism’ that does not presuppose the implications 
of semiotic thought that the term carries in Europe (posting to SMT-talk mailing list, 10 July 2014; 
the archives of this list are freely available at <http://lists.societymusictheory.org/pipermail/ 
smt-talk-societymusictheory.org> [accessed 17 December 2014]). 
139 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. by Samuel Henry Butcher (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), pp. 62–63, 
quoted in Maus, ‘Music as Drama’, p. 72. 
140 Abbate, ‘What the Sorcerer Said’, p. 224. 
141 ‘Music as Narrative’, p. 18. 
142 See Karl, pp. 17–18.  Karl’s examples are Raskolnikov and Razumikhin from Dostoyevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment: both are poor, yet the former turns to crime while the latter remains honest.  
Each character serves as a “control” for the other: without Razumikhin, for example, we might be 
tempted to read Raskolnikov as Dostoyevsky’s comment on the effects of poverty. 
-87- 
 
 
  
-8
7
- 
of the self perceived as foreign or inimical to the persona’s interests’), and the goal state (usually 
figured as an idealised protagonist); these may interact through various archetypal ‘functional 
sequences’ (such as ‘enclosure’, ‘subversion’, and ‘counteraction’) which have an effect on the 
strength or fortunes of each of the persona’s states.143  This approach, argues Karl, avoids atomistic 
observations with no sense of directedness and allows for the construction of coherent (yet flexible) 
plots that may span whole movements (or even whole works). 
A similar theory is proposed by Almén who, in addition to emphasising the importance of 
relationships of conflict, explicitly draws attention to ‘the listener’s identification with one pole or 
the other, the initial condition, and the outcome’ as constitutive elements of musical plot.144  
Drawing on the work of Northrop Frye and James Jakób Liszka, Almén identifies four narrative 
archetypes based on the interaction of the two binary dimensions of order and transgression and 
victory and defeat (pp. 11–20).  It is in the second of these binaries (i.e. the emphasis on either 
victory or defeat) that the listener’s identification with one of the poles becomes definitive: the 
‘victory of order over transgression’ characterises the Romance archetype (as evidenced by a typical 
Superman story, for example), whereas the ‘defeat of transgression by order’ is characteristic of 
Tragedy (as in Orwell’s 1984).145  Elements representing order, transgression, and empathy are 
found amongst musical characteristics functioning topically, conventionally, or gesturally; a minor-
key funeral march that is closed harmonically might be considered to represent fatalistic order, for 
example, while an ascending phrase suggesting a major key might represent optimistic 
transgression, setting up a dynamic from which it is possible to read an entire movement.146 
Once the listener’s likely empathetic leanings have been established, it is possible to deduce 
what a composition’s “desired” end-state might be.  Since order is usually represented by the 
musical material that opens a work, one popular Romance trope is the quest to return to a 
particular “pure” motivic form heard near the opening.147  Elgar’s First Symphony, for example, 
opens with a diatonic theme that Elgar described as a ‘sort of ideal call – in the sense of persuasion, 
                                                     
143 See pp. 20–22 for a detailed typology of functional sequences and, in Figure 1 (p. 21), a 
graphical emplotment of the first movement of Beethoven’s ‘Appassionata’ Sonata with a key that 
helpfully summarises Karl’s theory.  The quoted definitions of protagonist and antagonist are found 
on p. 23. 
144 ‘Narrative Archetypes’, p. 34, n. 34.  I refer to this source throughout this paragraph; see also the 
same author’s Theory of Musical Narrative.  
145 See p. 18.  The other two archetypes (ibid.) are ‘Comedy’ (the ‘victory of transgression over 
order’) and ‘Irony/Satire’ (the ‘defeat of order by transgression’, perhaps more clearly characterised 
as a dystopian denial of the possibility of heroic figures). 
146 This is exactly what Almén does in relation to Chopin’s C minor Prelude on pp. 20–27. 
147 Maus proposes an alternative interpretation inflected with a narrative story/discourse split: 
‘When a movement begins with a cadential gesture, for instance, one might regard it as the end of a 
story; the piece might be heard, then, as reaching into the past to show the events that led up to 
that cadence.’ (‘Music as Narrative’, pp. 28–29). 
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not coercion or command’ before plunging into an hour of agitated chromatic music: when the 
opening theme does return in its key of A at the end of the symphony, the apparent hollowness of 
its victory suggests that the symphony may be an example of the Ironic archetype (figured as failed 
Romance).148  This interpretation is, however, dependent on the stability of the opening material: 
Schoenberg’s tonal problem represents a quest for stability starting from an inherently unstable 
source, and Cone’s concept of the ‘promissory note’, a pitch such as a prominent leading note 
which ‘strongly suggest[s] an obligation that it [fails] to discharge’ similarly invokes an external 
“desired” order that is implied, but not stated, by the musical material.149  Depending on the piece 
and the interpretation, Romance can shade into Comedy if the unstable element is seen as a 
transgressor striving to establish a new order (in Karl’s language, if the protagonist figures the goal 
state as an idealised version of itself), as in the conventional per aspera ad astra symphonic plot: 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is a Romance if read as an attempt to purge its initial motive of 
instability, or a Comedy if read as an individual’s journey from darkness to light.  Narratives of 
desire can also focus on particular pitch-classes: Nattiez’s reading of Density 21.5 centres around the 
forces which serve to expand and contract its melodic range and thus work towards a melodic high-
point, and Maus notes that certain pitch-classes (especially lowered sixth degrees) can function as 
‘obtrusive’ tonal problems that the piece’s narrative must deal with in order to move on.150 
Musical plots, while often resting firmly on the interpretation of motivic connections, can 
therefore not be touted as answers to the search for a “purely” motivic syntax.  It is difficult to 
imagine how agency and empathy could be constructed without recourse to topical, gestural, or 
                                                     
148 Letter to Ernest Newman, 4 November 1908, in Edward Elgar: Letters of a Lifetime, ed. by Jerrold 
Northrop Moore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 200.  The ambiguous status of the work’s 
ending has been a common theme in Elgar scholarship.  Elgar himself describes the ideal call’s 
return as ‘conquering (subduing)’ in the above-cited letter, a description that contrasts markedly 
with the theme’s originally non-coercive nature and therefore hints that the victory may be Pyrrhic 
(or even that the listener’s sympathies do not, or no longer, lie with order – Almén does not 
explicitly consider the possibility that a listener’s sympathies might shift during the course of a 
piece).  For a particularly sophisticated analytical interpretation see J. P. E. Harper-Scott, ‘“A Nice 
Sub-Acid Feeling”: Schenker, Heidegger and Elgar’s First Symphony’, Music Analysis, 24 (2005), 
349–82, especially pp. 372–73. 
149 Edward T. Cone, ‘Schubert’s Promissory Note: An Exercise in Musical Hermeneutics’, 
Nineteenth-Century Music, 5 (1981–82), 233–41 (p. 235). 
150 ‘Music as Narrative’, p. 20.  J. P. E. Harper-Scott offers a psychoanalytical reading of desire in 
music, in which the Lacanian ‘objet a’, the much longed-for missing “it”, can never provide true 
satisfaction once acquired: see J. P. E. Harper-Scott, The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: 
Revolution, Reaction, and William Walton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  Pages 117–
29 present an analysis of Wagner’s Prelude to Tristan und Isolde in terms of its missing A minor: if 
the longed-for chord were to appear, argues Harper-Scott, ‘we would recognize at once that it was 
not “it”, not the objet a we were seeking’ (p. 118), and therefore that the true object of our desire 
was ‘desire itself’ (p. 120).  This position is sympathetic to a structuralist plot analysis since the 
semantic importance of the objet a is determined by its relationship to the other elements of the 
piece, and not to any inherent properties it might have. 
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conventional connotations, or desire without reference to harmony (broadly construed to include 
both the tonal tendencies of promissory notes and the quest for ‘missing’ pitch-classes within a 
post-tonal framework).151  It would also be a stubbornly blinkered analysis that systematically 
avoids the narrative implications of formal or tonal processes in, for instance, setting up 
expectations for the return or arrival of particular keys or themes.  Finally, although agency need 
not be construed naïvely as the representation of particular characters by particular recurrent 
themes, plot constructions do require more-or-less coherent segment groupings in order to describe 
how “a” certain agent changes over time.152  It is therefore perhaps surprising that this leaves 
archetype 3 of Figure 2.1 the least well-suited to describe musical emplotment – despite its 
implications of Agawu’s ‘speech’ mode and the rhetoric of motivic ‘discourse’ or ‘argument’ 
surrounding its manifestations (see Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, for example).153  Its interpretation 
hinges on whether we are willing to see the final segment as a transformed version of the first, or 
whether it is better understood as “new” material (albeit with well-traceable origins); this in turn 
may depend on whether the final segment appears to initiate a new process of its own. 
However, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that the motivic dimension cannot 
provide its own ‘specific and independent structural/processive principle’ and so must draw on 
others, it retains its power as an entry point into a particular piece of music’s unique features.  To 
deny the possibility of motivic plot altogether is to jettison the variety of suggestive approaches and 
techniques outlined above, just as to admit defeat in the face of the problematic nature of 
categorisation is to neglect the important tension between circular and linear time that characterises 
musical experience.  The final section of this chapter sketches a mathematical approach to the 
problem that endeavours to accept and model this tension, with the remainder of the thesis being 
devoted to its fuller development, exploration, and exemplification.  In particular, the strategies for 
                                                     
151 A post-tonal piece might, for example, conspicuously avoid a certain pitch-class or set whilst 
freely employing others, or a process of gradual registral expansion might set up, deny, or achieve 
the expectations of a further-expanding range; Miloš Zatkalik also notes that the gradual 
deployment of all possible pitch-class sets displaying a certain property, or of all possible textural 
combinations within an instrumental ensemble, can set up musical processes with clear desired 
goals (see Miloš Zatkalik, ‘Reconsidering Teleological Aspects of Nontonal Music’, in Music Theory 
and its Methods: Structures, Challenges, Directions, ed. by Denis Collins, Methodology of Music Research, 
7 (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 2013), pp. 265–300).  These ideas also appear in a recent monograph by 
Jack Boss, which uses Schoenberg’s concept of the musical idea, and in particular the ‘problem, 
elaboration, solution’ paradigm, to analyse his twelve-tone music: see Jack Boss, Schoenberg’s Twelve-
Tone Music: Symmetry and the Musical Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
152 See Almén, ‘Narrative Archetypes’, p. 8.  This observation may be recast in terms of a 
compositional persona through Cone’s suggestion that ‘[f]ormal repetitions are often best 
interpreted as representations of events rehearsed in memory’ (‘Schubert’s Promissory Note’, p. 
240): in both cases, we are seeing “the same” thing at different times.  Howell follows Kierkegaard 
in distinguishing repetition, or experiencing-again, from recollection, or re-experiencing (see pp. 
103–04). 
153 See Agawu, Music as Discourse, pp. 98–102. 
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emplotted analysis discussed above will underwrite not only certain aspects of the formal model 
developed in Chapter 3, but also the analytical approach taken in Chapter 4. 
2.5 A Graph-Theoretic Model 
Defined mathematically, a graph is a set, 𝑉, of elements called vertices or nodes and another set, 
𝐸, whose members (called edges) are pairs of elements from 𝑉.154  It is commonly represented 
visually, with the vertices as points or shapes and the edges as lines between those points, but it is 
important to remember that a graph is not a visual or geometric entity as such: rather, it is a set of 
abstract relationships between objects, independent of any visual presentation.  Indeed, it is 
possible to shift the focus in the definition of a graph slightly and understand 𝐸 not as a set, but as 
a relation: two vertices from 𝑉 are related if there is an edge between them (symbolically: for 
𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑢𝐸𝑣 ⇔ {𝑢, 𝑣} ∈ 𝐸).  The edge relation is symmetric (so if 𝑢 is related to 𝑣, 𝑣 is related to 
𝑢: 𝑢𝐸𝑣 ⇔ 𝑣𝐸𝑢), but not reflexive (since in the basic definition above, a vertex cannot be paired 
with itself – but see Definition 2.1) or transitive, and so it is not an equivalence relation (see Section 
2.3, point four).  It does, however, give rise to an equivalence relation: that of connectivity, where 
two vertices are connected if a path exists between them (i.e. a sequence of vertices 
𝑢, 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, … , 𝑤𝑛, 𝑣 such that 𝑢𝐸𝑤1, 𝑤1𝐸𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛𝐸𝑣).  This relation is reflexive (we can 
assert, by definition, that a vertex is connected to itself), symmetric (since a path from 𝑢 to 𝑣 
implies a path from 𝑣 to 𝑢), and transitive (since if paths from 𝑢 to 𝑤 and 𝑤 to 𝑣 exist, then a path 
from 𝑢 to 𝑣 exists), so the relation induces a partition on the set of vertices: the equivalence classes 
are then known as connected components.  If we remove the symmetry of the edge relation then 
the result is a directed graph or digraph: instead of the edges being unordered pairs {𝑢, 𝑣} they 
become ordered pairs (𝑢, 𝑣) known as arrows, which are visually represented as arrows rather than 
lines.  The consequence for the notion of connectivity is that it splits into three types: we say that a 
component is simply connected if the replacement of all directed edges with undirected ones 
produces a connected graph; we say that it is weakly connected if for every pair of vertices 𝑢, 𝑣 
there is a path from 𝑢 to 𝑣 and/or a path from 𝑣 to 𝑢; and we say that it is strongly connected if 
there is a path from 𝑢 to 𝑣 and a path from 𝑣 to 𝑢 for every possible pair. 
                                                     
154 The concepts outlined in this paragraph, as well as some others to be used in the next chapter, 
are defined formally at the end of this section.  The terms and results are standard, but I have used 
two texts in particular as reference works: Reinhard Diestel, Graph Theory, Graduate Texts in 
Mathematics, 173, 4th edn (Heidelberg: Springer, 2010; repr. 2012) is a recent, formal, and 
comprehensive survey of the field, while Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin 
Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs (New York: Wiley, 1965) 
focuses on how directed graphs might be used in the context of empirical modelling. 
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The four archetypes represented in Figure 2.1 are all digraphs (archetype 4 requires a slight 
extension of the definition as some of its arrows point between groups of vertices rather than 
individuals).155  The dotted central vertex in archetype 2 shows that vertices and edges can have 
attributes assigned to them, often represented through some visual means such as line style or 
colour (in this example, the central vertex is the only one with the attribute ‘is an abstraction from 
the piece’).  Graphs, and digraphs in particular, can therefore be used to model the relations 
between motivic segments, taking what was referred to as ℳin Section 2.2 as the vertex set.  We 
can, in fact, go further: given that motivic relationships are typically intransitive (see Section 2.3, 
point four), we can drop the stipulation that the members of ℳmust all be mutually related to each 
other, simply requiring instead that each element of ℳis either the initial or terminal point of at 
least one arrow (as otherwise the element does not recur and so is not motivic).  This means that 
different ℳ-sets do not need to be assumed a priori, but instead can be extrapolated from the 
intransitive mass of motivic relations present within one large set of all the piece’s motivic 
segments: the simultaneous intransitivity of the arrow relation and transitivity of the connectivity 
relation lends each category a coherence of identity, yet also a rich internal structure of arrow 
relationships that overwrites assumptions of mutual interchangeability.  The stratified blocks of a 
paradigmatic analysis constructed from overriding criteria are therefore replaced by dynamic, non-
linear, and interconnected groupings arising from local, segment-to-segment associations. 
What do the arrows in such a model actually represent?  Linking, as they do, concrete 
segments on the musical time-line, they are the agents by which linear time is converted into 
circular time, and so can represent a whole range of musical relationships, often simultaneously.  In 
a simple case, they might represent (varied or unvaried) repetition by linking a segment to a 
predecessor which is particularly morphologically similar.  They might also represent the form-
building role of repetition, linking an antecedent to its consequent or a recapitulation to its 
exposition, and they can do this individually or as part of larger thematic groupings.  They might 
also represent derivation, transforming one segment into the next, or epiphany, combining two 
segments into one; they might alternatively acknowledge the lasting influence of a particularly 
strong motivic statement (typically near the beginning of a piece) and link certain segments back to 
a specific paradigmatic example.  The different ways in which motivic segments can relate to each 
                                                     
155 Archetype 4 could be understood as the result of an iterated process of grouping applied to 
archetype 3.  Similar to the concept of condensation (see Definition 2.5), this process would create 
a partition of the vertex set in which every element lies in its own part, except for the two leftmost 
vertices, which would be grouped together.  An arrow would then be drawn between new vertices 
𝐴 and 𝐵 if and only if there was an arrow between 𝑎 and 𝑏 for some 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵.  This 
means that arrows would not point from sets to vertices, but to sets containing single vertices: the 
last element in the chain in archetype 4 of Figure 2.1 should not, for example, be 𝑣5, but {{{𝑣5}}}, 
with the arrow pointing into it originating from {{{𝑣1, 𝑣2}, {𝑣3}}, {{𝑣4}}}. 
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other are therefore well-served by a non-geometric digraph structure: far from being a shortcoming, 
it is argued that this captures the heterogeneity of motivic relationship better than the problematic 
similarity spectrum model.  This approach is broadly structuralist – it treats the links between 
segments, rather than the musical material of the segments themselves, as primary – and so the 
symmetry-based morphological model presented in Section 3.3 is to be understood as an abstracted 
‘second reading’ to be used in constructing an emplotted third. 
The possibilities for nuanced interpretation are extensive; however, any model must 
necessarily emphasise some aspects of the target phenomenon at the expense of others, and this 
one runs the risk of downplaying categorisation in its focus on temporal process.  Of course, the 
connected components “fall out” of the pairwise segment-to-segment associations, but these 
components can run the risk of being too coarse-grained: a single passage such as that presented in 
Figure 2.3 can forge two reasonably independent and coherent categories into one component.  
Within the constraints of digraph structure, a segment cannot be linked to an inner essence or an 
entire category, meaning that an arbitrary decision is sometimes forced between concrete segments; 
evolving categories like that portrayed in archetype 4 retain an important role in the analytical 
process, but can only exist as formal objects after the analytical event, deduced a posteriori from the 
resultant graph structure.  The next chapter, after formalising the model sketched above, outlines a 
number of ways in which substructures between the level of the individual link and the entire 
component can be found within an analytically constructed graph. 
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Graph Theory: Some Fundamentals 
Definition 2.1 
A graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) is a set 𝑉 of vertices or nodes and a set 𝐸 of edges (we assume from 
now on that both of these sets are finite).  Each edge is defined as a pair of vertices from 𝑉, 
known as the edge’s endpoints, which the edge is said to join.  The complete graph on 𝑛 
vertices is that non-multigraph (see below) in which every vertex is joined to every other; its 
edge set therefore has 
1
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1) members.  (The complete graph on one vertex is simply that 
vertex). 
If 𝐸 is a multiset (i.e. contains at least one vertex pair more than once) then 𝐺 is a multigraph, 
and any edges sharing the same endpoints are said to be parallel.  If an edge is itself a multiset 
(i.e. joins a vertex to itself) then it is known as a loop, and 𝐺 is again said to be a multigraph. 
If each edge in 𝐸 has one of its vertices chosen to be an initial point and the other to be a 
terminal point, then the set of edges 𝐸 becomes a set of arrows 𝐴 and the resulting structure 
𝐷 = (𝑉, 𝐴) is known as a directed graph or digraph.  The digraph 𝐷 is said to be an 
orientation of the underlying graph 𝐺.  Whilst an edge is written as an unordered set 
{𝑎, 𝑏} = {𝑏, 𝑎} (often written 𝑎𝑏 or 𝑏𝑎) an arrow is written as an ordered pair (𝑎, 𝑏) or (𝑏, 𝑎): 
parallel edges in 𝐸 therefore only map to parallel arrows in 𝐴 if they are oriented in the same 
direction; otherwise they are known as antiparallel. 
 
Definition 2.2 
The degree of a vertex 𝑣 in a graph 𝐺, written 𝑑𝐺(𝑣), is the number of times 𝑣 appears as an 
endpoint in 𝐸 (if 𝐺 is not a multigraph, then this is equal to the number of vertices in 𝑉 joined 
to 𝑣; if 𝐺 is a multigraph, then note that each loop contributes 2 to 𝑑𝐺(𝑣)).  The indegree and 
outdegree of a vertex 𝑣 in a digraph 𝐷, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐷(𝑣) and 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝐷(𝑣) respectively, are the numbers 
of times 𝑣 appears as a terminal and initial point in 𝐴 respectively (so each loop contributes 1 to 
each).  Clearly, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐷(𝑣) + 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝐷(𝑣) = 𝑑𝐺(𝑣). 
 
Definition 2.3 
The graph 𝐺′ = (𝑉′, 𝐸′) is said to be a subgraph of 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) if 𝑉′ ⊆ 𝑉 and 𝐸′ ⊆ 𝐸.  It is 
said to be an induced subgraph if 𝐸′ is the set of all edges in 𝐸 whose endpoints both lie in 𝑉′.  
This definition extends to directed graphs in the natural way (i.e. by replacing 𝐸 with 𝐴 and 𝐺 
with 𝐷). 
 
Definition 2.4 
A path 𝑃 is a subgraph of 𝐺 such that 𝑉′ = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛} and 
𝐸′ = {𝑎1𝑎2, 𝑎2𝑎3, … , 𝑎𝑛−1𝑎𝑛} (where all the 𝑎𝑖 are distinct).  If 𝑎𝑛𝑎1 is added to 𝐸′, then the 
path becomes a circuit.  For brevity, paths can be written 𝑎1𝑎2 … 𝑎𝑛. 
In a digraph, a directed path is a path in the underlying graph oriented in the direction of its 
vertex ordering – so 𝐴′ = {(𝑎1, 𝑎2), (𝑎2, 𝑎3), … , (𝑎𝑛−1, 𝑎𝑛)}.  In this case, 𝑎1 is said to reach 
𝑎𝑛, and 𝑎𝑛 is said to be reachable from 𝑎1 (trivially, each vertex is said to reach itself).  A path 
in the underlying graph which is not necessarily oriented as a directed path is known as an 
undirected path.  Each vertex 𝑣 in an oriented path is known as a transmitter if 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑃(𝑣) =
0, a receiver if 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑃(𝑣) = 0, and a carrier if 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑃(𝑣) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑃(𝑣) = 1; directed paths are 
therefore precisely those which have a transmitter at one end, a receiver at the other, and 
carriers in between.  A directed circuit is a directed path with (𝑎𝑛, 𝑎1) added to 𝐴′. 
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A graph or digraph which contains no circuits is said to be acyclic.  An acyclic graph is a tree, 
and an acyclic digraph is a DAG – a directed acyclic graph. 
When paths or circuits are referred to in the context of a digraph, they are assumed to be 
directed unless specified otherwise. 
 
Definition 2.5 
In a graph, two vertices are said to be connected if a path exists between them.  As this is an 
equivalence relation (we specify that a vertex is connected to itself, even if it does not have a 
loop), the vertex set is partitioned into sets known as connected components: two vertices lie 
in the same connected component if and only if there is at least one path between them. 
In a digraph, two vertices are connected or simply connected if they are connected in the 
underlying graph; they are weakly connected if one reaches the other; and they are strongly 
connected if each reaches the other (i.e. if they lie on a directed circuit).  Simple and strong 
connection are equivalence relations inducing partitions into simple components and strong 
components respectively; the set of weak components does not partition the vertices since 
weak connection is asymmetric and therefore not an equivalence relation. 
The condensation 𝑫∗ = (𝑽∗, 𝑨∗) of a digraph 𝐷 = (𝑉, 𝐴) takes the set of strongly connected 
components 𝑉∗ as its vertices and includes an arrow (𝑉1, 𝑉2) in 𝐴
∗ if and only if there is an 
arrow in 𝐴 from a member of 𝑉1 to a member of 𝑉2 (𝑉1 ≠ 𝑉2). 
 
Proposition 2.6 
i. Every vertex in a DAG is reachable from a vertex of indegree 0 and reaches one of 
outdegree 0.  Every simple component of a DAG therefore includes at least one vertex 
of indegree 0 and at least one vertex of outdegree 0. 
ii. If 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑉 are members of strong components 𝑎∗, 𝑏∗ ∈ 𝑉∗ respectively, then there is a 
directed path from 𝑎 to 𝑏 in 𝐷 if and only if there is a directed path from 𝑎∗ to 𝑏∗ in 𝐷∗. 
iii. Condensations are always DAGs. 
Proofs 
i. We prove that every vertex reaches a vertex of outdegree 0; a symmetrical argument 
shows that every vertex is reachable from a vertex of indegree 0.  If vertex 𝑎1 does not 
reach a vertex of outdegree 0, then we can construct an arbitrarily long path 𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3 … by 
following an arrow out of each vertex.  Since 𝐷 is finite, one of the 𝑎𝑖 must be repeated; 
but this contradicts the fact that 𝐷 is a DAG.  So 𝑎1 must, in fact, reach a vertex of 
outdegree 0. 
ii. Every pair of consecutive vertices on a directed path from 𝑎 to 𝑏 either belong to the 
same strong component, or they do not.  In the former case, the vertices map to the 
same vertex in 𝐷∗; in the latter case, an arrow must exist between their images in 𝐷∗, 
meaning that a path must always exist between 𝑎∗ and 𝑏∗.  Conversely, paths in both 
directions must exist between any pair of vertices that lie in the same strong component, 
so any path (i.e. sequence of strong components) between 𝑎∗ and 𝑏∗ is easily converted 
to a path between 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
iii. Suppose, aiming for a contradiction, that 𝐷∗ contains a circuit, and that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are two 
distinct vertices in this circuit.  Then there is a directed path from 𝑎 to 𝑏 and another 
from 𝑏 to 𝑎, so they must lie in the same strong component; but then they cannot be 
distinct vertices in 𝐷∗.  So 𝐷∗ is acyclic.∎ 
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3 A Formalised Model and an Analytical Example 
The previous chapter outlined the rationale behind choosing a graph-theoretic model, and in its 
final section sketched the general correspondences between the target phenomenon (the 
connectedness of musical segments) and the chosen mathematical concept (a directed graph).  The 
aim of this chapter is to explore that relationship in more detail: to define formal concepts that 
capture the pertinent characteristics of particular musical examples in generalisable ways, and to use 
graph theory as a means of organising and interpreting musical observations.  The concepts that 
arise are thus fed by both musical and formal concerns, embedding a certain tension between the 
intuitive clarity of musical examples and the mathematical rigour necessary to ensure that such 
examples can be generalised successfully (including barring all monsters – see Section 1.7) and 
therefore successfully implemented algorithmically. 
Anticipating a mixed readership, the decision has been taken to use a worked analytical 
example to motivate, clarify, and illustrate the mathematical material: this example will be the first 
movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in F minor, Op. 2, No. 1 (reproduced and segmented in 
full in Figure 3.22 and on the supplementary CD), and the formal ideas arising from its analysis will 
be summarised and made rigorous in mathematical language at the end of each section.1  Technical 
terms defined stipulatively, or common terms re-defined explicatively (see Section 1.7), appear in 
bold italic typeface where they are defined informally, with mathematical sections being cross-
referenced as appropriate within the main text.  Mathematical proofs are included for completeness, 
but are not essential to the understanding of the musical arguments (or even the mathematical 
definitions and theorems) proposed.  Aside from any stylistic considerations of exposition, it is 
hoped that the continuous presence of an evolving musical analysis will serve as a reminder that the 
ideas proposed are not theories of music: they are elements of a framework that can be used to 
interpret and guide a series of analytical decisions. 
3.1 Analytical Input: Segmentation, Derivation, and 
Succession 
In an important sense the formalisms outlined here do not model pieces of music: they model 
musical analyses.  In other words, their basic inputs are analytical decisions, and their basic outputs 
are the logical implications of those decisions (notwithstanding the possibility that decisions can be 
revised explicitly once their implications have been revealed, or implicitly in the way that all 
                                                     
1 The example has been processed from Ludwig van Beethoven, Pianoforte-Sonaten [Score], Ludwig 
van Beethovens Werke, 16, 3 vols (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1862–90; repr. New York: Kalmus, 
[n.d.]), I (1862), 1–4. 
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analytical observations are necessarily theory-laden).  The model therefore outlines a three-stage 
process which loops round into a cycle: some primary observations are made, these observations 
are subject to formal manipulation, and the resulting conclusions are analytically interpreted back 
within their musical context (possibly giving rise to a new set of input interpretations).  The middle 
stage of this process concerns itself with the formal structures outlined in the subsequent sections 
of this chapter, implemented via a computer algorithm – specifically, a VBA macro running from a 
NodeXL spreadsheet.2 
Conversely, no computational methods are proposed to carry out the first stage, but nor is 
it claimed that such methods are irrelevant; they have been avoided here partly for reasons of scope 
(as Section 2.3 shows, the study of computational segmentation and pattern-matching is a 
burgeoning field with many open problems) and time (since it would require the encoding of entire 
movements rather than selected segments), but there is also a deeper methodological component to 
be considered.  The interaction between human mind and (imagined) sound is crucial to the act of 
analysis – the editors of a special issue of the Journal of Mathematics and Music on computational 
music analysis state that ‘in our opinion, no analysis can ever be fully automated’, and that 
‘sometimes approaches with the least computational complexity can reveal the most musically 
relevant results’ – and so one of the best uses for a computer program, argues Marsden, is as ‘an 
analyst’s assistant, […] finding relationships from which a human analyst might choose’.3  The role 
of the human therefore remains substantial in the absence of a “ground truth”, and so the labour-
saving benefits to this project of constructing and adopting sophisticated segmentation and pattern-
matching programs (to carry out what are, after all, the first steps) are possibly negated by the 
inevitable need to manually sift the individual results (especially since motivic analysis and similarity 
matching are not synonymous – see Section 2.3, point six).  Marsden’s critique of pitch-class set 
theory rests on the idea that the process of segmentation itself is the analysis, and he argues that 
traditional analytical concepts (such as Nattiez’s ‘dominant criteria’ – see Section 2.2) are powerful 
‘specifically in their allowance for expert knowledge and experience’.4  The first steps in this model 
are therefore left for the analyst to carry out manually, a process which personal experience has 
                                                     
2 NodeXL ‘is a free, open-source template for Microsoft® Excel® 2007, 2010 and 2013’ that is 
designed to permit the construction and exploration of network graphs within the familiar Office 
software; it can be downloaded at <http://nodexl.codeplex.com> [accessed 17 December 2014].  
The use of Excel is inspired by Anthony Pople’s in his Tonalities project: see Anthony Pople, ‘Using 
Complex Set Theory for Tonal Analysis: An Introduction to the Tonalities Project’, Music Analysis, 
23 (2004), 153–94. 
3 Anagnostopoulou and Buteau, p. 82; Marsden, ‘Position Paper’, p. 150.  Marsden goes on to state, 
however, that he ‘know[s] of no case in which such an approach has been used in this manner’.  See 
also Chapter 1 at n. 96. 
4 ‘What Was the Question?’, pp. 139, 144.  The principal difference between pitch-class set theory 
and my own model is that the analysis continues after the ‘trivial calculation and collation’ (p. 139) 
has been carried out by the computer. 
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shown to be an excellent way to get to know the score; it is worth reiterating, however, that there is 
no reason why proposed computational ‘assistants’ cannot be slotted into the higher-level 
framework proposed here.5 
 The initial task facing the analyst, then, is to produce a spreadsheet populated with rows 
like that depicted in Figure 3.1 (drawn from the ‘Chapter 3 – Beethoven’ spreadsheet included on 
the supplementary CD).  The first thing to note about this figure is the way it encodes the musical 
segment itself: as a succession of pitches and time-points.  Factors such as harmony, 
instrumentation, articulation, and dynamics are not encoded explicitly, chiefly because they are 
secondary to the definition of a motivic segment as a melodic entity (Definition 1) and so introduce 
unnecessary complexity to the tasks that the algorithm outlined here is designed to carry out.  
Whilst it may be interesting to track, say, the various articulations applied to a particular figure 
throughout a piece (as can be done once the algorithm has given its results), encoding articulation 
as a motive-defining factor independent of pitch and rhythm seems to be a strategy that would only 
bear fruit in a limited number of specialised (and probably obvious) cases.  I adopt, however, 
Cook’s defence against the charge that Schenkerian analysis only deals with pitch structures: ‘no 
good Schenkerian analysis ignores [register, rhythm and other surface features]; instead, it presents 
the results of a careful consideration of these features, though it does so silently’.6  In a similar way, 
the segments identified in these analyses can be, and often are, shaped and delineated by factors 
that they do not explicitly encode. 
Each segment is encoded in a single row as a sequence of pitches followed by a sequence 
of time-points, separated by ‘-’; the bar in which the segment begins is also specified, and this is 
automatically (via an Excel formula) turned into a three-digit form and combined with the first 
pitch to yield a segment label (segments beginning with the same pitch in the same bar are 
highlighted automatically in the spreadsheet, and must then have numeric suffixes manually 
                                                     
5 In particular, a visual interface using optical character recognition to encode user-highlighted 
segments of a PDF score would drastically speed up these first steps.  The resulting annotated score 
could be integrated with the other input processes (by allowing the analyst to draw arrows on the 
score itself) and also the output method (by transforming a PDF into an interactive graph 
incorporating musical excerpts and even audio playback). 
6 Nicholas Cook, A Guide to Musical Analysis (London: Dent, 1987; repr. 1992), p. 61. 
Label Parents Successors Bar [Pitches]-[Time-points] 
032|C6 032|B5 033|D6 32 C6 Eb6 Db6 - 2.5 3 3.5 4 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The encoding of segment 032|C6 from Figure 3.22. 
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assigned – ‘032|C6(1)’ and ‘032|C6(2)’, for example; see Definition 3.1.6).7  Each pitch is encoded 
with a letter name, optional accidental, and octave number which applies to the letter name such 
that C4 = middle C and each octave runs from C to the B above (Definition 3.1.1).  Commensurate 
with Definition 1, these pitches are understood to constitute a single melodic line, and so no time-
point may be duplicated within a single row (a direct result of Definition 3.1.4 and Definition 3.1.6).  
The time-point of each pitch’s onset (and the final offset) is encoded with respect to a local 0 – the 
initial bar-line of the entry in the ‘Bar’ column – which means that the segment is in its bar form 
(Definition 3.1.6).  The encoding of grace notes and other less definite forms of metric notation is, 
as in performance, a matter of case-by-case interpretation, partly based on how integral they are to 
the shaping of a segment as a recurrent melodic unit: the grace notes of 007|C6 are here 
interpreted to be melodically more important than the arpeggiated chord; the grace notes of 
004|C5 and similar segments are interpreted as before-the-beat quavers; and a basic form of 
reduction removes the trills of 085|C5 and 087|C6 to make them more directly comparable to 
081|C5 and 083|C6, for example.8 
The unit of a single beat stays fixed throughout a movement, but this global conceptual 
beat need not be identical to a single beat as notated in the score: the number of global beats in 
each bar needs specifying in the movement’s time signature map, which should list, on a separate 
spreadsheet within the same workbook, the points at which this number changes (starting with bar 
1, or 0 if the movement begins with an anacrusis, and ending with the final bar to confirm the 
length of the movement; see Definition 3.1.2).  If, for instance,  changes to  in the score, the 
indication = suggests a change from 4 to 3, while = suggests a change from 4 to 6 or 2 to 3, and 
=. suggests that the “time signature” should remain constant while each “beat” after the change 
has length 4
3
 (such that three of these add up to the length of a single four-beat bar).  The global 
beat is primarily a notational convention, however, and so these suggestions should be balanced 
with the need to keep encoding manageable and rhythms comparable: not only is it tiresome or 
impossible to try and encode beats of length 4
3
 or every (notated or un-notated) tempo nuance in 
the piece (see n. 12), but the algorithm searches for exact duration matches, meaning that if the 
tempo doubles but the notation remains the same (for example), it is usually better not to record a 
change.  In the Beethoven example, which has 152 bars, begins with an anacrusis, features no time 
signature changes, and is easier to encode with four beats in a bar (despite the fact that its time 
signature is ), the table simply consists of two rows: 0|4 and 152|4. 
 While bar form undoubtedly facilitates encoding (by using local zero-points and salient 
beat units), it can be difficult to work with once input is completed since identical onsets can be 
                                                     
7 Further label references in this chapter relate to Figure 3.22. 
8 The encodings of these segments, and all others, are available on the supplementary CD. 
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encoded in different ways (for example, the onset of C5 in bar 15 is recorded as both ‘0 beats from 
bar 15’ and ‘4 beats from bar 14’).  Converting each time-point to a distance from a global zero 
(the beginning of bar 1 or 0) is a good first step, but making use of the time signature information 
to express each beat as a fraction of a bar – so ‘time-point 130.5’ becomes ‘time-point 32.625’, the 
fifth quaver of bar 32 – is even better, making references more intuitive and metric parallels more 
immediate (this is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3, particularly Definition 3.3.3 and Theorem 
3.3.4).  Interpreted geometrically, this introduces a notion of periodicity to the piece’s time-line, 
twisting it into a helix (spring shape) in which metrically equivalent positions (e.g. all the second 
beats in four-beat bars) line up vertically and bars with fewer beats have shorter loops since beat 
length is constant (see Definition 3.1.3).  Such a model brings to mind Howell’s characterisation of 
the relationship between circular and linear time (p. 112): 
While repetition patterns, in themselves, may be indicative of circular time […] they 
actually articulate a temporal framework within which a subtle process of 
developing variation can be perceived.  It is only by having a constant against 
which we can measure change, that a sense of ongoing, linear time can be 
assimilated. 
To understand how the chosen method of time-point encoding deals with duration, and 
how this imposes certain conditions on the first and last time-points of each row, a brief 
examination of Eytan Agmon’s theory of musical durations, which treats durations as mathematical 
intervals with associated lengths, will prove instructive.9  Departing from the question of when a 
piece of music ends (it cannot be at its last attack, as this initiates a duration), Agmon argues that 
musical durations are inherently asymmetric: that is, they include their ‘left extreme[s]’ (onsets or 
attacks), but not their ‘right extreme[s]’ (offsets or releases; Definition 3.1.4), which are ‘ordinarily’ 
defined by ‘the attack of another duration […] that immediately follows’.10  Durations are therefore 
‘uniquely associated with a single moment in time’, a cognitively efficient strategy that is reflected in 
William Rothstein’s observation that ‘the word “beat” […] signifies both a single point in time and 
the temporal distance between two such points’.11  In this understanding, rests are ‘pseudo-
durations at best’ since they lack well-defined attacks and so easily blur with the offsets that precede 
them: in the typically Mahlerian rhythm  , for example, ‘[d]o we really hear a duration between 
                                                     
9 See Eytan Agmon, ‘Musical Durations as Mathematical Intervals: Some Implications for the 
Theory and Analysis of Rhythm’, Music Analysis, 16 (1997), 45–75.  Unlike a musical interval, a 
mathematical interval is not just a distance but a portion of the number-line. 
10 Agmon, p. 48.  Computational and empirical studies usually make use of ‘inter-onset intervals’ 
rather than durations, with Lartillot and Toiviainen, for example, arguing that ‘[i]nter-onsets might 
be considered as more prominent than note durations because note onsets are perceptually more 
salient than offsets’ (p. 285).  This strategy also has benefits in encoding and computational 
efficiency (see next sentence). 
11 Agmon, p. 48; William Rothstein, Phrase Rhythm in Tonal Music (New York: Schirmer, 1989), p. 58, 
quoted in Agmon, p. 49.  Rothstein notes in particular that upbeats are often understood as 
durations and downbeats as time-points (p. 58). 
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[…] the release of the first note and the attack of the second?’, or is the rest better understood ‘in 
terms of texture, articulation, and even timbre’?12  Given these ideas, and the unpredictability of 
reverberation, the release of a piece’s final note is therefore ‘more mental than physical in 
character’: candidates for the endpoint of Figure 3.22 include the second beat of the last bar, the 
third beat of the last bar (including the fermata) or, if one recognises a two-bar hypermetrical 
phrasing pattern, the downbeat of a hypothetical extra bar.13  And although these concepts arose 
through consideration of endings, they can also apply to beginnings: pieces starting with an 
incomplete bar, for example, might be “felt” (by performers especially) to begin with the preceding 
downbeat. 
In a motivic segment, the onset of each pitch also serves as the offset of the preceding 
note (Definition 3.1.5 and Definition 3.1.6; this is also the defining characteristic of a 
subsegment); the exception to this is, of course, the final offset, which must be encoded directly to 
give one extra time-point in each row when compared to the number of pitches (i.e. one more than 
the segment’s size).  This lends rests a pseudo-durational or articulatory status, justified under the 
assumption that segments must have a gestalt-like character (Definition 1): since 150|F5, for 
example, has been identified as a segment, it may be safely assumed that the rests within it do not 
create enough of a discontinuity to split the segment into three, and are therefore matters of 
articulation.14  The direct encoding of the final offset is subject to a degree of interpretative 
freedom and so it is not considered part of a segment’s rhythm proper (Definition 3.3.3 excludes it 
from the assessment of rhythmic equivalence): its primary purpose is to fix a segment’s duration 
on the time-line (Definition 3.1.6) and hence permit the construction of chains of succession 
(defined later in this section and in Definition 3.1.8).  While a segment may therefore incorporate a 
rest within its final duration, its first duration must begin with an attack: in addition, this first attack 
must occur within the bar specified in the ‘Bar’ column (otherwise it is not in bar form as defined in 
Definition 3.1.6).  This means that the first time-point of each row takes a value that is greater than 
                                                     
12 Agmon, p. 54 ‘[d]o we really’, ‘in terms of’; p. 55 ‘pseudo-durations’.  Rhythm thus shades into 
articulation just as meter shades into tempo; to pay too much heed to rests within rhythms or 
tempo relationships across time signatures necessarily leads to thorny questions of how these 
encodings relate to staccato rhythms without rests, or changes from andante to poco meno mosso within 
the same time signature.  It is therefore necessary to keep the definitions of rhythm and meter fairly 
simple and restrictive in order to ensure that encodings are consistent. 
13 Agmon, p. 49. 
14 In other cases, as noted by both Ruwet and Nattiez, rests can play a vital role in delineating 
segments from each other on the syntagmatic chain: see, for example, Ruwet, pp. 14, 19 and 
Nattiez, ‘Density 21.5’, pp. 272–73.  James Tenney and Larry Polansky’s computational method of 
segmentation, critiqued by Nattiez (ibid., pp. 324–29), identifies a segment boundary wherever the 
interval between two onsets is ‘greater than those immediately preceding and following it’ (James Tenney 
with Larry Polansky, ‘Temporal Gestalt Perception in Music’, Journal of Music Theory, 24 (1980), 205–
41 (p. 208)). 
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or equal to 0, but strictly less than the number of beats in its bar (since bars, like other durations, 
include their left but not right extremes). 
The ‘Parents’ column records the label, or labels separated by commas, of any segment(s) 
that the analyst considers the current row to be more-or-less directly derived from (if such parents 
exist).  If a segment represents a completely new idea in the piece, then this cell is left blank and the 
segment is a source (Definition 3.2.9).15  This decision should not be seen as separate from the 
process of segmentation, but intimately tied up with it: as Emilios Cambouropoulos argues, humans 
do not begin the process of categorisation ‘with an accurate description of entities and properties’ 
but instead ‘alter their representations of entities concurrently with emerging categorizations and 
similarity judgements’ (p. 11).  Not only, therefore, should a motivic segment not be recorded if it is 
not ‘recognisably recurrent’ (Definition 1, reflected in Definition 3.1.7), but that recurrence should 
help to determine how related segments are encoded.  For example, the grace note of 005|C5 is 
encoded to be consistent with the grace note of 004|C5, and the decision to include the initial C4 
of 035|C4 is made through analogy with the phrasing of 020|Fb5.  Whilst the ‘Parents’ column can 
include relationships of the kind that Cone labels ‘derivation’ (see Section 2.3, point six), here the 
term is used to cover a broader range of devices, with Cone’s ‘derivation’ being relabelled 
‘progression’ for reasons explained in Section 3.2.  The penultimate paragraph of the previous 
chapter included an indicative discussion of the various factors that may underpin the choice of a 
particular parent, and a considerable portion of the algorithm’s work lies in determining how these 
factors apply to each individual derivation arrow (as discussed below); the analyst does not, 
therefore, need to explicitly distinguish between different types of arrow at this stage.  Beyond the 
basic formal stipulations that a segment may not be derived from itself, or from the same parent 
more than once, the following constraint applies: given a proposed derivation 𝐴 → 𝐵 (i.e. an entry 
of ‘𝐴’ in 𝐵’s row), 𝐴 must begin before 𝐵 ends (Definition 3.1.7).  This rules out strict reverse 
derivation, but still permits the variety of formations represented in Figure 3.2, many of which can 
be used to describe certain contrapuntal structures (number 10, for example, could represent a 
canon, and numbers 8 and 9 might represent canons by diminution in which the augmented version 
is seen to give rise to the shorter version and vice-versa, respectively).16 
                                                     
15 Technically speaking, Definition 3.2.9 only defines sources with respect to condensed, and 
therefore acyclic, graphs (see Definition 2.5 and Proposition 2.6iii), so the term strictly applies to 
strong components of the derivation digraph (Definition 3.2.1) containing no member which is 
derived from outside the component. 
16 Although reverse derivation as an arrow pointing backwards in time is not permitted, it may still 
manifest itself as an interpretative analytical category in a number of ways.  If 𝐴 “foreshadows” 𝐵, 
for example, then one might expect segments related to both but appearing after 𝐵 to be connected 
to the more “stable” 𝐵 in preference to 𝐴: this would appear in the graph as a relatively small 
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 It is important to remember that parent choice is necessarily selective, and indeed should 
not aim to be comprehensive.  Whilst the analytical observation that a certain segment serves as a 
symbol of an entire category might force a partially arbitrary choice of parent, the power of the 
graph-theoretic interpretation means that if the analyst wishes to place segment 𝐴 in category 𝒞, it 
is sufficient merely to assign an existing member of 𝒞 as one of 𝐴’s parents.  Of course, a little 
knowledge of how the algorithm forms its categories is useful here, and 𝐴 may ultimately not be a 
member of 𝒞 at all hierarchical levels (it is only guaranteed to be part of the same simple 
component): these issues are explored in more detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
The final piece of information required for each segment is a list of its ‘Successors’ in the 
syntagmatic chain.  This column is designed to allow the model to deal with non-monophonic 
music by clarifying how segments are part of longer melodic lines, streams, or voices: this in turn 
allows the identification of recurrent groupings (themes) in the manner outlined in Section 3.2 (see 
Definition 3.2.7 and Theorem 3.2.8 in particular).  Succession relationships are subject to the 
constraint that if 𝐵 is a successor to 𝐴, then 𝐵 must begin after 𝐴 begins and end after 𝐴 ends 
(Definition 3.1.8): this means that the only derivation configurations in Figure 3.2 that are 
permitted as succession configurations are numbers 1 (e.g. 018|Eb5–020|Fb5), 2 (e.g. 020|Fb5–
                                                                                                                                                           
collection of segments appearing in a relatively limited range of bars pointing into a larger collection 
of more widely distributed segments. 
 1)  
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Figure 3.2: The eleven possible configurations of the derivation 𝑨 → 𝑩.   
These are generated by moving the onsets and offsets of 𝐴 and 𝐵 within the marked 
zones of the schematic at the bottom of the figure. 
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022|Fb5), and 10 (e.g. 014|Db5–015|C5).17  In addition, if 𝐵 begins before 𝐴 ends (configuration 
10) then the two segments must overlap: that is, the final pitches and time-points of 𝐴 must match 
the initial pitches and time-points of 𝐵.18 
The algorithm can assign an assumed successor to 𝐴 (Definition 3.1.8) by first 
considering all those segments that begin after 𝐴’s initial onset and before its final offset: if exactly 
one of these overlaps with 𝐴, then it is chosen as 𝐴’s assumed successor (so, for example, 015|C5 
is the assumed successor to 014|Db5).  If none overlap, then 𝐴’s assumed successor is the segment 
whose initial onset has the lowest value greater than or equal to 𝐴’s final offset (so 003|G4 is the 
assumed successor to 000|C4): if this segment is not unique, or if 𝐴 overlaps with more than one 
segment, then the segment has no assumed successor and so the analyst must settle the tie.  Usually 
this involves making a choice between the candidates, but it is also possible to list several segments 
separated by commas (for example if a melodic line splits into a melody and countermelody).  A 
segment may also be assigned multiple successors if there is no particular sense of continuation: if 
the third voice in a passage of three-voice counterpoint ends before the others, for example, there 
might be no reason to prefer either of the remaining voices as a continuation, and so both are 
listed.  Only those segments that end the piece are permitted to have no successors at all. 
Beyond settling ties, the analyst is free to ignore or overwrite assumed successors, subject 
to the constraints on succession relationships outlined above (and in Definition 3.1.8) and 
commensurate with the idea that a succession chain is a slightly more analytically mediated concept 
than a simple ordered list (entries in the ‘Successors’ column always take precedence over the 
algorithm’s choices).  Segment 032|C6, for example, is clearly continued by 033|D6, even though 
033|C3 is technically the next to begin (note that the positioning of final offsets can be used to 
force the algorithm to behave in a certain way without the need to explicitly list a successor: in this 
example, changing the final time-point of 032|C6 from 4 to 4.5 to incorporate the rest would make 
033|D6 its assumed successor).  Finally, it is worth observing that no problems arise from listing 
successors that duplicate the algorithm’s choices: it is sometimes convenient, for example, to 
encode segments in the order of a particular succession chain, and then simply copy and paste the 
‘Label’ column’s values into the ‘Successors’ column, shifting the list up by one cell. 
                                                     
17 Here and elsewhere, ‘–’ is used informally to denote a span of successive segments: this is usually 
a single chain between the two specified endpoints, but may also include branches pointing into or 
out of that chain (particularly in the discussion of themes in Section 3.2). 
18 The nature of this matching is detailed in Figure 3.4 and Definition 3.1.8: in particular, the initial 
onset of 𝐵 and final offset of 𝐴 are granted some flexibility, and pitch identity is defined 
enharmonically (so the pitches must map to the same value under 𝑐+: see Definition 3.3.1). 
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It is not uncommon for large sections of a piece to trace out a single syntagmatic chain 
(Leopold Mozart’s melodic filo, or ‘thread’ – see Chapter 2 at n. 22), and when the succession 
relationships are represented as a digraph (see Section 3.2, in particular Definition 3.2.2) the formal 
structure that results is a single directed path 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → ⋯.  Figure 3.3 shows the sections of 
the Beethoven example which do not fall into this structure: these are the imitative section at bars 
10–13 (reproduced below the figure), with 014|Db5 representing the point at which the two lines 
merge back into one (an extended recapitulation, bars 110–117, is shown as the figure’s fourth 
graph); the passage in the development which repeats a cadential pair of segments (067|Ab3 and 
069|B4) twice (as 069|Gb3 & 071|A4 and 071|Fb3 & 073|G4; note that an alternative analysis 
could have 069|B4–071|A4–073|G4 forming a parallel chain rather than collapsing back to a 
single voice after each cadence); and the passage discussed above in which a new melody enters in 
the bass (033|C3) as an ongoing process of ascent reaches its summit in 033|D6 (repeated four 
bars later; again, 033|D6 could be legitimately succeeded by 037|Ab5 rather than rejoining the 
melody after the segment somewhat arbitrarily ends in bar 34).  The fifth graph of Figure 3.3, which 
represents the recapitulation of the second, is in fact identical to the second when considered as an 
 
Figure 3.3: The simultaneous succession chains of Figure 3.22.  
The score for the first of these is reprinted below the figure; note that 008|G2 ends 
with a semibreve and so is simultaneous with 011|Eb5. 
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abstract set of succession relationships independent of visual representation: the two graphs are 
therefore said to be isomorphic.19  The visual difference is an incidental by-product of the layout 
algorithm used by NodeXL, and so no significance should be attached to any chain that might 
appear to be the “main” one, or to any instances of such a chain deviating from the vertical (for 
example in the third graph, where the filo enters at the left with 065|Ab5 but continues at the right 
with 077|E4).  Visual representation does play an important part in later figures, but Figure 3.3 is 
presented in a “neutral” arrangement to reinforce the concept that graphs are primarily sets of 
relationships, and not geometric maps. 
Mathematical Formalisation 
Definition 3.1.1 
A letter name 𝒍 is an element of the set 𝐿 = {C,D,E,F,G,A,B}, an accidental 𝒂 is an element 
of the set 𝐴 = {z,b, ∅,#,x}, and an octave number 𝒐 is an integer such that 0 ≤ 𝑜 ≤ 9.  A 
pitch 𝒑 is an ordered triple (𝑙, 𝑎, 𝑜), usually written 𝑙𝑎𝑜; C∅4 = C4 is middle C, and is 
enharmonically equivalent to B#3. 
 
Definition 3.1.2 
Given a finite set 𝐵 of sequential integers starting from 0 or 1 (i.e. for fixed 𝛼 ∈ {0,1} and 
𝛽 ∈ ℤ+, 𝐵 = {𝑏 ∈ ℤ+ ∪ {0}|𝛼 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝛽}) known as bars, a time signature map 𝒔 is a 
surjective function from 𝐵 to ℚ+.  After specifying 𝑠(0) if 0 ∈ 𝐵 or 𝑠(1) if 0 ∉ 𝐵, 𝑠 is usually 
described by listing 𝑏 and 𝑠(𝑏) whenever 𝑠(𝑏) ≠ 𝑠(𝑏 − 1). 
A time-point 𝒕 is a member of ℝ+ ∪ {0} such that 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝐵) ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝐵) + 1.  It may be 
alternatively notated as an ordered pair (⌊𝑡⌋, 𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)(𝑡 − ⌊𝑡⌋)).20 
 
Definition 3.1.3 
A composition’s time-line can be understood as a helix in three dimensional space 
parameterised by the following equations: 
 𝑥(𝑡) =
𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)
2𝜋
(1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜋(𝑡 + 1 2⁄ )) 
 𝑦(𝑡) =
𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)
2𝜋
𝑠𝑖𝑛2𝜋(𝑡 + 1 2⁄ ) 
 𝑧(𝑡) = 𝑡 
where 𝑀𝐼𝑁(𝐵) ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑀𝐴𝑋(𝐵) + 1.  Each coil of the helix represents one bar, with a distance 
of 1 round the 𝑥 − 𝑦 projected circumference (i.e. not the helix arc length) representing one 
beat.  Since this beat is held constant throughout the piece, longer bars have larger loops, but on 
the 𝑧-axis passing through the start of each bar, the bars are spaced equally. 
 
                                                     
19 That is, one can find a way to match each vertex in one graph with a partner in the other in a way 
that preserves all the arrow relationships (so that the partner of 𝐴’s successor is a successor of 𝐴’s 
partner). 
20 If 𝑡 is an integer, then ⌊𝑡⌋ = 𝑡 and ⌈𝑡⌉ = 𝑡 + 1.  In practice, 𝑡 is always a member of ℚ+ ∪ {0}, 
but it is useful for the helix of Definition 3.1.3 to be defined as a continuous space.  
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Definition 3.1.4 
A duration 𝒅 = [𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐), where 𝑡1 < 𝑡2, is a closed–open interval of a time-line; 𝑡1 is known as 
an onset and 𝑡2 an offset.  A duration’s length is given by 𝑡2 − 𝑡1. 
 
Definition 3.1.5 
A note is a pitch–duration pair (𝑝, 𝑑). 
 
Definition 3.1.6 
A motivic segment 𝑴 of size 𝒏 (i.e. |𝑀| = 𝑛) is a set of notes 
{(𝑝1, 𝑑1), (𝑝2, 𝑑2), … , (𝑝𝑛, 𝑑𝑛)} such that 𝑑1 = [𝑡1, 𝑡2), 𝑑2 = [𝑡2, 𝑡3), …, 𝑑𝑛 = [𝑡𝑛, 𝑡𝑛+1).  It 
can therefore be specified by listing 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … 𝑡𝑛+1, and we may write 𝑝𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 and 
𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑀 for brevity (even though pitches and time-points are technically not members of 𝑀, but 
members of members of 𝑀). 
A motivic segment’s duration is [𝑡1, 𝑡𝑛+1), so we may write 𝒐𝒏(𝑴) = 𝑡1 and 𝒐𝒇𝒇(𝑴) =
𝑡𝑛+1.   
A subsegment is a contiguous subset of 𝑀 i.e. {(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖) ∈ 𝑀|𝑐1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑐2} for some fixed 𝑐1 
and 𝑐2, 1 ≤ 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 ≤ 𝑛 (trivially, 𝑀 is a subsegment of itself). 
A motivic segment can be rewritten into its bar form (𝒕𝟎, 𝑴), where 𝑡0 = ⌊𝑡1⌋ and 𝑡0
∗ = 0, by 
replacing each 𝑡𝑖 of 𝑀 with 𝑡𝑖
∗as follows: 
𝑡𝑖
∗ = {
𝑡𝑖−1
∗ + 𝑠(⌊𝑡𝑖⌋)(𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1)
𝑡𝑖−1
∗ + 𝑠(⌊𝑡𝑖−1⌋)(⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ − 𝑡𝑖−1) + 𝑠(⌊𝑡𝑖⌋)(𝑡𝑖 − ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋)
𝑡𝑖−1
∗ + 𝑠(⌊𝑡𝑖−1⌋)(⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ − 𝑡𝑖−1) + 𝑠(⌊𝑡𝑖⌋)(𝑡𝑖 − ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋) + ∑ 𝑠(𝑗)
⌊𝑡𝑖⌋−1
𝑗=⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉
if 
⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ > ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋
⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ = ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋
⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ < ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋
21 
A segment’s label is given by 𝑡0|𝑝1, or 𝑡0|𝑝1(1), 𝑡0|𝑝1(2), etc. if more than one segment 
beginning with 𝑝1 starts in bar 𝑡0. 
The collection of all the motivic segments listed for a given time-line (i.e. piece) is denoted ℳ. 
 
Definition 3.1.7 
A derivation relationship, 𝑴𝟏𝜹𝑴𝟐, is a distinct ordered pair of motivic segments (𝑀1, 𝑀2) 
such that 𝑜𝑛(𝑀1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀2); 𝑀1 is said to be a parent of 𝑀2.  Each element of ℳmust be 
𝛿-related to at least one other element of ℳ. 
  
                                                     
21 Note that for each 𝑑𝑖−1, 𝑡𝑖−1 < 𝑡𝑖 (Definition 3.1.4), so if ⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ > ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋ then ⌊𝑡𝑖−1⌋ = ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋ =
⌈𝑡𝑖−1⌉ − 1. 
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Figure 3.4: An illustration of overlapping as defined in Definition 3.1.8iii. 
Shaded pitches map to the same value under 𝑐+ (see Definition 3.3.1). 
 
Definition 3.1.8 
A succession relationship, 𝑴𝟏𝝈𝑴𝟐, is a distinct ordered pair of motivic segments (𝑀1, 𝑀2) 
such that: 
i. 𝑜𝑛(𝑀1) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑀2); 
ii. 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀2); 
iii. If 𝑜𝑛(𝑀2) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1), the segments must overlap: that is, 
{𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑀1|𝑜𝑛(𝑀2) < 𝑡𝑖 < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1)} = {𝑡𝑖
′ ∈ 𝑀2|𝑜𝑛(𝑀2) < 𝑡𝑖
′ < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1)} and 
𝑐+(𝑝𝑖
′) = 𝑐+(𝑝|𝑀1|−𝛼+𝑖) for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝛼  
 where 𝑝𝑖
′ ∈ 𝑀2, 𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝑀1 and 𝑡𝛼
′ = 𝑀𝐴𝑋{𝑡𝑖
′ ∈ 𝑀2|𝑡𝑖
′ < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1)}. 
The function 𝑐+ is defined in Definition 3.3.1, and Figure 3.4 illustrates the concept of 
overlapping schematically. 
If Σ(𝑀1) ⊂ ℳ is defined as the set of all possible 𝑀2 ∈ ℳ satisfying i to iii above for a fixed 
𝑀1, then if there is a segment 𝑀𝑠 ∈ Σ(𝑀1) such that 𝑜𝑛(𝑀𝑖) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑀𝑠)∀𝑀𝑖 ∈ Σ(𝑀1)\𝑀𝑠 and 
no member of Σ(𝑀1)\𝑀𝑠 overlaps with 𝑀1, 𝑀1 has an assumed successor – namely, 𝑀𝑠.22 
Segment 𝑀1 does not have a successor at all if and only if Σ(𝑀1) is empty. 
 
  
                                                     
22 Here Σ is used simply as a symbol denoting a set, without meaning summation. 
𝑜𝑛(𝑀1) 𝑡2 
𝑝3 
𝑡3 
𝑝4 
𝑡4 
𝑝5 
𝑡5 
𝑝6 
𝑡6 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀1) 
𝑝1
′  𝑝2
′  𝑝3
′  𝑝4
′  
𝑜𝑛(𝑀2) 𝑡2
′  𝑡3
′  𝑡4
′  𝑡5
′  𝑡6
′  𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑀2) 
{𝑡4, 𝑡5, 𝑡6} = {𝑡2
′ , 𝑡3
′ , 𝑡4
′ } 
|𝑀1| = 6,  𝛼 = 4 
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3.2 The Derivation and Succession Digraphs 
Once the input is complete, the first task carried out by the algorithm is to construct the derivation 
digraph (Definition 3.2.1) and the succession digraph (Definition 3.2.2), which collate all the 
pairwise derivation and succession relationships respectively (the first of these digraphs is shown in 
full for the Beethoven example in Figure 3.23; again, its visual layout is secondary in defining its 
meaning).23  As the phrase ‘distinct pair’ in Definition 3.1.7 implies, the derivation digraph may not 
include parallel arrows or loops; the second sentence of Definition 3.1.7 also ensures that isolated 
vertices are not permitted (Corollary 3.2.4).  Unlike the succession digraph (see, again, Corollary 
3.2.4), the derivation digraph may contain directed circuits (including antiparallel arrows).  The 
arrows in these circuits are still subject to the condition that prohibits strict reverse derivation in 
Definition 3.1.7, and so any circuit segment may end only after its parent has begun, and must have 
begun before its child ends.  Circuits within single succession chains are therefore very unusual 
(though technically possible, albeit by introducing a high degree of encoding redundancy due to the 
amount of overlapping needed); this, and their tendency to work against the flow of time, makes 
circuits somewhat rare (given the general preference for a single compositional filo), but they cannot 
be completely dismissed a priori.  Consider, for example, a canon by diminution (represented as 
configuration 8 from Figure 3.2): one reading of this might have 𝐵 beginning as a derivation of 𝐴, 
but then overtaking such that the second half of 𝐴 is derived from 𝐵, thus creating the pair of 
antiparallel arrows (𝐴, 𝐵) and (𝐵, 𝐴).  Lemma 3.2.5 and Theorem 3.2.6 further explore some of the 
conditions that give rise to derivation circuits. 
The interactions of the two digraphs (which share the same vertex set) define a relationship 
inspired by Agawu’s terminological differentiation of ‘succession as distinct from progression’.24  
One segment is therefore said to progress to another (i.e. they are in a relationship of progression) 
if the latter both succeeds and is derived from the former (Definition 3.2.3; these arrows are 
coloured green in the NodeXL output).  This is a straightforward renaming of Cone’s derivation 
and my continuous development (as described and exemplified in Section 2.3, point six) in order to 
bring into sharper focus the nature of this device as simultaneous derivation and succession.  The 
term covers quite a broad range of analytical categories, including generation of a responding 
phrase (000|C4→003|G4; see also the definition of archetype 2 in Section 2.2), exact, truncated, or 
extended repetition at the same (011|Eb5→013|Eb5, 015|C5→018|Eb5, 020|Fb5→024|Fb5, 
115|G5→117|E5) or a different (095|Ab4→096|Eb6) pitch level, liquidation (145|E5→150|F5), 
sequence (013|Eb5→014|Db5, 032|B5→033|D6, 033|C3→035|Eb3, 065|Ab5→071|Fb3, 
                                                     
23 See Definition 2.1 to Proposition 2.6 for an introduction to the general graph-theoretical 
terminology used in this chapter. 
24 Music as Discourse, p. 93. 
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073|G4→077|E4, 088|F6→089|Db6, 111|Bb5→113|Gb5, 112|Db5→ 114|C5), a freer but still 
directed series of focal pitches (A5–B5–C6 in 004|C4→007|C6,25 C5–F5–C6–F6 in 
081|C5→084|F6), or a combination of several of the above (026|G4→030|G5).26  All the 
examples of progression in this movement are included in the above taxonomy of informally 
defined classes, but note that the converse is not true: for example, the pair 101|F4–103|G4 is not 
a progression despite the fact that it is almost identical to 000|C4→003|G4.  This is a direct result 
of an input decision to treat the second pair as a repetition of a previously generated grouping 
rather than a retracing of the progression process. 
 The notion of segment grouping is formalised in Definition 3.2.7 and Theorem 3.2.8 
through a concept labelled thematic repetition.  At the core of this concept is a relationship 
known as thematic joining: a derivation arrow (𝐴, 𝐶) is thematically joined to (𝐵, 𝐷) if 𝐵 is a 
successor to 𝐴 and 𝐷 is a successor to 𝐶 (or, since the relationship is symmetric, if 𝐴 is a successor 
to 𝐵 and 𝐶 is a successor to 𝐷).  The arrows (000|C4,101|F4) and (003|G4,103|G4), for example, 
are thematically joined, as are (003|G4,103|G4) and (004|C5,104|C5): this creates a pair of proto-
themes, since the succession chain 101|F4–103|G4–104|C5 is derived, in order, from the 
succession chain 000|C4→003|G4–004|C5.  By continuing to add as many thematically joined 
derivation arrows as possible, the full themes extend as far as 012|Bb4 and 112|Db5 respectively 
before 014|Db5 and 114|C5 (being unconnected by a derivation arrow for analytical reasons 
discussed in more detail below) break the pattern.  Note also that while these themes are single 
succession chains, not all themes need to be: the general requirement is that they are connected 
subgraphs of the succession digraph (Theorem 3.2.8i), so may include branches. 
 As the lengthy Definition 3.2.7 shows, some monster-barring is necessary to exclude 
structures we might not think of as themes but which satisfy the conditions of thematic joining: the 
overlapping 𝐴𝐵𝐶 and 𝐵𝐶𝐷 in the progression chain 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 and the counter-intuitive 
𝐵1𝐶1𝐴2 and 𝐵2𝐶2𝐴3 in 𝐴1𝐵1𝐶1𝐴2𝐵2𝐶2𝐴3𝐵3𝐶3, for example.  We may forbid segments from 
being included in both the first and second themes of the same thematic repetition, and insist that 
there is a preferred resolution of passages like that shown in the second example: the theme pairs 
𝐴1𝐵1𝐶1/𝐴2𝐵2𝐶2 and 𝐴2𝐵2𝐶2/𝐴3𝐵3𝐶3 should obviate the need for 𝐶1𝐴2𝐵2/𝐶2𝐴3𝐵3 and 
𝐴1𝐵1/𝐴2𝐵2, for instance.  With suitable conditions in place (as illustrated in Figure 3.11), it follows 
                                                     
25 Cone notes that this directed motion, extended backwards to include the F of bar 1 and the G of 
bar 3, is repeated in diminution to yield the bass notes of bars 5–8 (i.e. F–G–A–B–C in which the 
first two inter-onset intervals are twice the size of the second two; see Edward T. Cone, Musical 
Form and Musical Performance (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 75–76). 
26 Here ‘→’ is used as a version of the succession marker ‘–’ (see n. 17) which indicates that all of its 
succession relationships are also progression relationships; it refers only to single chains, and not 
branches, of the succession digraph. 
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that each derivation arrow can be part of at most one thematic repetition (expressed in Definition 
3.2.7 as connected components of size greater than 1 in a graph in which the derivation arrows are 
the vertices), and that this is incompatible with the idea of disjoint themes only when a derivation 
circuit is present (Theorem 3.2.8iv): in this case, when the symmetrical nature of the circuit 
prohibits a preferred interpretation, the thematic repetition is known as circular.27 
Figure 3.5 lists the 18 thematic repetitions (grouped into categories) that 78 of the 
Beethoven example’s 126 derivation arrows identify.  It is instructive, both in terms of piece and 
method, to examine these 18 theme pairs in more detail; in particular, the crucial roles played by 
segmentation and development are brought to the fore in such an examination.  Firstly, note that a 
recapitulation realised as an exact reprise of the exposition (and segmented in the same way) would 
manifest itself as a single long thematic repetition.  That is not the case here: putting aside the extra 
final four segments, the recapitulatory deletion of 039|C3 and replacement of 014|Db5–018|Eb5 
with 114|C5–117|E5 splits the exposition “theme” into shorter sections.28  A great deal therefore 
rests on how variation is interpreted: had, for example, 039|Eb2 and 039|C3 been combined into a 
single segment, or the repeated Cs in bar 139 understood as a form of 039|C3, the second split 
                                                     
27 Lartillot and Toiviainen show a similar concern for rooting out redundant repetition in pattern 
recognition: rather than establishing segmentation preference rules, however, they condense ‘all the 
possible rotations of [a] periodic pattern […] into one single cyclic pattern’ (p. 295). 
28 Note that although there are only two discontinuities here, this splits the recapitulation into four.  
This is because, as Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.7 show, 014|Db5 is a successor to both 013|Eb5 and 
012|Bb4, so its removal not only disconnects what follows it from what precedes it, but also 
isolates the two chains that precede it from each other. 
Exposition Recapitulation  Immediate  
000|C4–012|Bb4 101|F4–112|Db5  000|C4→003|G4 004|C5→005|C5 
011|Eb5→013|Eb5 111|Bb5→113|Gb5  033|C3–035|C4 037|C2–039|C3 
020|Fb5–039|Eb2 119|Db5–138|C3  041|D4–042|G4 043|D4–044|G4 
041|D4–046|G5 140|Ab4–145|E5  043|D4–044|G4 045|D5–046|G5 
Exposition Development  081|C5→084|F6 085|C5–088|F6 
020|Fb5–027|D5 055|Gb5–062|B4  088|F6→089|Db6 090|F6–091|Db6 
Simultaneous   095|Ab4→096|Eb6 097|F4–098|Db6 
011|Eb5→013|Eb5 012|Bb4–014|Db5  097|F4–098|Db6 099|Eb4–100|C6 
111|Bb5–115|G5 112|Db5–117|E5  026|G4→027|B4 031|G5–032|B5 
069|B4–069|Gb3 071|A4–071|Fb3  055|Gb5–057|Gb5 063|Ab5–065|Ab5 
Figure 3.5: The 18 thematic repetitions in Figure 3.22 (given Figure 3.23 and Figure 3.3). 
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would not have occurred.  The themes as they are identified thus direct attention towards certain 
critical points in the music, and invite alternative interpretations that would lead to different formal 
conclusions. 
 An alternative (abstract) situation forcing a thematic split is shown in Figure 3.6.  In the 
diagram on the left, the merging of two successive segments into one necessitates a split into two 
thematic repetitions since no derivation arrow in the first is thematically joined to an arrow in the 
second.  A similar situation obtains in the central picture: this time, however, the second repetition 
consists of a single arrow and so is not a thematic repetition at all (Definition 3.2.7).  These 
examples suggest that the segments in the first and second themes must be related via a bijection 
(that is, a one-to-one matching of each segment in the first with a unique partner in the second), 
but this is not the case as the picture on the right shows: the first two arrows are both thematically 
joined to the third without the two themes overlapping with each other.  Thematic repetitions 
including this permitted merging structure (or its inverse, in which one segment breaks into two) 
are known as non-isomorphic, and are prefixed with * in the NodeXL output (Definition 3.2.7). 
Returning to the Beethoven example, bars 11–14 and 111–18, as well as marking the 
principal point of difference between the exposition and recapitulation (due to their transitional 
functions), appear again in Figure 3.5 as examples of simultaneous thematic repetition: that is, 
they are thematic repetitions in which the first onset of the second theme occurs before the final 
offset of the second (Definition 3.2.7).29  Figure 3.7 shows the relationships of derivation and 
succession between the relevant segments: it can be seen that, as per the criteria for thematic 
repetition stated above, the shaded second theme is distinct from the unshaded first theme and 
derived from it in a way that preserves its succession relationships.  However, each repetition 
displays an additional succession (in fact, progression) relationship: the final unshaded segment 
                                                     
29 These same segments appear as parallel succession chains in Figure 3.3 and, looking ahead, as 
epiphanies in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.6: The effects of different types of merging on thematic structure. 
Succession arrows are shown dashed and derivation arrows solid.  Similar examples 
can be constructed to show the effects of the inverse process of splitting. 
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progresses into the final shaded segment.  This undermines the sense of continuation between the 
final two shaded segments, and therefore the clear imitative pattern set up by, for example, 
111|Bb5→113|Gb5 and 112|Db5→114|C5. 
 The third example of simultaneity in Figure 3.7 emphasises the “end-weighted” nature of 
thematic repetition in this model.  Again, it can be verified that the shaded and unshaded segments 
(ignoring those ringed by dotted lines) fall into groups related internally by succession and to each 
other by derivation, but examining bars 67–74 in context shows that this grouping is somewhat 
counter-intuitive: as the discussion of Figure 3.3 above shows, the segments fall more naturally into 
the cadential pairs 067|Ab3 & 069|B4, 069|Gb3 & 071|A4, and 071|Fb3 & 073|G4.  These pairs 
are not themes in the present technical sense as they are not held together by succession: they 
cannot be, as the second member of each pair begins before the first has ended, and without any 
overlapping notes.  Again, the progression relationships between the themes undermine the sense of 
succession within each theme, and the instability produced here seems to be more pronounced than 
in the previous two examples.  Their interpretation being so context-dependent, simultaneous 
thematic repetitions found by the algorithm are therefore prefixed ‘SIM’ so that they may be easily 
isolated and examined on a case-by-case basis. 
 The final column of Figure 3.5 lists those thematic repetitions in which an earliest segment 
of the second theme is a successor to a latest segment of the first: in other words, in which the 
 
Figure 3.7: The three examples of simultaneous thematic repetition from Figure 3.5. 
The first and second themes in each case are indicated through shading (segments in 
dotted rings included for context), while solid arrows represent derivation and 
horizontal arrows represent succession (so solid horizontal arrows represent 
progression).  Each tall shaded segment lies in two succession chains and hence 
undermines the separation between the two themes. 
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repetition is immediate (Definition 3.2.7; these are prefixed with ‘IMM’ in the NodeXL output).  
Many of these are straightforward: note, in particular, the double repetition of 041|D4–042|G4 as 
043|D4–044|G4, then 043|D4–044|G4 as 045|D5–046|G5.  The second of these pairs serves as 
a reminder that the term ‘repetition’ can be misleading, since themes are based purely on 
relationships of succession and derivation and not morphology: segments 085|C5–088|F6, for 
example, are morphologically quite distinct from 081|C5→084|F6, but the second theme can be 
seen to share a certain structural organisation (four segments, rising C5–F5–C6–F6) with the first; 
this parallel between wholes but not necessarily parts mirrors Adorno’s variant concept, which is 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.  The final two rows in this column list themes that are 
repeated after brief passages of intervening material and so are not strictly immediate: note in 
particular that 055|Gb5–062|B4 has already been identified as a thematic unit, repeating 020|Fb5–
027|D5, and so 063|Ab5–065|Ab5 may be understood as a truncated immediate repetition of this 
material rather than a non-immediate full repetition of 055|Gb5–057|Gb5. 
 In some of the rows of Figure 3.5, both themes are progression chains.  This means that all 
the second-theme segments after the first have at least two arrows pointing into them, 
corresponding to two alternative methods of derivation: progression-then-repetition or repetition-
then-progression (note that this equates to choosing both the ‘repetition of a previously generated 
grouping’  and ‘retracing of the progression process’ interpretations discussed above).  Any segment 
with indegree greater than or equal to two is labelled an epiphany (Definition 3.2.10), adapting 
Cone’s terminology explicatively and adding to it stipulatively (see Section 2.3, point six and Section 
1.7).  Whilst this definition respects Cone’s central concept – two or more processes culminating in 
a single point, and hence retrospectively connecting their origins – it (like the present use of 
‘derivation’) covers a broader range of scenarios than those Cone uses the term to describe.  It is 
therefore useful to distinguish two subclasses: an epiphany is strong if all the processes leading into 
it cannot be traced back to a single point, and weak otherwise.  The former is closest to Cone’s 
original usage, while the latter describes something like the process of rederivation (or progression–
repetition/repetition–progression), here recast as a kind of “false” epiphany: consider, for example, 
the moment of recapitulation in a sonata movement, which retrospectively connects the final 
segments of the development to the initial segments of the exposition, creating a sense of 
culmination akin to a “true” epiphany – despite the fact that the former set of segments is 
ultimately derived from the latter. 
All four epiphanies in the Beethoven example, shown in Figure 3.8, are weak, and so 
describe simultaneous processes that begin and end at the same points as each other.  Segment 
005|C5, for example, is both a quasi-sequential progression from 004|C5 and a truncation (with 
the same harmonic underpinning) of 003|G4.  The square is completed by considering the 
relationships between these segments and 000|C4: 003|G4 is its response phrase (or quasi-
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sequential progression), and 004|C5 is its truncation.  We might therefore see 005|C5 as a 
truncation of 000|C4’s response, or as a progression from its truncation; alternative interpretations 
(created by pairing off the sides of the square in different ways) might see a progression 
(000|C4→003|G5) and its truncated repetition (004|C5→005|C5), or the splitting (003|G4 keeps 
the shape, 004|C5 keeps the harmony) and re-integration (keeping the harmony of 003|G4 and 
shape of 004|C5) of 000|C4 into a transformed version of itself. 
The other three epiphanies in the Beethoven example (112|Db5, 113|Gb5, and 114|C5) 
interrelate to create a total of four paths from 011|Eb5 to 114|C5.  They have been arranged in 
Figure 3.8 such that progressions run horizontally and arrows linking segments in the exposition to 
segments in the recapitulation run vertically.  This shows, among other things, that 112|Db5 
branches off from 111|Bb5 just as 012|Bb4 branches off from 011|Eb5; that the progression 
111|Bb5→113|Gb5 repeats the progression 011|Eb5→013|Eb5; and that the progression 
112|Db5→114|C5 imitates the progression 111|Bb5→113|Gb5 (see also Figure 3.7).  Just as in 
the simpler example, alternative interpretations are possible and may be joined together in various 
ways: 114|C5 could be the outcome of a two-stage derivation initiated by a repeat of 011|Eb5, for 
example, or of a single-stage progression initiated by a repeat of 011|Eb5’s imitator 012|Bb4. 
At the close of Chapter 2, it was argued that while the connected components of a 
derivation digraph represent a good first level of motivic categorisation, reasonably independent 
and coherent categories can be forced into the same connected component through passages of 
progression (as in the Schubert-to-Strauss example of Figure 2.3).  Given that this idea of two 
becoming one is enacted above all at a piece’s points of epiphany, it seems natural to propose a 
subdivision of the connected components that retraces the merging process in order to split the 
components at such points.  The basic underlying idea is that a segment’s identity is derived chiefly 
 
Figure 3.8: The moments of epiphany in Figure 3.23. 
In the digraph on the right, voices (i.e. progression chains) run horizontally, and the 
upper and lower halves represent the exposition and recapitulation respectively. 
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from the blend of segments it is ultimately derived from: to see how this is applied in practice, 
consider Figure 3.9. 
We might imagine 𝐴 and 𝑋, the two sources (Definition 3.2.9) in Figure 3.9, emitting blue 
and yellow dyes respectively along the derivation arrows.  Segments 𝐵, 𝐶, and 𝐷 would then be 
coloured blue to constitute one family (Definition 3.2.12) while 𝑋 would be the only member of 
the yellow family.  At 𝐸 and 𝐹 – points of strong epiphany that hence derive their identities from 
two families (𝐴’s and 𝑋’s) to create new identities dependent on both – the dyes would 
independently mix into the same shade of green; but since the process, and not just the result, of 
the blending is crucial, the two segments lie in separate sibling families (Corollary 3.2.15).  Contrast 
this with segment 𝐺, which has 𝐹 as its only parent and so lies in the same family as it: the rationale 
for separating 𝐸 and 𝐹 rests on the supposition that if they truly were members of the same family, 
one would have been derived from the other rather than both from first principles.  Segment 𝐻, a 
weak epiphany with parents in different families, marks the start of another new family: being the 
same shade of green as 𝐸 and 𝐹 (and 𝐺), 𝐻’s family is a sibling to theirs.  Finally, green meets blue 
again at 𝐼 to create a new family which is a different shade of green to the others; it is therefore a 
cousin (Corollary 3.2.15) to them. 
 The strong epiphanies 𝐸 and 𝐹 function in exactly the same way as described by Cone: 𝐴 
and 𝑋 begin the piece as independent motives, are repeated and varied to form two stable families, 
and then are brought together to create a relationship between them – or to emphasise through 
rhetoric a latent relationship that the two families had shared from the outset.  The weak epiphanies 
in Figure 3.9 function in quite different ways, however: 𝐻 and 𝐼, being parented by segments in 
different families, initiate new families, while 𝐷 does not.  The class of weak epiphanies is therefore 
 
Figure 3.9: An example of family formation. 
Families are marked with dotted circles, and siblings are the same shade.  Segments 𝐴 
and 𝑋 are sources, 𝐷 is a weak internal epiphany, 𝐸 and 𝐹 are strong epiphanies, and 
𝐻 and 𝐼 are weak external epiphanies (see also Figure 3.12). 
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subdivided into external and internal types (Definition 3.2.10) depending on whether or not the 
paths from a shared origin pass through different families or, equivalently, other strong or weak 
external epiphanies (compare the paths from 𝐵 to 𝐷 with the paths from 𝐴 or 𝑋 to 𝐻 or 𝐼; see also 
Lemma 3.2.11).  The crucial segments that initiate new families are therefore the sources, strong 
epiphanies, and weak external epiphanies: every family contains exactly one of these (Corollary 
3.2.14), and the families may be defined as the simple components of the digraph which removes 
every arrow pointing into a strong or weak external epiphany – the so-called inter-family arrows 
(Definition 3.2.12; see Figure 3.12 for an illustration).  This formulation is proved to arrive at the 
same set of families as the dyeing process outlined above (formalised as a labelling algorithm) in 
Theorem 3.2.13, and the colour of each family can be formalised as a profile vector 𝑃(𝑎) 
(Definition 3.2.9) which has as many components as there are sources and records the percentage 
of each segment derived from each source via an equally-weighted average of its parents’ profiles.  
For Figure 3.9, 𝑃(𝐴) = 𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐶) = 𝑃(𝐷) = (100,0), 𝑃(𝑋) = (0,100), 𝑃(𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐹) =
𝑃(𝐺) = 𝑃(𝐻) = (50,50), and 𝑃(𝐼) = (67,33).  It can be seen that siblings have identical profile 
vectors, and cousins have profile vectors with nonzero entries in the same places (Corollary 3.2.15); 
siblings are therefore also cousins.30 
 The algorithm labels families with ordinal numbers carrying no real significance beyond 
identification (they are assigned using a breadth-first search – see n. 46 – which fans out from each 
source, yielding an approximate ordering by first onset): families containing sources (source 
families) are prefixed with ‘S’, and others (composite families; see Corollary 3.2.14) have three-
part hierarchical labels dependent on cousin grouping, sibling grouping, and finally family (such that 
families sharing the same first part are cousins and those sharing the same second part are siblings).  
In Figure 3.9, 𝐴/𝐵/𝐶/𝐷 and 𝑋 might belong to S1 and S2 respectively, then 𝐸 to 1.1.1, 𝐹 and 𝐺 to 
1.1.2, 𝐻 to 1.1.3, and 𝐼 to 1.2.1.  In the Beethoven example, since every epiphany is a weak internal 
epiphany the five families S1 to S5 are identical to the connected components: as can be seen in 
Figure 3.23, the five sources are 000|C4 (which has 96 descendants), 015|C5 (which has 2), 
042|G4 (which has 9), 069|B4 (which has 4), and 081|C5 (which has 11).  The profile of each 
segment therefore consists of a single ‘100’ in one of the five slots of the vector; to reiterate, this is 
not because every segment is identical to a source, but because every segment is derivationally 
related to only one source.   
                                                     
30 The above concepts (sources, profiles, epiphanies, families, and inter-family arrows) are well-
defined only with respect to DAGs, so it is necessary in general to find a graph’s condensation 
(Definition 2.5) before applying these ideas.  The properties of each vertex in the condensation (i.e. 
strong component of the original) can then be translated to apply to the original digraph in a 
natural way (see Definition 3.2.9 to Corollary 3.2.15 for a formalisation).   As the first paragraph of 
this section suggests, it is reasonable to expect derivation digraphs to be nearly acyclic. 
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The claim made here is that families form relatively self-contained units in which 
differences between segments cannot be explained through appeals to any new or foreign ideas in 
the piece, but must derive from “internal” processes, logics, or narratives – which nevertheless 
retain the potential to be globally significant.  Each family is therefore roughly equivalent to a 
paradigmatic block: but here the awkwardness of oblique relationship is replaced by the concept of 
epiphany in a way that obviates Agawu’s concern regarding one-off hybrid segments (see Chapter 2 
at n. 90).  Having refined a basic formal categorisation based on derivational connection into one 
that accounts for rhetorical disposition (specifically through considering epiphany as a digraph 
structure), the next section examines the morphological relationships of musical material that hold 
between the segments themselves. 
Mathematical Formalisation 
A note on notation: In Section 3.1, motivic segments were understood as sets (of notes) and so 
were labelled using upper-case letters.  In the following, we are chiefly interested in segments as 
vertices, and so lower-case letters are used as labels; this does not change the definition of a motivic 
segment, but does allow upper-case letters to be used as labels for sets of segments (and of arrows).  
This convention is retained in Section 3.3, which brings together the set-focused and vertex-
focused perspectives.  The script letter ℳ is retained throughout for the set of all segments. 
Definition 3.2.1 
A derivation digraph 𝒟 = (ℳ, 𝐷) is a finite digraph taking ℳ as its set of vertices and including 
(𝑚1, 𝑚2) in its arrow set 𝐷 if and only if 𝑚1𝛿𝑚2. 
 
Definition 3.2.2 
A succession digraph 𝒮 = (ℳ, 𝑆) is a finite digraph taking ℳ as its set of vertices and including 
(𝑚1, 𝑚2) in its arrow set 𝑆 if and only if 𝑚1𝜎𝑚2. 
 
Definition 3.2.3 
Two segments 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 are said to be in a relationship of progression if 𝑚1𝛿𝑚2 and 𝑚1𝜎𝑚2.  
Taking the derivation and succession digraphs (ℳ, 𝐷) and (ℳ, 𝑆) respectively, the progression 
digraph is described as (ℳ, 𝐷 ∩ 𝑆). 
 
Corollary 3.2.4 
Derivation and succession digraphs have the following basic properties: 
i. Neither digraph may contain loops or parallel arrows. 
ii. Succession digraphs may not contain circuits. 
iii. Derivation digraphs may not contain isolated vertices (i.e. connected components of size 1). 
Proofs 
i. This follows directly from Definition 3.1.7, Definition 3.1.8, Definition 3.2.1, and Definition 
3.2.2. 
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ii. Since all onsets (and offsets) in a succession chain must be strictly increasing (i.e. 𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) <
𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) < ⋯ < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) – see Definition 3.1.8), it is necessarily true that 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) >
𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) and so 𝑚1 may not be a successor to 𝑚𝑛. 
iii. This follows directly from the second sentence of Definition 3.1.7.∎ 
 
Lemma 3.2.5 
A path of derivations 𝑚1𝑚2 … 𝑚𝑛 may always be converted to a circuit by adding (𝑚𝑛, 𝑚1) if, for 
all 𝑖 from 1 to 𝑛 − 1, and for some fixed value of 𝑘 from 1 to 𝑛 − 1: 
 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖) ≥ 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖+1) if 𝑖 < 𝑘; 
 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑘) ≥ 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑘+1); 
 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖) ≥ 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) if 𝑖 > 𝑘, 
and at least one of these relationships is not one of equality. 
Equivalently, if each (𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖+1) is configured with reference to Figure 3.2 as: 
 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, or 11 if 𝑖 < 𝑘; 
 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, or 11 if 𝑖 = 𝑘; 
 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, or 11 if 𝑖 > 𝑘, 
including at least one of the bold configurations, a circuit is always possible. 
Proof 
For each derivation arrow (𝑚1, 𝑚2), a number of relationships between its onsets and offsets must 
hold according to Definition 3.1.4, Definition 3.1.6, and Definition 3.1.7.  It is useful to model 
these as a digraph where (𝑥, 𝑦) represents 𝑥 > 𝑦 (Figure 3.10a), since any path within this digraph 
corresponds to a conclusion concerning the relation between its endpoints (for these purposes we 
may model equality as a double-headed arrow).  When each bold edge of Figure 3.10a is assigned a 
value of <, =, or >, the eleven configurations of Figure 3.2 arise as follows: 
 
 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚2) 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) = 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚2) 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) > 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚2) 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) 1/2/10 4 8 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) = 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) 7 3 6 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) 9 5 11 
 
If a > or = relationship is assigned to at least one of the bold edges, the dashed edge will always 
point (𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2)) since there will be a path from 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) to 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) via 𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) or 
𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚2) (for example: 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚1) = 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) ⇒ 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2)).  If both bold 
edges are assigned a < relation, then the dashed edge remains unspecified, and can take any of the 
three relation values corresponding to configurations 1, 2, and 10 respectively.  (If we remove the 
requirement of Definition 3.1.7 – i.e. the arrow (𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚2), 𝑜𝑛(𝑚1)) – we find that a symmetrical 
situation holds for two > relations, such that the bottom-right cell of the table would hold three 
configurations: 11, and configurations akin to 2 and 1 with the letters 𝐴 and 𝐵 reversed.) 
Taking the digraph model above and applying it repeatedly to build a path of derivations, the goal 
of the proof is to understand what conditions necessarily lead to the diagonal arrow 
(𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛)) of Figure 3.10b, permitting the derivation 𝑚𝑛𝛿𝑚1 and thereby closing the 
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circuit.  Firstly, note that passing from the top to the bottom of the figure is only possible if 
(𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖), 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖−1)) is included as an arrow for some 𝑖, and that this in turn is only possible if 
𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖−1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖) and 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖−1) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖).  This means that the start of the downwards 
arrow, 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖), is unreachable from 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), and therefore that any path from 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) to 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) must pass from the bottom half to the upper half of the figure exactly once. 
The most general way to do this is via one of the dashed arrows: any path including a vertical arrow 
followed or preceded by a left-to-right arrow can be shortened to one including a left-to-right 
diagonal arrow (as the discussion of the table of configurations above shows), and any path 
including a bottom-right-to-top-left diagonal arrow can be shortened to one including a vertical 
arrow (𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖)𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖−1)𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖) becomes 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖)𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖)).  Since 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) must be strictly 
greater than 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), at least one of the arrows in the path must not be double-headed.  The 
paths so described (starting with a path of offsets, then jumping upwards to a path of onsets, even 
if this jump is the first or last move) are formalised as stated in the theorem, and can be rephrased 
in terms of configuration numbers by considering the inequalities in relation to the table of 
configurations above.∎ 
(Note that the lack of a path between 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) and 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) does not imply that 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) ≤
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛), only that the relation 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) does not follow as a direct consequence of 
the pattern of onsets and offsets.  This is analogous to the dashed-arrow relationship between 
𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) and 𝑜𝑛(𝑚2) above, since it is fixed under certain onset–offset patterns, but may vary 
under others.) 
 
Theorem 3.2.6 
Consider the following statements concerning the derivation circuit 𝑚1 … 𝑚𝑛𝑚1 and some 𝑖 ≥ 1: 
A. The circuit is not constructed as described in Lemma 3.2.5. 
B. (𝑚𝑖 , 𝑚𝑖+1) is configured as 1. 
C. (𝑚ℎ , 𝑚ℎ+1) is configured as 2, 7, 9 or 10 and for some 𝑖 > ℎ ≥ 1, (𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖+1) is 
configured as 2, 4, 8, or 10. 
D. 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) > 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1). 
E. 𝑖 < 𝑛 − 1 and for some 𝑗 > 𝑖, (𝑚𝑗, 𝑚𝑗+1) is configured as 5, 9, or 11 such that 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑗+1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1). 
Then D ⇒ A ⇔ B or C, and D ⇒ E.  Note that this means that D can only, but does not always, 
hold when A is true. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Modelling onset–offset inequalities as digraphs in the proof of Lemma 3.2.5. 
Bold edges may point in either (or both) direction(s), and in some circumstances determine 
the dashed arrows’ orientations.  Dotted edges and arrows represent a repeating structure. 
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Proofs 
To prove that D ⇒ A it is sufficient to prove that ¬A ⇒ ¬D.  If the circuit is constructed as in 
Lemma 3.2.5 (i.e. ¬A), then there is a path between 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) and 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛).  If 𝑖 + 1 > 𝑘 then 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) must be part of this path, whereas if 𝑖 + 1 ≤ 𝑘 then 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖+1) must be part of the 
path.  But 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚𝑖+1) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1), so a path can always be found from 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) to 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1).  
This path may be comprised entirely of double-headed arrows without violating Lemma 3.2.5 
(provided 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑝) > 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑝+1) for some 𝑝, 𝑖 + 1 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑛), so 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) ≥ 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) (i.e. ¬D). 
It is easy to check that B and C conflict with the configurations outlined in the statement of Lemma 
3.2.5, so B or C ⇒ A. 
Since Lemma 3.2.5 describes all the situations in which a path of length >1 between 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) and 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) (but not vice-versa) arises, if we assume A to be true, then no such path exists.  This 
means that 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚ℎ) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚ℎ+1) for some ℎ, and either 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚ℎ) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚ℎ+1) or 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖) <
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) for some 𝑖 > ℎ.  In the first of these cases, (𝑚ℎ , 𝑚ℎ+1) must be arranged in 
configuration 1; in the second, (𝑚ℎ, 𝑚ℎ+1) must be arranged in configuration 2, 10, 7, or 9 whilst 
(𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖+1) must be arranged in 1, 2, 10, 4, or 8.  So A ⇒ B or C. 
For a circuit to form, 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), so if D is true then 𝑖 ≠ 𝑛 − 1.  Moreover, if 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1) > 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1), then 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑖+1), which means that 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑗+1) < 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑗) for 
some 𝑗, 𝑖 < 𝑗 < 𝑛.  The arrow (𝑚𝑗, 𝑚𝑗+1) therefore needs to be configured as 5, 9, or 11 with 
𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑗+1) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1) to ensure that 𝑜𝑛(𝑚𝑛) < 𝑜𝑓𝑓(𝑚1).  So D ⇒ E.∎ 
 
Definition 3.2.7 
For distinct 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 ∈ ℳ, two derivation arrows (𝑎, 𝑐) and (𝑏, 𝑑) are said to be thematically 
joined if (𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑐, 𝑑) ∈ 𝑆 or (𝑏, 𝑎), (𝑑, 𝑐) ∈ 𝑆. 
Let 𝐷 be the vertices of a graph in which the set of edges 𝐽 consists precisely of those pairs which 
are thematically joined, then define: 
 𝒥1 as the set of all paths in (𝐷, 𝐽) between any pair 𝑎1 = (𝑥2, 𝑥1) and 𝑎2 = (𝑥1, 𝑥0) 
 chosen such that 𝑎1 is not connected to (𝑥3, 𝑥2) for any 𝑥3; 
 𝐽1 as the set of all edges {𝑏, 𝑎2} concluding paths in 𝒥1; and 
 𝐽1
− as the set of all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐽1 such that there is no 𝑏 ∈ 𝐽1 satisfying, ∀𝑃 ∈ 𝒥1, 𝑎 ∈ 𝑃 ⇒ 𝑏 ∈ 𝑃 
 but 𝑏 ∈ 𝑃 ⇏ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑃. 
If 𝐽𝑖
− is obtained from (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑖−1
𝑟=1 ) in a similar way, and 𝑛 is the largest value of 𝑖 for which 
𝐽𝑖
− ≠ ∅, then the thematic repetitions in the piece are defined by the connected components of 
(𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ) having two or more vertices.  The initial points of the 𝐷-arrows constitute the first 
theme ℳ1 of each component, and the terminal points of the 𝐷-arrows constitute the second 
theme ℳ2 (see Figure 3.11). 
If the earliest onset of ℳ1 occurs before the latest offset of ℳ2, the themes are simultaneous.  If 
a segment with an earliest onset in ℳ2 is a successor to a segment with a latest offset in ℳ1, the 
thematic repetition is immediate.  If the 𝐷-arrows define a bijection between ℳ1 and ℳ2, then 
the themes are isomorphic. 
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Theorem 3.2.8 
If 𝐷′ is the vertex set of a connected component of (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ), then: 
i. ℳ1 and ℳ2 form connected regions of 𝒮; 
ii. 𝐷′ ⊆ {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐷|𝑎 ∈ ℳ1, 𝑏 ∈ ℳ2}; 
iii. (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ) contains no complete path from any 𝒥𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛; 
iv. ℳ1 ∩ ℳ2 ≠ ∅ if and only if some subset of 𝐷′ forms a circuit in 𝒟; in this case, the 
thematic repetition is said to be circular. 
Proofs 
i. If two 𝐷-arrows are joined by an edge in (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ), then by definition their initial 
points are joined by an arrow in 𝒮.  Since 𝐷′ is connected in (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ), the set of 
initial points in 𝐷′ (i.e. ℳ1) must be simply connected in 𝒮.  A similar argument holds for 
ℳ2. 
ii. Clearly every member of 𝐷′ points from ℳ1 to ℳ2 by definition.  But we cannot, in general, 
assume the converse (and therefore that the sets are always equal) since not every arrow that 
points from ℳ1 to ℳ2 is thematically joined to another. 
iii. We seek to prove that every path in 𝒥𝑖 contains at least one edge from 𝐽𝑖
− for a given 𝑖; from 
this it follows that (𝐷, 𝐽\𝐽𝑖
−) cannot contain any of the paths from 𝒥𝑖, and therefore that 
statement iii is true. 
Any path in 𝒥𝑖 must contain a member of 𝐽𝑖 by definition so assume, aiming for a 
contradiction, that some 𝑃 ∈ 𝒥𝑖 contains some 𝑎 ∈ 𝐽𝑖\𝐽𝑖
− but no 𝑎′ ∈ 𝐽𝑖
−.  Since 𝐽𝑖\𝐽𝑖
− may 
be defined as the set of all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 such that there is some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 appearing in all the same 
paths (in 𝒥𝑖) as 𝑎 (but in at least one without 𝑎), 𝑏 ∈ 𝑃.  So either  𝑏 ∈ 𝐽𝑖
− (a contradiction) 
or 𝑏 ∈ 𝐽𝑖\𝐽𝑖
− and there exists some 𝑐 appearing in all the same paths as 𝑏 but not vice-versa 
(we know that 𝑎 ≠ 𝑐 since 𝑏 appears in at least one path without 𝑎).  Iterating this argument 
we reach an inevitable contradiction: since 𝐷 is finite and (𝐷, 𝐽) is not a multigraph, 𝐽𝑖 must 
be finite, and so every path in 𝒥𝑖 contains at least one edge from 𝐽𝑖
−. 
iv. The latter statement implies the former since any vertex in a circuit is both an initial and a 
terminal point: if (𝑥2, 𝑥1), (𝑥1, 𝑥0) ∈ 𝐷′, then 𝑥1 ∈ ℳ1 ∩ ℳ2. 
Conversely, if ℳ1 ∩ ℳ2 ≠ ∅ then there must be some vertex 𝑥1 ∈ ℳ which is both an 
initial and terminal point in 𝐷′ (i.e. (𝑥2, 𝑥1), (𝑥1, 𝑥0) ∈ 𝐷′).  There must also be some vertex 
𝑥3 ∈ ℳ such that (𝑥3, 𝑥2) ∈ 𝐷′: otherwise, (𝑥2, 𝑥1) and (𝑥1, 𝑥0) would satisfy the 
conditions for 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 respectively in Definition 3.2.7, and would hence be disconnected 
in (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑛
𝑟=1 ) (as proved in part iii above).  Repeating this argument, we find that 
(𝑥4, 𝑥3), (𝑥5, 𝑥4), … ∈ 𝐷′: but since ℳ is finite, one of the 𝑥𝑖 must be repeated, thereby 
creating a circuit of 𝐷-arrows.∎ 
 
Some of the main concepts from Definition 3.2.7 and Theorem 3.2.8 are illustrated in 
Figure 3.11.  The patterns of derivation (solid arrows) and succession (dashed arrows) shown in the 
first column are converted to (𝐷, 𝐽) graphs in the next: in row a, for example, the thematically 
joined pairs of derivation arrows (𝑎, 𝑐), (𝑏, 𝑑) and (𝑎′, 𝑐), (𝑏, 𝑑) become edge-joined pairs of 
vertices {𝑎𝑐, 𝑏𝑑} and {𝑎′𝑐, 𝑏𝑑} (the shared vertex 𝑐 makes the resultant themes non-isomorphic).  
Row a contains a pair of arrows that satisfy the conditions for 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 in Definition 3.2.7, and so 
the path between them in (𝐷, 𝐽) is a member of 𝒥1 (dashed in the diagram) and its final edge 
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(pointing into 𝑎2) is a member of 𝐽1 (bold in the diagram).  As it is the only member of 𝐽1, it is also 
a member of 𝐽1
−, and so is removed from the graph to form (𝐷, 𝐽\𝐽1
−): as this contains no 𝑎1, 𝑎2 
pairs, it defines a thematic repetition which gives rise to ℳ1 (black vertices) and ℳ2 (white 
vertices) in the final column (which, for clarity, omits all succession arrows from the first column 
that do not point between members of the same theme). 
 Row b is an example of immediate thematic repetition: the twelve vertices in the first 
column form a single succession chain in which each segment is derived from the one occurring 
three places before.  There are three possible 𝑎1, 𝑎2 pairs (the second and third are labelled with 𝑏 
and 𝑐), and again the paths between them (i.e. 𝑎1 to 𝑎2, 𝑏1 to 𝑏2, and 𝑐1 to 𝑐2) are shown dashed 
with the final edges in bold.  This time, however, the paths overlap, and it can be checked that 
{𝑐1, 𝑎2} is the only edge in 𝐽1
− (since, for example, {𝑎2, 𝑏2} appears in the 𝑏 and 𝑐 paths but so does 
{𝑐1, 𝑎2}, which also appears without {𝑎2, 𝑏2} in the 𝑎 path).  The graph (𝐷, 𝐽\𝐽1
−) opens up the 
second layer so the process can be repeated: this could not have been done in stage one since 𝑎1 in 
stage two functions as 𝑎2 in stage one.  Stage three – the graph (𝐷, 𝐽\𝐽1
− ∪ 𝐽2
−) – is the final stage, 
giving rise to the three thematic repetitions shown in the third column.  Note that the white and 
grey themes each appear in two thematic repetitions, first as ℳ2 and then as ℳ1, analogous to 𝐵 
 
Figure 3.11: Some examples illustrating Definition 3.2.7 and Theorem 3.2.8. 
The first column shows three different arrangements of derivation (solid) and succession 
(dashed) arrows; the second column shows the successive (𝐷, 𝐽\ ⋃ 𝐽𝑟
−𝑖−1
𝑟=1 ) graphs for each 
of these (with edges in 𝒥𝑖 paths dashed and members of 𝐽𝑖 bold); and the third column 
shows the resulting divisions of the original vertices into themes.  See text following 
Theorem 3.2.8 for further explanation. 
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and 𝐶 in the derivation chain 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷.  Whilst the above process seems to be a laborious 
way to arrive at a fairly instinctive partition of the twelve segments into themes (that produced by 
starting at the beginning of the chain and including derivation arrows until a segment from ℳ2 
appears in ℳ1), it has the advantage that it is generalisable to other situations – not least those 
portrayed in rows a and c, but also including variations of row b in which, for example, the 
succession order of 𝑎1 and 𝑏1 is reversed. 
 Row c gives an example of a circular thematic repetition, and this can be resolved into 
disjoint themes in two ways as shown in the third column.  Although the structure is similar to that 
shown in row a, the crucial difference is that the symmetry created by the circuit does not allow any 
one of its arrows to be prioritised for inclusion: 𝒥1 is therefore empty here.  Choosing to break the 
circuit by removing one of its four arrows leads to one of the two alternative interpretations as 
shown in the third column; more complex arrangements than c featuring several circuits sharing 
edges and vertices yield a wider range of interpretations, some of which cannot be fixed through 
the removal of a single arrow. 
Definition 3.2.9 
A vertex of 𝒟∗ (see Definition 2.5) is a source if it has indegree 0; the set of all sources in a given 
𝒟∗is denoted 𝑆∗ = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑟}. 
The profile of each 𝑠𝑖, 𝑃(𝑠𝑖), is given by an 𝑟-component vector with an entry of 100 in the 𝑖th 
position and 0s everywhere else.  If the 𝑛 parents of a given vertex 𝑎 are listed arbitrarily as 
𝑚1, 𝑚2, … , 𝑚𝑛, then the profile of each  𝑎 ∈ ℳ
∗ is given by 𝑃(𝑎) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑃(𝑚𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  If 𝑚 ∈ ℳ 
is in strong component 𝑚∗ then 𝑃(𝑚) = 𝑃(𝑚∗). 
 
Definition 3.2.10 
Any segment 𝑚1 ∈ ℳ
∗ with 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝒟∗(𝑚1) ≥ 2 is a moment of epiphany.  If there exists a vertex 
𝑚0 ∈ ℳ
∗ such that every parent of 𝑚1 is reachable from 𝑚0 then 𝑚1 is a weak epiphany; 
otherwise, it is a strong epiphany.  If  𝑚1 is a weak epiphany, then it is categorised as external if 
at least one of the vertices on the paths from 𝑚0 to 𝑚1 is a strong epiphany or weak external 
epiphany; otherwise, it is categorised as internal. 
 
Lemma 3.2.11 
If a condensed derivation digraph contains a weak external epiphany, then it must contain at least 
one strong epiphany. 
Proof 
Assume, for a contradiction, that 𝒟∗ contains at least one weak external epiphany and no strong 
epiphanies.  Then for a given weak external epiphany 𝑤1, Definition 3.2.10 states that there must 
be a path leading from some other weak external epiphany 𝑤2 to 𝑤1, and so in turn from 𝑤3 to 
𝑤2, 𝑤4 to 𝑤3, and so on.  Since derivation digraphs must be finite, at least one of the 𝑤𝑖 must be 
repeated in this list, say as 𝑤𝑖+𝑘; but then we have a circuit 𝑤𝑖+𝑘𝑤𝑖+𝑘−1 … 𝑤𝑖+1𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖+𝑘, thus 
contradicting the definition of 𝒟∗ as a condensation (Proposition 2.6iii).  Therefore, 𝒟∗ must 
contain at least one strong epiphany.∎ 
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Definition 3.2.12 
Let 𝐸∗ ⊂ ℳ∗ be the set of all strong and weak external epiphanies in 𝒟∗, and let 𝐼∗ be the set of 
arrows which point into 𝐸∗ (i.e. 𝐼∗ = {(𝑚1, 𝑚2) ∈ 𝐷
∗|𝑚2 ∈ 𝐸
∗}).  Then the families of 𝒟∗ are 
the simple components of the digraph (ℳ∗, 𝐷∗ − 𝐼∗) (see Figure 3.12 for an example). 
If 𝑚𝑖 ∈ ℳ is in strong component 𝑚𝑖
∗, then 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 are members of the same family in 𝒟 if 
and only if 𝑚1
∗ and 𝑚2
∗  are members of the same family (or are equal) in 𝒟∗.  Those arrows in 𝐷 
whose endpoints lie in different families are known as inter-family arrows, the set of which is 
denoted 𝐼. 
 
Theorem 3.2.13 
The following labelling process partitions the vertex set of 𝒟∗ into families: 
1. Label each source with its own name. 
2. Label every vertex that is not a source only when all of its parents have been labelled: 
a. If its parents all have the same label, assign this label to the vertex. 
b. Otherwise, label the vertex with its own name. 
3. Repeat step 2 until all vertices have been labelled. 
Proof 
Let 𝒟∗ be labelled as described above, and denote the label of vertex 𝑎 as 𝑙(𝑎).  First we note 
that the proposed labelling is indeed possible (and partitions the vertices) since a DAG induces a 
partial ordering on its vertices: if we tried to run the process on 𝒟, which in general may contain 
circuits, we would reach a stalemate at every strongly connected component while each vertex in 
each circuit waits for its parent to be labelled.  We also note that, since any vertex 𝑎 may only 
have label 𝑥 if all of its parents have label 𝑥 (or if 𝑎 = 𝑥), the collections of vertices all having the 
 
𝓓 = (𝓜, 𝑫) 𝓓∗ = (𝓜∗, 𝑫∗) (𝓜∗, 𝑫∗ − 𝑰∗) 
Figure 3.12: The condensation and partitioning into families of a derivation digraph. 
The first digraph features two strongly connected components (in dotted circles), which 
are shrunk to single vertices in the other two digraphs.  The categorisation of epiphanies 
in the second digraph (coloured grey, with sources in black) induces the partition into 
families seen in the third; the family categorisation can then be extended back into the 
original vertex set by re-expanding the strongly connected components. 
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same label must be (simply) connected regions of 𝒟∗.  In other words, if 𝑎 and 𝑏 both have label 
𝑥, then there must exist paths from 𝑥 to 𝑎 and 𝑥 to 𝑏 in which every vertex also has label 𝑥.  
Note that this is a stricter condition than simple connectivity (since the 𝑥–𝑎  and 𝑥–𝑏 paths must 
be directed), but a looser condition than weak connectivity (since 𝑎 and 𝑏 need not be joined by a 
directed path in either direction, unless 𝑥 = 𝑎 or 𝑥 = 𝑏). 
We now seek to prove that the set of arrows whose endpoints are given non-identical labels are 
precisely those arrows that make up 𝐼∗.  From this it follows directly that the arrows in 𝐷∗ − 𝐼∗ 
are precisely those arrows of 𝐷∗ that point between identical labels, and hence that the connected 
regions defined by label equality coincide exactly with the components of (ℳ∗, 𝐷∗ − 𝐼∗) (i.e. the 
families). 
Consider an arrow (𝑎, 𝑏) in which 𝑙(𝑎) ≠ 𝑙(𝑏).  Clearly 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝒟∗(𝑏) ≥ 2 (since if 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝒟∗(𝑏) = 1, 𝑏 
would have inherited 𝑎’s label), so 𝑏 is a moment of epiphany.  In addition, we know that at least 
one other parent of 𝑏, say 𝑎′, does not have label 𝑙(𝑎) (as otherwise 𝑏 would again inherit 𝑙(𝑎)), 
and therefore that ∄𝑥 such that there are label-preserving paths from 𝑥 to 𝑎 and 𝑥 to 𝑎′.  If ∄𝑥 
such that there are any paths from 𝑥 to 𝑎 and 𝑥 to 𝑎′, then 𝑏 is a strong epiphany.  If ∃𝑥 such that 
non-label-preserving paths exist from 𝑥 to 𝑎 and 𝑎′, then there must be at least one non-label-
preserving arrow in these paths, and therefore at least one other 𝑏-like epiphany.  This reasoning 
can be applied recursively until, as in the proof of Lemma 3.2.11, we must reach a strong 
epiphany; retracing our steps, the other 𝑏-like epiphanies can then be classified as weak external.  
Arrows with non-identically labelled endpoints are therefore members of 𝐼∗. 
A similar argument running in the opposite direction shows that strong and weak external 
epiphanies necessarily have different labels to their parents.  Consider a strong epiphany 𝑏 with 
parents 𝑎 and 𝑎′; by definition, there is no vertex 𝑥 such that paths to 𝑏 via both 𝑎 and 𝑎′ exist, 
so 𝑎 and 𝑎′ must have different labels to each other and hence to 𝑏.  Now if a digraph contains at 
least one weak external epiphany then, by Lemma 3.2.11, the digraph must contain a weak 
external epiphany 𝑏 with paths 𝑥 … 𝑎𝑏 and 𝑥 … 𝑎′𝑏 such that at least one of these vertices is a 
strong epiphany.  Since strong epiphanies necessitate a label change, this means that 𝑏 cannot 
have the same label as both 𝑎 and 𝑎′, and therefore that all other weak external epiphanies in the 
digraph necessitate label changes.  So all the members of 𝐸∗ have different labels to their parents, 
and hence all members of 𝐼∗ are non-label-preserving arrows.  Since we have proved above that 
all non-label-preserving arrows are members of 𝐼∗, it follows that the two sets are equal.∎ 
 
Corollary 3.2.14 
Every family contains exactly one member of 𝑆∗ ∪ 𝐸∗.  If it contains a member of 𝑆∗, it is a 
source family; otherwise, it is a composite family. 
Proof 
When the vertices of 𝒟∗ are labelled as described in Theorem 3.2.13, all the members of a single 
family are given the same label.  Moreover, each vertex may only be labelled with its own name or 
that of its parents (if they all share the same label); as the proof of Theorem 3.2.13 shows, those 
vertices in the former category are precisely the sources and the strong and weak external 
epiphanies.  If two vertices in the same family are labelled with their own names, then clearly not 
every vertex in the family can have the same label, giving rise to a contradiction.∎ 
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Corollary 3.2.15 
Members of the same family always have the same profile, but segments with the same profile do 
not always belong to the same family.   
Distinct families with identical profiles are known as siblings; families ultimately derived from 
the same sources (i.e. with nonzero entries in the same components of the profile vector) are 
known as cousins. 
Proof 
Definition 3.2.9 and Theorem 3.2.13 show that there is a certain correspondence between 
assigning profiles and assigning labels (and therefore families): each source is assigned a brand 
new value of its own, and a profile/label is passed from parent to child if all of the other parents 
of the same child have the same profile/label.  However, while this is the only way to pass a label 
from parent to child, it is not the only way to pass a profile from parent to child since a vertex 
may share a profile with only one of its parents (for example if their profiles are (50,50), (75,25), 
and (25,75)).  In addition, two vertices with the same profile need not be connected via profile-
preserving paths: a vertex with parent profiles (75,25) and (25,75) will have profile (50,50), as will 
other vertices with parent profiles (100,0) and (0,100).  Label equivalence is thus a stricter form of 
profile equivalence.∎ 
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3.3 Morphology 
The discussion up to this point has focused on the structural, graph-theoretic relationships that 
hold between motivic segments modelled as vertices, making use of the derivation and succession 
(and occasionally segment onset and offset) information from the analytical input.  The final section 
of this chapter now looks “inside” the vertices to examine how the morphological characteristics of 
pitch and rhythm inflect the structure of the digraph.  To ignore this crucial aspect would be long-
sighted, but it is worth reiterating that morphology is of interest to the present model only insofar 
as it can be used to enrich a structural digraph interpretation.  The ideas outlined in this section are 
not, therefore, proposed as solutions to the more general problems of melodic similarity (outlined 
in Section 2.3), not least because motivic analysis and melodic similarity matching are not identical 
goals (although they are, of course, related), but also because their theory-discarding (see Section 
1.8) emphasis on unambiguous equivalence excludes certain more context-dependent relationships 
(such as patterns amongst non-contiguous notes).  The algorithm outputs a relatively small set of 
confidently identified relationships rather than a potentially enormous set of possible ones: as the 
following makes clear, however, the former can be used to establish indirect connections that 
equate, in many cases, to instances of the latter. 
 The approach taken here is also atypical when set alongside models of melodic pattern-
matching in that, formally speaking, segmentation and similarity assessment are kept separate rather 
than existing in a symbiotic mutual dependence (although they do still implicitly influence each 
other here).  The morphological concepts introduced are intended, then, to organise the members 
of ℳ into a logical, abstract, and atemporal structure (Cone’s second reading – see Section 2.3, 
point six), which can then be used as an orienting framework to chart the piece’s unfolding in time 
(Cone’s third reading).  Metaphors that treat a piece of music as a path through an abstracted space 
are nothing new in music theory, from the major scale and the circle of fifths to the transformation 
network of pitch-class sets used in Lewin’s analysis of Stockhausen’s Klavierstück III and the four-
dimensional cube used by Tymoczko in his analysis of two piano pieces by Chopin.31  The principal 
difference between these harmonic spaces and the motivic ones outlined here is that the latter are 
piece-specific and therefore inherently incomplete: like Mendeleev’s periodic table, they organise 
known elements into a logical arrangement, leaving appropriate gaps for those whose existence is 
theoretical. 
                                                     
31 Lewin, Musical Form and Transformation, pp. 16–67 (see, in particular, Examples 2.5 and 2.6 on pp. 
34 and 38–39); Tymoczko, A Geometry of Music, pp. 284–93.  Tymoczko reaches the fascinating 
conclusion that ‘Chopin’s F minor Mazurka [Op. 68, No. 4] and E minor Prelude [Op. 28, No. 4] 
are related by way of a tritone substitution’ (p. 291, Figure 8.5.11). 
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 Given two motivic segments of the same size, 𝐴 and 𝐵, we begin by defining three 
equivalence relations that can hold between them (Definition 3.3.1 to Definition 3.3.3).32  If the 
sequence of directed semitone intervals between consecutive notes in 𝐴 matches the corresponding 
sequence in 𝐵 (or, equivalently, if 𝐴 and 𝐵 are exact transpositions of each other when note spelling 
is ignored), then 𝐴 and 𝐵 are chromatically equivalent or C-equivalent, written 𝐴 ∼𝐶 𝐵.  If the 
sequences of diatonic intervals (i.e. intervals between letter names – up a third, down a fourth, and 
so on) in 𝐴 and 𝐵 are identical, then 𝐴 is diatonically equivalent or D-equivalent to 𝐵: 𝐴 ∼𝐷 𝐵.33  
Finally, if the time-points of 𝐴 can be mapped to the time-points of 𝐵 by adding a constant integer 
to each, and if the pattern of time signatures across the bars they occupy is the same, then they are 
rhythmically equivalent or R-equivalent, 𝐴 ∼𝑅 𝐵 (this definition is recast in terms of the time-line 
helix of Definition 3.1.3 in Definition 3.3.3 and Theorem 3.3.4).  Instead of separately listing each 
type of equivalence that holds between a given pair, the letters C, D, and R can be combined for 
the sake of brevity: in particular, if a pair is CDR-equivalent, 𝐴 ∼𝐶𝐷𝑅 𝐵, then this is often referred 
to simply as equivalence.  Another particularly pertinent type of composite equivalence, CD-
equivalence, occurs when a pair of segments has the same sequence of spelled pitch intervals (e.g. 
up a major third, down a minor ninth, repeated perfect unison). 
 In the language of Section 2.3, point three, these are function-based categorisations by 
symmetry and so cannot be used to measure distance.34  Each type of equivalence is necessarily 
transitive with itself (from the definition of an equivalence relation), so the statements 033|C3 ∼𝐷𝑅 
034|Db3 and 034|Db3 ∼𝐷𝑅 137|Bb2 together imply that 033|C3 ∼𝐷𝑅 137|Bb2.  Note, however, 
that like the three Neo-Riemannian transformations P, L, and R, the different types of equivalence 
are not transitive with each other as they each fix different dimensions while the others move freely: 
if 130|F5 ∼𝐷 131|G5 and 131|G5 ∼𝐶𝐷 131|A5, then while we can safely conclude that 130|F5 
∼𝐷 131|A5, we must observe directly that, in addition, 130|F5 ∼𝑅 131|A5 (and therefore that 
130|F5 ∼𝐷𝑅 131|A5). 
 Musically, these equivalence relations correspond to the Schoenbergian description of 
variation as ‘changing some […] features and preserving some [others]’: once an identical pattern 
has been identified in one dimension (say, rhythm), it is assumed that the others may vary quite 
                                                     
32 See Section 2.3, point four, for the definition of an equivalence relation. 
33 The assumption here is that note spelling functions as an adequate indicator of scale degree. 
34 Recall that a symmetry is a function that preserves a certain set of features.  We can define 
equivalence relations and equivalence classes either in terms of the common features that the class 
members share (e.g. pitch-integer, letter-name, or inter-onset intervals) or in terms of the functions 
that preserve those features (e.g. ‘𝐴 is equivalent to all those segments that can be reached by a 
chromatic/diatonic/rhythmic transposition’).  Therefore, even though some of the definitions 
above are expressed in terms of shared features, they are still essentially function-based (rather than 
proximity-based). 
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widely without disintegrating the proposed similarity relationship.35  The concept has been applied 
to the problem of motivic pattern extraction by Lartillot and Toiviainen, who outline a model based 
on ‘exact matching along multiple musical dimensions’ rather than on allowing a fuzzy tolerance in 
every dimension at once: the resultant so-called ‘heterogeneous patterns’ switch between levels of 
specificity (for example, “an ascending major sixth ending on a strong beat followed by three 
quavers descending by second and two notes ascending to an A in any octave”) and form a 
hierarchy based on shared characteristics (so the example given above would be a subclass of the 
more general “up–down–down–down–up–up”).36  The present model requires exact complete 
matching in one dimension, but the principle of holding certain elements constant while others vary 
freely is the same in both cases. 
 In addition to the three basic equivalence relations (and the four composite ones), the 
symmetric but intransitive relation of embedding, or E-relation, is defined between segments of 
different sizes: 𝐴~𝐸𝐵 if 𝐴 is CDR-equivalent to a subsegment of 𝐵 or if 𝐵 is CDR-equivalent to a 
subsegment of 𝐴 (Definition 3.3.5; certain conditions create transitive E-relations as specified in 
Corollary 3.3.7ii).  Not only does this notion extend the concept of exact matching plus free 
variation to allow comparison between motives of different sizes, but it does so in a way that keeps 
a check on the tendency of mathematical and computational approaches to uncover large numbers 
of matches that are often judged analytically insignificant.37  Shorter segments, for example, have a 
propensity to appear everywhere – notice that 071|A4 is contained in 117|E5 (as E–F) – but this 
problem would be compounded if individual C-, D-, and R-embedding were permitted among 
subsegments: in that case, 071|A4 would be related to every segment containing an ascending 
semitone, ascending second, or second–third beat crotchet rhythm. 
 Certain C-, D-, or R-embeddings are analytically significant (for example, it is unsatisfactory 
that segments 000|C4 and 003|G4 are morphologically unrelated) and the concept of indirect 
relation through embedding proves to be a powerful analytical tool for the identification of such 
relationships.  To explore the indirect connections produced by an intransitive relation, a graph-
theoretic model naturally suggests itself; again, however, the temptation to treat this graph as a 
means to measure distance must be avoided.  Taking ℳ as the set of vertices, the set of edges is 
defined as the union of four smaller sets corresponding to C-, D-, R-, and E-relation respectively 
                                                     
35 Schoenberg, Fundamentals, p. 8; he goes on to state explicitly (cf. Chapter 2, n. 23 above) that 
‘[p]reservation of rhythmic features effectively produces coherence’. 
36 See Lartillot and Toiviainen, p. 286; see also Olivier Lartillot, ‘Taxonomic Categorisation of 
Motivic Patterns’, in Discussion Forum 4B, ed. by Toiviainen, pp. 25–46 for more on pattern 
representation and hierarchical description. 
37 See, for example, Marsden, ‘Position Paper’, p. 149: ‘Commonly, […] mathematical and 
computational approaches find many more motives and many more relationships between 
fragments than traditional motivic analysis.’ 
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(Definition 3.3.6): taking the disjoint union produces the type multigraph (in which a CD-related 
pair, for example, is joined by both a C-edge and a D-edge), whereas taking the usual union 
produces the type graph (in which a CD-related pair is joined by a CD-edge).  In the subgraphs of 
the type multigraph formed by including all the edges of one equivalence relation (say, all the C-
edges, or all the pairs joined by both C- and D-edges) the connected components will be complete 
graphs (Definition 2.1) since equivalence relations are transitive: note that this is not always the case 
in the type graph since some C-equivalent pairs, for instance, may be joined instead by CD-, CR-, 
or CDR-edges (Corollary 3.3.7i).  The only subgraph of the type graph guaranteed to produce 
complete connected components is that formed from the set of CDR-edges, and any two vertices 
in one of these components will stand in exactly the same C-, D-, R-, and E-relationships to all the 
other vertices in the graph (Corollary 3.3.7i and iii). 
Figure 3.24 shows the full type graph for Figure 3.22.  The large number of edges (599 as 
opposed to the derivation graph’s 126 arrows) makes the graph difficult to read directly, but the 
difference in general shape when compared to Figure 3.23 is clear: note, in particular, the clusters of 
vertices forming complete graphs.38  It is the connections between these clusters (especially via E-
edges) that establish intransitive and indirect links: in particular, with reference to the example cited 
above, segment 101|F4 (the start of the recapitulation) is both R-equivalent to 003|G4 and 
embedded in 000|C4.  It can be seen from Figure 3.24 that certain vertices create “bottlenecks” in 
the graph and are therefore crucial in establishing indirect links.  Calculating a quantity known as 
betweenness centrality for each vertex, 𝑥, is one way to find these bottlenecks: included as a built-in 
feature of NodeXL, this measure looks at all the shortest paths between every pair of vertices in the 
graph and counts how many include 𝑥.  For the Beethoven example, the most central vertex is 
012|Bb4, followed by the CDR-equivalent two-note minor second figures 082|F5 and 092|F6, and 
then by the CDR-equivalent 095|Ab4, 096|Eb6, and 100|C6 (as suggested by Corollary 3.3.7iii, 
CDR-equivalent segments must have identical betweenness centralities).  These segments, of which 
the turn figure 095|Ab4 is particularly analytically salient, isolate as independent gestalten the 
shared subsegments of, for example, 000|C4, 004|C5, 011|Eb5, 052|Bb4, 053|Db5, and 115|G5 
(all of which are unrelated directly to each other): they therefore function like epiphanies in that 
they confirm concretely a morphological relationship that would otherwise remain theoretical. 
                                                     
38 As implied above, complete subgraphs of the type multigraph will always correspond to complete 
subgraphs of the type graph, albeit with potentially different labelling.  The vertices in the third-
largest component of Figure 3.24, for instance, are all R-equivalent and so form a complete R-
subgraph of the type multigraph; as shown here, however, some are also C- or D-equivalent, 
meaning that not every edge in the component is a pure R-edge. 
-131- 
 
 
  
-1
3
1
- 
 The insistence that shared subsegments must be stated independently to create a 
connection necessarily involves a trade-off: while it limits the proliferation of potentially 
insignificant relationships and anchors a piece’s morphological structure in the concrete rhetorical 
processes of the music, it is highly sensitive to slight changes in segmentation and can leave 
segments which are intuitively similar completely unconnected, even indirectly (this gives the 
concept a theory-discarding, rather than theory-conserving, bias; see Section 1.8).  Even those 
segments which are connected can delineate shortest paths which seem unnecessarily convoluted: 
segments 062|B4 and 132|C6, for example, are straightforwardly related through near-embedding 
which can be realised by the path of two theoretical segments shown in Figure 3.13 (or even more 
directly by a three-note subsegment spanning the bar-line), but in the type graph they are separated 
by at least five other vertices.  Again, this shows that path length is inadequate as a measure of 
similarity; even theoretical path length is misleading, since at most three extra segments are needed 
to connect any pair of vertices, no matter how dissimilar they might be (Corollary 3.3.7iv). 
 The type graph provides an abstract theoretical map of the morphological relationships 
(understood as combinations of C-, D-, R-, and E-relations) between a piece’s segments: as argued 
in the previous section, however, segments derive their identities primarily from derivational, rather 
than morphological, correspondences.  Motivic segments are not simply patterns of intervals: each 
segment carries the sequence of derivations that led to it as part of its identity, and a significant 
difference in this domain can overwrite any surface similarity that two segments may share.  Two 
segments (such as 083|C6 and 149|Ab5) might therefore be morphologically identical but 
derivationally distinct (if they lie in different families), and so those edges in the type (multi)graph 
with endpoints in different families are designated cross-family edges (identified by a suffix of ‘x’ 
in their labels).  Endpoints of cross-family edges that are CDR-equivalent still stand in identical C-, 
D-, R-, and E-relationships to the graph’s other vertices (Corollary 3.3.7iii), but at least one of each 
 
Figure 3.13: Theoretical connections are often shorter than paths in the type graph. 
The top half of the figure shows a theoretical link between 062|B4 and 132|C6, while 
the bottom half shows a shortest path of concrete segments linking the two in the 
type graph.  Note that this second path is not, and need not be, in temporal order. 
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pair of edges joining these endpoints to any other vertex must also be a cross-family edge 
(Corollary 3.3.9i).  When all the cross-family edges are removed from the type graph, the resultant 
connected components are known as types: these subdivide the original type graph components, 
known as cross-family types (Definition 3.3.8; these are the boxed subgraphs in Figure 3.24).  
Cross-family edges might be expected to be more frequent amongst shorter segments, since the 
likelihood of two derivationally unrelated segments “accidentally” arriving at the same 
morphological structure decreases as the number of notes increases: every one of the 49 cross-
family edges in Figure 3.24, for example, has a size 2 segment as at least one of its endpoints. 
To ground these concepts even more concretely in the musical (or, more precisely, 
analytical) reality of the music as it unfolds, a third hierarchical level of morphological 
categorisation is proposed: the type region (Definition 3.3.8).  Type regions, while also subdividing 
the types in the type graph, are defined as subdivisions of the families in the derivation digraph: 
specifically, if all the cross-type arrows (or developing arrows) which join members of different 
types are removed, the type regions are the resultant simple components.  Put a slightly different 
way: two segments are part of the same type region if there is an undirected path of derivation 
arrows between them, and if every vertex on this path belongs to the same type (Corollary 3.3.9ii 
and iii).  Figure 3.14 shows the largest family (also the largest component) of Figure 3.23 partitioned 
into type regions with curved lines crossing the developing arrows (which are drawn thicker): the 
same partition is shown using vertex colour in the NodeXL output. 
It is not unusual for all the members of one type to be contained in one type region (as is 
the case with every type in the present example): types are, after all, intended to model relationships 
of morphological closeness, and so it is to be expected that a given segment will often have a 
  
  
  
  
    
  
Figure 3.14: Family S1 of Figure 3.23 partitioned into type regions. 
Arrow labels have been omitted from the NodeXL output for clarity, and developing 
arrows are indicated by increased thickness. 
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member of the same type (if one exists) chosen as a parent.  Treating this expectation as normative, 
the types identified by the algorithm can be adjusted with respect to the analytical input to produce 
more flexible morphological categories – specifically by grouping together distinct types which 
seem, in the way the analysis has been constructed, to behave as one.  Suppose the only way to get 
into type 𝑌 in the derivation digraph is through type 𝑋, and that every developing arrow leaving 
type 𝑌 returns to type 𝑋: this suggests that the arrows in and out of 𝑌 do not really ‘develop’ at all, 
and that 𝑌 is therefore a simple, interchangeable variation – a subtype – of 𝑋 (Definition 3.3.11).  
This assumption, however, needs to be balanced with the alternative interpretation – that 𝑋𝑌𝑋 
represents a genuine circular process rather than a mere interchangeability of types – and so 
structures with extra stages which therefore carry an enhanced sense of process (such as the nested 
𝑋𝑌𝑍𝑌𝑋 or the extended 𝑋𝑌𝑍𝑋, where the grouping 𝑌 + 𝑍 behaves like a single subtype of 𝑋 but 
maintains some internal structure) are not included in the present definition (see Corollary 3.3.12, 
which also shows that two types may not be subtypes of each other; note also that 𝑍 remains, 
however, a subtype of 𝑌 in the first example above). 
The concept of subtypes can rehabilitate some of the relationships rejected by the theory-
discarding trade-off discussed above, in which subsegment similarities are only recognised if the 
subsegment appears independently at some point in the piece.  Suppose, for example, that segments 
097|F4, 099|Eb4, and 101|F4 are deleted from the Beethoven piece, severing, therefore, the  
  
  
  
  
 
Figure 3.15: The type region containing 003|G4 is a subtype of the shaded type. 
This figure removes 097|F4, 099|Eb4, and 101|F4 from the analysis: cf. the type region 
headed by 000|C4 in Figure 3.14.  The shaded type regions belong to the same type. 
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Derivation digraph Type (multi)graph 
Simple components 
Cross-family types Remove inter-family arrows… 
Families (in sibling and cousin groupings)  
 Remove cross-family edges… 
Types 
Remove developing arrows…  
Type regions 
 
Figure 3.16: A summary of the model’s hierarchy of categories.   
Subtypes are not shown: these use type region information to create groups of types. 
indirect connections between 000|C4 and 003|G4 (discussed above), and between 003|G4 and 
two of its children 005|C5 and 052|Bb4.  Given that 000|C4, 005|C5, and 052|Bb4 remain 
connected in the type graph (through, for example, 095|Ab4), a portion of Figure 3.14 changes as 
shown in Figure 3.15: this places 003|G4 and the CDR-equivalent 103|G4 in a subtype of the 
larger type region, creating a relationship between the type of 003|G4 and the type of 000|C4 that 
is weaker than identity, but stronger than the mere existence of a theoretical linking segment.39  The 
subtype concept can also be used, on an ad hoc interpretative basis, to informally describe some of 
the smaller types in Figure 3.14 (which contains no true subtypes): the theoretical segments needed 
to link 117|E5 and 039|C3 to their respective parents 115|G5 and 035|C4 (unlike those needed to 
link 007|C6 to 005|C5) suggest themselves straightforwardly enough for the former to behave like 
subtypes of the latter. 
 Type regions are labelled in a similar manner to families: with a three-part label dependent 
on cross-family type, type, and type region.  If one type is found to be a subtype of another, the 
latter adopts the two-part label of the former with the addition of a lower case letter; if the two 
types belong to different cross-family types, the subtype is suffixed with the label ‘(x[A])’, where [A] 
is the number of its cross-family type (if 3.1 was found to be a subtype of 2.4, for example, it would 
be renamed 2.4a(x3), with type regions 2.4a(x3).1, 2.4a(x3).2, and so on; the next subtype of 2.4 
would be 2.4b).  The hierarchy of categorisation is summarised in Figure 3.16, which shows how 
categories defined in one graph carry over to the vertices of the other and help define the next 
level: following each column downwards traces a path of ever-finer subdivisions (note that the 
families do not subdivide the cross-family types since each family may appear in several cross-
family types and vice-versa).  The nesting of these categories inside each other is fixed formally in 
                                                     
39 In general, for one type to be classed as a subtype of another, all the regions of the former must 
be surrounded by regions of the latter: in this example, the type of 003|G4 has only one region. 
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Theorem 3.3.10, which also shows that the set of developing arrows includes the set of inter-family 
arrows (labelled ‘Inter’ in the NodeXL output), the set of developing arrows with endpoints in 
different cross-family types (‘x-Developing’), the intersection of these two sets (‘x-Inter’), and the 
remaining developing arrows (‘Developing’).  All the other derivation arrows are labelled with the 
C-, D-, R-, or E-relation that holds between their endpoints (suffixing an ‘x’ if these are in different 
families), or left blank if they are indirectly related members of the same type region. 
 Using these concepts, a sketch of the movement’s essential motivic processes can be 
formed from the derivation digraph as shown in Figure 3.17: this motivic process digraph 
(Definition 3.3.13) is built around the piece’s sources and developing arrows and includes all the 
paths between them.40  Every type region is represented (Corollary 3.3.14v) and so it can be useful 
to think of the motivic process digraph as a “collapsed” version of the derivation digraph, replacing 
each type region with a single vertex in the first instance, then re-expanding it to include concrete 
derivation chains where necessary.  Compare, for example, Figure 3.14 with the largest component 
of Figure 3.17: the type regions and the arrows between them are the same, and some type regions 
are represented by single vertices; it would be contradictory to the intransitive nature of 
development, however, to connect 000|C4 to 007|C6 directly, and so all the derivation paths 
between these vertices (via 003|G4, 004|C5, and 005|C5) are included.  Another way to think of 
                                                     
40 This is another concept technically defined only for DAGs and therefore requiring a given 
derivation digraph’s condensation to be found first: full details of the translation between 
condensation and original can be found in Definition 3.3.13. 
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 3.17: The motivic process digraph for Figure 3.23 partitioned into type regions. 
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the motivic process digraph is as the result of a successive “pruning” of dead-ends within each type 
region (Theorem 3.3.15). 
 The motivic process digraph aims to summarise the derivational history of every “new” 
segment in the piece: given that the first occurrence of every type region (and therefore every 
strong and weak external epiphany too; Corollary 3.3.14iii) is included, any segment in ℳmay be 
derived from, and linked by a path of C-, D-, R-, and E-edges to, some vertex in the motivic 
process digraph without changing type (or, therefore, family).41  The NodeXL output categorises 
the vertices of the motivic process digraph based on the three sets used in Definition 3.3.13: initial 
and terminal points of developing arrows are labelled ‘Ai’ and ‘At’ respectively, with sources 
labelled ‘At’ and vertices that fulfil both roles at once labelled ‘Ait’; vertices reachable from two 
distinct ‘A’ vertices are labelled ‘B’; and all other vertices reaching ‘A’ or ‘B’ vertices are labelled ‘C’.  
 As Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.17 show, two type regions can have substantially different 
sizes, temporal distributions, and degrees of internal variation: not every category at the same 
hierarchical level, therefore, necessarily has the same analytical significance.  Whilst no a priori 
method for determining significance is proposed here, the temporal distribution (and therefore size) 
of each type region can be displayed in a map of the movement similar to a paradigmatic chart as 
shown in Figure 3.18.  With bars on the 𝑥-axis and type regions (grouped into families) on the 𝑦-
axis, a cell is filled if a member of its row’s type region occupies (at least a part of) its column’s bar.  
Note that the 𝑥-axis is split into three blocks – exposition, development, and recapitulation – for 
the sake of display and to facilitate proportional comparison: these top-level sectional breaks, and 
the subsectional breaks that determine the placement of the vertical lines, can be entered as part of 
the analytical input into the same worksheet as the time signatures.  They are intended as no more 
than guides to make the chart easier to navigate, but the form that they describe may bear directly 
on certain choices in the analytical input: segments in the section that the analyst has chosen to 
label ‘Recapitulation’, for example, are likely to be derived from segments in the section labelled 
‘Exposition’.42 
 Whilst full inventories of each category can be found by applying Excel’s built-in filters to 
the ‘Vertices’ spreadsheet, an approximate inventory of each type region can be gleaned from 
Figure 3.18 by reading along the shaded cells in each row (this is only approximate since the cells 
represent bars, which are not in one-to-one correspondence with the segments).  Inventories of 
larger categories can be sketched too, if necessary by applying Excel filters to the first column of 
                                                     
41 ‘First occurrence’ is here used informally to stand for sources or terminal points of derivation 
arrows; such vertices need not be the first to appear chronologically in a given type region due to 
the temporal flexibility of the derivation relationship (Definition 3.1.7 and Figure 3.2). 
42 Navigation is also aided by the fact that clicking in any shaded cell displays its bar number in the 
Excel formula bar, preceded by ‘n.’ if it is the first member of a type region. 
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the map itself: families correspond to blocks of rows, and cross-family types to rows sharing their 
first label number (it can be seen clearly that no type in this example contains more than one type 
region, not only because no two rows have the same first and second numbers, but also because no 
third number is greater than one).  The algorithm also automatically produces a similar, but 
“collapsed”, map in which each row represents one family: this retains, however, the convention of 
shading the first appearance of each type region (grey in Figure 3.18 and orange in NodeXL). 
 It is clear that the bulk of this movement’s activity occurs in family S1, with the first and 
second subjects forming distinct and independent type regions within this group and making the 
piece, in this analysis, essentially monothematic (in other words, there is a derivational link but a 
 
Figure 3.18: The distribution of type regions throughout Figure 3.22. 
Bars are plotted on the horizontal axis, which is marked out with sectional divisions (and 
split into three blocks corresponding to the exposition, development, and recapitulation), 
while type regions (demarcated into families by horizontal lines) are shown on the vertical 
axis (and labelled in the form [cross-family type].[type].[type region]).  The first 
appearance of each type region is shaded grey. 
 
Exposition 1st subject Bridge 2nd subject Codetta
1.1.1 n. 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 # # # # # # #
1.6.1 n. # # # # # # #
1.7.1
2.1.1 n. 8
3.1.1 n. # # # # # # # # # #
4.1.1 n. # # # # #
5.1.1 n. # #
6.1.1 n. # # # # #
1.4.1 n. #
1.5.1 n. # # # #
1.8.1
7.1.1 n. # # # # # #
8.1.1
1.2.1
1.3.1
Development 1st subject 2nd subject Retransition
1.1.1 # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.6.1 # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.7.1
2.1.1
3.1.1 # # #
4.1.1
5.1.1
6.1.1
1.4.1
1.5.1
1.8.1
7.1.1
8.1.1
1.2.1 n. # # # # # # #
1.3.1 n. # # # # # # # # # # # #
Recapitulation 1st subject Bridge 2nd subject Codetta
1.1.1 # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.6.1 # # # # # # # #
1.7.1 n. # #
2.1.1 # #
3.1.1 # # # # # # # # # # #
4.1.1 # # # # # #
5.1.1
6.1.1 # # # # # #
1.4.1
1.5.1
1.8.1 n. #
7.1.1 # # # # # # # # #
8.1.1 n. # #
1.2.1
1.3.1
b.9 b.21 b.33 b.49
b.56 b.81 b.101
b.109 b.120 b.132 b.153
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structurally significant morphological break between 000|C4 and 020|Fb5 – see Figure 3.17).  
Other categories have more limited reach: the three type regions of the second largest family, for 
instance, are contained entirely within bars 42–48 and 141–52 (reach is not always a measure of 
significance since this family has an important closing function, and indeed is the only family heard 
in bars 146–end).  Observations such as these feed into a consideration of the piece’s motivic 
processes and categories, and can be read alongside its harmonic, tonal, and formal structures, as 
well as its more heterogeneous gestural or “poetic” qualities, to produce an analytical plot. 
 Reading Figure 3.18 and Figure 3.17 in this way, the movement therefore unfolds as 
follows.  The opening idea over a tonic harmony gives rise to a responding phrase on the dominant, 
and this pair is then repeated in a truncated form and brought to a cadence via a liquidated (and 
therefore dissimilar) phrase followed by a pause.  The opening idea then returns and is developed to 
form the bridge section, which again culminates in a dissimilar motive (although it does bear certain 
similarities to the opening idea through the weak-to-strong minor second fragment heard in bars 
12–13).43  The principal motive of the second subject, a loose inversion of the opening idea, is 
heard two-and-a-half times before an extended sequential passage of hesitant quaver segments 
based around the ascending third shape at the end of the second subject motive.  This reaches a 
climax in bar 33, the start of the codetta, and liquidates into generic scale passages while a rising 
arpeggio figure (related, therefore, to the opening idea) is heard sequentially in the bass; the phrase 
is rounded off with a descending shape similar to the second subject motive, and subsequently 
repeated.  The exposition closes with a pair of alternating segments, one based around the rhythm 
and third at the end of the second subject motive, and the other a new idea using a rising sixth and 
descending fifth. 
 The development begins by following a similar blueprint to the opening of the piece: there 
is no liquidation, however, and no bridge, and the forward-driving quaver sequence that previously 
led to the codetta is cut off by a periodic return to the beginning of the second subject (one tone 
higher).  The second subject motive is then treated sequentially in the bass to cadence in a number 
of different keys; these cadences are reinforced by an ascending minor second pattern in the treble, 
which detaches itself from its original context (bars 73–78) and dissolves into two bars which are 
devoid of motivic content (bars 79–80).  After this total liquidation, a new motive (related 
rhythmically to the ascending minor second) is treated quasi-sequentially over a behind-the-beat 
                                                     
43 More directly, the segment 015|C5 fulfils the process of the previous bars in two ways: it 
completes the E–D–C line in bars 13–15, and extends the descending third of the triplet 
semiquavers to a descending fourth rather than turning back on itself as all the previous segments 
have done.  These relationships were not noted in the original analytical input, and so their 
discovery during the process of emplotted analysis is an example of the cyclical process of revision 
set out at the opening of Section 3.1.  (If the derivation 014|Db5𝛿015|C5 – see Definition 3.1.7 – 
were to be included, the two type regions of family S2 would become type regions of family S1.) 
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pedal C to construct a four-bar phrase, which is then repeated in a decorated form; its final 
segment, however, gets stuck, and is repeated neurotically until the treble cuts out and the pedal C 
moves to the strong beat.  Fragments of the opening motive return, leading to a strong restatement 
of the opening in the home key of F minor at bar 101. 
 The recapitulation proceeds mostly as in the exposition, except that the bridge refuses to 
coalesce on the descending idea of bars 15–20; the fragment of the opening idea is therefore left to 
wander for longer until it is capped off by a (repeated) segment characterised by a diminished 
fourth and augmented fifth.  The bridge-concluding segments in both the exposition and 
recapitulation therefore not only differ from each other, but are unique within the movement.  The 
remainder of the movement is an almost exact transposition of the corresponding passage in the 
exposition: bar 139, however, omits the descending second-subject-derived pattern in favour of a 
strong bassline reinforcement of the final structural perfect cadence.  The (harmonically closed) 
periodic alternating pattern is also extended and liquidated at the close of the movement as the 
harmony ventures away from F minor: first into a sequence of descending fifths (bars 147–50), and 
then into an archetypal cadential melodic pattern.  The tonal closure is hence undermined by a 
harmonic excursion and a linear (rather than periodic) motivic process, thus leaving a certain open-
endedness in preparation for the second movement, or for the repeat of the development and 
recapitulation that is marked in some editions. 
 The foregoing analytical plot is an example (albeit a somewhat extreme one) of 
interpretation, the third stage of the denotation–demonstration–interpretation paradigm outlined in 
Section 1.10: it translates the technical language of digraphs, families, type regions, and segment 
labels underlying Figure 3.17 and Figure 3.18 into more traditional music-theoretical terminology 
arranged in a conventional analytical narrative.  Indeed, some of its observations bypass the 
technical structures entirely, so the question is unavoidable: could the preceding three paragraphs of 
prose have been written straight from the score, without any recourse to mathematical 
formalisation at all? 
 I would argue that the answer is potentially yes, but offer three important qualifications in 
defence of the formalised framework set out in this chapter.  Firstly, as suggested in Section 1.1, the 
question of the indispensability of mathematics – that is, whether or not scientific theories can be 
expressed perfectly without any recourse to mathematics – is an active topic of debate in the 
philosophy of science.  The model outlined here makes no claims towards scientific validity, but 
any questioning of whether its mathematical elements are strictly necessary opens up a whole field 
of arguments and counter-arguments regarding the necessity and utility of any work of applied 
mathematics, from Tymoczko’s geometry of music to Einstein’s theory of relativity; certain 
apparently specific concerns about the role of mathematics in the present model are therefore, in 
reality, more general concerns about the epistemological basis of mathematics itself. 
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 Secondly, just as any denotation (i.e. translation from target phenomenon to mathematical 
concept) is imperfect, so is the inverse process of interpretation.  The analysis above uses ill-defined 
terms such as ‘motive’ and ‘idea’ to stand in (and not always consistently) for precisely defined 
concepts such as ‘type region’, so there is inevitable loss in translation.  Sometimes ‘motives’ are 
liquidated into other ‘motives’, sometimes they are liquidated into generic material, sometimes they 
‘develop’ into new types, subtypes, or even simply segments of the same type.  The traditional 
language, whilst intuitively graspable to those with some musical training and adequate for the 
expression of many important insights, actually serves here to mask a richer and more detailed 
analysis that clarifies the range and nature of relationships that the term ‘motive’ encapsulates; this 
expansion of the term is, after all, the very purpose of this thesis.  This is also why, as an example 
of interpretation, the analysis above is somewhat extreme: usually the aim is to use the formal 
concepts to illuminate the target phenomenon, and not to assiduously filter out all technically 
defined language as though it never existed. 
 Thirdly, in an argument that recalls the discussion of “accidental” morphological 
similarities that have no derivational underpinnings (as modelled by cross-family types): whether or 
not the analysis above could arise without the mathematical concepts, it did arise through the 
interaction of Figure 3.17, Figure 3.18, the musical score, and the mind of an analyst.  Theoretical 
lenses focus on some features and blur some others (hence the fairly limited discussion of harmony 
and tonality above): would the uniqueness of the bridge-closing segments, or the liquidation of the 
second subject into motives only heard in the development, have been remarked upon in an 
analysis produced without any conceptual map similar to Figure 3.18?  It is possible, but seems 
unlikely. 
 The ideas set out in this chapter comprise one particular toolkit for building models of 
pieces of music.  Each model can be revised and, following Frigg and Hartmann’s assertion that ‘we 
do not learn about [a model’s] properties by looking at it’, actively engaged with: the rich suite of 
tools built into both Excel and NodeXL permit detailed examinations of the properties of a given 
analysis (which is why all files are included on the supplementary CD).44  Some ideas are suggested 
throughout this chapter, but NodeXL’s layout, grouping, and metrics algorithms, and Excel’s 
filtering and statistical tools (including PivotTable summaries like those found in the CD’s 
spreadsheets) all bear further exploration: particularly useful for the construction of emplotted 
analyses is NodeXL’s ‘Dynamic Filters’ feature, which allows onsets to be filtered with sliding scales 
to build up a picture of how the various graphs grow with time.  The opportunities for further 
programming in VBA are also extensive. 
                                                     
44 Frigg and Hartmann, section 3.1. 
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 The following, and final, chapter is a case study in producing a more extended analysis of 
two substantial movements from the same work using this toolkit.  The toolkit is used, like the 
work of other analysts (especially Monahan), as a source of starting-points for exploration; as a 
“way in” to a work that is too complex to admit a single overarching plot or explanation.  The plot 
fragments and other insights that result are presented in prose, incorporating figures and technical 
language when doing so increases the richness and nuance of the interpretation; whilst they shed 
new light (or refract old light) onto the piece, however, they never do, and never can, reveal the full 
story. 
Mathematical Formalisation 
Definition 3.3.1 
Let 𝐿 and 𝐴 be defined as in Definition 3.1.1.  The functions 𝒅: 𝐿 → {0,1,2,3,4,5,6}, 𝒄: 𝐿 →
{0,2,4,5,7,9,11} and 𝒏: 𝐴 → {−2, −1,0,1,2} are defined respectively through the sets of ordered 
pairs {(C, 0), (D, 1), (E, 2), (F, 3), (G, 4), (A, 5), (B, 6)}, {(C, 0), (D, 2), (E, 4), (F, 5), (G, 7),
(A, 9), (B, 11)}, and {(z, −2), (b, −1), (∅, 0), (#, 1), (x, 2)}. 
The domains of the first two of these functions can be extended to the set of pitches: 
  𝒅+(𝑙, 𝑎, 𝑜) = 𝑑(𝑙) + 7(𝑜 − 4) 
  𝒄+(𝑙, 𝑎, 𝑜) = 𝑐(𝑙) + 12(𝑜 − 4) + 𝑛(𝑎) 
 
Definition 3.3.2 
Given a motivic segment 𝑚 of size 𝑛 ≥ 2 as defined in Definition 3.1.6, the 2 × 𝑛 − 1 interval 
matrix of 𝒎, 𝑰(𝒎), has its 𝑖th column 𝐼(𝑚)𝐶𝑖 given by (
𝑐+(𝑝𝑖+1) − 𝑐
+(𝑝𝑖)
𝑑+(𝑝𝑖+1) − 𝑑
+(𝑝𝑖)
).  Its 𝑖th row is 
denoted 𝐼(𝑚)𝑅𝑖 . 
 
Definition 3.3.3 
The following equivalence relations may hold between two motivic segments 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 of size 
𝑛 ≥ 2: 
 C-equivalence: 𝑚1 ~𝐶  𝑚2 ⇔ 𝐼(𝑚1)𝑅1 = 𝐼(𝑚2)𝑅1 
 D-equivalence: 𝑚1 ~𝐷 𝑚2 ⇔ 𝐼(𝑚1)𝑅2 = 𝐼(𝑚2)𝑅2 
 R-equivalence: 𝑚1 ~𝑅 𝑚2 ⇔ (𝑥(𝜏𝑖), 𝑦(𝜏𝑖), 𝑧(𝜏𝑖)) = (𝑥(𝑡𝑖), 𝑦(𝑡𝑖), 𝑧(𝑡𝑖) + 𝛼) for all 
 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} where 𝑡𝑖 and 𝜏𝑖 are the time-points of 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 respectively and 𝛼 is a 
 constant (𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑧 are defined in Definition 3.1.3). 
If 𝑚1 ~𝐶  𝑚2 and 𝑚1 ~𝐷 𝑚2, then write 𝑚1 ~𝐶𝐷 𝑚2 for brevity; CR-, DR-, and CDR-equivalence 
are defined similarly. 
 
Theorem 3.3.4 
For two time-points 𝑡𝑖 and 𝜏𝑖, if 𝑥(𝜏𝑖) = 𝑥(𝑡𝑖) and 𝑦(𝜏𝑖) = 𝑦(𝑡𝑖), then 𝑧(𝜏𝑖) − 𝑧(𝑡𝑖) must be an 
integer. 
For any pair 𝑚1 ~𝑅 𝑚2, 𝛼 must also therefore be an integer corresponding to a translation along 
the time-line by an integer number of bars. 
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Proof 
First note that for any integer value of 𝑡 (that is, any time-point that is the first beat of a bar), 
2𝜋(𝑡 + 1 2⁄ ) will be an odd multiple of 𝜋 and so 𝑥(𝑡) =
𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)
2𝜋
(1 − 1) = 0 and 𝑦(𝑡) =
𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)
2𝜋
×
0 = 0.  Since every bar must have a first beat, the 𝑥 − 𝑦 projection (or “shadow”) of every coil of 
the helix must pass through (0,0), with the radius of the coil being determined by 
𝑠(⌊𝑡⌋)
2𝜋
; Figure 
3.19a shows the projections of a number of coils of different sizes. 
Every point (𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡)) on the half-plane 𝑥 > 0 lies on the circumference of exactly one of these 
coil projections, thus determining the time signature of the bar 𝑡 occurs in (from the radius of the 
coil) and the beat of the bar 𝑡 occurs on (from the anticlockwise angle its radius makes from the 
radius to (0,0)).  If 𝑡𝑖 and 𝜏𝑖 map to the same (𝑥, 𝑦) co-ordinates, they must therefore have the 
same fractional parts (i.e. 𝑡𝑖 − ⌊𝑡𝑖⌋ = 𝜏𝑖 − ⌊𝜏𝑖⌋), and so 𝜏𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖 (and therefore 𝑧(𝜏𝑖) − 𝑧(𝑡𝑖)) must 
be an integer.  The result for 𝛼 follows directly.∎ 
 
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 with a worked example (sketched in Figure 3.19b), 
take the point (
9
4𝜋
,
3√3
4𝜋
).  Since both this point and (0,0) lie on the circumference of the coil we 
seek, the centre of the coil must be equidistant from both.  The line joining the two points directly 
is given by 𝑦 =
𝑥
√3
; its perpendicular bisector must therefore have gradient −√3 and pass through 
the point (
9
8𝜋
,
3√3
8𝜋
), meaning its equation is 𝑥 =
3
2𝜋
−
𝑦
√3
.  All the coil centres lie on the 𝑥-axis (i.e. 
the line 𝑦 = 0), so the centre of this particular coil is (
3
2𝜋
, 0), giving the coil a circumference of 3 – 
that is, three beats in a bar.  The angle from the horizontal is given by 𝑡𝑎𝑛−1 (
3√3
4𝜋
÷ (
9
4𝜋
−
3
2𝜋
)) =
𝑡𝑎𝑛−1(√3) =
𝜋
3
, which means that the full angle working round the coil anticlockwise from (0,0) 
is 
4𝜋
3
, or two-thirds of a full turn.  Any 𝑡 such that (𝑥(𝑡), 𝑦(𝑡)) = (
9
4𝜋
,
3√3
4𝜋
) must therefore be the 
Figure 3.19: a) The 𝒙–𝒚  projections of different-sized coils all pass through (𝟎,𝟎);  
b) Calculating the properties of the unique coil that passes through a given point. 
See the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 and the discussion which follows. 
 
 
 
𝑥 
𝑦 
    
(
9
4𝜋
,
3√3
4𝜋
) 
(
3
2𝜋
, 0) 
  a)                                  b)  
𝑥 
𝑦 
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second beat of a three-beat bar, and so must have fractional part 
2
3
; the difference between any two 
such points is therefore always an integer. 
 
Definition 3.3.5 
Two motivic segments 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, 2 ≤ |𝑚1| < |𝑚2|, are E-related (𝑚1 ~𝐸  𝑚2 and 𝑚2 ~𝐸  𝑚1) 
if and only if there exists a value 𝑐 such that {(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖) ∈ 𝑚2|𝑐 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑐 + |𝑚1| − 1} ~𝐶𝐷𝑅  𝑚1 – 
that is, if 𝑚1 is CDR-equivalent to a subsegment (see Definition 3.1.6) of 𝑚2. 
 
Definition 3.3.6 
Given a set of motivic segments ℳ, let 𝑇𝑋 = {{𝑎, 𝑏} ⊆ ℳ|𝑎~𝑋𝑏} for 𝑋 = 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑅, 𝐸, and let 
𝑇𝑋𝑌 = 𝑇𝑋 ∩ 𝑇𝑌.  Then the type multigraph is (ℳ, 𝑇
+) where 𝑇+ =⊎𝑋=𝐶,𝐷,𝑅,𝐸 𝑇𝑋.  The type 
graph is (ℳ, 𝑇), where 𝑇 =∪𝑋=𝐶,𝐷,𝑅,𝐸 𝑇𝑋; the edge set 𝑇 is naturally partitioned into up to 8 
disjoint sets (some of which may be empty) denoted 𝑇𝑋
+ for 𝑋 = 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑅, 𝐶𝐷, 𝐶𝑅, 𝐷𝑅, 𝐶𝐷𝑅 or 𝐸 as 
shown in Figure 3.20. 
 
Corollary 3.3.7  
The type multigraph and type graph have the following properties: 
i. For 𝑋, 𝑌 ∈ {𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑅}, the connected components of (ℳ, 𝑇𝑋), (ℳ, 𝑇𝑋𝑌), (ℳ, 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅) and 
(ℳ, 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+ ) are complete graphs. 
ii. If {𝑎, 𝑏}, {𝑏, 𝑐} ∈ 𝑇𝐸, and either |𝑎| < |𝑏| < |𝑐| or |𝑐| < |𝑏| < |𝑎|, then {𝑎, 𝑐} ∈ 𝑇𝐸 . 
iii. If 𝑎 and 𝑏 are members of the same connected component of (ℳ, 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+ ), then {𝑎, 𝑦} ∈
𝑇𝑋
+ ⇔ {𝑏, 𝑦} ∈ 𝑇𝑋
+ for all 𝑦 ∈ ℳ\{𝑎, 𝑏}. 
iv. For any two segments 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℳ, at most three new segments 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∉ ℳ are needed to 
ensure a path from 𝑎 to 𝑏 in the type (multi)graph for ℳ ∪ {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧}. 
Proofs 
i. This follows directly from the transitivity property of equivalence relations.  Note that since 
𝑇𝑋
+ ⊆ 𝑇𝑋 and 𝑇𝑋𝑌
+ ⊆ 𝑇𝑋𝑌, 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+ = 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅 is the only part in the partition of 𝑇 that always 
defines an equivalence relation. 
ii. If 𝑎 is equivalent to a subsegment of 𝑏 and 𝑏 is equivalent to a subsegment of 𝑐, then 𝑎 is 
Figure 3.20: The edge set of the type graph, 𝑻, is partitioned into up to 8 disjoint sets 
(each denoted 𝑻𝑿
+) by the intersection relationships between the four 𝑻𝑿 sets. 
 
 
  
 
𝑇𝐶
+ 
𝑇𝐷
+ 𝑇𝑅
+ 
𝑇𝐸
+ = 𝑇𝐸 
𝑇𝐷𝑅
+  
𝑇𝐶𝐷
+  𝑇𝐶𝑅
+  
𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+  
𝑇𝐶 
𝑇𝐷 𝑇𝑅 
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equivalent to a subsegment of 𝑐.  This implies, but is not implied by, the statements 𝑎 ∼𝐸 𝑏 
and 𝑏 ∼𝐸 𝑐 since ∼𝐸 is symmetric (so 𝑏 might be equivalent to a subsegment of 𝑎 and 𝑐 
equivalent to a subsegment of 𝑏 instead).  If the sizes of 𝑎 and 𝑐 are both greater or both less 
than the size of 𝑏, then one is not necessarily equivalent to a subsegment of the other (they 
may, in fact, be the same size); the transitivity of the ∼𝐸 relation therefore only holds if 𝑏 is 
the segment in the middle. 
iii. Since 𝑎 and 𝑏 are CDR-equivalent, anything C-, D-, and/or R-equivalent to 𝑎 or one of its 
subsegments must also be C-, D-, and/or R-equivalent to 𝑏 or one of its subsegments, and 
anything with a subsegment that is CDR-equivalent to 𝑎 must also have a subsegment that is 
CDR-equivalent to 𝑏. 
iv. Assuming that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not already connected in (ℳ, 𝑇) (whereupon 𝑥, 𝑦 and 𝑧 can be 
chosen arbitrarily), it is always possible to choose 𝑥 and 𝑧, |𝑥| = |𝑧|, as arbitrary 
subsegments of 𝑎 and 𝑏 respectively.  Segment 𝑦 can then be chosen as, say, C-equivalent to 
𝑥 and R-equivalent to 𝑧, creating a path 𝑎 ∼𝐸 𝑥 ∼𝐶 𝑦 ∼𝑅 𝑧 ∼𝐸 𝑏.  Segments 𝑎 and 𝑏 can be 
linked with only two additional segments if a subsegment of 𝑎 is C-, D-, or R-equivalent to a 
subsegment of 𝑏 (𝑎 ∼𝐸 𝑥 ∼𝐶/𝐷/𝑅 𝑦 ∼𝐸 𝑏), or with only one if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the same size 
(𝑎 ∼𝐶/𝐷/𝑅 𝑥 ∼𝐶/𝐷/𝑅 𝑏) or embed CDR-equivalent subsegments (𝑎 ∼𝐸 𝑥 ∼𝐸 𝑏).∎  
 
Definition 3.3.8 
The connected components of the type graph (ℳ, 𝑇) are known as cross-family types.45 
An edge {𝑎, 𝑏} ∈ 𝑇 is known as a cross-family edge if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in different families.  The set of 
cross-family edges is denoted by 𝑋. 
The connected components of the graph (ℳ, 𝑇 − 𝑋) are known as types. 
An arrow (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐷 is known as a cross-type arrow or a developing arrow if 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in 
different types.  The set of developing arrows is denoted by 𝑁; a subset of this is the set 𝑁𝑋 of 
arrows (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐷 such that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are in different cross-family types. 
The connected components of the digraph (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁) are known as type regions. 
 
Corollary 3.3.9 
i. For any {𝑎, 𝑏} ∈ 𝑋 and {𝑎, 𝑐}, {𝑏, 𝑐} ∈ 𝑇, with 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 distinct, {𝑎, 𝑐} and/or {𝑏, 𝑐} are 
members of 𝑋. 
Combining this result with Corollary 3.3.7iii, if {𝑎, 𝑏} ∈ 𝑋 ∩ 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+  then {𝑎, 𝑐} and {𝑏, 𝑐} are 
both members of the same part of the partition of 𝑇, and at least one is a member of 𝑋. 
ii. For any pair of segments 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℳ and an undirected path between them in (ℳ, 𝐷): 
a. 𝑎 and 𝑏 are members of the same type region if and only if some such path contains 
no member of 𝑁; 
b. 𝑎 and 𝑏 are not members of the same type if the path contains exactly one member of 
𝑁. 
iii. For any undirected circuit 𝒞 ∈ (ℳ, 𝐷) with arrow set 𝐶, |𝐶 ∩ 𝑁| ≠ 1. 
 
                                                     
45 These correspond to the components of the type multigraph; the following definitions refer to 
the type graph alone for simplicity but can easily be adapted to apply to the type multigraph. 
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 Family Cross-
family type 
Type 
𝐷\𝑁 Same 
 
Same Same 
𝑁\𝑁𝑋 ∪ 𝐼 Different 
𝑁𝑋\𝐼 Different [⇒Different] 
𝐼\𝑁𝑋  Different Same [⇒Different] 
𝑁𝑋 ∪ 𝐼 Different [⇒Different] 
Figure 3.21: Every arrow of 𝑫 falls into one of five sets depending on whether its endpoints’ 
families, cross-family types, and types are the same or different.  
 
Proofs 
i. Assume, for a proof by contradiction, that {𝑎, 𝑐} ∉ 𝑋 and {𝑏, 𝑐} ∉ 𝑋.  Then 𝑐 is in the same 
family as 𝑏 and 𝑎 and so 𝑏 and 𝑎 are in the same family as each other, contradicting the 
assumption that {𝑎, 𝑏} ∈ 𝑋.  The combination with Corollary 3.3.7iii follows 
straightforwardly, noting that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are members of the same connected component of 
(ℳ, 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+ ) if and only if {𝑎, 𝑏} ∈ 𝑇𝐶𝐷𝑅
+  by Corollary 3.3.7i. 
ii. The type regions are defined as the simple components of (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁).  Saying that two 
segments are members of the same type region is therefore equivalent to saying that they can 
be joined by an undirected path in (ℳ, 𝐷) that does not cross an edge in 𝑁. 
If an undirected path contains exactly one arrow from 𝑁, its endpoints can be labelled 𝑥 and 
𝑦 such that the (undirected) subpaths from 𝑎 to 𝑥 and 𝑦 to 𝑏 include only arrows whose 
endpoints belong to the same type.  This means that 𝑎 and 𝑥 are members of the same type, 
𝑦 and 𝑏 are members of the same type, and 𝑥 and 𝑦 are members of different types; 𝑎 and 𝑏 
are therefore members of different types. 
iii. Since a circuit by definition includes two paths between every pair of vertices, a contradiction 
arises if one of these paths contains a member of 𝑁 and the other does not (parts a and b of 
ii above are incompatible due to the ‘TR⇒T’ part of Theorem 3.3.10).  A circuit may not, 
therefore, contain only one member of 𝑁.∎ 
 
Theorem 3.3.10 
Let XT, T, TR, and F represent the statements ‘Segments 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℳ belong to the same cross-
family type/type/type region/family’ respectively.  Then TR ⇒ T ⇒ XT, T ⇒ F, and if (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐷, 
then T ⇒ TR.  A corollary (¬F ⇒ ¬T) is that every inter-family arrow is a developing arrow, so 
𝐼 ⊆ 𝑁. 
The intersections of the 𝐷-subsets 𝐼, 𝑁, and 𝑁𝑋 therefore partition 𝐷 as shown in Figure 3.21. 
Proofs 
By definition, the graph (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁) contains no arrows whose endpoints lie in different types.  
Two vertices linked by an undirected path in this graph (i.e. two members of the same connected 
component) must therefore belong to the same type – so TR ⇒ T. 
If two vertices are joined by a path in (ℳ, 𝑇 − 𝑋), then they must be joined by a path in (ℳ, 𝑇) – 
so T ⇒ XT. 
The graph (ℳ, 𝑇 − 𝑋) contains no edges whose endpoints lie in different families; any two 
vertices in the same connected component (i.e. type) must therefore lie in the same family, so T ⇒ 
  
 𝐼 𝑁𝑋 
𝐷 
 
𝑁 
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F (its corollary follows directly: if two vertices are in different families, then they must be in 
different types, so if there is a derivation arrow between them it is both an inter-family arrow and a 
developing arrow). 
If the endpoints of (𝑎, 𝑏) lie in the same type, then (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐷\𝑁 and so 𝐴 and 𝐵 lie in the same 
component of (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁) – so T ⇒ TR.∎ 
 
Definition 3.3.11 
If 𝑋 and 𝑌 are the vertex sets of two distinct types, then 𝑌 is a subtype of 𝑋 if and only if: 
i. no vertex in 𝑌 is a member of a strong component in 𝒟 which is a source in 𝒟∗; 
ii. every developing arrow joined to a member of 𝑌 is joined to a member of 𝑋; 
iii. at least one developing arrow points from 𝑌 to 𝑋. 
 
Corollary 3.3.12 
If 𝑌 is a subtype of 𝑋, then 𝑌 has no subtypes; in particular, 𝑋 cannot be a subtype of 𝑌. 
Proof 
If 𝑍 is a subtype of 𝑌 then, by condition ii of Definition 3.3.11, every developing arrow joined to a 
member of 𝑍 is joined to a member of 𝑌.  By the same condition, every developing arrow joined to 
a member of 𝑌 must be joined to a member of 𝑋: this means that 𝑌 cannot have a subtype 𝑍 unless 
𝑍 = 𝑋.   
However, every vertex in 𝒟 must be reachable from a vertex whose strong component is a source 
in 𝒟∗ (by Proposition 2.6i, ii, and iii).  If 𝑋 and 𝑌 are subtypes of each other, then neither type 
contains such a vertex (by condition i of Definition 3.3.11), meaning that every vertex in 𝑋 or 𝑌 
must be reachable from a vertex not in 𝑋 or 𝑌: this contradicts condition ii.∎ 
 
Definition 3.3.13 
Let: 
 𝐴∗ = {𝑎∗ ∈ ℳ∗|𝑖𝑛𝑑𝒟∗(𝑎
∗) = 0} ∪ {𝑎∗ ∈ ℳ∗|(𝑎, 𝑏) or (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈ 𝑁, 𝑏 ∈ ℳ}  
 (that is, the set of all strong components of 𝒟 that are sources and/or contain endpoints of 
 developing arrows); 
 𝐵∗ = {𝑏∗ ∈ ℳ∗\𝐴∗|∃𝑎1
∗ , 𝑎2
∗ ∈ 𝐴∗, 𝑎1
∗ … 𝑏∗, 𝑎2
∗ … 𝑏∗ ∈ 𝐷∗,  𝑎1
∗ … 𝑏∗ ∩ 𝑎2
∗ … 𝑏∗ = {𝑏∗}}  
 (that is, the set of vertices in ℳ∗\𝐴∗ that are reachable from two distinct members of 𝐴∗ 
 by two disjoint paths in 𝒟∗); and 
 𝐶∗ = {𝑐∗ ∈ ℳ∗|∃𝑚∗ ∈ 𝐴∗ ∪ 𝐵∗, 𝑐∗ … 𝑚∗ ∈ 𝒟∗}  
 (that is, the set of all vertices in ℳ∗ that reach any member of 𝐴∗ or 𝐵∗ in 𝒟∗). 
The motivic process digraph (𝐶, 𝑁+) is the subgraph of (ℳ, 𝐷) induced by 
𝐶 = {𝑐 ∈ ℳ|𝑐∗ ∈ 𝐶∗ }. 
 
Corollary 3.3.14 
The motivic process digraph has the following properties: 
i. 𝐴∗ ⊆ 𝐶∗ and 𝐵∗ ⊆ 𝐶∗, but 𝐴∗ ∩ 𝐵∗ = ∅; 
ii. 𝑁 ⊆ 𝑁+; 
-147- 
 
 
  
-1
4
7
- 
iii. 𝐸∗ ⊂ 𝐴∗ (where 𝐸∗ is the set of strong and weak external epiphanies; see Definition 3.2.12); 
iv. a vertex is included in 𝐶∗ if and only if it lies on an undirected path 𝑎1
∗ … 𝑎2
∗ ∈ 𝒟∗, 𝑎1
∗ ≠
𝑎2
∗ ∈ 𝐴∗, that contains no other members of 𝐴∗ and no subpath 𝑚1 → 𝑥 ← 𝑚2 that can be 
replaced with a subpath 𝑚1 ← 𝑦 → 𝑚2 from 𝒟
∗, where if 𝑚1 ∈ 𝑎1
∗ → 𝑥, 𝑚2 ∉ 𝑎2
∗ → 𝑥 (→ 
indicates a directed path); 
v. the mapping that sends every component of (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁) to the type region of its members 
is a bijection; moreover, each component of (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁) contains at least one vertex whose 
strong component is a member of 𝐴∗. 
Proofs 
i. By Definition 2.4, every vertex reaches itself, so all members of 𝐴∗ and 𝐵∗ are included in 
𝐶∗, whereas 𝐵∗ and 𝐴∗ are distinct by definition. 
ii. The strong components of the endpoints of every developing arrow lie in 𝐴∗ (by definition) 
and therefore 𝐶∗ (by part i).  Since every vertex in a strong component in 𝐶∗ lies in 𝐶, and 
𝑁+ is the set of all arrows whose endpoints lie in 𝐶, the set of developing arrows lies in 𝑁+. 
iii. Since the strong components of endpoints of arrows in 𝑁 lie in 𝐴∗, and 𝐼 ⊆ 𝑁 (Theorem 
3.3.10), 𝐸∗ ⊂ 𝐴∗ since every strong or weak external epiphany is a strong component that 
must contain the terminal point of at least one inter-family arrow (𝐼∗, which bridges families 
by Definition 3.2.12, is related to 𝐼 through Proposition 2.6ii).  However, 𝐸∗ ≠ 𝐴∗ as 
ℳmust include at least one vertex whose strong component is a source in 𝒟∗ (Proposition 
2.6i). 
iv. First, if 𝑐∗ ∈ 𝐶∗ then 𝑐∗ reaches some 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴∗ and/or 𝑏∗ ∈ 𝐵∗; we may also note that every 
vertex is reachable from a vertex of indegree 0 (Proposition 2.6i) and therefore a member of 
𝐴∗.  If 𝑐∗ reaches 𝑎∗, since it is also reachable from some 𝑎∗′ ≠ 𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴∗ (𝒟∗ is acyclic), it 
lies on a path as described.  If 𝑐∗ reaches 𝑏∗, 𝑐∗ must be reachable from some 𝑎∗ and 𝑏∗ 
from some 𝑎∗′ ≠ 𝑎∗ (since 𝑏∗ must be reachable from at least 2 distinct members of 𝐴∗), so 
𝑎∗ → 𝑐∗ → 𝑏∗ ← 𝑎∗′ is the required undirected path (which, containing only one receiver, 
has no replaceable subpaths). 
Now suppose 𝑐∗ lies in 𝑃, an undirected path as described: we aim to show that 𝑐∗ must 
reach a member of 𝐴∗ and/or a member of 𝐵∗.  Given that it is impossible to have a path of 
carriers between two transmitters or two receivers, transmitters and receivers must alternate 
in any oriented path, and since each path endpoint is adjacent to only one path arrow, it must 
be either a transmitter or a receiver: every oriented path therefore takes the form 𝑎1
∗ =
𝑇1𝑅1𝑇2𝑅2 … or 𝑎1
∗ = 𝑅1𝑇1𝑅2𝑇2 …, terminating with 𝑎2
∗ = 𝑇𝑛 or 𝑅𝑛.  If 𝑎1
∗ = 𝑅1 and 𝑐
∗ is a 
carrier between 𝑇1 and 𝑅1 then clearly a path exists from 𝑐
∗ to a member of 𝐴∗; similarly, if 
𝑎2
∗ = 𝑅𝑛 and 𝑐
∗ lies between 𝑇𝑛 (or 𝑇𝑛−1 if 𝑎1
∗ = 𝑅1) and 𝑅𝑛 then a path exists from 𝑐
∗ to a 
member of 𝐴∗.  We may restrict our attention, therefore, to paths of the form 
𝑇1𝑅1 … 𝑅𝑛−1𝑇𝑛, which means that no vertex in the path (except, trivially, the endpoints) can 
reach a member of 𝐴∗.  Given that each 𝑅𝑖 is reachable by precisely those vertices between 
𝑇𝑖 and 𝑇𝑖+1 inclusive, if it can be shown that every 𝑅𝑖 is a member of 𝐵
∗, then every 𝑐∗ ∈ 𝑃 
reaches a member of 𝐴∗ and/or 𝐵∗ as required. 
Every transmitter in 𝑃 that is not one of the two endpoints must be reachable in 𝒟∗ from a 
member of 𝐴∗ (of indegree 0; Proposition 2.6i) but may not be a member of 𝐴∗ itself (by 
definition of 𝑃): we label an arbitrary member of 𝐴∗ that reaches 𝑇𝑖 without passing through 
any other members of 𝐴∗ as 𝑎∗(𝑇𝑖).  From the definition of 𝑃, we know that for each 
subpath 𝑇𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 ← 𝑇𝑖+1 there exists no 𝑦 ∈ ℳ
∗ such that 𝑇𝑖 ← 𝑦 → 𝑇𝑖+1 ∈ 𝒟
∗ (provided 
𝑛 > 2; if 𝑛 = 2 then 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 are distinct members of 𝐴
∗ by definition, so 𝑅1 is a member 
of 𝐵∗).  Vertices 𝑎∗(𝑇𝑖) and 𝑎
∗(𝑇𝑖+1) must therefore be distinct, so 𝑎
∗(𝑇𝑖) → 𝑇𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖 and 
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𝑎∗(𝑇𝑖+1) → 𝑇𝑖+1 → 𝑅𝑖 are two distinct paths from two distinct members of 𝐴
∗ leading to 
𝑅𝑖, meaning 𝑅𝑖 ∈ 𝐵
∗ as required. 
v. First note that since 𝐶 ⊆ ℳ and 𝑁+ ⊆ 𝐷, any component of (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁) must be entirely 
contained within a component of (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁) i.e. a single type region.  The function that 
sends each component to the type region(s) of its members is therefore single-valued; we 
seek to prove that it is also injective (i.e. that no two components lie in the same type region) 
and surjective (i.e. that at least one vertex from every type region may be found in (𝐶, 𝑁+ −
𝑁)).   
For the first of these, assume for a contradiction that 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 lie in two different 
components of (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁) but the same type region.  Then an undirected path exists 
between them in (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁) but not (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁), so every undirected path between 𝑚1
∗ 
and 𝑚2
∗  in 𝒟∗ contains at least one member of ℳ∗\𝐶∗ (this conclusion about the 
condensation can be made due to Proposition 2.6ii).  Since 𝑚1
∗ and 𝑚2
∗  must be members of 
𝐶∗, they each lie on an undirected path (whose other vertices are also in 𝐶∗) between two 
members of 𝐴∗ as described in part iv: these four members of 𝐴∗ must be distinct otherwise 
an undirected path with all vertices in 𝐶∗ is created between 𝑚1
∗ and 𝑚2
∗ .  Now consider the 
path formed by taking the undirected path 𝑎1
∗ … 𝑚1
∗ … 𝑚2
∗ … 𝑎2
∗  and replacing every subpath 
forbidden by part iv with its alternative (so 𝑥 → 𝑧 ← 𝑦 becomes 𝑥 ← 𝑤 → 𝑦) until no such 
subpaths remain.  If this path contains no members of 𝐴∗ then we have reached a 
contradiction since 𝑚1
∗ and 𝑚2
∗  are joined by a path in which every member is also a member 
of 𝐶∗ (by part iv); if the path does contain  members of 𝐴∗ then a contradiction is also 
reached since 𝑎1
∗ … 𝑚1
∗ … 𝑎3
∗ , 𝑎3
∗ … 𝑎4
∗ , …, 𝑎𝑛
∗ … 𝑚2
∗ … 𝑎2
∗  are undirected paths as described in 
part iv that link up to give an undirected 𝐶∗-path between 𝑚1
∗ and 𝑚2
∗ .   
For the proof that every type region has at least one vertex in (𝐶, 𝑁+ − 𝑁), it is sufficient to 
show that every type region contains at least one vertex whose strong component is in 𝐴∗.  
For a given type region, if one of its vertices, 𝑎, is an endpoint of an arrow in 𝑁, then 
𝑎∗ ∈ 𝐴∗.  Otherwise, the type region is not only a component of (ℳ, 𝐷 − 𝑁), but also of 
(ℳ, 𝐷): it therefore must contain a strong component that is a source in 𝒟∗ (Proposition 
2.6i) and hence a member of 𝐴∗.∎ 
 
Theorem 3.3.15 
The motivic process digraph can be constructed from 𝒟∗ with the following algorithm: 
1. Set 𝐶∗ = ℳ∗, let 𝐴∗ be fixed as in Definition 3.3.13, and set every vertex in 𝐶∗ as 
unmarked with 𝑂(𝑐) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑(𝑐). 
2. If an unmarked vertex 𝑐 exists in 𝐶∗ such that 𝑂(𝑐) = 0: 
a. If 𝑐 has one parent, 𝑏, and 𝑐 ∉ 𝐴∗, remove 𝑐 from 𝐶∗ and subtract 1 from the value 
of 𝑂(𝑏); otherwise mark 𝑐 with ‘xx’ if 𝑐 ∈ 𝐴∗ or ‘x’ otherwise, and return to step 2.  If 
now 𝑂(𝑏) = 0 set 𝑐 = 𝑏 and repeat a.  Otherwise, return to step 2. 
Otherwise, go to step 3. 
3. If 𝐶∗ contains a vertex 𝑐 marked ‘x’: 
a. Trace a path backwards along the arrows from 𝑐 until a vertex 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴∗ is reached.  
Again starting from 𝑐, perform a reverse depth-first search until all paths leading back 
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from 𝑐 to an already-visited vertex have been tested; if at any point a vertex 𝑎′ ≠ 𝑎 ∈
𝐴∗ is reached, stop the search, mark 𝑐 with ‘xx’, and return to step 3.46  Otherwise, if 
𝑃𝑐 is the set of parents of 𝑐, remove 𝑐 from 𝐶
∗ and subtract 1 from 𝑂(𝑝) for each 
𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑐.  If 𝑂(𝑝) = 0 for any 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑐 , go to step 2; otherwise go to step 3. 
Otherwise, go to step 4. 
4. Let 𝐶 and 𝑁+ be constructed from 𝐶∗ as in Definition 3.3.13. 
Proof 
First, note that in any DAG where all the vertices of outdegree 0 are members of 𝐶∗, all the other 
vertices must also be members of 𝐶∗.  This is because every vertex in a DAG reaches a vertex of 
outdegree 0 (Proposition 2.6i), and every vertex that reaches a member of 𝐶∗ must also be a 
member of 𝐶∗ (since a vertex that reaches a vertex that reaches a member of 𝐴∗ ∪ 𝐵∗ must also 
reach that member of 𝐴∗ ∪ 𝐵∗).  The algorithm therefore works by successively removing vertices 
of outdegree 0 (i.e. 𝑂(𝑎) = 0) from ℳ∗ until all the vertices of outdegree 0 that remain fulfil the 
criteria for membership in 𝐶∗ (in fact, they must fulfil the criteria for membership in 𝐴∗ ∪ 𝐵∗ since 
no vertex in 𝐶∗\𝐴∗ ∪ 𝐵∗ can have outdegree 0).  Once 𝐶∗ has been found, it is straightforward to 
list the members of each of its strong components, and to find the arrows in 𝐷 that have both their 
endpoints in this list (step 4). 
Step 2a sorts any vertex of outdegree 0 into one of three categories: those marked ‘xx’ are members 
of 𝐴∗ and must therefore be retained in 𝐶∗ (Corollary 3.3.14i); those marked ‘x’ have indegree 
greater than or equal to 2 and are therefore potential members of 𝐵∗ (note that membership of 𝐴∗ 
takes precedence over potential membership of 𝐵∗); and all those that remain cannot be in 𝐶∗ since 
(having outdegree 0) they do not reach any member of 𝐴∗, 𝐵∗, or 𝐶∗.  The members of this final 
category must have indegree 1 (since vertices of indegree 0 are members of 𝐴∗ by definition) so 
each vertex that is removed reduces the outdegree of one other vertex by 1; if this creates a vertex 
of outdegree 0, then it can only be retained in 𝐶∗ subject to the categorisation procedure of 2a, and 
so the process loops. 
Once the process reaches step 3, every remaining vertex of outdegree 0 is either a member of 𝐴∗ or 
a potential member of 𝐵∗.  Those in the latter category must be checked to see if two disjoint paths 
from two distinct members of 𝐴∗ can be found, and this is the function of the reverse depth-first 
search in step 3a: if such paths exist, then the vertex is marked ‘xx’ to be retained alongside the 
vertices in 𝐴∗, but otherwise it is removed and its parents’ outdegrees altered accordingly (possibly 
necessitating a return to step 2).  Once every vertex of outdegree 0 has either been removed or 
marked ‘xx’, the vertices that remain will be precisely the members of 𝐶∗ as required.∎ 
                                                     
46 Primogeniture succession is an example of a depth-first search, which finds a longest path before 
backtracking to the most recent junction (Queen Elizabeth II, Prince Charles, Prince William, 
Prince George, Prince Harry, etc. – as of 17 December 2014).  Compare with a breadth-first search, 
which fans out to examine each generation before progressing to the next (Queen Elizabeth II, 
Prince Charles, Prince Andrew, Prince Edward, Princess Anne, Prince William, etc.). 
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Figure 3.22: A segmentation of the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata in F minor, Op. 2, No. 1. 
See n. 1.  This figure is also included on the supplementary CD to facilitate side-by-side comparison with the in-depth discussion in the text. 
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Figure 3.22 continued. 
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Figure 3.23: The full derivation graph for Figure 3.22 with the first five segments magnified. 
The segments shown in bars 5 and 6 have their grace notes encoded to begin before the beat and so have labels beginning 004… and 005… respectively. 
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Figure 3.24: The full type graph for Figure 3.22. 
Connected components (cross-family types) are separated into boxes. 
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4 Mahler’s Sixth Symphony 
Amongst all of Gustav Mahler’s symphonies, there seems to be something about the Sixth that 
analysts and musicologists find irresistible.  Three book-length studies and an appellation of ‘pre-
eminence in Mahler’s ouevre’ from the unavoidable figure of Adorno (‘around whom analytical 
programmes have hovered with varying degrees of frustration and veneration’, according to Jeremy 
Barham) crown countless chapters, articles, and substantial discussions in Mahler biographies.1  To 
cite here only the most recent of these: two of the four case studies in Monahan’s 2008 thesis (and 
forthcoming monograph) are 46- and 49-page discussions (plus musical examples) of the 
symphony’s first and last movements respectively; and although the second of these was published 
as a 43-page double-column article in 2007, Monahan’s 60-page 2011 article on the first movement 
actually advances a significantly new perspective when compared to that which is presented in his 
thesis.2   
In such a crowded marketplace, it seems natural to ask what this chapter hopes to add.  As 
part of this thesis, its primary purpose is to suggest how the model developed in previous chapters 
can be applied in the context of an extended analysis; it aims, therefore, more towards insights 
about the model’s potential than new ground in the field of Mahler studies.  The final section of 
this chapter reflexively examines how the proposed formalisms shift between foreground and 
background in the various analytical modes deployed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and so some patience 
is requested if they momentarily seem overwhelmingly close or vanishingly distant (cf. the 
discussion closing the previous chapter).  That said, any analysis (especially one constructed in sight 
of a new theory) always says something new (as the discussion of “equivalent” models and 
metaphors in Section 1.10 shows) and seeks to confirm, challenge, extend, and nuance a reader’s 
existing conceptualisation of a piece of music.  While this involves, according to Agawu, ‘a fresh 
engagement, a re-enactment, not an aggregation of facts about previous enactments’, this chapter’s 
broader aim is to show that such previous enactments need not be obstacles around which new 
analyses should steer to avoid accusations of duplication: they can, and should, instead be read as 
links in an ongoing chain of suggestive description and performative perception (see Section 1.3) to 
                                                     
1 The three book-length studies are Norman Del Mar, Mahler’s Sixth Symphony: A Study (London: 
Eulenburg, 1980); Hans-Peter Jülg, Gustav Mahlers Sechste Symphonie, Freiburger Schriften zur 
Musikwissenschaft, 17 (Munich: Katzbichler, 1986); and Robert Samuels, Mahler’s Sixth Symphony: A 
Study in Musical Semiotics, Cambridge Studies in Music Theory and Analysis, 6 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).  Adorno’s label (which he assigns to the last movement in 
particular) is found in Mahler, p. 135, while Barham’s comment is from Jeremy Barham, 
‘Introduction’, in Perspectives on Gustav Mahler, ed. by Jeremy Barham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 
xxiii–xxx (p. xxviii). 
2 See Introduction, n. 27, which also lists Monahan, ‘Success and Failure’, pp. 51–54 as a discussion 
of the outer movements of the Sixth. 
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be engaged with dialogically and extended analytically.3  Monahan’s recent, extensive, and 
persuasive analyses are particularly well-suited to this purpose, especially given both his stated 
desire that they be used this way (cited at n. 29 in the Introduction above), and his own predilection 
for reading with and against the observations of his predecessors.  The results of my dialogical 
method – in particular the choice to adopt several of Monahan’s category labels throughout my 
own analysis – are evaluated in Section 4.3. 
 The Sixth Symphony’s fecund potential for reinvention, which makes its performative 
analytical chain a fruitful one to examine, seems to be tied to the work’s relative interpretative 
openness: unlike many of Mahler’s other symphonies, the Sixth was never programmatically glossed 
by its composer, and nor does it include any sung texts or substantial reworked passages from 
previous compositions (Monahan identifies one brief quotation: the chorale in the Finale is derived 
from St Peter’s penitential cry ‘Und sollt’ ich nicht weinen, du gütiger Gott’ in the Wunderhorn 
setting that comprises the fifth movement of the Third Symphony).4  Nevertheless, there are 
certain biographical accretions that have assumed canonical status: the ‘Tragische’ subtitle under 
which Mahler conducted the work at least once; the ‘three blows of fate’ represented by the 
hammer-blows in the Finale and purportedly anticipating events in Mahler’s life; and the portraits 
of the Mahlers’ young children in the ‘arhythmic [sic] games’ of the Scherzo, and of his wife Alma in 
the ‘great soaring theme’ of the first movement.5  Of these, it is the ‘Tragic’ reading that has come 
to define one of two standard critical tropes used to approach the symphony.  Whilst it is 
undoubtedly supported by the brutal effect of the hammer-blows and the affective bleakness of the 
symphony’s ending, its adoption as a quilting point for the work’s multifaceted complexity can 
                                                     
3 Agawu, ‘How We Got Out of Analysis’, p. 274. 
4 See Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 161.  Monahan also suggests that the Sixth’s popularity with 
critics and audiences may stem, in part, from its concordance with ‘the Mahler that postwar 
audiences have constructed in their own image: cynical, knowing, internally conflicted, and immune 
to the untenable promises of fast-fading Romantic ideologies’ (‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 54). 
5 See Henry-Louis de La Grange, Gustav Mahler, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995– ), 
III: Vienna: Triumph and Disillusion (1904–1907) (1999), p. 814, n. 44 for the first of these.  The 
others all originate in (and are quoted here from) Alma’s memoirs (Alma Mahler, Gustav Mahler: 
Memories and Letters, ed. by Donald Mitchell, trans. by Basil Creighton, 2nd edn (London: Murray, 
1968), p. 70) and persist as interpretative strategies despite having been seriously questioned by 
several authors.  The symbolic import of the three hammer-blows is undermined by the fact that 
Mahler initially intended five, and later two; de La Grange also argues that the third blow – Mahler’s 
heart diagnosis – was actually a relatively manageable condition peripheral to the infection that 
killed him, and in any case pales next to the blow of Alma’s admission of infidelity in 1910 (see de 
La Grange, Mahler, III, 813–14, which still maintains that Mahler may have deleted the third 
hammer-blow for superstitious reasons).  That Mahler’s resignation (not dismissal) from the Vienna 
State Opera was a ‘blow’ also seems debatable (as suggested in, for example, Jonathan Carr, The Real 
Mahler (London: Constable, 1997), p. 135).  Regarding the other ‘portrait’ myths, the Mahlers had 
only one very young child while Gustav was composing the Scherzo in the summer of 1903, and it 
is not entirely unproblematic that Mahler should depict his new wife in a ‘Tragic’ symphony 
(Monahan’s 2011 reading of the first movement seeks to reconcile the ‘Tragic’ and ‘Alma’ myths in 
order to pursue their hermeneutic and ‘psychobiographical’ ends; see ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 123). 
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damage the hermeneutic potential of the second trope, which is nevertheless frequently advanced at 
the same time as the first.6 
 This second trope is one of polarity, of extreme contrast and even conflict between (usually 
two) affective zones.7  The narrative potential of binary opposition is by no means unique to this 
work (it is a central component of Karl’s theory of musical narrative, discussed in Section 2.4), but 
the ‘sharp contours’ of the outer movements’ two-block expositions (mirrored by the contrasting 
inner movements) invites an interpretation of the first trope that hinges on conflict and ultimate 
defeat (recall that Almén’s ‘Tragedy’ archetype, again discussed in Section 2.4, is defined as the 
‘defeat of transgression by order’).8  The ‘two-block exposition’ (sometimes called a Dutchman-
exposition after the paradigmatic example of Wagner’s overture) is a term coined by James 
Hepokoski to describe those sonata expositions which dramatise the opposition between their two 
subject areas: the first subject is usually restless, minor-key, and “masculine”, whilst the second 
(occurring after a fairly minimal transition, ‘a mere panning from one tableau to another’) is 
redemptive, major-key, “feminine”, and often apotheosised in the recapitulation or coda.9 
While Monahan pursues an interpretation in terms of gender politics in his 2011 reading of 
the first movement of Mahler’s Sixth (using an earlier article by Hepokoski as a springboard), it is 
worth noting that Hepokoski suggests a number of other binaries that a two-block exposition 
might enact: the examples he gives are ‘tormented hero/redemptive agent; active 
struggle/withdrawal into the erotic; tyrannical oppression/projected political emancipation’.10  The 
last of these certainly has its resonances with the Sixth: it chimes with the uniquely twentieth-
century subjectivity ascribed to Mahler’s character by postwar audiences (see n. 4), and respects 
Adorno’s near-canonical portrait of the Sixth as ‘[t]he totality that sanctions for its own glory the 
destruction of the individual’.11  Monahan neatly surveys the specific interpretations that have been 
                                                     
6 ‘Quilting point’ is a term from the work of Jacques Lacan (literally point de capiton, ‘upholstery 
button’; see Harper-Scott, Quilting Points, p. 7) referring to a single ‘master signifier’ (p. 8) adopted as 
a means of explaining other, ‘floating’ (p. 8), signifiers: ‘lines painted on the ground and a scattering 
of nets, balls, and rackets are meaningless until quilted by the idea “tennis”, for instance’ (p. 7).   
7 Monahan also identifies two tropes, but these both fall under my first: the symphony as 
‘consummate essay in negativity or cynicism’ (‘Narratives’, I, 104), or as ‘the downfall of some tragic 
hero’ (ibid., p. 105; see also ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, pp. 53–54).  Samuels notes Constantin 
Floros’s implied refusal to resolve the symphony’s polarities: ‘since all human life is here, there is no 
need to see the negative episodes as having the last word’ (p. 80). 
8 See Almén, ‘Narrative Archetypes’, p. 18.  The phrase ‘sharp contours’, as it applies to ‘symphonic 
formalism’, is Adorno’s (Mahler, p. 93). 
9 James Hepokoski, ‘Beethoven Reception: The Symphonic Tradition’, in The Cambridge History of 
Nineteenth-Century Music, ed. by Jim Samson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; repr. 
2002), pp. 424–59 (p. 448). 
10 ‘Beethoven Reception’, p. 448.  See also Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 146, which cites James 
Hepokoski, ‘Masculine–Feminine’, Musical Times, 135 (1994), 494–99. 
11 Adorno, Mahler, p. 97.  Some of the more explicitly Adorno-inspired analyses of the Sixth include 
Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’; de La Grange, Mahler, III, 808–41; Samuels; and Bernd 
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attached to the symphony’s suggestive polarity: ‘I have read the Sixth as the ascension of the 
masculine over the feminine, but we can just as easily hear it as a triumph of death over life (with 
[Donald] Mitchell), of unfreedom over freedom (with Adorno), of aggression over compassion 
(with [Stefan] Hanheide), of fate over defiance (with Alma) or alienation over acceptance (with 
[Henry-Louis] de La Grange), and so on.’12 
 This concept of heightened contrast or polarity has implications beyond the intra-
movement plots set in motion by the two-block expositions: it serves as a binding agent for the 
symphony in both a direct way and a more abstract way.  First, this symphony is unusual in 
Mahler’s output in that it includes an unambiguous “motto” theme, first heard at bar 57 of the first 
movement and repeated with very little variation a further 21 times (according to Robert Samuels’s 
tabulation) throughout the symphony.13  It embeds a crucial polarity in that its only melodic 
material is a shift from the third of a major triad to the third of a minor triad; on its last appearance 
(the final sonority of the piece and an excellent illustration of just how important single-note 
motives can be), the major triad is absent completely.  This somewhat crude example of a standard 
“cyclic” technique is merely, observes de La Grange, ‘the most obvious’ in ‘a list of parallels 
between the opening Allegro and the Finale [that] is impossible to draw up exhaustively’; these 
parallels, coupled with similarities in the movements’ affective and formal profiles, invite a 
comparison that leads to a second, more dialectical, understanding of the function of polarity in the 
symphony as a whole.14 
In this second understanding, the clarity of the first movement’s sonata form (complete 
with repeat marks at the end of the exposition)15 invites a reading of the Finale in which, as 
                                                                                                                                                           
Sponheuer, Logik des Zerfalls: Untersuchungen zum Finalproblem in den Symphonien Gustav Mahlers 
(Tutzing: Schneider, 1978) (the last of which is ‘more or less adopted wholesale’ by Jülg, according 
to Samuels, p. 79). 
12 ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 172.  These are all examples of writers transforming similar understandings 
of potential meaning into actualised meanings: see Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, pp. 181–
86, and Chapter 1 at n. 25 above. 
13 See Samuels, p. 160 and notes 42, 45, 92, 93, and 102 below.  Peter Brown considers this 
symphony to be ‘Mahler’s most blatantly cyclic effort’ (A. Peter Brown, The Symphonic Repertoire, 5 
vols (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002– ), IV: The Second Golden Age of the Viennese 
Symphony (2003), p. 655). 
14 See de La Grange, Mahler, III, 817.  Julian Horton has argued that, in ‘all of his nine completed 
symphonies’, Mahler’s motivic technique shuns superficial cyclic repetition but constantly 
references other movements and other works in more mutable ways, ‘question[ing] the notion of 
inter-movement unification even as it references its guiding method’ (Julian Horton, ‘Cyclical 
Thematic Processes in the Nineteenth-Century Symphony’, in The Cambridge Companion to the 
Symphony, ed. by Julian Horton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 190–231 (p. 
219)).  This self-negating aspect of Mahler’s approach to repetition is characteristic of Adorno’s 
thought, and in particular his concept of the variant, those ‘always different yet identical figures’ that 
saturate Mahler’s music (Mahler, p. 86; see also Sections 4.2 below and 2.1 above). 
15 The repeat marks not only generate potential for dialectic engagement, but also for confusion 
over bar numbering: I treat the first-time bracket as bars 123–27, such that bar 128 coincides with 
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Samuels puts it, ‘form is in some sense primary [to its] semiotic process’; more colourfully, Adorno 
writes that the Finale ‘melts the crust of form, which the first movement had hardened dialectically,  
as if whole geographic regions were glowing volcanically and their settlements were pitching into 
each other in a river of fire’.16  The Finale’s complexities are therefore offset (dialectically) against 
the relative simplicity of both the opening movement’s form and the generic sonata model it 
evokes; but when gestures which can only be read as structural markers are undermined by their 
voice-leading contexts and thereby ‘simultaneously insis[t] on and den[y] a reading’, the Symphony 
‘confront[s] the institution within which it situates itself’ and the result, for Adorno, is no less than 
‘the end of the symphonic sonata, or […] the end of the order that bore the sonata’.17 
4.1 The First Movement 
How do these polarities – thematic, affective, tonal, and formal – play themselves out in the 
motivic structures of the symphony’s outer movements?18  A convenient starting-point is 
Monahan’s motivic segmentation of the first movement’s primary theme, reproduced alongside my 
own in Figure 4.1.19  These two interpretations are in broad agreement as segmentations of a 
syntagmatic chain; the major difference here is one of hierarchical level, with Monahan tending to 
group similar successive segments together rather than making their internal derivational 
relationships more explicit (Monahan’s P1.1, for example, refers to the same music that I split into 
                                                                                                                                                           
rehearsal number 14, and have amended all cited bar references to match this scheme.  This is 
Monahan’s practice in his thesis, but his 2011 articles assign bar 123 to RN14 (in the figures and 
examples, at least; a correction to his ‘Alma’ article had to be issued in the subsequent issue of the 
journal to ask readers to subtract 5 from all numbers above 122 in the text (see Journal of the 
American Musicological Society, 64 (2011), 470)).  Given that the first-time bracket is nearly identical to 
the opening, I have treated it as part of the repeat and therefore not included any of its segments in 
my analysis; nor have I listed every segment in the repeated section twice. 
16 Samuels, p. 65; Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Mahler Today’, trans. by Susan H. Gillespie, in Essays on 
Music, ed. by Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 603–11 (p. 609). 
17 Samuels, p. 86 ‘insis[t]’, ‘confront[s]’; Adorno, ‘Mahler Today’, p. 609 ‘the end’. 
18 Throughout this and the following section, every effort has been made to include figures and 
annotated score excerpts for local processes discussed in detail: these have been processed from 
Gustav Mahler, Symphonie Nr. 6 in vier Sätzen für grosses Orchester [Score], ed. by Erwin Ratz, Sämtliche 
Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 6, rev. edn (Lindau: Kahnt, 1963), but Monahan’s annotated 
short scores have also proved invaluable (see ‘Narratives’, II, 386–413 and 490–532).  Dynamic 
markings and most cautionary accidentals have been omitted, but articulation marks have been 
retained where possible; and needless to say, a selective attitude towards the reduction of Mahler’s 
complex textures has been necessary.  Discussions of longer-ranging processes necessarily cite bar 
numbers (see n. 15 above), and the reader is urged to follow these up to fully comprehend the 
arguments being made and to situate them within the symphony as a whole.  Finally, the graphs, 
tables, and charts used in constructing these analyses are available on the supplementary CD. 
19 Monahan’s chief theoretical orientation is Hepokoski and Darcy’s Sonata Theory, which uses 
P(rimary) and S(econdary) as labels for what might traditionally be called first and second 
subjects/key areas.  One should be aware, however, that P and S are defined stipulatively (such that, 
for example, the two areas must be separated by a mid-exposition break called a medial caesura, 
which can take a variety of different cadential forms): see Hepokoski and Darcy, especially pp. 16–
18 and 23–29. 
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the progression 006|A4→006|C5).  This kind of informal grouping is heuristically useful, but can 
hide aspects of the motivic story being told: this, in turn, can affect an assessment of the music’s 
formal and tonal processes. 
 To illustrate this concretely, consider the movement’s brief introduction, reproduced in 
Figure 4.2.  Its stubborn insistence on a tonic pedal and lack of any clear dominant harmony make 
it difficult to read as a structural upbeat to the arrival of the A minor primary theme at bar 6.  As 
such, existing analyses tend to see it doing little more than establishing an affective ground (Adorno 
speaks of the movement’s ever-present ‘soundless march rhythm’) for the movement to unfold 
against: for Norman Del Mar it ‘sets the march-like character’; for de La Grange it ‘symbolizes the 
                                                     
20 Adapted from Figure 4.3 in Monahan, ‘Narratives’, II, 314; he labels his figure ‘Primary Theme 
(P) Motive Index’. 
 
Figure 4.1: The primary theme area of the first movement in my segmentation 
(square brackets) and Monahan’s (dotted slurs, P1.1–P1.8).20 
Only segments which fall in one of Monahan’s motives and/or begin a type region are 
included; the latter are in bold typeface, and are surrounded by a box if they also 
begin a new family.  See also Figure 4.3. 
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determination of the “hero”’ whose story we are about to hear; and for Egon Gartenberg it opens 
up a vista of ‘a march of symphonic breadth’.21  This static, scene-setting quality is certainly borne 
out by the aforementioned tonic pedal and segment 002|C4, which remains centred on the chordal 
third of A minor and touches on 2̂ only very briefly.  An escape bid is made by 002|E4, which 
introduces the chordal fifth, ascends rather than descends, and, crucially, does not return to its 
opening note, becoming melodically open rather than closed.  This open ascent becomes sequential 
transposition, outlining a melodic minor 5̂–6̂–7̂ in its chromatic climb; the energy of this is briefly 
dammed again by threefold repetition in bars 4–5 (accompanied by a crescendo) before finally 
discharging onto the A of bar 6. 
 Simultaneously, the ascending 002|E4 is inverted to 003|E4, which seeks to mirror the 
upwards motion towards the tonic through the exertion of a downwards pressure on 002|C4 in 
order to complete a 3̂–2̂–1̂ descent.  Again through transposition E–D becomes D–C by bar 5, but 
the crucial C–B and B–A are missing until the octave-leap fulfilment of the ascending pattern 
assists its descending counterpart by prefixing C–B–A to create 006|C5.  The stalled downwards 
tendency of 2̂ in 002|C4 is thus finally fulfilled by 006|C5, and this is made possible by 006|A4 as 
the fulfilment of the “escaped” 002|E4.  In this way, the harmonically static introduction 
motivically reinforces a sense of arrival on the octave-leap As in bar 6 (one approached from above, 
and the other from below, starting from C4).  This is an introductory function which is not 
immediately apparent in a purely harmonic reading, nor in a reading which smoothes over the 
progression from 006|A4 to 006|C5.  
 If heuristic groupings of motivic segments can obscure local processes, possibly with 
significant formal implications, then we might ask what effect these groupings have on the 
formation of larger-scale categories.  Figure 4.3 lists every new type region to appear in bars 6–21, 
adds in any of Monahan’s motives not already included, and gives the percentage of the 
movement’s segments that belong to each new category at all applicable hierarchical levels (recall 
                                                     
21 Adorno, Mahler, p. 161; Del Mar, p. 34; de La Grange, Mahler, III, 821; Egon Gartenberg, Mahler: 
The Man and His Music (London: Cassell; New York: Schirmer, 1978), p. 307. 
 
Figure 4.2: Motivic processes in the introduction to the first movement (bars 1–5). 
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that a new family or type necessitates a new type region, that a new cross-family type or set of 
siblings necessitates a new type or family respectively, and that a new set of cousins necessitates a 
new set of siblings; see Theorem 3.3.10 and Corollary 3.2.15).  The first row tells us, for example, 
that 006|A4 is the source of a family incorporating 4.2% of the movement’s segments; of these, 
3.8% (of the movement, equivalent to 90.6% of the family) lie in its type region (the only one in its 
type), and 81.9% of the movement lies in its cross-family type (which is actually begun by 002|C4, 
not shown in the table – hence the square brackets). 
 Figure 4.3 clarifies an understanding (suggested above) of Monahan’s ‘motive index’ as a 
segmentation of the first subject area rather than an efficient listing of the movement’s most 
recurrent motivic ideas.22  Some of his motives betray a degree of internal self-similarity (P1.4 can be 
                                                     
22 This is not how Monahan himself sees the index, which he claims identifies the ‘Spartan stock of 
basic motives’ underlying ‘a tour-de-force of Mahlerian developing variation’ (‘Narratives’, I, 119); 
in the light of the discussion below, his claim seems untenable. 
  C.S.F C S F XT.T.TR XT T TR 
P1.1 
006|A4 S2 - - 4.2% 1.2.1 [81.9%] 3.8% 3.8% 
006|C5 4.1.1 6.9% 4.3% 4.3% 1.3.1  3.3% 2.6% 
P1.2 008|A5 S3 - - 7.4% 1.49.1  1.8% 0.8% 
P1.3 009|A4 S4 - - 1.3% 1.5.1  0.5% 0.3% 
P1.4 
010|A4     1.6.1  0.7% 0.7% 
011|D6 S5 - - 3.9% 1.7.1  3.9% 3.9% 
012|A5         
012|D5         
 
011|G#5 S6 - - 4.4% 2.1.1 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 
012|C#4     3.1.1 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 
 014|B3 [S1] - - [21.2%] [1.1.1]  [1%] [0.4%] 
P1.5 
014|E5     [1.4.1]  [10.2%] [4.6%] 
015|A5     1.18.1  1.2% 1.2% 
P1.6 019|A5     4.1.1 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
P1.1* 
020|G#4         
020|F5 4.2.1  2.6% 0.5% 1.8.1  0.5% 0.5% 
P1.1VAR 025|A4 5.1.1 11% 0.3% 0.3% 1.50.1  0.3% 0.3% 
P1.7 034|Bb3 [5.2.1]  [8.9%] [8.9%] 1.13.1  8.1% 7.8% 
P1.8 034|D4     1.11.1  0.1% 0.1% 
* not explicitly labelled by Monahan 
Figure 4.3: Category sizes for Monahan’s first-movement P-motives (see Figure 4.1) 
and any other segments in bars 6–21 that begin new type regions. 
The type region label for each segment that begins a new type region is listed in the 
‘XT.T.TR’ column.  Percentages then indicate how many of the movement’s segments 
belong to this type region (final column), and to any new categories at higher levels 
that the segment also initiates (the ‘T’ count includes subtypes, and the ‘C.S.F’ column 
lists the labels of new families; see Section 3.2, Section 3.3, and Figure 3.16 for an 
explanation of this labelling hierarchy).  Square brackets indicate categories that have 
already appeared in the piece, but in segments not listed in the table, and dashes 
indicate that source families cannot, by definition, have cousins or siblings. 
 
 
-162- 
 
  
split into an 𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏 format – as it has been in my analysis, with all the 𝑏s belonging to the same type 
region), hiding, as demonstrated with respect to P1.1=006|A4→006|C5 above, part of the 
movement’s motivic story.  If we accept that Monahan’s labels as categories are adequately 
modelled by my own formal structures at some level – in other words, that the set of segments in 
the piece that Monahan would label ‘P1.2’ is close enough to some category (say, the type region, or 
the family) formed around my 008|A5 – then we can see that their levels of recurrence vary quite 
considerably.23  The families built around the two segments that make up P1.1 constitute roughly 
equal proportions of the movement, but the type regions do not; P1.7 initiates the largest type region 
in the movement, while the type region containing P1.3 appears only once again (as segment 
402|A4); and certain category-establishing segments in bars 6–21 are not included in Monahan’s 
list.  Neither Monahan’s categories nor my own therefore demonstrate evenness of size or 
significance (properties which are not always correlated: the family of the motto rhythm’s first 
appearance, 057|A2, contains only 2.2% of the movement’s segments); the differences between the 
two interpretations lie in the explicitness of their membership criteria, and the sharpness with which 
categories are distinguished from individual segments. 
The label ‘P1.2’ is a convenient shorthand which, in the manner of archetype 1 from Section 
2.2, indexes a whole cluster of related segments using the paradigmatic example in bars 8–9.  While 
this makes it more readily apprehensible to a reader than ‘type region 1.49.1’, such a label blurs the 
line between segment and category and stamps all of its members with connotations of the primary 
subject area.  These connotations, however, are not always appropriate, since while much of the 
motivic material introduced here is certainly ‘primary’ to the movement, it is not necessarily 
restricted to, or even particularly strongly associated with, those areas of the movement’s structure 
allotted to the first subject. 
To illustrate this, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 construct versions of Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3 
for the movement’s secondary theme.  Perhaps their most striking property is the lack of square 
brackets in Figure 4.5: this means that all the motivic material in the paradigmatic statement of S 
(and, indeed, the entire S-section, bars 76–128) is either new, or derived from the paradigmatic 
statement of P in bars 6–21.  Of the former, it is only Monahan’s S1.1 (my 076|A5) and S1.2 (my 
078|G5) that initiate new categories of any significance; of these, the latter is the S-theme’s only  
                                                     
23 It is difficult to reconstruct Monahan’s categories entirely due to the problems outlined in 
Section 2.3: does P1.1VAR (in bar 25 of Figure 4.1) belong to the same category as P1.1, for example, 
or is Monahan simply pointing out a freer parallelism?  This reaches its familiar ad absurdum 
conclusion when a dotted line under S1.1 in his secondary theme index (see Figure 4.4) indicates a 
parallelism with P1.2 – to which category, then, does that segment belong?  The approach taken here 
– essentially to extrapolate from Monahan’s segment labels using my own model – is not perfect, 
but seems preferable to indulging in the highly speculative exercise of guessing how Monahan 
would segment the entire movement. 
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source.  (Nine of the fifteen other new type regions contain a single segment, and the other six 
contain between two and four.)  The head-motive of the “Alma” theme, the motive that one would 
therefore expect to function most clearly as an icon for the second subject throughout the 
movement, is, as Monahan points out, closely related to P1.2.  While its status as a head-motive does 
tip its associative balance in the favour of the second, rather than the first, subject, it is interesting 
                                                     
24 Adapted from Figure 4.6 in Monahan, ‘Narratives’, II, 319. 
 
Figure 4.4: Segmentations of the first movement’s secondary theme (cf. Figure 4.1).24 
 In addition to the conventions of Figure 4.1, Monahan’s parallels to the P-theme are 
marked with dotted lines. 
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to note that 15 of its family’s 57  members (26%) occur outside those sections of the movement 
that Monahan designates to be based on S material.25 
 The exposition’s transitional section (TR in Sonata Theory nomenclature – not to be 
confused with the abbreviation for ‘type region’ in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5) has frequently 
attracted attention for its detached aloofness from the sonata processes unfolding around it.  Its 
chorale topic ‘cannot lead anywhere’ according to Adorno, and its failure to adequately prepare the 
tonal ground for the second subject (it remains resolutely in A minor) enhances the second 
subject’s ‘sensation as character’; for Monahan (citing a remark by Hepokoski), the music ‘seems 
merely to “compose out” the silence of the medial caesura’, preserving the two-block exposition, 
                                                     
25 I follow the formal overview given as Figure 1 in ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 125, which mostly 
replicates Figure 4.1 from ‘Narratives’, II, 312 (subject to the change in bar numbering outlined in 
n. 15).  When Monahan reproduces the figure again, albeit with the development omitted, as 
Example 8 in ‘Success and Failure’, p. 52, the final section (bars 426–end) is labelled ‘S’ rather than 
‘Episode Two(S/TR)’, further emphasising the “S-ness” of this music.  The 15 non-S segments 
occur in P-based sections – so the motive never appears in the purely TR(ansitional) bars 61–77 
and 341–53. 
  C.S.F C S F XT.T.TR XT T TR 
S1.1 076|A5     1.9.2  3.4% 2.7% 
S1.2 078|G5 S12 - - 5.1% 1.20.1  4.2% 4.2% 
 083|A4     1.21.1  0.1% 0.1% 
S1.3 086|G5 8.1.1 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 1.22.1  0.4% 0.4% 
 087|Bb5 8.1.2   0.1% 1.23.1  0.1% 0.1% 
 088|F6 8.2.1  0.4% 0.4% 1.24.1  0.4% 0.4% 
 089|Bb6 7.1.1 1.2% 0.1% 0.1% 1.25.1  0.1% 0.1% 
S1.4 
089|E6         
089|C#6         
090|G#5         
090|E5         
090|G#4     3.1.2   0.1% 
 090|G6 7.3.1  0.1% 0.1% 1.26.1  0.1% 0.1% 
 090|E6 7.4.1  0.1% 0.1% 1.27.1  0.1% 0.1% 
 090|F#4     1.28.1  0.4% 0.4% 
S2.1 
090|B4     1.29.1  0.7% 0.5% 
091|D5         
 091|G4     1.3a.1   0.5% 
 092|E4     1.3.2   0.1% 
“P1.7” 092|G5         
 093|A3     1.30.1  0.1% 0.1% 
 094|A4     1.29a.1   0.1% 
 095|D5     1.31.1  0.3% 0.3% 
Figure 4.5: New categories, Monahan’s S-motives, and associated percentages for 
bars 76–98 of the first movement (cf. Figure 4.3). 
All other categories within this range appear for the first time in Figure 4.3. 
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and for Samuels, ‘the use of a clearly non-symphonic genre (the chorale) precisely at this moment, 
which is so crucial to the symphonic process, foregrounds the artificiality of the choice’.26 
Monahan reads the chorale’s inertia as the fallout of a rupture created by the first 
appearance of the motto; in particular, he observes that ‘[o]nly eight of the thirty-two notes in the 
soprano voice are not involved in some semitonal descent’ (i.e. that they take on the motto’s 
melodic shape).27  This association between a symbol of fate or tragedy (here the motto) and a 
transitional chorale theme is writ large in the Finale by the hammer-blows; the third blow, that 
which ‘fells [the hero]’ (as Gustav via Alma has it), is the only one to coincide with the motto, 
purging its major chord and initiating the symphony’s dying utterances.28  Aside from the motto 
and the pizzicato remnants of the first subject’s opening segments, two other families corresponding 
to the first two two-bar phrases of the chorale are found here; originally, three were identified, but 
the third segment (bars 67–68) remained unconnected to anything else in the movement in my 
analysis and so was found to be non-motivic (see Definition 3.1.7).29  These two source families, 
and all of the composite families derived from at least one of them, occur during six passages in the 
                                                     
26 Adorno, ‘Centenary Address’, pp. 108, 109; Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 147, n. 76; Samuels, p. 
145.  Other comments include de La Grange’s label of ‘odd, expressionless’ (Mahler, III, 821) and 
Johnson’s ‘dissociated’ (Julian Johnson, Mahler’s Voices: Expression and Irony in the Songs and Symphonies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 192); Floros’s claim that it ‘rests […] within itself’ 
(Constantin Floros, Gustav Mahler: The Symphonies, trans. by Veron Wicker (Portland: Amadeus 
Press, 1993; repr. Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1994), p. 167); and Del Mar’s assertion that it ‘plays no 
part in the argument’ (p. 35).  Topically, Del Mar sees it symbolising ‘calm faith even under severest 
adversity’ (ibid.) and Hans Eggebrecht as an ‘intrusion from above’ (Hans Heinrich  Eggebrecht, 
Die Musik Gustav Mahlers (Munich: Piper, 1982), p. 113, quoted in Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 123, n. 
34), but these interpretations contrast sharply with Williamson’s ‘secularized’ (John Williamson, 
‘The Development of Mahler’s Symphonic Technique with Special Reference to the Compositions 
of the Period 1899–1905’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, 1975), p. 115, quoted 
in Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 123) and Monahan’s ‘archaic […] whiff of the sacred’ in a marriage 
ritual that joins the two gendered subject areas only nominally (‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 147, n. 76).  
This is a good example of how taking the idea of tragedy as a quilting point can affect a reading of a 
passage that others might see as hopeful or innocuous, potentially neglecting the work’s defining 
contrasts and polarities by seeking to resolve them into an overarching scheme. 
27 ‘Narratives’, I, 123, n. 35. 
28 Alma Mahler, p. 70; it was this third hammer-blow, in bar 783 of the Finale, that was deleted by a 
supposedly superstitious Mahler after the publication of the first edition (see n. 5 above).   The 
symbolic status of the motto is canonical: to cite just a few examples, its rhythm and major–minor 
fall are ‘Fate motifs’ for Del Mar (p. 24), ‘tragic symbols’ for Floros (Symphonies, p. 167), ‘the 
“tragic” theme’ for Gartenberg (p. 307), and ‘the tragedy motif’ for Michael Kennedy (Michael 
Kennedy, Mahler, The Master Musicians Series (London: Dent, 1974; repr. 1978), p. 118); Peter 
Brown also sees the fall as an allusion to the coda of the ‘Todtenfeier’ first movement of the Second 
Symphony (p. 656).  The allegiances between the motto, chorale, and hammer-blow (and the 
chorale-derived hammer-blow theme) are explored further in Section 4.2, where it is argued that 
they together represent a crucial third agent suppressed in Monahan’s reading. 
29 Of course, ‘unconnected’ is relative, in this symphony in particular; the three notes C–A–B are 
prominent in this movement (cf. 006|C5’s C–B–A) and the Finale (cf. 017|B3’s B–C–A, a 
retrograde inversion; see also n. 67).  Still, they fall short of being ‘a short, recognisably recurrent 
melodic gestalt’ (Definition 1) within the context of this movement. 
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movement: one during the exposition, three during the development, one during the recapitulation, 
and one during the coda. 
The five post-expositional passages might be read as an attempt for this music to fulfil the 
transitional role that it failed to play in the exposition.  It serves in the development as both the 
gateway to (bars 210–20) and from (bars 244–47) the idealised ‘fantasy projection’ of the S-theme 
(bars 222–43), which ‘unfolds within a finely-spun contrapuntal texture […] unspoiled by Strauss’s 
high-industrial orchestra’.30  Monahan has the first of these passages ‘sleepwalking’ through a 
dreamlike re-enactment of the exposition, and the second attempting to take ‘some critical “insight” 
[…] back down from the Alpine heights’ after an all-too-fleeting ‘confrontation with eternity’.31  
Within the context of a Mahlerian Klangfläche (‘sound-plane’ usually connoting nature; the term is 
Dahlhaus’s), the chorale makes a virtue of the very stasis that seemed so out-of-place in the 
exposition.32  The celesta countermelody that accompanies and then extends the Moses-like return 
from the mountain (bars 244–55; the three source families introduced appear nowhere else in the 
movement) suggests that the chorale has indeed been changed by its experience.33  Sure enough, 
when the chorale appears for the fourth time to lead into the recapitulation it is subjected to basic 
development: diminution (bars 276–77), sequential iteration (F in bar 270, D in bar 276, F in bar 
279, and F in bar 283), interval change, and liquidation as the first phrase is heard independently of 
the second (bars 279 and 283). 
It is, however, the chorale’s appearance in the recapitulation, as shown in Figure 4.6, that 
truly realises its developmental potential.34  The skeletal pizzicati that accompanied the chorale in 
                                                     
30 Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 138; here Monahan borrows the term ‘fantasy projection’ from Warren 
Darcy, ‘Rotational Form, Teleological Genesis, and Fantasy-Projection in the Slow Movement of 
Mahler’s Sixth Symphony’, Nineteenth-Century Music, 25 (2001–02), 49–74. 
31 ‘Narratives’, I, 139 ‘sleepwalking’; p. 140 ‘insight’, ‘confrontation’.  The ‘Alpine heights’ are 
suggested by the cowbells and Mahler’s comments on them (albeit in relation to their role in the 
Seventh Symphony), symbolising ‘the loneliness of being far away from the world’ and evoking ‘a 
sound of nature, echoing from a great distance […] as though [one] stood on the highest peak, in 
the face of eternity’ (see Constantin Floros, Gustav Mahler, 3 vols (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel, 
1977–85), I: Die geistige Welt Gustav Mahlers in systematischer Darstellung, pp. 323, 430, quoted in Floros, 
Symphonies, p. 165). 
32 See Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth-Century Music, trans. by J. Bradford Robinson, California Studies in 
Nineteenth-Century Music, 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 307; Robinson 
translates the term as ‘sound-sheet’.  Adorno cites this same passage as an example of ‘extra-
territorial’, time-arresting Suspension (Mahler, p. 41; see also Chapter 2 at n. 124 above). 
33 The melody is, in fact, suggested in bars 216–18; but it is unmarked by the accents of bars 244–
46 and is not stated independently (as it is at bars 250–55), suggesting that it is part of the general 
sonic background here and not yet strictly motivic.  Perhaps it, too, is changed by its journey up the 
mountain? 
34 This reading is hinted at by de La Grange when he considers the recapitulation’s transition to be 
‘influenced by the “nature” episode in the development’ (Mahler, III, 824), but he does not pursue 
the relationship any further than a correspondence in texture and orchestration.  Interestingly, 
when comparing recapitulation to exposition, de La Grange discusses the transition’s modifications 
‘in particular’ (ibid.) and devotes only half a sentence to the second subject, whereas Del Mar 
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the exposition are still present, but their thematic material shadows the chorale rather than 
representing the aftershock of the first subject.  After a brief intervening passage unconnected to 
anything else in the movement (bars 343–48), these two-note shadows take on a third note as the 
chorale incipit is repeated; in bar 353, the shadows are substantial enough to stand alone, forming 
the call to which the first few notes of the second subject are the response.  Perhaps disoriented by 
the transition’s newly-found effectiveness, the second subject does not ‘burs[t] in’ as before (in Del 
Mar’s phrase (p. 39)) but gradually assembles a substantially truncated repetition (in the “wrong” 
key) characterised variously as ‘protracted, groping’, ‘linger[ing] to reflect on its experiences in the 
development’, ‘an act of passive-aggressive retaliation’ against ‘its role as a mere functionary in the 
sonata’s master plan’, or ‘still distracted by fantasy’ – all by Monahan alone.35 
The final appearance of the chorale, in the movement’s closing peroration (bars 458–61), is 
a little more cryptic.  Monahan reads the close of the development as a ‘field of open conflict’ 
                                                                                                                                                           
reverses this and considers the transition to be ‘virtually identical’ when set alongside the ‘major 
change’ undergone by the second subject (p. 39). 
35 ‘Narratives’, I, 143 ‘groping’; ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 152 ‘linger[ing]’; p. 53 the rest.  Del Mar notes 
that the second subject ‘emerges most subtly out of the repeating phrases of [the chorale]’ (p. 39), 
and Samuels that the orchestration and motivic material serve to smooth rather than delineate the 
transition’s boundaries in the recapitulation (p. 146; see n. 43 below).  He also argues that this 
constitutes ‘the longest “developmental” passage in the movement’ (p. 146) after a largely modular 
development section, and that while reserving development of the second subject for the 
recapitulation is nothing new, ‘it is usually part of the integration of the material into the tonic’ (p. 
147).  The section, in its proposal and subsequent denial of a sonata-form reading, is therefore 
another instance of the symphony’s self-negating formal dialectic. 
 
Figure 4.6: The ‘developing’ transition in the first-movement recapitulation, bars 
349–56. 
Only the most relevant segments are highlighted here. 
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between TR and P (in particular P1.7) as the latter abruptly rebukes the former for attempting to 
reverse the normative expositional order (labelled, by Sonata Theory, the ‘rotational order’): P (bar 
128) – TR (bar 201) – S (bar 222) is reflected around S and becomes the path back down the 
mountain, TR (bar 239) – P (bar 256).36  Once the chorale has been ‘overwhelmed’ and 
‘submerg[ed]’ (Del Mar’s terms; see p. 39), the recapitulation can continue in its expected order; 
beginning, of course, with the triumphant P.  The coda (as a ‘recomposition of the [development]’) 
further underlines this “correction” by presenting the elements involved in the conflict in their 
normative order: this revokes their connotations of a journey away from S, which has become 
‘liberat[ed]’, in part, by the mercenary P1.7.37 
The chorale as it appears in the coda – three-part trombones, two-bar phrasing, both 
halves together with no sequential treatment – seems to have reverted to its pre-mountain form, 
and thus works against a reading which sees it emerging unscathed by the retransitional battle to 
finally fulfil its intended purpose in the recapitulation.  But perhaps its very triumph as a transition 
is its tragedy, since the purpose of a transition is to lose its identity to the themes on both sides: its 
skeletal countermelodies in the exposition and recapitulation point backwards to P and forwards to 
S respectively, and its submergence by P in the retransition is matched by its burial as an almost 
negligible contrapuntal detail in the fevered excitement of S in the coda.  Its wish was granted on its 
journey up the mountain – it learned how to become a transition – but only through experience 
have the tragic consequences of this made themselves clear.38  If we read P as an antagonistic 
reinforcer of hegemony and S as a bid for freedom (as it seems reasonable to do: they represent 
Gustav and Alma respectively in Monahan’s 2011 ‘marriage’ reading of the first movement, and 
totality and individualism respectively in his analysis of the Finale) then, as Monahan points out, the 
re-establishment of the rotational order is good for both P and S (as the former achieves its goal 
while the latter is given ‘the final word’).39  The suppression of the chorale’s attempt at reversal is 
                                                     
36 See Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 139–41 (p. 141 ‘field’).  The concept of form as a continual 
recycling of large-scale ‘rotational’ blocks is explored in relation to this symphony (and to the 
Andante in particular) by Darcy, ‘Rotational Form’. 
37 See Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 141‘liberat[ed]’; p. 144 ‘recomposition’; p. 146; and II, 320. 
38 The darker side of this music is hinted at by Schoenberg, who writes of its ‘cool, icy comfort 
from a height which is reached only by one who soars to resignation; only he can hear it who 
understands what heavenly voices whisper without animal warmth’ (Arnold Schoenberg, ‘Gustav 
Mahler’, trans. by Dika Newlin, in S&I, pp. 449–72 (p. 457)).  The passage’s double-faced nature is 
examined in more detail in the next section. 
39 See Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 147 and ‘“I Have Tried”’; his characterisation of the Finale’s themes 
is painted in broad strokes here (but unpacked further in Section 4.2 below) and agrees with other 
authors’ readings of their affective and topical profiles (see, for example, Stephen E. Hefling, ‘Song 
and Symphony (II). From Wunderhorn to Rückert and the Middle-Period Symphonies: Vocal and 
Instrumental Works for a New Century’, in The Cambridge Companion to Mahler, ed. by Barham, pp. 
108–27 (p. 123)).  Johnson provides an interesting inverted counterpoint to this interpretative 
theme by contrasting the ‘open-ended developmental tendency of the symphony’ with the ‘self-
contained strophic form of the Lied’ in relation to first and second subject groups (see Mahler’s 
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thus imperative for both, which perhaps explains the uneasy alliance of P1.7 and S: TR’s assumption 
that S will support its anti-hegemonic stance explains the care with which it prepares the ground in 
the recapitulation before it comes to its horrible realisation and is ultimately swallowed.  The 
fortissimo appearance of TR in the coda is, then, an act of defiance, an attempt to un-wish its wish 
and return to its state in the exposition, aloof and unentangled in sonata politics; as Stephen Hefling 
notes, ‘the “chorale”, now in the brass, finally sounds like one’.40 
Of the remaining sources in the movement which have not been discussed above, three are 
introduced in the exposition and two in the development.41  The first of these is an undistinctive 
two-note oscillating figure (the family contains a single type region) which liquidates to lead into the 
motto in the exposition and recapitulation (bars 47–56 and 331–38) and appears nowhere else; the 
second and third are the tattoo rhythm and major–minor fall of the motto itself.  If the motto 
families, and any composite families that are derived from them, are tracked through the 
movement, we see that the two elements become decoupled in the development: the tattoo 
underscores tranches of march-like music in the first episode (bars 128–36, 157–66, and 171–78) 
while the major–minor fall resounds as a ghostly echo separating to two chorale phrases in the 
sleepwalk up the mountain (bars 208–14).  Eager to be reunited in the recapitulation, the major–
minor fall weakly attempts to assert itself too soon (so weakly, in fact, that Samuels fails to notice it) 
in bars 319–20.42  When the appropriate recapitulatory moment arrives (just before the chorale), it 
is the rhythm that jumps in too soon: it overlaps with the liquidating figure and catches the major–
minor fall by surprise, weakening the impact of the latter and paving the way for the transfigured 
chorale (bars 337–40).43  In the remainder of the movement, the two halves are not only decoupled 
but varied: the rhythmic patterns in bars 395–400 refer back to the development’s first episode 
rather than the motto per se (they constitute a new pair of cousin families in my reading), and the 
major–minor shift at the movement’s Höhepunkt nine bars before the end is, as Monahan argues, 
                                                                                                                                                           
Voices, p. 171).  The co-dependence of P and S suggests a sinister nuance to their unfolding drama 
(especially departing from Monahan’s domestic reading): namely, that since S strives for freedom 
but does all it can to remain within P’s hegemony, their situation is not unlike that of an abusive 
relationship.  Accordingly, P reneges on their truce in the reversed recapitulation of the Finale, 
giving itself (what seems like) the last word (see Section 4.2 below). 
40 ‘Song and Symphony (II)’, p. 120. 
41 It does make sense to speak of sources in this graph even though they are strictly defined in the 
condensation only (see Definition 3.2.9): this is because no source in this graph is strongly 
connected to any other vertex, so their strong components contain only themselves.  In fact, there 
is only one strong component of size greater than one in this piece: a pair of antiparallel edges 
between the simultaneous octave-separated segments in bar 485.  Normally doublings at the octave 
are not encoded separately, but these represent the convergence and conclusion of two hitherto 
parallel succession chains (cf. flutes and trumpets, bars 481–84; see further discussion at the end of 
this section).  The convergence of motivic processes back towards their points of origin is, I argue 
below, a prominent tragic narrative device in the Finale. 
42 Bars 319–20 are not included in Samuels’s tabulation of the motto’s appearances (p. 160). 
43 Samuels notes the ‘softening of the orchestration […] which removes the sense of abrupt 
disjuncture’ in this passage (p. 146). 
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‘semiotically “defused”’, relating more strongly to Wagnerian ‘redemptive peroration’ than this 
work’s contextual “Fate” motive (the final tonic major chords in Tristan and the Ring, the moment 
of arrival in the grail temple in Parsifal, and a significant structural moment in Strauss’s Tod und 
Verklärung are all prepared by similar 6̂ →6̂ motions).44  After a few appearances in the Scherzo, 
destabilised by the triple-time meter (Samuels identifies these at bars 261–66, 419–26, and 432–39), 
and a hint of major–minor interchanging in the Andante, the motto is next heard again at full 
strength in bar 9 of the Finale (the point at which, it seems, Mahler originally intended to place the 
first hammer-blow).45 
The two remaining sources in the development occur at bars 155 (a four-note descending 
scale figure repeated in the following bar) and 162 (a melodic turn figure that is spun out into a 
melody in bars 162–66 and 171–74; this is motive P2.1, the first half of theme P2, for Monahan).46  
A segment combining the scale shape with the turn rhythm is heard in bars 177–78 (and again, with 
the turn figure itself, in bars 191–95), while the sequential treatment of the scale which opens the 
coda (on B3 in bar 383, then C4 in bar 385) culminates, on D4, in a complementary combination of 
the turn shape and scale rhythm that Adorno labels ‘an irruption of the horrible’.47  The turn melody 
also echoes, and hybridises with, a liquidated form of P1.7 in bars 176–77; this is then extended to 
form an ascending version of the latter (bars 177–80) which features heavily in the bass, and later 
the melody, of the retransition (bars 259–62, 269–75, and 278–81). 
The affective qualities of aloofness and disjuncture associated with both the chorale and 
the motto not only suggest certain narrative interpretations as explored above, but also facilitate 
those very interpretations by disassociating themselves from the rest of the movement’s motivic 
material to the point that they are recognisable as independent entities.  We must tread more 
carefully in reading the movement’s chief formal and narrative polarity (that between the first and 
second subject areas) since, as shown in Figure 4.5, the degree of motivic correspondence between 
the two themes is high.  This is not unique to this piece: indeed, for Donald Mitchell, one of Reti’s 
most radical insights is in showing how masterworks’ contrasting first and second subjects betray a 
                                                     
44 See Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 148–49; the quotes are from p. 149.  Given that these bars relate to 
the motto only morphologically, and not derivationally or ‘semiotically’, they remain outside the 
motto families and their composites in my reading.  (The motto’s syntactic function is also absent: 
Monahan notes (ibid., p. 148) that this is the only time that it does not signal a change of mode.) 
45 See Samuels, p. 160 and de La Grange, Mahler, III, 809, 813 (‘Introduction to the first movement 
(bar 9)’ on p. 813 appears to be a mistake). 
46 See Figure 4.5 in Monahan, ‘Narratives’, II, 323. 
47 Mahler, p. 125.  Definition 1 is again invoked here since scale and turn figures are ubiquitous in 
almost any music.  In particular, the bar that separates the second and third occurrences of the 
scale-in-turn-rhythm family (bar 194) includes a turn-in-scale rhythm segment; but this occurs at the 
same time as a more prominent developmental motive in the horns, and is cast into the shade by 
the flutes, which pick out the scale-in-turn-rhythm segments on each side whilst falling silent for 
this bar.  It thus does not make a significant enough impression on its first appearance (especially 
when compared to its ‘irruption’ form) to be treated as motivic. 
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deeper organic unity and so necessarily belong to the same piece as each other.48  But Monahan has 
written on the Finale’s ‘metastasiz[ing] […] organicism run amok’, making it ‘exceedingly difficult to 
know, to retain in the mind’s ear’; his 2011 reading of the first movement also hinges on the idea 
that Mahler’s ‘idealized image of the feminine Other [in the Alma theme] was so thinly actualized 
[…] that it could so easily and so tellingly shade into narcissistic self-depiction [in its echoes of the 
P-theme]’.49  The first three source families to appear in the work (the dotted pattern that saturates 
the introduction, the octave leap, and the “Alma” motive P1.2=S1.1), together with the composite 
families made up solely from this set of three, contain 51.2% of the work’s segments.  Moreover, 
81.9% of the work’s segments lie in the same cross-family type, meaning that for any two segments 
picked at random, there is a 67.3% chance that a path of C, D, R, and E relationships exists 
between them such that every interim segment appears concretely in the piece.50 
Our way in to this impenetrable thicket of motivic relationships seems to be the S-theme’s 
only source: the inauspicious four-note segment 078|G5 (labelled S1.2 by Monahan).  The 
secondary theme unfolds in periods alternating between S1.1 (the “Alma” motive) and S1.2 (see 
Figure 4.7), and this local motivic polarity (and quest for integration) enacts in miniature the 
broader affective polarity of the movement’s two subject areas.  Comparing the first four notes of 
076|A5 (henceforth the ‘Alma-incipit’) and the entirety of 078|G5, we see that while both are 
upbeat figures, stepwise motion and straight quavers are associated with the former, and leaping 
motion and dotted rhythms with the latter.  We might also note that the Alma-incipit is the chief 
characteristic that distinguishes 076|A5 from its ancestor in the P-theme, 008|A5, so the story that 
can be read through this section is that of S1.2 – the only “true” S-motive – trying to rehabilitate its 
partner’s “S-ness” (and in doing so to transfigure itself) by driving for an independent statement of 
the Alma-incipit. 
This process begins in the second period, where S1.2 mimics the melodic shape of the 
Alma-incipit; this is reinforced by a “straight” phrase in the winds which fills the silences between 
the two occurrences of S1.2.  In the next period, S1.2 tries a different tack and makes a bid for 
freedom, co-opting the rushing motive from P (P1.8; see Figure 4.1) and initiating three, rather than 
two, segments: but this results in a collapse similar to that seen in the P-theme (although the 
angular quaver figure has been replaced by an augmented version of the semiquaver figure; see 
Figure 4.4), followed by a ‘grotesque’ march that Monahan reads as a significant problematisation 
                                                     
48 See Mitchell’s ‘Prefatory Note’ to Reti, Thematic Process, pp. v–vii (p. vi). 
49 ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 75 ‘amok’; p. 80, n. 92 ‘to know’; ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 148 
‘idealized’.  He also warns against ‘overemphasiz[ing] “materiale Einheit” at the expense of rhetorical 
differentiation (which is more crucial to the musical argument)’ as this can quite easily lead to an 
overly homogenous view of the movement (‘Narratives’, I, 135, n. 57); the model presented in this 
thesis, being built on the considerations of Chapter 2, also seeks to respect the role of rhetoric and 
derivation in motivic analysis. 
50 There is a 66.9% chance that any two random segments will lie in the biggest cross-family type. 
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of a naïve ‘Alma-portrait’ reading.51  The periodic S-phrases then resume; in the second of these 
(i.e. the fifth iteration of the S1.1–S1.2–S1.2 pattern), we are conditioned to listen for S1.2 after S1.1 and 
so the repeated Alma-incipit that we hear is understood as the first straight appearance of S1.2 in the 
main melody.   
This is a moment of strong epiphany between two families which have been separated thus 
far, but the integration of the two motives is not yet complete as S1.2 still contains a melodic leap; 
this leap also seems to have spread back to the Alma-incipit, which leaps in the same place as S1.2 in 
all but the first and fourth periods (we might also note the straight leaps in bars 103, 105, and 106, 
which prefigure the chorale’s recapitulatory rederivation of the S-theme).  The bid for freedom 
therefore again results in collapse, but this is significantly rhetorically softened as the scurrying 
                                                     
51 See Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, pp. 134, 136; ‘grotesque’ is his term. 
 
Figure 4.7: The first-movement S-theme’s periods (bars 76–89, 98–111, and 115–18). 
The segmentation is mine, using Monahan’s labels (see Figure 4.4): only those 
segments most relevant to the in-text discussion are included here. 
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semiquaver figure becomes a rippling textural filler for the celesta, triangle, and winds.  Finally, just 
as the tonic is achieved and the codetta opens, we hear an independent Alma-incipit arising in a 
moment of weak external epiphany: S1.1, having asserted its independence from its ancestor P1.2 
through rederivation from the redemptive S1.2, is now free to unfold on its own terms and in its 
own time (bars 115–22).  Note that in the foregoing analysis the agents or narrative functions S1.1 
and S1.2 are at first identified with one family each (S3 and S12), but are then read to continue 
through or across the composite families that arise as the analysis proceeds: an interpretative leap is 
required, for example, to read the composite family 8.1.1 (which combines S1.2 with the rushing 
motive) as a “transfigured” S1.2.  This points to an important difference between Monahan’s labels 
(as agents) and my own (as categories) – even as each inflects the other’s reading. 
The development begins as P regroups, aided by the motto rhythm.  Re-appropriating the 
rushing P1.8 to gain higher melodic ground (bars 138–42), a tutti statement of the entire primary 
theme in E minor is attempted at bar 149, but S1.1/P1.2 refuses to comply: stubbornly retaining its 
exposition pitch level of A5 rather than the required E6 (bar 151), it causes the P-line simply to give 
up and crumple back down to E4, and in doing so distorts the octave motive into an eleventh 
(Figure 4.8).  The motive slowly regains its shape – outlining a tenth, G5–E4, in bar 152 – until it 
finally has the strength to summon up P1.2 on F5, almost a full octave short of its required pitch 
level.  A suggestion of S1.2 is heard in bars 166–70 in a motive labelled P2.2 by Monahan; although 
its augmented reference to S1.2 is not immediately obvious, I would argue that it suggests a certain 
redemptive escapism in its ascending shape, turn towards major harmony, and ability to halt the 
relentless motto rhythm.52 
The return of the four-note Alma-incipit is, however, anything but escapist: although it 
retains the pitch-classes of its emancipatory appearance in bars 115–16, it has dropped another 
octave, regained its dotted rhythm, and is tossed around in dialogue with its inversion (bars 178–
182) to usher in its ‘disfigurement’ in ‘a lumbering march’, ‘[e]lephantine and inert’.53  Once the 
march proper begins at bar 183, the disfigured incipit is re-joined with S1.1 and the pitch level 
gradually sinks through A (bars 186–87), G (bar 188), and F (bar 190).  Despite an ascending 
                                                     
52 See Monahan, ‘Narratives’, II, 396: here he interprets P2.2 as related to P1.7, the ‘“free agent”’ that 
assists in the liberation of S in his reading (ibid., I, 141). 
53 Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 150. 
 
Figure 4.8: The collapse of the attempted tutti statement of P near the beginning of 
the first movement’s development section (bars 149–54). 
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tendency in bars 190–91, the descending shapes go on to proliferate: a trumpet segment strips all 
the leaps from S1.1 in a moment of weak epiphany (bars 192–93), and its descent is echoed in the 
merging of the scale and turn motives (bars 193 and 195), the rattling version of P1.6 (bars 194 and 
196–97), and two disfigured forms of S1.1 (bars 195 and 197–98; the former absent-mindedly tails 
off chromatically, while the latter’s incipit decouples itself in terms of pitch, register, and 
instrumentation in bar 196).  P then marshals its forces for an ascent mirroring its unsuccessful 
attempt in bars 144–48, but gets stuck in bar 200 as the movement ‘tear[s] open from within’ and 
the cowbell music begins.54 
 It is interesting to note that the segments at bars 201–04 and 208–10, whilst both 
recognisable as S1.1 (albeit abandoned by their incipits), both begin new cross-family types; that is to 
say, no other segment has the same chromatic, diatonic, or rhythmic structure, and they neither 
embed nor are embedded by any other segment.  The affective sense of Otherness is thus very 
subtly supported motivically, and this continues into the weak external epiphany that constitutes the 
first phrase of the Utopian vision (bars 222–23).55  The most significant morphological 
relationships between this phrase and the other members of its cross-family type are its embedding 
of the Alma-incipit from bar 115–16 (not as an incipit, but at its end), and, ironically, the fact that 
its rhythm has only so far occurred at two other points in the movement: once in bars 25–26 and 
again in bars 153–54, both during statements (or attempted statements) of the P-theme. 
 The Utopian music itself falls into two strophes that each loosely retread the S1.1–S1.2–S1.2 
pattern, once in G major and again in E flat major (the key of the Symphony’s Andante).  The first 
of these features two “Utopian” versions of S1.1 (one ascending and one descending) and three 
statements of S1.2, and is rounded off by a hybrid of the “Utopia” motive with the angular quavers 
from P1.4 in bars 228–29 (the only moment in bars 222–43 that does not lie in a family entirely 
derived from S1.1 and/or S1.2).  The five appearances of S1.2 in this section each make use of a 
different initial interval – perfect fourth, perfect fifth, minor seventh, diminished fourth, and then 
finally the usual minor third (bars 225–27 and 232–33) – subtly echoing the more radical 
development being undergone by S1.1 as the solo violin spins out a counterpoint to the familiar 
periodic structure in the solo horn (bars 230–36).  The two instruments swap roles for the final 
phrase in bars 237–38 before the ascending and descending versions of S1.1 are heard in the bass 
clarinet to lead to the transfigured chorale.  This passage of subtle development, flanked by 
Klangflächen and adopting their affective stasis, is the means by which the chorale learns its lesson; 
                                                     
54 Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 135. 
55 The phrase ‘Utopian vision’ is Monahan’s, and he uses it to designate three episodes in the Finale 
discussed below (see ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 62); other writers (Peter Brown, for example) 
also see the cowbell episodes as ‘foil[s] to the work’s predominantly tragic character’ (Peter Brown, 
p. 662).  Bruno Walter, however, considers ‘that other world’ to be completely outside of this 
symphony’s ‘field of vision’ (Bruno Walter, Gustav Mahler, trans. by James Galston (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1937), p. 123). 
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but the Utopian kind of development on show here is not that of forward-driving symphonic 
motivic working, but rather the free and even heterophonic spinning-out of contrapuntal lines that 
Monahan so admires in Mahler’s earlier symphonies (see above at n. 30) and which Johnson sees 
projecting ‘a fragile sense of forward motion and arrival thus far lacking’ in the movement.56  Given 
that Monahan considers the S-theme’s primary flaw to be that it is ‘precariously overextended’, 
‘stretching its scant melodic/motivic resources to the limits of good taste’, it seems that the S-
theme itself also has something to learn from its Utopian transfiguration.57 
 The story of the S-motives resumes at the start of the recapitulation in bar 291, which is in 
A major until P1.2/S1.1 has been heard; its echo in the bass ends on E, which derails the 
recapitulation (just as the same double-faced motive derailed the development; see Figure 4.8) by 
persisting throughout melodic material which was heard in the exposition over A (bars 297–306).  
The expected harmony is resumed at bar 307; but the appearance of 309|A4 (the recapitulation of 
025|A4, which combines P1.1 and P1.2) re-opens the fissure between the melodic and bass strata 
(this time the pedal drops by a fifth to D in bar 315).  The melody begins to sink to compensate for 
this – by a semitone in bars 318–20, then to a fourth below the original in bars 320–21 – and once 
the D pedal quits, the bass adopts a level to match the melody.  But as we enter the liquidation, the 
fissure opens up again at a point where S1.1 was heard in the exposition (compare bars 46 and 330): 
the bass stays on E, but the “melodic” parts flounder around and cannot settle on a particular level.  
It is into this fractured environment that the motto prematurely enters and the chorale makes an 
unhindered attempt to effect a transition. 
 The second subject area attempts to forget the humiliation inflicted on the Alma-incipit in 
the developmental march, and so picks up where the exposition left off: four-note segments 
abound in bars 353–59 (rederived as an answer to the chorale counterpoint – see Figure 4.6 –  and 
demonstrating the porous boundaries between S1.2 and the Alma-incipit), but we don’t hear the 
Alma-incipit in its undotted leap-free form until bars 360–61, where it serves as the opening of 
three overlapping statements of S1.1 (residual heterophony from the Utopian episode, perhaps?).  Its 
independent form appears in bar 364 as a pun (if we permit augmented seconds and augmented 
unisons as diatonic steps): the horns pick out A–C–D–D from the extended “bid-for-freedom” 
version of S1.2, respelled as B–C–D–D.  The Alma-incipit proper is heard again in the codetta: 
this time twice, setting up both iterations of the luxuriating S1.1.  Its indignity in the development 
has been overcome by its Utopian transformation, its preceding fresh start in the opening up of 
new but closely related type regions, and its successful derailing of the P-theme’s recapitulation. 
                                                     
56 Johnson, Mahler’s Voices, p. 70.  Johnson later describes this motion as ‘gently tangential to the 
main trajectory of the movement’ (ibid., p. 222), and considers it ultimately unfulfilled (ibid., p. 70). 
57 Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 134. 
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 The wheel of fortune must turn once more, however, as the distant thumping pedal of P 
returns to begin the coda (labelled by Monahan ‘the Allegro’s darkest, most toxic music’).58  When 
a march that mirrors the development’s begins in bar 395, its new accompaniment figure is derived 
from the Utopian vision (bars 396–402); deprived of its affective support, this figure does little 
more than hopelessly reiterate the same reified CDR-class at the same pitch level.  The 
reappearance of the subtly S1.2-derived ascending figure (P2.2; bars 400–02 and 413–18) is similarly 
stripped of the features that marked it out as redemptive in bars 166–70; instead it gets carried 
along with the general sweep, taking on an association with a P1.1-derived motive that comes to 
‘spread malignantly through the symphonic tissue’ of the Finale (first heard in bar 393, trombones; 
Monahan considers this to be derived from P1.1VAR, but it is prepared more directly by the 
stretching and inversion of the second half of P1.1 by the basses in bars 391–92).59  The redemptive 
motive does seem to have had some effect, however, as in bar 402 the accompaniment motive 
shifts up to F2 and changes its intervals slightly; while it drops back down to E2 in bar 410, it then 
jumps up to G2 for its final appearance in bar 416.  This ascent is coupled with an increasing 
density of P1.2/S1.1 quotations (bars 391–92, 411–12, 414–16, and 418–19) until the incipit returns 
and ‘the Alma melody buoys up from the contrapuntal depths in A major’ in bars 419–21, pointing 
forwards to the key of the movement’s apotheosis, and backwards to that of the recapitulation’s 
opening.60 
 The next section (bars 426–33) resists straightforward amalgamation into an overarching 
narrative.  On one hand, it is in E minor (a tritone away from the triumphant A major, and the 
modal inverse of the Utopian E major); it reinstates the march topic, including the disfigured 
dotted Alma-incipit; its primary motivic material is drawn from the most P-reminiscent part of S 
(bars 90–98, omitted in the recapitulation); and it is presented as the culmination of the P music cut 
off by the rupture in bar 201 (compare bars 199–201 with bars 423–25).61  On the other hand, it 
comes between S1.1’s reassertion of A major and its apotheosis in the same key, and carries a certain 
air of triumph rather than parody in its dotted Alma-incipit and S1.2 quotations (bars 426–29); 
Hefling considers the passage to be the first stage in the second subject’s ‘replenish[ment]’.62  
Monahan explains this as the ‘exil[e]’ of the strongly P-derived S-section, ‘sustain[ing] the galloping 
tension’ of bars 423–25; if, as suggested in n. 61 above, the rupture is interpreted as the “true” 
continuation of these bars, then the E minor section may even be seen as a radical recomposition 
                                                     
58 ‘Narratives’, I, 144. 
59 Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 145.  The role that this new motive – Monahan’s ‘G2’ – plays in the 
Finale is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. 
60 Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 154. 
61 See Monahan, ‘“I Have Tried”’, pp. 154–55 and Figure 2 on p. 157.  Monahan reads the parallel 
to bars 199–201 slightly differently: for him, bars 423–25 employ ‘the same spastic figure that 
triggered the development’s rupture’ (‘Narratives’, I, 145), suggesting that rupture, and not 
culmination, is the more natural response to this material. 
62 ‘Song and Symphony (II)’, p. 120. 
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of the Utopian vision.63  This reading is borne out by the return of the shimmering sonorities and 
ascending-fourth dotted fanfares in the ensuing transition to the apotheosis (bars 434–48); a 
passage which, Monahan notes, also incorporates the liquidated motives from the retransition that 
led to A major.64  Add in a strongly foregrounded “Alma” statement (complete with incipit, bars 
440–43: although there is a slight fracture as the incipit’s last note slips up a semitone and becomes 
“de-elided” with the start of the P1.2-derived descent), juxtaposed with a return of the ‘galloping 
tension’ music and ‘malignant’ Finale motive (bars 453–46), and we find a passage that seems to 
heighten, rather than resolve, the symphony’s polarities just as it approaches a moment of 
ostensible closure. 
 By bar 446, however, it seems clear in which direction the movement will go: the dominant 
of A major established, the Alma-incipit is heard in augmentation on fortissimo brass.  Although it is 
cut off before its final note (in a gesture of the kind that almost always leads to catastrophe in the 
Finale), the phrase is picked up again on the same pitches, but this time supported by A major 
harmony and continuing into an augmented S1.1 that is CD-equivalent to its first appearance in bar 
76.  What follows is a passage in which every segment (excluding the two that constitute the chorale 
quotation in bars 458–61) is related to at least one of the two S-motives in some way, and the type 
regions duly proliferate: the Alma-incipit attaches itself to P1.7 and the octave leap (bars 453–56), 
the ‘malignant’ motive gives way to S1.1 as a tail (bars 470–71, tuba), and the violins freely 
counterpoint S1.1 in a figure that echoes and rehabilitates the ascending P2.2 from the development 
(bars 463–65).  As the movement draws to a close, S1.2 and the Alma-incipit draw into an even 
tighter weave, falling over each other in versions that neutralise and reclaim the leaps and dotted 
rhythms that were construed as antagonistic in the exposition.  In the final bars, S1.2 provides itself 
as an incipit to the Alma motive while the Alma-incipit figure sheds its leap and does the same (see 
also n. 41).  The conflict of the movement is resolved; but after two inner movements that provide 
extended character portraits of the symphony’s poles (A minor hegemony and E major Utopia), 
the threads are untied and picked up again in the Symphony’s gargantuan, and tragic, Finale.65 
 
                                                     
63 Monahan, ‘Narratives’, I, 145; see also ‘“I Have Tried”’, p. 155. 
64 See ‘Narratives’, I, 145–46.  The correspondence between this passage and the vision is also 
noted by Peter Brown (p. 666) and Del Mar (p. 41). 
65 Samuels suggests that the first movement’s sense of resolution is illusive: ‘the motivic activity is 
maintained right up to the double bar line’ as forward-driving motives are reified through obsessive 
repetition and harmonic stabilisation (p. 152).  Again, this signals a desire to resolve the symphony’s 
contrasts onto the quilting point of ‘tragedy’; to explain away its outwardly positive passages as “not 
really” positive at all. 
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4.2 The Finale 
Although there are of course striking differences between the two movements (most significantly in 
their respective codas), as discussed above it can be productive to read the Finale against its first-
movement predecessor – a movement which, for Adorno, the Finale ‘heightens […] and negates’.66  
This heightening is certainly apparent in the Finale’s recycling of motivic stock – the octave leap 
and the minor third are the most basic elements – to produce the ‘asphyxiating’ sense of 
‘inescapable coherence’ that gives Monahan his chapter and article title: 93.3% of the movement’s 
segments belong to its largest cross-family type, and this takes the odds of a CDRE-path existing 
between any two randomly selected segments up to 87.1% (and the odds of a direct C, D, R, or E 
relationship between any two segments up to 3.3%).67  Perhaps more important (as acknowledged 
by Adorno and Constantin Floros) is the reappearance of distinctive timbral and topical areas from 
the first movement – the march, the chorale, the cowbells and their attendant Utopian distance – as 
these features bring otherwise subterranean games of motivic correspondence to the unavoidable 
discursive surface.68 
 We therefore find another structural polarity: the motivic material serves to unify and 
homogenise, while the affective regions (both those from the first movement, and “internal” 
gestures such as the hammer-blows or the ‘I[ntroductory]-complex’ of strings, harp, and celesta) 
serve to distinguish and delineate.69  As in the first movement, however, two affective regions carry 
motivic material that remains relatively independent from the rest of the Finale: the motto and the 
chorale (which comes to be associated with the hammer-blows through its transformation into the 
hammer-blow theme).  Read this far as tracing two parallel stories (despite the fact that their first 
appearances are yoked together to form the exposition’s transition), their roles here are more 
closely intertwined: not so much in terms of their points of occurrence on the music’s time-line, but 
in the convergence of the narrative functions that they discharge (they also share a morphological 
                                                     
66 Mahler, p. 138.  This dialectical relationship makes the outer movements an ideal pair to analyse 
when space does not permit a detailed examination of the entire symphony; I restrict myself to 
noting here that the melodic-motivic lens, in particular as it relates to form, has been a popular one 
through which to view the Andante: see Schoenberg, ‘Mahler’, pp. 460–62; Samuels, pp. 18–63; 
Darcy; and James Buhler, ‘Theme, Thematic Process and Variant Form in the Andante Moderato 
of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony’, in Perspectives on Gustav Mahler, ed. by Barham, pp. 261–94. 
67 Del Mar (p. 53), de La Grange (Mahler, III, 817), and Monahan (‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 71) 
identify the octave leap as an important unifying factor both within the Finale and across the other 
movements; Ratz (p. 37) recognises its prominent “internal” role but does not make its connection 
to the first movement explicit.  Floros (Symphonies, p. 184) and de La Grange (Mahler, III, 817) also 
single out the “Alma” motive, while Monahan (ibid.) highlights the minor third and Adorno notes 
that the A–B–C–A motive of the Finale (e.g. bars 16–22, tuba) retrogrades the A–C–B–A of P1.1 
(‘Centenary Address’, p. 105).  Monahan first discusses the concept of inescapable coherence on p. 
75 of his eponymous article, and the term ‘asphyxiating’ is Adorno’s (Mahler, p. 103). 
68 See Adorno, ‘Centenary Address’, p. 105 and Floros, Symphonies, pp. 164–65. 
69 ‘I-complex’ is Monahan’s term, and he reads it as a structural marker delineating the movement’s 
four main blocks from each other (see ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, pp. 61–63 and below at n. 117). 
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correspondence in that the chorale begins in the same way that the motto rhythm ends: with three 
repeated notes of equal duration).70  The motto is, in Floros’s phrase, an ‘iron clamp’, recurring 
virtually unchanged throughout the symphony as the antithesis of development; the chorale, having 
learned precisely what development means for a transitional theme, has come to occupy a similar 
antagonistic position.71 
 The dialectic of stasis and development dramatised in the first movement (and seemingly 
resolved by the idealised passage atop the mountain, which managed to project both at once) is 
thus re-opened in the Finale; it is, however, somewhat suppressed in Monahan’s reading of the 
movement’s competing formal forces.  He approaches his analysis through the Adornian concept 
of the novel-symphony, a structure in which ‘[t]he listener must abandon himself to the flow of the 
work, from one chapter to the next, as with a story when you do not know how it is going to 
end’.72  The concept is a dialectical one, defined against, but remaining dependent on, ossified and 
pre-determined formal models which ‘supply critical points of reference and are thus indirectly 
constitutive of the work’s meaning’.73  Monahan seeks ‘a more integrated view of emplotment’ (p. 
60) by departing from Adorno’s characterisation of sonata form as the static antithesis (variously 
labelled the Classical, formalistic, architectonic, or dramatic impulse) to novelistic construction: he 
uses Sonata Theory’s descriptions of ‘the genre’s built-in teleologies’ (p. 60) to conclude ‘[t]hat the 
sonata itself might act as an agent’ (p. 92).74  This lends a sense of dynamism to both of the main 
characters (i.e. the formal and the novelistic paradigms) in Monahan’s plot, but each still behaves 
antagonistically towards the other: in Adorno’s ‘single suggestive comment’ (p. 55) on totality and 
individuality quoted above at n. 11, Monahan sees the sonata ‘momentarily suffused with agency’ 
(p. 92), defining an image of ‘the monolithic work pitted against its own constituent elements’ (p. 
55). 
                                                     
70 Opinions are split regarding how ‘yoked together’ the two areas in the first movement are.  
Samuels (p. 144), Del Mar (p. 34), and Peter Brown (p. 662) consider the motto (bars 57–60) to be 
part of the transition or bridge (Brown even goes as far as to label it IT and the chorale 2T); de La 
Grange (Mahler, III, 821) and Monahan (see n. 25 above) have the transition beginning at bar 61; 
and Floros (Symphonies, p. 166) puts the motto and chorale in two sui generis sections (although he 
suggests that the chorale takes ‘the position that is normally occupied by the transition’ (ibid., p. 
167)).  Mahler himself places a rehearsal number (7) at the start of the chorale, but not at the start 
of the motto.  These formal disagreements contextualise Agawu’s implication that the first and 
third chords of the chorale reverse the A major to A minor motion of the motto (Kofi Agawu, 
‘Prolonged Counterpoint in Mahler’, in Mahler Studies, ed. by Hefling, pp. 217–47 (p. 227)). 
71 Floros, Symphonies, p. 164. 
72 Adorno, ‘Centenary Address’, p. 87. 
73 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 57; in the present section, parenthetical page numbers in 
the text which relate to Monahan refer to this article.  Ratz’s analysis is also informed by the 
Adornian formal dialectic discussed here (see p. 35 especially). 
74 The term ‘dramatic’ in this context is opposed to ‘narrativistic’ in referring to the temporal 
structure of plays rather than novels; cf. Maus’s pair of articles ‘Music as Drama’ and ‘Music as 
Narrative’. 
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This competition partly takes place in the arena of thematic and motivic process.  
According to Adorno, the ‘technical formula’ on which the novel-symphony depends is the variant 
technique, a device which allows the inner motivic materials of fixed, gestalt-like themes to shift like 
components of a mobile sculpture, ‘revis[ing] their nuances, their lighting’ without damaging the 
identity of the theme as a whole.75  The inescapable coherence of this movement’s motivic 
substance (in particular the P-theme, ‘a ragtag group of undistinguished motives and fanfares’ for 
Monahan (p. 76)) is therefore read by Monahan as an anti-novelistic force, one which ‘collude[s] 
with the sonata and its A-minor agenda’ (p. 75) in bringing about total integration.  The eventual 
‘Failure of the Novel-Symphony’ alluded to in Monahan’s title is clinched in the movement’s 
closing gesture, stripped of all melody and reinforcing a single static harmony; but, following 
Samuels’s interpretation, to view this moment as a victory for sonata form is surely mistaken.  
Monahan implicitly agrees in a later article, quoting Adorno on this movement’s dramatisation of 
‘the end of the symphonic sonata’ (see n. 17 above) and agreeing that after the ‘self-destructive 
Finale’ of the Sixth, the sonata plot paradigm ‘loses much of its explanatory power’ with respect to 
Mahler’s oeuvre.76  The sonata, then, has over-reached itself (Samuels speaks of ‘the suicide of the 
symphony’): its determination to impose homogeneity on the movement’s novelistic materials has 
resulted in a negation of the very temporality and dynamism which allowed it to be read as an agent 
in the first place (and which Adorno acknowledges: ‘epic composition was never the mere antithesis 
of the dramatic but also close to it, like the novel, in its onward momentum, its tensions and 
explosions’).77  This destruction of both sonata and novelistic paradigms creates a power vacuum 
into which the static third agents – the non-symphonic chorale and the non-novelistic (i.e. 
unchanging) motto – rush: when the critic Robert Hirschfeld attacks Mahler’s use of the hammer 
by commenting that ‘[s]peakers whose words fail them at the decisive moment beat the table with 
their fists’, he inadvertently hints at the twin failures of the movement’s discursive frameworks 
(brought about, in part, by the agency of the hammer).78  The mutual origin of the chorale and the 
                                                     
75 Adorno, Mahler, pp. 86, 87.  Buhler uses the variant technique to orient his formal analysis of the 
symphony’s Andante (see ‘Theme, Thematic Process and Variant Form’). 
76 ‘Success and Failure’, p. 54; he makes a similar point at the end of his ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’ 
thesis chapter (see ‘Narratives’, I, 286). 
77 Adorno, Mahler, p. 97; Samuels’s fifth chapter (pp. 133–65) is entitled ‘Musical Narrative and the 
Suicide of the Symphony’. 
78 Robert Hirschfeld, ‘[Review of the Vienna Performance of Mahler’s Sixth Symphony]’, Wiener 
Abendpost, 10 January 1907, quoted in Mahler: A Documentary Study, ed. by Kurt Blaukopf with 
contributions by Zoltan Roman, trans. by Paul Baker and others (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1976), p. 246.  Hirschfeld, ‘that remarkably astute but wholly ambivalent contemporary critic of 
Mahler’ (Buhler, p. 264), has something of a reputation for writing ‘with more perspicacity than he 
knew’ (Julian Johnson, ‘Mahler and the Idea of Nature’, in Perspectives on Gustav Mahler, ed. by 
Barham, pp. 23–36 (p. 28)). 
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motto in the liminal space of the transition rather than as main (P or S) characters in the sonata plot 
therefore takes on added significance in this context.79 
The chorale makes its first Finale appearance (followed by the motto’s second) in bar 49; 
recalling the first movement, it introduces four new source families as two-bar phrases which are 
repeated and varied to make up a second half of equal length.80  Contrasted with the ‘vacuum 
clouded only with elementary particles’ that precedes it, the effect of this regularity is striking: but 
while for de La Grange (and Adorno), ‘this hostile, reactionary, and unyielding element 
unquestionably has a negative meaning and a negative role’, for Monahan, it is a Freudian attempt 
to ‘repeat actions as a means of mastering the past’ (p. 71), ‘a rebeginning, a new start of the sort 
necessary to find the “ideal ending”’ (p. 73).81  Its attempt to establish an alternative C minor sonata 
is considered by Monahan to be one of the movement’s two ‘broadly defined and largely 
independent forces of resistance against the sonata’s A-minor hegemony’ (p. 81; the other is S2, 
beginning at bar 205); but as suggested above and argued below, this characterisation forms only 
part of the movement’s complex and shifting network of oppositions and allegiances. 
After a foretaste of the chorale’s later incarnation as the hammer-blow theme in bars 82–85 
(followed by a swarm of what Monahan calls ‘G-motives’ (see pp. 79–80): generic segments related 
to the motto rhythm that are not associated with any particular sonata zone and tend to bring about 
liquidation and collapse), the chorale next appears in the transitional section of the thematic 
exposition.82  Here, it has not only taken on the distended shape of the G2-motives (the ‘malignant’ 
chains of octave leaps first heard just prior to the chorale in bars 42–43), but also appears in a 
                                                     
79 Ratz notes the transition’s importance in his analysis: being ‘twice as long’ as the first subject, he 
argues that ‘[o]ne might equally well call it the second main subject group’ (p. 39).  
80 As discussed at n. 29 above, the first movement’s four chorale phrases initiate only two families: 
the third segment is derived from the first, and the fourth is non-motivic. 
81 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 68 ‘vacuum’; de La Grange, Mahler, III, 833 ‘hostile’.  
Adorno considers the chorale ‘dark’ (in de La Grange’s translation; see Mahler, III, 833, n. 149) or 
‘sombre’ (in Jephcott’s; see Adorno, Mahler, p. 97): the original is ‘düstere’ (see Theodor W. 
Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann and others, 20 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 
1970–86), XIII: Die musikalischen Monographien, ed. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (1971), p. 
245). 
82 The Finale’s sectional boundaries are notoriously ambiguous, as discussed most extensively by 
Samuels (pp. 64–90; see also n. 117 below) and also by Peter Brown (pp. 671–73).  My own 
interpretation (which mostly follows Monahan’s as given in ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 62) takes 
bars 1–113 to be the motivic exposition (laying out the movement’s principal melodic material) and 
bars 114–228 to be the thematic exposition (establishing the complete themes and tonal areas that 
set the sonata in motion; the idea that the movement enters and exits “sonata space” follows 
Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 65).  While slow generative introductions are nothing new, 
witnessing the very derivation and assembly of supposedly gestalt-like themes takes on added 
significance in the context of the ‘failure of the novel-symphony’ and lends the first section a truly 
expository – and not merely introductory – function.  Other writers who place bars 1–113 in the 
exposition are Floros (Symphonies, p. 182) and Hans Redlich (Hans Ferdinand Redlich, ‘Analysis’, in 
Gustav Mahler, Symphony VI: A Minor [Score], ed. by Hans Ferdinand Redlich (London: Eulenburg, 
1968), pp. viii–xxiii (p. xxii)), although almost all analyses acknowledge these bars’ generative role. 
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shuffled order: bars 141–44 are based on the chorale’s second quarter (bars 53–56) and further 
stretched in bars 145–148, before bars 149–57 vary the chorale’s second half (bars 57–64) and 160–
67 its first (bars 49–56).  The third quarter is then treated sequentially (bars 168–71) before the 
doubly-stretched second quarter returns and finally snaps into a whirlwind of G-motives (see Figure 
4.11). 
The segments caught in this whirlwind suggest a suspicion which the S-themes later 
confirm: that the label ‘G’ is not entirely adequate since, while retaining a degree of narrative 
distinctness, these motives easily shade into segments found within the P- and S-themes themselves 
(de La Grange even goes as far as to consider the transition ‘a development within the exposition’, 
an idea which exists in a certain tension with the chorale’s static nature).83  This is discussed in 
further detail below, but for present purposes it suffices to note that the incipit of S2 is closely 
related to the octave-leaping G2 (which has a tendency to appear simultaneously with the chorale – 
or hammer-blow theme, as it becomes).  This parallel is strengthened by chorale-type gestures in 
the S2 theme leading to ultimately disrupted cadences (bars 216 and 299–300) which set the 
template for the first hammer-blow itself (bar 336), preceded by a passage in which a rather distant 
relative of the chorale’s first quarter (oboes, bars 319–22) gets stuck going round in liquidated 
circles (bars 322–27). 
The chorale’s liquidation here and shuffled distension in the thematic exposition are what 
the hammer-blow and its associated theme seek to reverse.  The theme restratifies the motivic 
material into two blocks: the first consists of the first two segments of the chorale (still not in their 
original form, but the leap of a seventh in bar 83 has become a more manageable fifth) 
accompanied by a G2-chain and dotted, P-reminiscent strings (bars 336–43); the second consists of 
double-speed G-motives accompanied by dotted thirds and rushing semiquavers (bars 344–47).  
Under encouragement from the shorter rhythmic values in the strings, the chorale and G2 motives 
return to their original notated rhythms (although still in a higher tempo) for the repeat of the first 
block, while the repeat of the second morphs the G-motives into the shape of the chorale’s second 
segment; these are batted around the orchestra before being rederived, by bar 357, into the 
emancipatory fanfare from bar 217.  This time the bid succeeds (last time it careered into the return 
of the I-complex) and leads to the Finale’s first ‘Utopian vision’ (Monahan’s term; see p. 62). 
What, exactly, is this a vision of?  In tonal terms, Monahan reads its glimpse of A major as 
an idealised projection of the sonata’s outcome that is tenable only as long as the G-motives are 
kept at bay; when they begin to reappear in bar 372, he argues, the tonality slips and C minor 
regains control (p. 84).  This is the key of the chorale’s alternative sonata, and while the chorale and 
the S-themes share a common enemy in the A minor P-theme, ‘[f]or the chorale, whose aim is to 
control an orderly and efficient sonata, the S-themes’ formally disruptive short-cuts to 
                                                     
83 See de La Grange, Mahler, III, 834. 
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transcendence are unwelcome’ (p. 82; recall also that S made an enemy of TR by subsuming it in 
the first-movement recapitulation).  I find this reading problematic for two main reasons, the most 
immediate of which is the motivic material of the Utopian vision: there are unambiguous G2 
quotations in bars 368 (horns) and 371 (bass instruments), and the first phrase (bars 364–66) is 
related to the first appearances of G1 (if such a stable category can be identified) in bars 86ff. (Ratz 
(p. 44) even considers G1 to be ‘worked out jointly’ with the second subject here).  Moreover, it 
seems odd to be advocating a chorale as the instigator of a sonata (alternative or otherwise) when 
its very effect (in the first movement especially) is one of non-symphonic disjuncture or stasis; 
Monahan even draws attention to the last-movement chorale as ‘a voice from beyond the Sixth 
Symphony entirely’ (p. 73, n. 70) in pointing out that it is a Wunderhorn quotation (see also above at 
n. 4). 
The chorale topic, redemptive key, merger with the “generic” (i.e. less symphonic-
teleological) motives, and S1-quotations suggest a reading which looks back to the Utopian music 
of the first movement.  There the virtues of stasis were extolled: even though the plot proposed 
above was one of the chorale’s search for developmental capacity, the central Utopian episode 
sought to bestow this through free, almost heterophonous, variation, drifting some distance from 
its start to its end in a way uninfluenced by the goal-directed pressures of symphonic development.  
This kind of stasis is the opposite face to that imposed by the ‘iron clamp’ of the motto (hence the 
motto quotations in the first-movement Klangfläche, bars 208–09 and 213–14), but both kinds work 
to undermine the authority of the sonata.84  The dynamic interactions between the symphony’s 
three main characters function on zones of conflict and agreement: P-as-sonata-agent seeks to 
impose order on S-as-novelistic-freedom, but the latter is ultimately dependent on the former for its 
generic desires (i.e. resolution in the tonic major) and so both resist TR/motto-as-non-symphonic-
stasis.  At the same time, both TR and P tend towards homogeneity and unity (leading the latter to 
negate itself) while TR and S tend towards the vision of “another way” (which would, of course, 
strip S of its animating force).  To take just one of these zones of conflict, stasis is presented both 
as a liberating force for subjectivity in a world driven by the demands of a hegemonic system, and 
as simply an alternative (and ultimately even more suffocating) system itself; the refusal to resolve 
these two pictures into one respects the symphony’s polarity and, in its denial of easy answers, its 
real tragedy.85 
                                                     
84 Redlich links, as ‘sign-posts’ of the symphony’s ‘philosophical message’ (p. viii), the cowbells, 
deep bells, and motto: they are all ‘fundamental stationary sounds, the first two of which are off 
pitch while all three are impervious to thematic or rhythmic development’ (p. ix). 
85 In Almén’s terminology, this denial might make Mahler’s Sixth his ‘Ironic’ symphony; see 
‘Narrative Archetypes’, p. 18 and Chapter 2, n. 145 above.  In an article examining his four 
narrative archetypes (or ‘mythoi’) in relation to Mahler’s early symphonies, Almén chooses the 
second and third movements of the Second Symphony as examples of an ironic mythos (see ‘The 
Sacrificed Hero: Creative Mythopoesis in Mahler’s Wunderhorn Symphonies’, in Approaches to Meaning 
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 Within this interpretative context we may revisit the so-called ‘G-motives’.  The motivic 
exposition immediately sets up a contrast between two source families: the sombre dotted minor 
third cell (to which the single occurrence of the octave-leap family in bar 16 may be appended), and 
the more rhapsodic clarinet gesture in bar 19.  These call across the chasm to each other until the 
deep bells make their first appearance and theme S1 begins to be forged; during this, a simultaneous 
‘elementary particle’ (Monahan’s term; see n. 81 above) drifts into view in the bassoon and bass 
clarinet (bar 34; see Figure 4.9).  The gravitational pull of the more massive S1 fuses the two 
gestures of bar 34 into the gesture beginning at bar 35 (Monahan’s S1.4), which then has its final 
distinctive two-note rhythm stripped away in bars 37–39.  In response to this display of 
assimilation, the oboe mocks the malevolent dotted celesta and tuba in diminution before the horns 
retaliate by fusing the octave and minor third cells together to create what was referred to above as 
G2. 
Following the chorale, the elementary particle makes another bid to become a theme in its 
own right, developing into an ascending fanfare (bars 69–73) before being answered (or ‘opposed’, 
according to Ratz (p. 38)) by its assimilated version, the prefigured hammer-blow theme, and a 
writhing mass of melodically restricted assimilated motives (these are the first appearances of G1 
referred to above).87  The final section of the motivic exposition is a gathering of momentum for 
the P-theme’s march: reiteration of the minor third motive in bars 103–07 creates a homogenous 
aural background that gathers energy in rhythmic diminution in bars 108–09.  ‘Rhapsodic’ motives 
fall over each other in an attempt to escape what they have already realised, confirmed in a 
                                                                                                                                                           
in Music, ed. by Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 
pp. 135–69 (pp. 157–60)). 
86 Monahan’s labels for this and the following figure are extrapolated from Example 2 in 
‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 71. 
87 Ratz also sees G1, a hybrid of P and S motives, taking on a ‘pronounced transitional function’ (p. 
40); this reactivates the questions of transition identity discussed in Section 4.1 and supports a 
reading of G1 as a homogenising force.  Del Mar similarly sees the motives in these bars as 
‘composite but salient’ (p. 54), and both he and Ratz (pp. 40–41) remark on the importance of 
rhythm in binding together this disparate category (cf. Chapter 2 at n. 23 above; Ratz even makes 
direct reference to Schoenberg). 
 
Figure 4.9: The forging of theme S1 and the origin of G1 in the Finale, bars 30–39.  
Monahan’s segmentation is shown using boxes (with corresponding labels) and my 
own using brackets.86 
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dramatised moment of epiphany in bars 112–14: the (+2, −3) pattern of the hegemonic minor 
third has been embedded in the descending form of their gesture of individualism since bar 25, and 
they are finally assimilated just as A minor is confirmed for the start of the thematic exposition.  
Parading its trophies, the P-theme (Figure 4.10) unfolds a minor third/dotted rhythm segment 
(P1.1), the ascending (P1.2) and descending (P1.4) forms of the rhapsodic motive, the homogenous 
background that allowed their capture (P1.3), and not only the ‘elementary particle’ itself (P1.5), but 
also its fanfare-like attempt at initiating its own theme (P1.6).88 
 The above plot demonstrates that motives G1, G2, P1.5, and S1.4, and all the segments 
related to them, do indeed work across thematic zones, but that their meanings are not entirely 
‘generic’ and interchangeable: they are related not only in a static, paradigmatic, morphological 
sense, but also share a more concrete common backstory that can illuminate plot processes later in 
the movement.  Take, for example, the ‘whirlwind’ (referred to above) that appears after the 
distended and shuffled chorale/hammer-blow theme; this is taken by both Del Mar and Floros to 
constitute the transition proper (bars 176–90; Figure 4.11).89  The elementary particle (P1.5) again 
tries to bring some melodic coherence to the liquidated mass of semiquavers, its initial melodic 
interval widening from a fifth (bar 180) to a sixth (bar 182).  At the same time, the rhythmically 
similar but kinetically opposed G1/S1.4, which tends towards stepwise descent rather than leaping 
ascent, outlines a descending scale in the trumpets from E5 to F3 over 8 bars.  This drags P1.5 down 
into a G2 chain (recall that this is the ‘malignant’ motive that combines the octave leap and minor 
third, the two strongest symbols of P-hegemony); but the distinctive   . tail that was originally the 
property of P1.5 passes into this voice from the G1-scale and is ultimately translated from a 
descending strong–weak figure to an ascending weak–strong one in the first segment of S1.  
Staggering on through identity-stripping bombardment, P1.5 thereby finally instigates a new theme 
thanks to the very motive that dissolved it into a G2 chain (its descendant G1) – although is victory 
is somewhat Pyrrhic given that this not only happens in a transition (the illusive freedom of which 
                                                     
88 Figure 4.10 shows that my own segmentation of the Finale’s P-theme (in particular, my third 
segment) does not respect the kind of internal derivation pattern that Monahan was critiqued for 
overlooking in Section 4.1.  I defend this position in this particular case by arguing that the wider 
consequences are less significant than those arising from the segmentation of P1.1 in the first 
movement, and also that it is analytically suggestive to view this gesture as a roll of aural wallpaper 
(rather than a modular progression chain of P1.3-motives) that can be cut off to various lengths 
during the movement. 
89 Del Mar, p. 55; Floros, Symphonies, p. 183. 
 
Figure 4.10: The Finale’s P-theme in Monahan’s segmentation (boxes) and my own 
(brackets), bars 114–21. 
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is discussed in Section 4.1), but also merely rederives the only P- or S-theme already heard in a 
complete form in the motivic exposition. 
 The thematic inclinations of P1.5 are entirely absent from the first Utopian vision which, as 
argued above, makes a virtue of stasis and flaunts its unificatory credentials through the gentle 
stratified repetitions of a three-note (two-pitch) fragment.  To recap the historical thematic 
processes embedded in this tiny phrase (as shown in Figure 4.12): it is an augmented version of the 
emancipatory fanfare first heard in bar 217, understood there as a derivative of S1.2 which itself 
varies the opening of theme S1 (traceable back to the dotted minor-third cell in the motivic 
exposition, and rederived, as shown in Figure 4.11, from P1.5 in the thematic exposition).  In the 
Utopian vision, it is figured more immediately as the outcome of G2’s adoption of the shape of the 
second segment of the chorale in the repetition of the hammer-blow theme; it then shades back 
into a G1 motive in bar 372.  A hint of the complexity of its resonances is given in bars 366–69, 
shown at the bottom of Figure 4.12.  The S1.3 motive, heard simultaneously with, and ultimately 
incorporating, P1.5 in the motivic exposition, is here accompanied by the ‘malignant’ G2 in the 
horns.  The adoption of the three-note fragment as a tail to S1.3 is continued by the final three notes 
of G2: this gesture, fractured across two octaves, reconstitutes the dotted “G2” version of the 
chorale’s second segment from which the three-note fragment was derived. 
 Towards the end of the vision, a snatch of the I-complex’s descending broken chord (itself 
related to the first movement’s Alma theme) is heard in the first violins in bar 374.  When the 
Utopian space is opened again in bar 458, it is the varied I-complex from the opening of the 
development (bar 229) that provides its thematic material, prompting Monahan to remark that ‘the 
 
Figure 4.11: The ‘whirlwind’ of G-motives after the collapse of the chorale in the 
Finale, bars 180–92.   
All segments in the passage are marked with brackets, while boxes pick out key stages 
in the motivic process as discussed in the text. 
-187- 
 
  
relation between thematic materials and the character-impulses they bear is more fluid than we 
might have assumed’ (p. 86); here the vision ‘insists that if the tonic major is to become a reality, 
the I-complex – which harbours the major-minor motto – must be transfigured’ (ibid.).90  Elements 
of the first Utopian vision (S1.3 and the three-note fragment) begin to surface amidst the undulating 
scales of the I-complex until a forte statement of the three-note motive in the flutes and oboes 
serves as a reminder of its multivalent and therefore fickle nature: the music suddenly darkens as 
the writhing G1-motives from the motivic exposition return to lead into the second hammer-blow 
(compare bars 469–78 with bars 86–95, where they led into the motto). 
 The music following this hammer-blow at first unfolds in a similar way to that following its 
predecessor: the first major point of divergence is that the second block is truncated from four bars 
to two.  The G2-motives having been so curtailed (the principal melodic line even loses its 
characteristic octave leap: compare the woodwind in bars 487–88 to the F trumpets in bars 344–
45), the second chorale segment does not take on a dotted rhythm as expected in bar 493.  A 
                                                     
90 Floros similarly takes the I-theme as an example of ‘how one and the same theme can totally 
change its character’ (Symphonies, p. 184). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12: The complex resonances of the three-note motive from the Finale’s first 
Utopian vision. 
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furious triple statement restores the octave leap to the motivic foreground (bars 497–99) while the 
bass instruments chain together G2-motives in diminution and the horns state them at their original 
rhythmic value, dragging the chorale segment down until it finally takes on the dotted rhythm again 
in bar 504.  Alternating G2 and dotted-chorale motives tumble into the recapitulation, their 
constituent leaps and dotted figures not so much liquidating as being thrown off as collision debris, 
until the I-complex (back in its non-transfigured form) once more applies the iron clamp of the 
motto.  At the very moment in the symphonic structure that Adorno identifies as containing its 
greatest artifice, the moment of recapitulation’s tautologous affirmation of ‘a celebratory “That is 
it” in repeating what has already existed in any case’, the sonata order (represented by the non-
chorale materials) makes a desperate attempt to remake the chorale in its own image; but it is 
clamped on one side by the hammer, and on the other by the I-complex (which Del Mar sees as 
going through the motions of recapitulation, entering ‘willy-nilly […] regardless of the tonal 
conflict’).91 
 The restatement of thematic material is thrown off course by the fact that A minor is too 
weak to wrest control of the motto (as it did in bar 9), which is now heard in C minor (the key of 
the chorale) for the first time.  (Tracking the motto to this point, we hear it on A in bar 9, on G 
following the chorale in bar 65, then the triad alone on C in bars 96, 395, and 401).92  Monahan 
reads this as C minor ‘abandon[ing] any image of a finale that “might have been” and mak[ing] its 
last bid for authority simply by imitating its A-minor rival’ (p. 86); in my own reading, this gesture is 
a bald statement of alliance between the motto and the chorale, both representing stasis.  But, of 
course, change of key is still change and so is anathema to the motto, which mostly reinstates the 
pitch level of A for its seven further appearances (at bars 622, 668, 686, 754, 783, 798, and 820).93  
                                                     
91 Adorno, Mahler, p. 63 (see also Chapter 2, n. 102); Del Mar, p. 60.  For more on the tonal conflict 
of this passage, see John Williamson, ‘Dissonance Treatment and Middleground Prolongations in 
Mahler’s Later Music’, in Mahler Studies, ed. by Hefling, pp. 248–70 (pp. 253–54). 
92 In his inventory of motto appearances, Samuels (p. 160) misses the one in bar 96 and leaves that 
in bar 395 implicit (through analogy with bar 401, which he does list, and which almost exactly 
repeats bar 395).  He also includes an extra appearance of the triad, in G, at bar 338, but I do not 
consider this to be a Definition 1-commensurate instance since the chord is in first inversion and its 
rhythm does not match the hypermeter, coinciding as it does with the third and fourth (rather than 
first and third) notes of the hammer-blow theme.  Monahan’s annotated short score (‘Narratives’, 
II, 490–532) agrees almost exactly with my listing (the only disagreement is at bar 798; see next 
note). 
93 Samuels (p. 160) adds an extra appearance (on A) at bar 696, but again this does not coincide 
with the hypermeter; it is omitted from both mine and Monahan’s inventories.  The occurrences at 
bars 622 and 754 are listed as ‘[r]hythm only’ and given no pitch level by Samuels; while the triad is 
missing in both cases, the latter simultaneously reinforces the tonic and dominant of A in the 
timpani, and the former the dominant in an ecstatic (and therefore anathemic) passage of prevailing 
A tonality.  The occurrence at bar 798 is listed by neither Samuels nor Monahan and actually occurs 
on D: while this is the key of the thwarted S-themes, its barely audible appearance (lacking the fifth 
of the triad or the rhythm) has very little effect on the key or the mood of the coda.  It might be 
read as a final subtle reminder of the positive side of stasis. 
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It is perhaps the greatest irony of this symphony that its furthest-reaching and most obvious 
narrative-teleological act of symbolism – major–minor in bar 57 of the first movement becomes 
minor–minor in bar 820 of the last – is carried out by the very gesture that represents stasis, 
atemporality, and homogeneity.94 
 One of the principal axioms of the novel-symphony is that ‘musical time, unlike 
architecture, permits no simple relationships of symmetry. […] What happens must always take 
specific account of what happened before’.95  The I-complex that begins the recapitulation 
overwrites this, skipping back over its transfiguration in the development to its expositional form: 
but as, in its ‘dissolution field’, C minor ‘takes on [A minor’s] entropic inertia’, elements of S (as 
avatars of the novel-symphony) and the transfigured I-complex (as an unavoidable memory) disrupt 
the progress of a near-exact motivic recapitulation.96  Of the 45 segments in bars 520–74, 35 
(including the first 30 in the section) are derived from bars 3–40 (including thematic repetitions of 
sizes 29, 3, and 2); 4 are versions of the Alma motive (S1.5 in the context of this movement); 3 
repeat a version of the transfigured I-theme (bars 566–68); and the remaining 3 echo a phrase from 
the development’s dissolution field (compare bars 561–65 with bars 250–53 and 278–80; the Alma 
motive is also prominent in this section).97 
 As the novel paradigm gains strength, theme S1 returns to undergo a similar kind of “static 
development” to that enjoyed by S2 in the Utopian episode of the first movement.  Although not 
quite as improvisatory or contrapuntally limpid, there is a similar freedom of motivic development, 
proliferation of quasi-heterophonic entries, and lightness of scoring (including the solo violin); Del 
Mar observes that here, ‘suddenly the air has cleared’ (p. 61).  The augmented S1.3 that follows in 
bar 601 finally fulfils the versions at bars 93 and 476 (which were cut off by the motto and hammer 
respectively) in a passage reminiscent of the lead-in to the first movement apotheosis at bars 446–
48 (compare the timpani in IV, bar 601 and I, bar 449).98  This is followed by a passage which 
seems to relive that movement’s closing peroration in its mood, key, and ecstatic motivic invention: 
Monahan notes that it ‘sweep[s] up all of the movement’s thematic characters in a manic A-major 
                                                     
94 In addition, two of the final three segments – the single pitch and the second iteration of the 
motto rhythm – actually begin new type regions. 
95 Adorno, Mahler, p. 52. 
96 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 86 ‘entropic inertia’.  The term ‘dissolution field’ is 
Samuels’s (p. 78) and Monahan’s (p. 63, n. 46) preferred translation of Adorno’s Auflösungsfeld, 
usually rendered ‘disintegration field’ by Jephcott (e.g. Mahler, p. 99); however, Jephcott uses ‘field 
of dissolution’ and ‘dissolution field’ on p. 98 and p. 159 respectively (cf. Adorno, Gesammelte 
Schriften, XIII, 245 and 302).  It refers to those ‘inert and inchoate expanses’ (Monahan, 
‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 63, n. 46) that follow the I-complex in this movement; Floros labels 
those same expanses ‘music from far away’ (Symphonies, p. 180). 
97 The fortunes of the Alma motive in the Finale are not tracked exhaustively here, but provide a 
suggestive avenue for further exploration. 
98 Only Del Mar seems to note this correspondence (p. 62), but he does not extend the parallel 
backwards to the S1 episode or forwards to the ecstatic section. 
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whirlwind’ (p. 88), 20 of the 29 type regions used in bars 610–41 being new.  Particularly significant 
are S1.4 and its echoes of the first movement’s P1.7 (bars 618–21); the chorale/G2/motto quotation 
in bars 622–27 (paralleling, but certainly not as submerged as, the chorale in the first movement, 
bar 458); two appearances of the Alma motive with its incipit (bars 630–34); and, in bar 635, the 
first appearance of an ‘elementary particle’ type region since its attempt to salvage the Utopian 
vision at bar 383 after crashing into the I-complex in bars 224–28.99  Getting carried away in the 
excitement and resuming its drive to begin a theme of its own, it has forgotten that it (and its 
ascending fanfare descendant, bars 636–41) is already part of a theme – the P-theme – and so it 
becomes the weak link that allows the A minor sonata to finally perform its recapitulatory function.  
And ‘perform’ is an apposite word: Monahan notes that ‘P actually progresses toward an 
increasingly exact reprise as it unfolds; it does not just embody repetition mindlessly, it achieves it, 
even flaunts it’ (p. 88) in its ‘undoing of novelistic time’ (ibid.).  Of the 44 segments in bars 642–66, 
34 (including the last 25) are derived from bars 114–37 (including themes of sizes 31 and 2), with 7 
of the remaining 10 being derived within the section itself. 
 In Monahan’s reading, this is a moment of terrible victory for P as it establishes an 
‘architectonic order’ and ‘tonal singularity’ (p. 88) from which the novelistic materials can make no 
recovery.  On the contrary, I argue that this is the beginning of the end for P, the point at which the 
sonata overreaches and ultimately collapses into itself, clearing the field for the novelistic and static 
paradigms.  The key event is, once more, the transition (bar 668ff.), in which the TR and S1 themes 
are ‘den[ied] […] even the dignity of an autonomous reprise’, ‘paraded en masse like prisoners of 
war’.100  This action is one that is ultimately antithetical to sonata form, which rests on the 
functional, sectional, and temporal differentiation of its themes; P, having ‘undo[ne] novelistic time’ 
in the previous section, now undoes its own sonata temporality (‘[t]he recapitulation becomes an 
apparition’, in Adorno’s words), opening the way for the black hole of the motto to collapse the 
form into a singularity.101  The initial time-warping effects of this are demonstrated by the shifting 
motivic layers in the first four bars (see Figure 4.13): when compared to bars 139–42, the dotted 
bass pattern and chorale/G2 figure are in the same place (although the latter has been inverted and 
the pitch pattern of the former shifted forward by a beat), while the repeated trombone triads and 
                                                     
99 The fusion of P1.5 and S1.3 into S1.4 is the only motivic element of bars 1–38 missing from bars 
520–66; it marks the point at which the recapitulation goes awry (although S1.4 and the start of its 
following segment are heard, in augmentation, in bars 561–66). 
100 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 88.  Del Mar advances a different reading: that the S1 
motives spill over as a result of the previous passage’s unstoppable ‘momentum’ (p. 62).  He still 
notes, however, the close correspondence between the recapitulation of P and its parallel passage in 
the exposition. 
101 Adorno, Mahler, p. 93. 
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rhapsodic violin motives have been moved later by one bar to coincide with the motto’s minor 
triad; this lends it, in Samuels’s phrase, an ‘emphasise[d] corporeality’.102 
 Aside from the omission of the first ‘distended’ chorale, which is overwritten by S1 
(compare bars 674–77 to 145–48), the transitional sections in the exposition and recapitulation 
largely bear bar-by-bar comparison: bars 678–85 are based on bars 149–56 (albeit with “Alma” 
fragments replacing the accompanying octave leaps, and the chorale’s final segment reverting to its 
descending bar 62 form rather than the optimistic bar 154 form), while bars 688–705 even more 
closely retrace bars 160–77 (25 of the 38 segments in the latter are derived from distinct segments 
of the former’s 27, with a further 9 in the latter being derived within the section itself).103  The G2-
motives and dotted minor thirds which link the two halves of the chorale in bars 157–59 are 
replaced by another motto in bars 686–87, and this functions as a temporal short-circuit back to the 
previous motto shown in Figure 4.13 (bars 668–70): an almost exact repetition, it retains the violin 
semiquavers (which are not present in bars 157–59) and again leads into the inverted chorale incipit 
(which is present, as a G2-like bass, in bar 160; the source of the inverted chorale after the motto at 
                                                     
102 Samuels, p. 162.  In our motto inventories, Samuels (p. 160), Monahan (‘Narratives’, II, 496), 
and I do not list the echo of the motto in the trombone triads’ first appearance at bar 139. 
103 These observations presuppose an almost Adornian ‘variant’ understanding since a derivation 
relationship does not necessarily imply morphological identity.  It is natural to compare segments in 
this section with segments in the exposition’s transition (a reading which Samuels argues is ‘reliant 
on a formal model fixed in advance’ in its ‘suppression’ of the ‘arguably prior’ theme S1 (p. 76)), 
and similar thematic groupings can be found even if individual melodic shapes (to say nothing of 
orchestration and harmony) change: morphological identity alone, as argued in Chapter 2, is unable 
to give a full picture of a piece’s motivic processes. 
 
Figure 4.13: Shifting motivic layers in bars 139–42 and 668–71 of the Finale.  
Some segments from the second passage have been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
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bar 670 is therefore revealed after the motto at bar 688).  Two distinct passages in the exposition’s 
time-line (bars 139–42 and 157–59) are thereby implicitly fused in the recapitulation (bars 668–71 
and 686–8), anti-novelistically revoking everything in between them and tightening the clamp 
around the symphony’s temporality.104  A similar glitch is projected by the tragic detail of the 
completely unnecessary bar 667: after a bar-by-bar recounting of the primary theme up to bar 666 
(cf. bar 138), bar 667 inserts itself just before the transition (from bar 668/139) as a nod towards 
recapitulatory recomposition.  But it does not go anywhere: it uses the same motivic material and 
drives towards the same key as the previous bar, and then is cut off by the motto before the 
transition proceeds, once again, via bar-by-bar repetition. 
 When the chorale finally snaps, the whirlwind of G-motives from the exposition (including 
the rederivation of S1.1 from P1.5) is replaced by something even more catastrophic.  Octave leaps 
from G2 and the distended chorale (plus the chorale’s second segment in bars 710–11) give way to 
triumphant, chorale-like G-motives (bars 712–15) before the sonata flatly challenges the second 
motto’s recapitulatory excisions by hyperbolically asserting the missing bars.  But here they liquidate 
down to the symphony’s ‘submotivic Urformen […], the octave leap and the 2̂–3̂–1̂ minor-third cell’; 
the passage that follows (720–24) is devoid of motivic content completely, losing even the repeated 
2̂–3̂–1̂ semiquavers that threaded through the similar section in the development (bars 385–94).105  
The octave leap and the minor third (and their combination in G2) are the principal icons of sonata 
homogeneity: in the Schoenberg–Reti tradition, submotivic features such as these are the means by 
which the surface contrasts and narratives of sonata form are bound together into an organic 
whole.  But here, after one of the sonata’s most ingenious unifying ideas (that TR and S1 can be 
controlled through almost-simultaneous recapitulation), the tautologous conclusions of such a 
reductive quest for uniformity make themselves clear as the topmost branches of the great motivic 
tree that was rooted at the beginning of the symphony are cut back or grafted onto one another.  
Even the celebratory music in bars 712–15 makes use of motivic material that is by now so 
                                                     
104 Samuels sees a similar process at work in the way that the I-complex and hammer-blow are 
‘shared out between the double bar lines at bar 229 and bar 336, as if deliberately to complicate or 
frustrate the reading of the form’ (p. 88).  On a grander scale, Adorno notes that in the 
development ‘[t]he great march is installed between the concrete piers of the [chorale]’, again 
invoking the idea of a static clamp around a more dynamic section (Mahler, p. 100); more generally, 
he sees the development divided into four by gestures which rein in excessive motivic working 
(these are the hammer-blows, the general pause at bar 394, and the return of the I-complex; see 
Mahler, pp. 98–100). 
105 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 88.  Del Mar considers ‘the absence of that motivic 
link’ (i.e. the missing semiquavers in bars 720–24) to be ‘terrifying’, precipitating a crisis which 
allows second-subject material to emerge in much the same way as it did from the exposition’s 
whirlwind (p. 63).  See also n. 114 below for more on this passage’s “a-motivic” status. 
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homogenised that it is difficult to trace its origins: the sonata has succeeded and, at the same time, 
failed, dragging the sonata-dependent S1 and chorale themes with it.106    
Into this vacuum rush five heterophonous statements of the Alma-derived motive to begin 
the third and final Utopian vision, an attempt by the novelistic S-music to turn paralysis into a form 
of stasis (recall that the novel-symphony functions on the variant, which earns its temporality ‘not 
from the pent-up, onward-driving force of Beethoven, but from the amplitude of a hearing 
encompassing the far distance’).107  The motivic material in this section is mostly based on what 
Monahan (p. 88) terms the ‘emancipation motive’ (the transfigured I-theme that began the 
development; a hint of the original I-theme is given in the cellos, bars 732–35): this blossoms in the 
familiar ‘Utopian’ manner in its free unfolding of heterophonous, long-breathed melodies.108  As its 
confidence increases, the music even tries the same tactic to reanimate the defeated G2-motive 
(bars 741–43); its potential for such treatment is limited, however, and it is abruptly thrown to one 
side as the key shifts to F major (the key of the original statement of the Alma theme in the first 
movement).  An intertextual foreshadowing of the ‘pushing forward’ motive from the first 
movement of the Ninth Symphony (bars 750–51) introduces a parade of G1-motives and the 
motto rhythm ‘in full thematic regalia’; but unlike Monahan, I see this parade as a mockery made by 
the tonic major, and not of the tonic major, as the wind and strings weave S2-incipits, emancipation 
motives, and Alma motives around the now ‘thematic’ (i.e. novelistic) G1-motives (note also that 
this theme makes heavy use of the multivalent three-note idea from the first Utopian vision shown 
in Figure 4.12).109   
In Del Mar’s reading, ‘even Motto theme A has lost its ferocity, as the horns declaim a 
victory march’ (p. 63); but while the G-motives (as symbols of sonata homogeneity) are safely 
defeated and can be reanimated within the novelistic paradigm, the attempt to rehabilitate the 
motto rhythm goes too far: it cannot be excised as its suffocating stasis is ingrained too deeply in 
the novel-symphony’s non-linear, non-teleological temporality.  Tragedy is therefore imminent: but 
                                                     
106 Although motives from S1 have an important role to play in the next section, the S1 theme as a 
whole (the artificial sonata-dependence of which is discussed below) does not appear again.  The 
chorale has had an uneasy relationship with the sonata since its first-movement quest to become a 
transition; its parading and ultimate collateral demise here bear the scars of that quest and establish 
the motto as an autocratic symbol of stasis.  The motto is therefore able to co-opt, in bar 783, the 
chorale/hammer-blow theme’s most direct affective symbol: the hammer-blow itself. 
107 Adorno, Mahler, p. 87. 
108 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, pp. 86, 88. 
109 Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 90 ‘regalia’.  The motive from the first movement of 
the Ninth (first heard prominently in the trumpets, bars 44–45) is identified by Micznik as ‘hav[ing] 
the function of “pushing forward” or “leading to” other events’ (p. 218; see also p. 225).  In the 
Finale of the Sixth, the segment at bar 750 bears a clear relationship to G1 (in particular, it is an 
augmentation of the ‘full regalia’ form at bars 754–55): however, the rhythm, static harmony leading 
quasi-cadentially into a new section, use of homophonic brass, and predominance of descending 
semitones cannot help but connote intertextually for those familiar with the Ninth. 
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it is difficult to hear the motives in the final bars of this section (bars 765–72) as ‘warlike’ (with de 
La Grange), or ‘boisterous’, ‘emblematic of the sonata’s triumph’, and ‘betray[ing a] nihilistic glee’ 
(with Monahan).110  These bars are as redemptive as anything in the Second Symphony, and as 
accepting as anything in the Ninth or Das Lied von der Erde; this affective surface notwithstanding, 
they also represent the culmination and apotheosis of one of the movement’s ‘red thread’ motivic 
stories.111 
To retrace the story up to this point: motive P1.5, the ultimate ancestor of the movement’s 
G1-motives, was introduced in bar 34 as an independent element that quickly got pulled into theme 
S1 (Figure 4.9).  It tried to form its own theme again in bar 70, but by bar 118 had become 
embedded in the P-theme, its octave leap widened to a ninth.  After the collapse of the chorale in 
the transition (bar 180), it made its most “thematic” appearance in the movement, being treated 
quasi-sequentially and liquidated to re-derive S1 (Figure 4.11) before attempting a codetta 
(brusquely cut off by the I-complex) in bar 224.  Its only appearance in the development was a 
single-segment attempt to claw back the first Utopian vision as it slipped away (bar 383), and its 
overexcitement in the ‘retransition’ was what permitted the return of the A minor P-theme as its 
leap dropped back down to an octave (bars 638–39) then a seventh (bars 640–41), before being 
restored to a ninth in the P-theme itself (bars 646–47).112  Its apotheosis, bars 765–72, not only 
completes the intervallic process by starting with a ninth (bars 765–66) and twice iterating a radiant 
tenth (bars 767–70), but also combines two of its memories in a gesture of self-immolating 
sublimation: it liquidates to a two-note cell in the manner of its “thematic” appearance (Figure 
4.11), and unfolds a complete descent from 7̂ to the 1̂ of the I-complex (its first and only 
appearance in A minor), walking defiantly into the flames of order that have cut off its impulses 
throughout the movement.  For Adorno, quoted by de La Grange, ‘[t]hese bars contain the feeling 
of “despite everything!”, of success in the face of a doom which the [coda] can do nothing to 
diminish’; for Ratz, they ‘affir[m] the belief that perseverance in an apparently lost cause may be, 
morally speaking, of the greatest value for the development of the individual as well as of 
mankind’.113 
The flames of order alluded to above warrant some unpacking.  Of the eight appearances 
of P1.5 (or P1.5-based passages) throughout the movement, two are subsumed within P-themes, two 
                                                     
110 See de La Grange, Mahler, III, 837 and Monahan, ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 90. 
111 The ‘red thread’ metaphor underwriting leitmotivic analysis is discussed in Section 2.2. 
112 ‘Retransition’ is Monahan’s label for bars 612–41 since bar 642 marks the ‘Recapitulation 
Proper’ (the return of P and A minor); the I-complex at bar 520 (following what I refer to as the 
retransition above) opens the ‘Pre-Recapitulatory Space’ and therefore the ‘Recapitulatory Block’ as 
a whole (see ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 62 and below at n. 117). 
113 Adorno, ‘Centenary Address, p. 103, quoted in de La Grange, Mahler, III, 837; Ratz, p. 47.  Ratz 
even implies that Mahler’s decision to remove the third hammer-blow, signalling that ‘death is not 
the end, but the ascent to higher spheres’ (p. 48), may have been prompted by the redemptive 
quality of this passage. 
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cut off by I-complexes, two pulled into S1, one overgrown by G-motives and the chorale, and one 
buried in the a-motivic avalanche that later kills the sonata.  Only two of these five agents have 
unambiguous allegiances: the P-themes shore up the sonata, while the a-motivic passages attack it 
with inertia (the a-motivic passage in the development liquidates to a general pause in bar 394 – it 
‘wipes the slate clean’ for Del Mar – before a P-based march, the development’s most coherent 
episode, asserts its dominance, despite the motto’s protestations in bars 395 and 401).114  At first, it 
seems unusual for an S-theme to represent order: but this is the same supposedly novelistic gestalt 
(for Adorno, ‘the most novel-like constellation anywhere in Mahler’) that we have seen meticulously 
assembled in the introductory dissolution field, and which Monahan has argued represents ‘a mere 
mutation of its nemesis P’ (p. 77); S1 is therefore an intruder in S-space, the P-theme in an S-
theme’s clothing.115  The G-motives, being ultimately descended from P1.5, are a negative 
homogenous projection of the very element that wishes to transfigure itself by breaking through 
from the sonata into novelistic space; they are its most direct antithesis, its shadow.116 
The immolation of P1.5 is finally accomplished, however, by the I-complex, whose double-
faced nature leads Samuels to single it out as one of the most concrete manifestations of the 
symphony’s self-negation (see above at n. 17).  On the one hand, it functions as a formal marker 
and so acts as an enforcer of the sonata: for Monahan, its four appearances initiate the expositional, 
developmental, recapitulatory, and coda blocks (although the first three of these blocks consist of 
‘anticipation phases’ before the sonata proper takes place in their ‘accomplishment phases’).117  On 
the other hand, since a formal marker relies on being immediately recognisable on each appearance, 
                                                     
114 Del Mar, p. 58.  In his Theory of Harmony (which is dedicated to Mahler), Schoenberg argues that 
the hammered chord in bars 385ff. is melodic in origin (p. 330): while it is distinctive enough to 
suggest the comparison with bars 720ff., it is not a melodic gestalt in the spirit of Definition 1. 
115 Adorno, Mahler, p. 98.  Monahan’s Example 5 (p. 78) shows how S1 simply varies the elements 
of P in order, and de La Grange even argues that the former retains the latter’s ‘character [of] 
tension and defiance’ (Mahler, III, 834), despite then going on to describe S1 as ‘the most “positive” 
element in the Finale’ (ibid., p. 835).  Adorno, in a characteristic self-contradiction (and possibly 
referring to the entire theme complex S1+S2), maintains that the theme ‘strings together 
heterogeneous components’ which are nevertheless ‘organically intertwined’, allowing it ‘to be 
utilized equally well as a unity, to be selected and spun out like an individual component’ (Mahler, p. 
98). 
116 Ratz follows the Dutchman archetype to read the P and S themes as ‘hero’ and ‘point of rest’ 
respectively (see this chapter’s introduction), but then reads the entire transition as an “internal” 
threat to the hero: ‘the idea is suggested to us that threats to our existence reside, properly speaking, 
within ourselves’ (p. 43).  This makes an interesting counterpoint to Del Mar’s interpretation of the 
first-movement chorale, cited in n. 26 above, as ‘suggesting calm faith even under severest 
adversity’ (p. 35). 
117 See ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 62.  In the six analyses of the Finale that Samuels compares, 
the only unanimously-agreed formal boundary is the start of the coda (marked by an I-complex) at 
bar 773 (see Samuels, pp. 71, 74–75).  Both Samuels (p. 86) and Monahan (‘“Inescapable” 
Coherence’, p. 64, n. 52) identify self-standing formal markers like the I-complex to be typically 
Mahlerian devices: other examples that they list include the openings of the Second, Third, and 
Fourth symphonies, the Schreckenfanfaren in the last movement of the Second, and the outbursts in 
the second movement of the Fifth. 
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it must include an element of stasis: not only does the I-complex explicitly and anti-novelistically 
revoke its transfigured second appearance at the start of the recapitulation, but three of the four 
“model” statements of the motto (major–minor fall plus rhythm) occur within I-complexes (the 
fourth occurs after the chorale in bars 65–66).  The final I-complex at bar 773 sets up the 
expectation of a fourth block which the sonata is now too weak to fulfil: the coda block lasts only 
49 bars as against 220+ for each of the other three, and includes none of the expected post-I 
rotational elements.  The section labelled ‘epilogue’ by most writers (bars 790–819) picks over the 
remnants of the shattered sonata and novel-symphony – the octave and dotted minor third motives 
and their various combinations including G2, S2, the emancipation motive, and the dotted chorale 
second segment – before the final motto concludes the work.  This conclusion, argues Samuels, has 
less to do with tonality and voice-leading (it is difficult to identify the structural arrival of A amidst 
the I-complex and the chromaticism of the epilogue) than it has to do with motivic, formal, and 
narrative process (p. 163): 
We know that the work has ended, not so much because of a cadence, as because 
all the developmental material has been worked through, and because the motive 
signals closure through its narrative coding.  Where on its first appearance ([at bar 
57 of the first movement]) it was integrated into the voice-leading succession, its 
‘closural’ significance arising solely from its position in the form, here this state of 
affairs is reversed: the motive stands outside linear succession, which simply 
accepts the bass note A as conclusive.  This constitutes a brilliant solution to the 
problem of making the work end: there is no comforting (but false) cadence or 
culminatory resolution, yet the work truly ends, and ends with a corporeal violence 
which completes the narrative scheme rather than just breaking off the progress of 
the music. 
With the sonata and the novel-symphony dead, the forces of stasis finally, then, give way to the 
forces of silence. 
4.3 Epilogue: Coherence and Categorisation 
As argued at the end of the previous chapter, the concepts developed in this thesis are not intended 
to stand as analyses in themselves, but rather to stimulate and facilitate analytical insights; in 
particular, they serve to focus attention on the domain of motivic process.  This much should be 
clear from the analyses above, which zoom in and out on the musical detail – from the close 
examination of the first-movement introduction in Figure 4.2 to the exhaustive lists of all motto 
appearances – and deploy the technical language of type regions, families, and epiphanies only 
when it is helpful to do so (usually when quantifying the level to which a given category saturates a 
given passage).  The chapter’s trajectory may be read as one in which the formal model gradually 
moves further into the background, beginning with the explicit tallying and tracking of emerging 
categories in Section 4.1 and ending with the freer narrative ‘third reading’ (see Section 2.3, point 
six) of the Finale in Section 4.2 (which nevertheless was still constructed in extensive consultation 
with the spreadsheets included on the supplementary CD).  Throughout, morphological novelty 
and correspondence have been used to offset, but not overwrite, affective or syntactic 
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differentiation; themes P and S1 in the Finale, for example, are treated independently despite their 
close motivic relationship.  The complete digraphs themselves, having 766 and 1127 vertices 
respectively, do not feature explicitly as good comparisons (commensurate with the arguments 
made in Section 1.9): several digraph-like figures included in the chapter (such as Figure 4.12) are 
really schematics, informal reductions of processes uncovered during the analysis rather than strict 
subgraphs of a derivation digraph. 
Also apparent throughout the chapter is the use of (frequently borrowed) descriptive labels 
for heuristic categories such as ‘the motto rhythm’, ‘P1.4’, or ‘the elementary particle’.  These not 
only enhance readability and ease of cross-reference (compared to ‘family S6’, ‘type region 1.6.1’, or 
‘type region 1.16.1’), but attribute narrative roles (‘gesture of stasis’), formal functions (‘part of the 
P-theme’), or motivic histories (‘subsumed into S1’) to musical segments; as argued in Section 4.1, 
they are often best understood as agents or functions rather than strict segment groupings.  Such 
labels also facilitate dialogue with other analyses (Monahan’s in particular), and can be useful 
heuristically even if questioned at some level (the ‘elementary particle’ P1.5 is not uncomplicatedly a 
force of P, for example, and nor are the G-motives wholly generic). 
 As in all motivic analyses, a certain tension underlies an unwritten assumption: that motivic 
events in the music represent the same character changing through time.  Strictly speaking, the 
chorale may not appear or recur, nor may it be modified or developed into something else, since 
what we conceive as a gradual re-moulding of a single object (for example in the first-movement 
transition depicted in Figure 4.6) is actually a stream of objects.  This is the principle on which 
categorisation (and its associated problem of intransitivity) hinges, and which the graph-theoretical 
model seeks to address.  Without apologising for the use of labels that facilitate dialogue or arise 
heuristically from consideration of the musical data, it is interesting to examine the extent to which 
these heuristic categories coincide with the categories proposed by the formal model. 
 Figure 4.14 lists the principal motivic categories or characters used in my analysis of the 
Finale above, and tallies the number of times that each is used to refer to a particular type region.  
For example, the phrase ‘the elementary particle makes another bid to become a theme in its own 
right, developing into an ascending fanfare (bars 69–73)’ refers to the segments 069|G2, 070|G2, 
and 072|D4; the first (the elementary particle) belongs to type region 1.16.1 and the others (the 
ascending fanfares) to 4.1.1 (all three lie in family S9), so these figures are tallied in the appropriate 
sections of the table.  No segment has been listed twice (such that, for example, each ‘chorale/G2 
motive’ is placed in just one category), and I have tried to limit extra detail which is not explicitly 
mentioned in the analysis.  For example, when ‘the wind and strings weave S2-incipits, 
emancipation motives, and Alma motives around the […] G1-motives’, or when one section 
repeats another already discussed in motivic detail, I have itemised and tallied the relevant 
segments; but when the text refers to ‘S1’ I have simply counted the ordered segments that 
constitute that theme, and not the derivative versions that frequently counterpoint it.  A total of 
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532 of the movement’s 1127 segments (47%) have been listed, spanning 13 of the 19 source 
families, 29 of the 77 composite families, and 115 of the 281 type regions. 
 The only “perfect” category – in which the text uses a single label to refer to every member 
of a single family and no others – is the motto (which is actually two perfect categories: the triad 
and the rhythm).  This very separation from the rest of the movement’s motivic material is what 
makes the complete listing of its appearances possible, and underlines its affective qualities of 
separateness and resistance to development.  Slightly less perfect are the first and fourth chorale 
segments and ‘rhapsodic’ motive, which each refer to two families never given another label, but do 
not mention every single occurrence of them.  All of the rest overlap in some way (such that certain 
families are referred to by at least two different names); whilst this could be seen as a criticism of 
the formal model and/or the heuristic categories, it is my contention that this mismatch tells us 
something about the movement’s motivic processes themselves – in particular, their inescapable 
coherence. 
 It was argued above that one of this movement’s primary narrative-structural devices is the 
liquidation and re-integration of the branches of the motivic tree, and this can be seen most clearly 
in the action of type region 1.2.1 from family 5.1.1.  This composite family is formed in bar 42 as a 
hybrid of source families S1 and S3 (broadly speaking, the octave leap and minor third), and comes 
to be associated most strongly with the category G2 (70 of the 93 appearances of 1.2.1 listed in the 
table – out of a total of 151 – are given this label).  This ‘malignant’ type region is one which 
metastasises throughout the other categories – invading the territory of the G1-motives (bars 94–
95), influencing the shape of the third chorale segment in the transition (bars 141–42), generating 
the incipit of the S2-theme (bars 205–06), and infecting the emancipation motive at the start of the 
epilogue (bars 790–92) – until it actually spreads back into the octave leap itself: the passage of 
liquidation in bars 712–20 prepares the ground for the phrases of the epilogue, which bear 
similarities to G2 but suggest segmentation patterns that re-isolate the octave leap.118  By then the 
damage is done: once an octave-leap segment has been derived from a single G2 segment (say, 
716|D5 from 708|E4, which lies in type region 1.2.1), any further octave leaps derived from that 
one will carry a trace of the “G2” type region 1.2.1.  While the term ‘octave leap’, then, can be used 
to describe morphologically identical pre- and post-G2 segments, the fact that their type regions are 
different betrays the fact that their identity has changed; perhaps the alternative order proposed by 
homogeneity and stasis is closer to the novelistic paradigm than first thought. 
 Similar stories can be told about the other overlaps in the table: the derivational 
interchanges between the elementary particle and G1 (family S9), or between the dotted chorale 
segment and the three-note motive (type region 1.81.1); the merging and re-isolation of the second 
                                                     
118 The term ‘metastasize’ is used by Monahan (‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 75) to describe the 
action of the anti-novelistic themes in the movement. 
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chorale segment with and from the first (family S11); the inclusion of the octave leap and dotted 
chorale segment within the I-complex and emancipation motive (type regions 1.1.1 and 1.80.1), or 
of the Alma motive and G1 within the S1-theme (families 9.1.1 and 21.1.1, and type region 1.4.1); 
and the pervasive homogenising effect of dotted three-note motives within G1, S1, the three-note 
fragment, and the infected emancipation motives (type region 1.20.1).  Monahan ends his study of 
the Sixth Symphony’s Finale by remarking: ‘With Mahler, there is always so much more to say’, an 
assessment with which I heartily concur.119  But I would add the caveat that the same applies, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to any piece of music by any composer.  This thesis as a whole, its 
formalisations and its analyses as well as its reconceptualisations of mathematical and motivic 
analysis, should be seen as a contribution towards some of it being said.
                                                     
119 ‘“Inescapable” Coherence’, p. 94. 
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Label Family Type 
Region 
No. of 
references 
Total segments in 
this type region 
Motto Triad S5 1.3.1 8 8 
1.181.1 2 2 
53.1.1 1 1 
 11 11 
Rhythm S6 1.180.1 16 16 
2.1.1 3 3 
54.1.1 1 1 
 20 20 
Elementary 
particle/P1.5 
 S9 
 
1.16.1 16 17 
3.1.1 1 1 
Asc fanfare 4.1.1 4 5 
  21 54 
G2  5.1.1 1.2.1 70 151 
1.124.1 1 1 
1.125.1 1 1 
1.115.2 3 5 
38.1.1 1 1 
 76 169 
5.2.3 1.127.1 1 1 
 1 1 
16.2.1 1.84.1 1 1 
 1 1 
S2-incipit 5.1.1 1.2.1 3 151 
 3 169 
Chorale/ 
Hammer-
blow 
First segment S10 1.8.1 6 6 
25.1.1 2 2 
1.163.1 1 1 
 9 9 
11.2.1 1.79.1 2 2 
 2 4 
 
 
 
 
 Second 
segment 
S11 1.14.2 14 17 
1.14.1 3 3 
1.13.1 1 1 
1.36.1 2 2 
 20 29 
Third segment S12 1.9.1 4 4 
1.37.1 2 2 
 6 6 
5.1.1 1.2.1 6 151 
 6 169 
Fourth 
segment 
S13 1.10.1 4 4 
1.15.1 2 2 
8.1.1 1 1 
 7 9 
19.1.1 1.35.1 2 2 
1.35a.1 1 1 
 3 4 
Merged first 
and second 
S11 1.76.1 6 6 
 6 29 
1.1.1 1.38.1 1 1 
9.1.1 1 1 
1.166.1 1 1 
1.167.1 1 1 
 4 4 
11.1.1 1.74.1 1 1 
 1 1 
Dotted chorale second 
segment (=G2+chorale 2) 
16.1.1 1.80.1 8 16 
 8 18 
16.1.2 1.126.1 4 4 
1.126a.1 1 1 
1.126.2 1 1 
 6 6 
 
16.2.2 1.81.1 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Table comparing the heuristic categories used in Section 4.2 with families and type regions. 
Shaded categories appear more than once in the table, and bold categories have all of their segments referred to by the given label. 
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Octave leap S1 1.1.1 3 40 
 3 40 
5.1.1 1.2.1 11 151 
1.168.1 2 2 
 13 169 
29.3.1 1.75.1 3 21 
 3 21 
(Dotted) (minor) third/ 
repeated 2̂–3̂–1̂ 
S3 1.20.1 43 158 
1.20a.1 1 1 
1.96.1 1 1 
 45 180 
4.1.2 1.97.1 1 1 
 1 5 
4.4.1 1.95.1 7 17 
27.1.1 1 1 
 8 18 
16.3.1 1.187.1 3 3 
 3 3 
16.5.1 1.188.1 1 1 
 1 1 
“Alma” motive 21.1.1 1.41.1 5 16 
17.1.1 1 1 
1.173.1 2 2 
 8 36 
21.2.1 1.153.1 1 1 
47.1.1 1 1 
 2 2 
9.1.1 1.162.1 4 4 
1.43.2 1 1 
1.164.1 1 1 
1.169.1 1 1 
1.171.1 1 1 
 8 20 
 
     
 9.2.1 1.131.1 1 1 
 
   1 2 
 18.2.1 1.176.1 2 2 
1.177.1 1 1 
1.178.1 1 1 
1.182.1 1 1 
1.183.1 1 1 
23.2.1 1 1 
 7 8 
13.2.1 1.170.1 1 1 
1.172.1 1 1 
 2 2 
‘Rhapsodic’ motive S7 1.6.1 19 85 
 19 90 
4.2.2 1.28.1 11 36 
 11 43 
G1/‘G’ 5.2.1 1.19.1 11 19 
1.19.2 4 7 
1.88.1 1 1 
1.174.1 1 1 
 17 34 
5.1.1 1.2.1 2 151 
 2 169 
S3 1.20.1 5 158 
1.20b.1 1 1 
 6 180 
S9 1.16.2 5 8 
1.16a.1 1 1 
1.71.1 1 2 
 7 54 
7.1.1 1.4.1 4 13 
 4 24 
 
Figure 4.14 continued. 
 
  
  
-2
0
2
- 
 23.1.1 1.21.1 2 2 
1.123.1 1 1 
 3 7 
23.1.2 1.22.1 2 2 
 2 2 
 31.4.1 1.90.1 1 1 
1.93.1 1 1 
1.94.1 1 1 
 3 3 
I-complex/emancipation 
motive 
S1 1.1.1 28 40 
 28 40 
S2 1.11.1 27 30 
1.11a.1 1 1 
1.11.2 1 1 
 29 32 
S3 1.20.1 15 158 
 15 180 
S4 1.17.1 3 3 
1.128.1 3 3 
1.42.1 3 3 
1.12.1 3 3 
1.7.1 3 3 
 15 15 
18.1.1 1.87.1 1 1 
 1 2 
29.2.1 1.120.1 1 1 
 1 1 
29.2.2 1.119.1 1 1 
 1 1 
16.1.1 1.80.1 7 16 
52.1.1 1 1 
 8 18 
 
 5.1.1 1.2.1 1 151 
 1 169 
5.5.1 1.186.1 1 1 
 1 1 
S1 (and independent 
references to S1.3 and S1.4) 
S3 1.20.1 6 158 
1.122.1 7 9 
 13 180 
S8 1.141.1 3 11 
 3 12 
7.1.1 1.4.1 6 13 
1.5.1 4 4 
1.151.1 1 1 
1.151.2 1 3 
1.130.1 1 1 
41.1.1 1 1 
 14 24 
16.4.1 1.83.1 1 3 
1.121.1 2 2 
1.121.2 1 1 
 4 6 
9.1.1 1.132.1 1 1 
1.52.2 1 1 
 2 20 
21.1.1 42.1.1 1 1 
 1 36 
Three-note fragment S3 1.20.1 1 158 
 1 180 
16.2.2 1.81.1 2 6 
 2 6 
7.1.2 1.118.1 1 1 
 1 1 
 
Figure 4.14 continued. 
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Afterword 
In closing, we might return – in a Kierkegaardian spirit of dynamic repetition – to Schoenberg’s 
epigraph to this thesis.  His distinction between science’s systemisation of ‘all characteristic cases’ 
and art’s interest in ‘just a few, the interesting ones’ takes on new light when read, through Chapter 
1, as a sketch of science’s desire to extrapolate the general from the particular, and art’s desire to 
view the particular through the prism of the general.  Read through Chapter 4, the same distinction 
can be understood as a comment on the inherent incompleteness of any analysis; refracted again 
through Section 1.10, we might ask where this leaves the process of mathematical modelling. 
 The model presented in Chapter 3 is founded on the image of a motivic network: its 
central argument is that motives can be fruitfully understood as internally-structured, non-
homogenised categories that emerge from pairwise, time-directed, and rhetorically constructed 
relationships between individualised musical segments; it leans, therefore, towards archetype 4 of 
Figure 2.1, but can also incorporate the non-linearity of archetype 1, the informal heuristic ‘cores’ 
of archetype 2 (as shown in my use of Monahan’s categories in Chapter 4), and the intransitive 
temporal process of archetype 3.  However, to borrow another phrase from Schoenberg (cited in n. 
2 of the Introduction), the ‘basic shape’ of this model still has room for ‘reshaping’.  The limits of 
automated motivic analysis are discussed in Section 2.3, and the justifications for manual 
segmentation in Section 3.1, but there is nothing in principle precluding the adoption of more 
sophisticated computational methods for segmentation, encoding, or the identification of 
derivational and successional relationships (n. 5 of Chapter 3 in particular gives an indicative list of 
additions that could make the input method more user-friendly). 
The model and its macro also have potential for modular extension, adding new processes 
(possibly tailored to the requirements of particular analyses) to the existing program.  To list a few 
features, the desire for which arose during the writing of Chapter 4: the generation of figures such 
as Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5 could be automated; the relationships between families could be made 
clearer by explicitly listing each’s parent and descendant families; the “reach” of each node (i.e. the 
temporal distance between its offset and the latest of its children’s onsets) could be taken as a 
measure of its importance as a referential example; and a derivation digraph spelling out the 
relationships between themes could be defined to create the process ℳ1 → ℳ2 → ℳ3 from the 
pairs (ℳ1, ℳ2) and (ℳ2, ℳ3) (this is exactly what the derivation digraph does for segments).  
The decision was taken not to implement these processes computationally in order to illustrate that 
model-building is always open-ended: there will always be more functionality to add, and so the 
focus of this thesis has been to establish a sound conceptual architecture rather than an exhaustive 
toolkit of features. 
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The generality of this architecture therefore allows it, with some modification, to be 
applied to different repertories.  The Beethoven and Mahler examples were found to be different 
not only in scale, but also in structure (the former, for example, contained no composite families): 
indeed, one of the strengths of this model is that different pieces (or different interpretations of the 
same piece) are capable of producing different structures (unlike in Schenkerian and pitch-class set 
analyses, which generate their insights mainly from the process of reduction and not from the 
eventual structural product).  A comparative study of motivic practice using this model could 
therefore prove insightful (what do Strauss’s motivic networks look like, for example?  Or 
Schoenberg’s?  Or a jazz improvisation’s?), but care would need to be taken to avoid making 
empirical generalisations about musical practices from small data sets (i.e. single pieces).  There are 
also potential compositional applications, taking a network derived from an analysis (or by some 
other means) and filling its nodes with musical material to produce a (possibly non-linear or 
interactive) piece of music; this potential for interactivity also underwrites a wide range of possible 
artistic responses, educational strategies, or workshop-style activities to engage non-academic 
audiences. 
The creative act of composition, as argued in Chapter 1, is not too distant from that of 
analysis: in both cases, the model chosen influences the thinking about the music.  The path from 
analytical input to formal structure is well-defined (by Chapter 3), and one could argue that the 
inputs themselves (i.e. the segmentation and derivation relationships) are fairly uncontentious 
(Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.4 show, for example, that my segmentations broadly coincide with 
Monahan’s).  The path from formal structure to analysis, however, travels along freer lines, inviting 
diversions into analytical territories off the motivic track (as the occasional appearance of formal 
and tonal considerations in Chapter 4 attests).  At the end of Chapter 3 it was argued that the 
starting-point (i.e. the spreadsheets on the supplementary CD) and the route taken are significant in 
understanding the final destination: transposing this to the path between input and formal 
structure, one might then ask whether the mathematical details of Chapter 3 need to be fully 
understood by anyone wishing to use the model.  They are by no means essential: but the more one 
delves into the workings of the model, the more one understands its assumptions, strengths, and 
blind spots, and the sharper, therefore, the detail of its good comparison becomes. 
The foregoing has presented one way of modelling motives mathematically: its definitions 
have been by turns descriptive (‘motivic segment’ in Definition 1), explicative (‘motivic segment’ in 
Definition 3.1.6), and stipulative (‘strong’ and ‘weak’ in Definition 3.2.10), making liberal use of the 
sedimented meanings or metaphorical resonances of certain terms (‘epiphany’, in Cone’s sense, in 
Definition 3.2.10; ‘family’ in Definition 3.2.12).  These sedimented meanings, even in stipulative 
definitions, have been embraced rather than bemoaned; they contribute to the richness of the 
mathematical metaphor by latching onto existing music theories (and aesthetics – cf. the ‘great 
motivic tree’ of Section 4.2) and making the model’s insights more evocative.  But equally, I might 
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have considered a motivic segment to be a point (or contour region) in Tymoczko’s geometric 
space, a pattern with expectational probabilities that change as its category grows, a message sent 
down a noisy channel as its variations proliferate, or a function (or “colouring”) of a particular 
alphabet (such as a chord or a scale).  Returning to the thesis’s other epigraph, the differences 
between 80 and LXXX become, when situated within the context of a suggestive, perception-
changing music theory, something certainly worth making a ‘big fuss’ about.
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